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AbSTRACT
This dissertation revolves around the enigmatic role of development policy 
in the European Union (EU), and its place and purpose in relation to the 
EU’s trade policy and to the Union at large. In particular, it looks at the 
preconditions that direct the EU’s work for the international development 
objectives of poverty eradication and sustainable development. In this regard, 
there has been considerable debate on policy coherence for development, or in 
other words, on how the EU policies in the field of trade work in favour of, or 
against, development goals. In fact, the EU has made binding commitments in 
the EU treaties and in international conventions to advance coherence from a 
development perspective. However, what actually constitutes policy coherence 
for development in the EU, and how it is defined and promoted have largely 
remained unstudied to date. In addition, the question of the power to establish 
common standards for policy coherence deserves a closer look, both within the 
EU and in global governance at large. 
This contribution aims to fill this research gap by tracing the key development- 
and trade-related processes and analysing their outcomes. These include 
the first joint policy statement by the European Commission, the European 
Council and the Parliament, entitled the European Consensus on Development 
(2005–), as well as those elements of the EU trade policy that were officially 
declared to manifest policy coherence for development. Regarding the latter, 
the EU position in relation to the WTO Doha Development Round, as well as the 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), is a case in point. The dissertation 
addresses these issues in the broader historical, international and institutional 
settings before the Lisbon Treaty (2009), but also draws lessons for the present. 
The primary data consist of official EU documents and 34 semi-structured 
interviews with development and trade actors involved in these processes. 
Drawing on two analytical frameworks – power in global governance (Barnett & 
Duvall 2005) and normative power Europe (Manners 2002, 2006) – I examine 
the formation of the policy coherence for development principle in the EU’s 
development- and trade-related texts, discourse production and social practices 
that define, naturalise and reproduce certain norms while dismissing others (cf. 
Fairclough 1992, 2003).
My findings indicate that the EU’s contribution to policy coherence for 
development is affected by intra- and inter-institutional tensions, as well as 
by ambiguity surrounding the role and purpose of development policy in the 
Union. In particular, I demonstrate how the proactive role of the Commission in 
the policy initiation was triggered primarily by the changes in the security and 
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trade branches of the external relations, rather than by learning from the past 
development policies and its own goal attainment. Although these linkages can 
be seen as a strategic choice to improve the institutional position of European 
Community development policy both within the Commission as well as between 
the Commission and the Council, this choice compromised the development 
policy content. This tendency is particularly clear in the gradually narrowed, 
administratively and technically oriented approach to policy coherence for 
development. 
In relation to trade, policy coherence was limited mainly to the EU market 
access proposals for the Least Developed Countries. This aspect of trade 
liberalisation formed the core for both the international and EU consensus 
on trade and development. In turn, the reciprocal liberalisation of developing 
country markets under the Economic Partnership Agreements was initially 
much weaker. This changed with the dominant role and interests of DG 
Trade, which adopted the development policy discourse and influenced the 
Commission policy on development and trade. Consequently, the reciprocal free 
trade format and the European Commission’s interpretation of international 
trade law (i.e. GATT Article XXIV) also became the official understanding of 
policy coherence for development in the EU. As a result, the EU’s model for 
policy coherence is inclined towards trade policy coherence and in favour of the 
overall consistency of the Union, rather than policy coherence for development. 
Therefore, the EU’s normative model risks being inadequate when it comes to 
safeguarding and advancing development policy goals. 
Keywords: European Union, development policy, trade, policy coherence for 
development, normative power, economic partnership agreements, poverty 
reduction, sustainable development
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 UNPACKINg THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS 
ON DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE 
This dissertation revolves around the enigmatic role of development policy in 
the European Union (EU), and its place and purpose in relation to the EU’s trade 
policy and to the Union at large. In the light of the EU Treaties, these policies 
are designed to cover everything: advancing grand objectives of sustainable 
development and poverty eradication while promoting the Union’s interests in 
the world. This puzzle is my point of departure for exploring the EU’s normative 
power in global governance. My aim is to provide a better understanding 
of the EU’s capacity, or absence thereof, to act jointly and coherently in 
international development. More precisely, I explore the foundations of the 
Union’s normative positions and the pre-conditions for policy coherence from 
a development perspective. I will pose questions such as: What has been the 
normative approach put forward by the Union for tackling world poverty with 
the development and trade policies before the Treaty of Lisbon (2009)? How 
did this approach emerge within the EU institutions and how was it crystallized 
into the official EU policies? And eventually, what does this kind of analysis tell 
us about the Union as a power in international development? 
In this endeavour, I use the Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) 
concept in two ways. First, I refer to it as an organising principle in the debate 
on the development and trade inter-relationship, which has its roots in 
recent discussions on the role and limits of international development (aid) 
politics. Second, I assess in particular how the concept is understood within 
the EU institutions and strategically shaped in the EU development and trade 
policies. Essentially, policy coherence, or more specifically, policy coherence 
for development (PCD) in the language used by the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Union, is a treaty 
obligation stating that all EU policies that are likely to affect developing countries 
should take into account development policy objectives.1 However, this loose 
commitment is only the first step in a long, and fundamentally political, process 
of defining what actually constitutes a coherent Union action in development 
and trade, and what constitutes policy coherence for development in particular. 
In this respect, the EU’s claim to fame is its de facto position as the world’s 
1 See Article 178 Treaty of Amsterdam 1998, (Article 130v Treaty of Maastricht 1993). 
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leading trading power and the biggest donor of official development aid (ODA) 
in the world. Consequently, the Union has potentially significant power to set 
and shape international norms in development and trade. This quite unique, 
yet constantly challenged, position begs a closer look at the strategic nature 
of the EU’s approach to policy coherence for the development principle. By 
using different sources of power, the Union contributes to defining, producing 
and reproducing the way in which development- and trade-related policies are 
generally perceived in the world. Furthermore, it conveys an image of itself as 
an actor in global governance. 
The research emerged from the dilemma that I faced in my capacity as a 
researcher and participant in the field of development policy. Despite the wide 
consensus on the need for coherence between development and trade policies in 
the EU official discourse and even in the treaty obligations, in the real world the 
perceptions seemed to vary a great deal. In fact, there appeared to be very little 
undisputed evidence that EU policies actually pull in the same direction, or that 
the Union’s institutional jungleland2 would provide an ideal environment for 
making coherent pro-development policies. Yet the Union places a lot of weight 
on its external relations and global role based on European values and its belief 
in being a model of regional integration and an actor in the developing world.
When discussing the theme of my research, I have often experienced mixed 
reactions of suspicion and amusement, especially outside the usual mesh of 
those involved with the Union. “Do you really believe that the EU could – or even 
should – focus on world poverty, and make a difference in global governance?” 
“And, what kind of difference would that be then?” Frankly, I did not know 
how to reply at first. In a way I felt trapped between the official high rhetoric 
of the Union and concerned voices from outside. One way of breaking free and 
clarifying my thoughts was to pin down the concrete proposals that the EU has 
made for international development and to trace how these proposals were 
produced and promoted. My point of departure became the European Consensus 
on Development policy (2005- ) and those elements of EU trade policy that were 
officially declared to manifest “policy coherence”. In this respect, the Union took 
on a special and perhaps demanding task; not only would its own policies be 
influenced by the global processes taking place, but increasingly, the grand aim 
of the policies was to create a specific “EU way” of responding to important 
international concerns. Yet, the fundamental question remains: Why was the EU 
so willing to get involved as an international development actor in the first place?
The beginning of the research process coincided with an interesting period 
of time. On the one hand, there was a new wave of development optimism in 
the Union – and in the world at large – at the turn of the millennium. First, 
2 Expression inspired by Bruce Springsteen. 
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there was the major momentum sparked by the UN Millennium Development 
Declaration (2001) and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2001 to 
reduce world poverty. Furthermore, the concerns of the Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) were brought to the fore in the third UN Conference on the 
LDCs in Brussels in 2001. In a similar vein, the first WTO round of international 
trade negotiations was given the promising epithet of the Doha “Development 
Round” to attract developing countries back on board in 2001 – while the UN 
Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) called for 
mutually supportive trade, development and environmental policies in 2002. 
Simultaneously, to secure adequate resources for the new development efforts, 
the UN Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey in 2002 
brought world leaders together for this purpose with new pledges of increased 
development aid. In order to put these commitments into practice, the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was launched in 2005. On the other hand, the 
optimism was overshadowed by the gloomy events of 9/11, which also affected 
the developmental priorities and strengthened the security concerns on the 
international agenda. The EU was busy on all these fronts.
Moreover, the EU had also strategically chosen to increase its role in the 
nexus of development and trade on both multilateral and bilateral bases. 
The revival of the 2000 Cotonou Agreement between the states of Africa, the 
Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP) and the European Union, its subsequent 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations with the same regions 
with their own twists and turns, and the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative 
(2001) welcoming the least developed countries’ products onto the single market 
from all over the world, all symbolised alleged reforms in the EU development 
and trade approach. 
In this context, 2005 promised to be a watershed year for European Union 
Development policy, with a historical statement entitled “The European 
Consensus on Development” as its climax. In this statement, all the EU 
member states, the Commission and the Parliament together formulated a 
common EU vision of development reinforcing the preceding international 
commitments made to promote global development. For the first time in the 
history of development policy, the jointly adopted EU vision was based on a set 
of common values, principles and means designed to deliver in respect of the 
goal of eradicating world poverty.
By adopting this new development policy approach, the EU actors took on 
what appeared to be an unprecedentedly strong normative stand in the field 
of development policy. The normative position was evident even in the choice 
of the title “European Consensus”, no doubt aimed at distancing the position 
of the Union from the notorious “Washington Consensus” of the International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the US Treasury of past decades – a policy 
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that was also strongly supported by some key EU member states at that time.3 
Indeed, the “European Consensus” statement can be read as an attempt to create 
a specific European model based on European values and ideas for governing 
global development politics. 
To break the spell of the official EU discourse, one must pay careful 
attention to the process and contextual factors both within and outside the 
Union that played a role in the emergence of this new European Consensus on 
Development. The “European Consensus” was just like any other “new policy” 
within the European Union, a product of internal processes within and between 
various EU actors. In this particular case these processes were especially intense 
since the European Consensus statement was envisioned to lay the foundation 
of “a modern European development policy” for the first time.4 This vision of a 
“Common European Development Policy” was based on an idea of a common 
framework which would guide development policy-related activities both in 
the Community and in the member states in this area of joint competency, 
as defined by the Maastricht Treaty. Therefore, the dynamics and tensions 
between the different European actors involved both at the Community and 
member-state levels were decisive in terms of the eventual formulation of the 
“European Consensus”.
Because of the shared competency, development policymaking took place in 
the institutional setting that has provoked some of the core debates since the 
beginning of European integration: the question of power between, on the one 
hand, the Community level and member-state governments and, on the other 
hand, between the Community institutions of the Commission, the Council 
and the European Parliament.5 In other words, this study revolves around 
questions of whether the branch of EU external relations could and should have 
a Common “Europeanised” development policy dimension in the first place. 
From the institutional perspective, who has the power to define the EU vision 
of development in a shared competency – the Commission “as the guardian 
of EU interests” or the Council Presidency, representing the member states 
in the Union? And finally, there is the question of how the new development 
policy was designed to internally promote the principle of policy coherence for 
development and, in particular, what kind of response was actually given to this 
call from the trade policy side of the institutional fence of the Union.
3 For more on the Washington Consensus, see Williamson 2008. On the EU and the Washington 
Consensus, see Brown 2004. 
4 The terms “modern” and “European” were commonly used by Development Commissioner Louis 
Michel (2004-2009) to describe the European Consensus Statement.  
5 See, for instance, Wallace & Wallace 1996, Moravcsik 1998, Wallace 2005, Peterson & Shackleton 
2006 and Schmidt 2006.
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1.2 RESEARCH OUTLINE, METHODOLOgICAL 
CHOICES AND DATA
In this study, I approach the EU’s normative power in Global Governance from 
four perspectives. These perspectives encompass first, internal and external 
contexts (including institutional settings and historical backgrounds); second, 
the process of development policy formulation; third, development policy 
content, and finally, the development policy interrelationship with trade policy. 
Subsequently, Chapter 3 contextualizes, Chapter 4 presents the policy process, 
Chapter 5 analyses the content and Chapter 6 explores the relationship between 
development and trade. Each perspective has its particular research questions 
and methods that are outlined below. For the sake of clarity, a more detailed 
explanation of the applied methods is also included at the beginning of each 
analytical section. 
The analysis of Chapter 3 through Chapter 6 is underpinned by Chapter 2 
“Theoretical and Conceptual Context”. It also presents the main motivations 
that drive this research. The first two – power and normativity – are clearly 
more theoretical in nature, whereas the debate on policy coherence is related 
to the practical implications of all these theoretical concerns. More specifically, 
in Sub-chapters 2.1 – 2.3, I discuss the notion of power and its foundations in 
global governance (Barnett and Duval 2005) as well as the conceptualizations of 
“normative power Europe” (Manners 2002, Manners and Lucarelli 2007) in this 
larger setting. The latter notion includes the treaty basis for policy coherence as 
the backbone of the EU’s normativity and values. This is also where I discuss 
the relevance of my study and its linkages to these debates.  In Sub-Chapters 
2.4 – 2.5 I look at the framings of policy coherence and consistency that should, 
according to the EU treaty, direct the EU’s agency in international development. 
Here I also introduce a normative power Europe perspective to the development 
and trade nexus. Sub-Chapter 2.6 deepens the perspective by discussing 
linkages that exist between poverty, trade and sustainable development in the 
theoretical literature. The purpose of this section is to discuss the complexity 
in the interrelationship between development and trade and, in so doing, to 
point out different aspects and even controversies related to “policy coherence 
for development” in global governance. 
The Research Focus and Questions 
The first empirical chapter, Chapter 3, entitled “Contextualizing European 
Consensus”, provides a map for understanding the EU’s normative action from 
both the institutional and historical perspectives. In Sub-Chapter 3.1, I enter the 
EU’s institutional jungle in order to see how the Union is designed to promote 
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international development in terms of its institutions and competencies. In 
turn, Sub-Chapter 3.2 traces the historical evolution of the EU’s development 
policy and its interrelationship with trade policy both in terms of policies and 
institutional positions. In addition, I discuss the normative framework that 
has evolved from the association agreements with former colonies into an 
institutionalized partnership under the EC-ACP Lomé Convention and the 
“Development policy momentum of the early 2000s” (Sub-Chapters 3.2 – 3.4). 
In so doing, I aim to explain the historical development of the EU’s normative 
model. In Sub-chapters 3.5 – 3.6 I explore factors that pushed forward the 
development policy reform. My approach here is twofold. First, I analyse 
the inter-institutional power relations between the Commission and Council 
member states, focusing on the role of the Commission and Council Presidency 
in development policy. Second, I look at the pressures that emerged from the 
other branches of EU external relations, especially from European Security 
Policy and Trade. 
In Chapter 4, I embark on tracing the process of European Consensus 
on Development policy formulation from policy initiation to eventual policy 
adoption. In Sub-Chapters 4.1 – 4.4 I analyse, on the one hand, the evolution 
of the content and discourse production6 defining the EU’s normative stand 
in international development, including the EU position of policy coherence 
for development. On the other hand, I look at the inter-action between the 
Commission and the Council Presidency at the different stages of the policy 
process that led to the formation of the historic outcome. As such, Chapter 4 
is designed to explore the pre-conditions for policy coherence within the EU 
machinery. 
In this section I pose the following questions: 
 How was the European Consensus on Development formulated, and what 
does this process of formulation tell us about the development policy-making 
in the EU in terms of  
• a) inter-institutional cooperation and competition, and b) the position of 
development policy in the external relations of the EU?
• Thus, what were the main elements and ideas that came to constitute 
the discourse of the European Consensus on Development, and through 
whose efforts did they emerge on the EU agenda?
6 By the EU’s development discourse I refer to the rather established and distinct way of 
conceptualising and presenting development policy; its elements and contexts as formulated by 
the EU actors in the policy-making processes. I return to Critical Discourse Analysis methodology 
in Chapter 5.
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In Chapter 5, entitled “Critical Discourse Analysis of the European Consensus 
Statement”, I look more closely at the final content – in particular the discourse 
on development – that is jointly agreed to constitute the “European Consensus”. 
In Sub-chapter 5.1, I explain the critical discourse analysis method and its 
application. I also summarise the rationale and rhetoric of the Consensus 
formation. In Sub-chapters 5.2 – 5.5, I analyse the Consensus as a basis for the 
EU’s contribution to global development governance. My approach here is again 
two-fold: on the one hand I focus on development cooperation and aid as well 
as development and trade-related policy coherence for development as the key 
elements of the document. On the other hand, I look at the conceptualisations 
related to development policy, to its mission, objectives and the roles of the 
involved parties more generally.  
More specifically, I ask:
• What is the alleged European normative “alternative” for global governance 
of international development politics in particular? 
• What kind of model of coherence between development policy and trade 
policy is the EU promoting for this purpose? 
• What kind(s) of conceptions of the interrelationship between development 
and trade seem to underpin the EU’s development policy formulation? 
And how are these conceptions manifested in the EU’s model of policy 
coherence for development that is set to guide the Union’s agency both in 
its development cooperation and in international development politics more 
generally? 
Lastly, in Chapter 6, entitled “The Limits of Policy Coherence in Trade and 
Development”, I shift the perspective from the development policy field to trade. 
My intention here is to analyse how development objectives have been seen in 
the field of the EU’s trade policy. In this respect, I look at the interrelationship 
between trade and development in the actual practices of EU trade policy both 
in the multilateral and bilateral spheres, with a particular emphasis on EU-
Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). 
In this context, development and trade issues are officially bound together by 
the Cotonou Agreement (2000-2020), by international trade norms (within the 
WTO) and by the EU’s intended development policy commitments. Thus, this 
context provides an ideal test case for the EU’s understanding(s) of the kind of 
trade policy that is seen as being consistent with the EU’s adopted development 
policy objectives. Sub-chapters 6.1-6.2 re-examine the context in which EPAs 
were made, starting with the Doha Development Round and the emergence 
of bilateral trade agreements. In Sub-chapter 6.3, I proceed to the analysis of 
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the EPAs as a part of the EU’s trade policy Global Europe (2006). Sub-chapter 
6.4 demonstrates how the content of the envisioned Economic Partnerships 
has changed and thereby shaped the EU model of policy coherence. Lastly, in 
Sub-chapter 6.5 I define the boundaries that shape the EU approach to policy 
coherence in this normative context.
Specifically, I explore the following questions:
• How did the EU position on development and trade emerge, and what were 
its main normative features?
• What constitutes the content – as well as the limits – of the principle of the 
Policy Coherence for Development in this trade and development nexus?
• What does this reveal about inter-sectoral relations within the EU in the 
formation of policy coherence for development?
Chapter 7 closes the circle and draws the main conclusions from Chapters 
3-6, focusing on the key concepts of Normativity, Coherence and Power that 
define the role of development policy vis-à-vis trade in the EU’s system and 
international governance. In my final remarks I also discuss my main findings 
in the post-2009 Lisbon Treaty context. 
Methodological Choices and Data
As I will introduce my methodological choices in each section separately, a 
few introductory remarks will suffice at this point. The research applies two 
kinds of methodological frameworks. On the one hand, it is informed by 
Norman Fairclough’s (1992: 73, 2003) three dimensional approach to political 
discourses. These dimensions include the production of discourses (i.e. what 
Fairclough calls discourse practices), their actual content (i.e. text) and the way 
in which discourses influence our way of thinking and perception of reality (i.e. 
what Fairclough defines as social practices and naturalization of the dominant 
view). As such, the process of discourse formation, the discourse in itself and 
its implications relate closely to the framework of power and normativity. On 
the other hand, the analysis of policies requires yet another method: that of 
understanding the policy processes and the contextual factors that influence 
it. Therefore, Chapter 3 constitutes the contextual backbone of the study 
both in terms of development and trade practices as well as their role in the 
wider context of the EU’s normativity in global governance. In Chapter 4, 
“Development Policy Process and Policy Coherence”, I embark on a policy-
process tracing. More specifically, I track and reconstruct the process through 
which the European Consensus on development policy was produced between 
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the Commission, the UK Council Presidency and the European Parliament. In 
this endeavour, I draw on Hill’s (2009) model of the different stages in the policy 
process while analysing the respective contributions from the Commission, 
the Council and the Parliament at these junctures. In this dissertation, these 
stages include first, policy initiation (also encompassing preparatory work and 
consultations); second, agenda-setting for policy formulation and finally, policy 
adoption. In the context of agenda-setting and formulation, I also look at the 
struggle over leadership between the Commission and the Council Presidency.7 
I consider the international and institutional settings as well as the rivalry 
over priorities and leadership, essential features of the EU’s development 
discourse production – or discourse practices in Fairclough’s terms. They 
inform Chapter 5, in which I conduct a Critical Discourse Analysis on the first 
Common part of the European Consensus on Development. Here, drawing on 
Fairclough’s model (see Sub-chapter 5.2), I look more closely at the emerging 
EU discourse in terms of its textual, contextual and normative features. 
In Chapter 6, I combine the contextual, process and content analysis to 
understand the limits of the EU’s policy coherence for development approach in 
the arena of international trade. In a similar way, I start with the international 
and institutional context of the Doha Development Round and look at the 
evolution of the key elements that constitute the EU’s position in this setting. 
From there, I proceed to the level of bilateral trade agreements and finally to 
the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements. 
In particular, I focus on how the EU itself narrows down the space for policy 
coherence for development with ideas, assumptions, interests and institutional 
constraints, while referring back to sustainable development and poverty 
eradication for justification. In particular, I look at the normative model that 
the EU proposes for North-South trade under the WTO rules as “the only” 
alternative. 
Regarding the research data, the dissertation relies on two main pillars: 
document sources and semi-structured research interviews with 34 persons 
involved in the policy processes. The research process has in itself evolved from 
theoretical interests to document analysis, and from there to direct encounters 
with the interviewees before returning to the more theoretical questions. My 
interest in the EU documents was inspired by McCulloch’s (2004: 6-7) notion 
of documents as social and historical constructs. In fact, just like personal 
documents, the official documentation by a political entity may reveal 
something about the identity of the actor. In addition to the text itself and the 
7 In this task, I benefit from Carbone’s (2007a) model of a strong role for the Commission, which 
he refers to as an institutional entrepreneur, using different tactics to gain more power in relation 
to the member states. This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.2. 
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information it provides, it is important to understand documents in relation 
to their institutional milieus and to relate the text to its present and historical 
context. Thus, it is necessary to find out as much as possible about the document 
production and how it was received. This also motivated my extensive interviews 
and exchanges with different persons that were actively involved in the European 
Consensus and EPA processes. The core interviewees were selected based 
mainly on the importance of their role in the related policy processes as well 
as in the institutions they represented. For instance, regarding the European 
Consensus, my interviewees included representatives from the Council (CODEV 
Chair), the Commission DG Development and the European Parliament that 
had led the drafting process. Similarly for the EPAs, I interviewed the persons 
responsible for the economic partnership negotiations as well as those holding 
trade and development or policy coherence for development portfolios in 
DG DEV, DG Trade and DG Agriculture. In addition, civil society actors and 
members of the academic community provided an external perspective on the 
processes. I conducted the interviews mainly at the EU institutions in Brussels 
in 2008-2009. The recordings amounted to nearly 45 hours of (personally 
transcribed) thematically structured discussions. Annex 1 presents the main 
structure for development policy-focused questions (Interview form A) while 
Annex 2 outlines the key questions for the interviewees on the trade policy 
side (Interview form B). The purpose of the interview forms was to guide and 
balance the exchange between the interviewee and myself. Depending on the 
person’s expertise and interests, I also asked additional questions or deepened 
the discussion on certain points. In addition, I posed development-related 
questions to people working on trade and vice versa. Moreover, I had unofficial 
exchanges with the same interviewees on other occasions. In order to respect 
anonymity, each interviewee has a code number and only their institutional 
affiliation (i.e. European Commission (EC), European Parliament (EP), 
European Council (Council), Academia or Civil Society (CSO) is marked in the 
reference. Annex 3 includes the list of all interviewees in alphabetical order. 
The interviews served two main purposes. First, they provided crucial 
background information on the processes as well as an avenue for additional 
fact-finding regarding information that is not publicly available. This was 
particularly important for the process tracing and the internal debates on 
the EPAs. However, I also acknowledge that fact- finding based on personal 
interviews highlights the subjective understanding of the issue in question. 
Therefore, when the interviews are used for fact-finding purposes, the excerpts 
in the text are used to illustrate the issue, which is then cross-checked with 
other interviews and sources. On the other hand, a note is made when the same 
issue reoccurs in many interviews. In addition, the interviews revealed a lot 
of “unintentional, sideline information” such as ideas, assumptions, attitudes, 
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prejudices and beliefs that define the debates in the development and trade 
nexus. Most importantly, these were related to the interrelationship between the 
actors, institutions and policy issues in the Union and in the partner countries, 
as well as in global governance at large.
As said, the emphasis given to the documentary data and interviewees varies 
between the three main parts of the study. Due to the classified nature of the 
preparatory CODEV documents, in Chapter 4 I draw heavily on interviews, 
especially in the process tracing after the Commission proposal up to the 
resulting European Consensus. However, the preparatory documents by the 
Commission, member states and the European Parliament were of paramount 
importance for understanding the turns in the EU discourse. Chapter 5 is 
in turn largely based on official documentary sources, in particular on the 
resulting and final document of the first EU development policy statement, 
whereas in Chapter 6 I combine both types of sources, those of official EU 
documents related to the Cotonou Agreement and EPA negotiations, as well as 
data gathered through the research interviews.  
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2 THEORETICAL AND  
CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT
2.1 POwER IN gLObAL gOVERNANCE fOR 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Global governance studies have become an increasingly important field of 
International Relations since the end of the Cold War. Essentially, global 
governance refers to some sort of international order consisting of rules, 
patterns, institutions and norms steering international agency in a stipulated 
direction.8 However, as for example Hoffman and Ba (2005: 2-6) note, the 
label “global governance” includes a great number of different, sometimes 
even conflicting perspectives. In order to explore these, they divided global 
governance literature into three broad categories: global governance 
as management of global problems (such as poverty or environmental 
destruction); global governance as a project and global governance as a 
worldview. 
Väyrynen (1999) defines global governance as “collective action to establish 
international institutions and norms to cope with the causes and consequences 
of adverse supranational, transnational, or national problems”.9 Held and 
McGrew (1999, 2002) focus on the key domains of economic and political 
globalisation, as well as environmental change in their approach to governance. 
They define globalisation as a “historical process which transforms the spatial 
organization of social relations and transactions, generating transcontinental or 
inter-regional networks of interaction and the exercise of power”.10 Both notions 
aptly convey the essence of the concept for this study.
Interestingly, the EU constitutes a supranational political system in itself as 
Hix (2005) defines it, which seeks to govern efforts to manage global problems 
as well as “globalisation” through its development and trade policies. Thus, 
it also forms an area of collective action in Väyrynen’s (1999) sense. At the 
same time, the Union also claims a role as a global actor11 in the governance 
of globalisation processes, for instance in the field of international trade and 
development policy in the international community. In this context, two 
8 See Hoffman and Ba 2005: 2, Bomberg 2004: 61. 
9 Väyrynen 1999: 25 in Ba & Hoffman 2005: 4. 
10 Held et al.:1999. 
11 On the EU as a global actor in external relations including the development policy perspective, 
see Orbie 2008, Bretherton & Vogler 2006, Mold 2007 and Vogt & Mayer 2006.
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“memberships” are particularly relevant: the EU (in this case, the EC and 
member states) as a member of the international donor community under 
the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as well as a participant 
in the related bodies and processes of the United Nations and, in terms of 
global trade, the EU as a member and advocate of trade liberalisation in 
poorer countries under the WTO. By virtue of the relationship with the partner 
countries and regions in both areas, the EU is well positioned to generate 
inter-regional networks, and exercises power as Held and McGrew discuss 
(1999, 2002).
On the development policy side of the nexus, the EU contribution includes 
designing, maintaining, advocating and implementing certain activities such 
as development assistance, and promoting the principle of policy coherence 
for development. The latter would ideally imply, for instance, creating new 
ways of controlling negative impacts and, where possible, directing other 
policy sectors to support development policy goals. Within the nexus between 
development and trade, the PCD approach would entail promoting multilateral 
trade institutions and rules as well as bilateral trade agreements that take into 
account the diverse developmental needs of poorer countries. However, the 
EU’s trade relations with poorer countries constitute a less central, yet strongly 
interlinked feature on the greater external trade agenda – a feature that is likely 
to affect the EU’s conceptions of policy coherence for development and global 
governance of north-south trade. 
That said, the need for collective action to manage global problems is 
obviously only the point of departure, as there are differing visions of the kind 
of collective activity that harnessing global problems entails.12 Barnett and 
Duvall (2005) argue that despite the impressive attention to the concept and 
the workings of global governance, the debate has not included a sustained 
consideration of power. They believe that this can to a certain extent be 
understood by the need to reject the traditional realist “power-oriented” 
analysis of world politics.13 For these two scholars, governance involves the 
rules, structures, and institutions that guide, regulate, and control social life, 
and as such are fundamentally elements of power.14 Therefore, they propose 
to address new types of questions such as who actually governs in global 
governance, and how institutions are designed to support this. My approach 
12 Hoffman and Ba 2005: 4 label these approaches as managerial, and institutional and civil society 
based. Whereas the former represents and legitimizes the status quo, the latter seeks to break 
away from the traditional approaches of world politics as well as bring in social movements and 
non-state actors as a driving force for change.
13 Barnett and Duvall 2005: 2, 7.
14 Barnett and Duvall 2005: 2.
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to the EU’s normative role in global governance draws on Barnett and Duvall’s 
conceptualisation of power in this context. In particular, their idea of different 
modes of power provides a framework to address the issue of policy coherence 
with “lenses of power” as presented below.
For Barnett and Duvall the starting point for understanding power in 
global governance is to identify the instances that generate different modes 
of power. In general terms, power is the production, in and through social 
relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their 
own circumstances and fate. To make the production of power more tangible, 
Barnett and Duvall identify two analytical dimensions. The first dimension 
has to do with the nature (kinds) of social relations through which power 
works related to social identities and capacities. Here, power can work in 
the interaction between pre-constituted actors towards one another, which 
affects the ability of others to control the circumstances of their existence. 
In this conception, power is largely an attribute that the actor possesses 
and may wittingly use over others. Alternatively, power may work through 
constituting social relations, which reproduce different kinds of social 
relations and understandings of actors’ capacities.15 The second dimension 
regards the specificity of social relations that concerns the degree to which the 
social relations are direct or socially specific or indirect and socially diffuse. 
Consequently, power can be used either instantly in the context of socially 
specific instances or through diffuse processes embedded in international 
institutions which, for instance, establish who gets to participate in debates 
and make decisions. Hence power in global governance is also about the 
social construction of power relations and their reinforcement through 
discourses.16 
Furthermore, Barnett and Duvall also divide the direct/indirect types 
of power into four categories. In so doing, they provide a framework for 
understanding how global outcomes are influenced, and how the way in which 
actors are variously enabled and constrained requires a consideration of 
different forms of power in international politics. The four categories into which 
they divide power in global governance are: compulsory power, institutional 
power, structural power and productive or discursive power.17 In this work, 
I focus on the institutional and discursive powers, as the structural power 
and compulsory power dimensions have different roles. In fact, I propose that 
the institutional and discursive modes of power sustain the structural power 
dimension, but the power structure in itself or the direct use of compulsory 
15 Barnett and Duvall 2005: 9-10.
16 Barnett and Duvall 2005: 8-9.
17 Barnett and Duvall 2005: 3-4.
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power are not at the core of this research.18 In other words, I am more interested 
in the way in which institutional and productive power produce and reproduce 
certain types of governance and norms which sustain the power structures 
between and within “developed” and “developing societies” than the power 
structures themselves or the direct use of power. 
Institutional power is in effect when actors exercise indirect control over 
others, such as when states design international institutions in ways that work 
to their long-term advantage and to the disadvantage of others. Institutional 
power can also work as compulsory power, provided that the actor truly has 
control over an institution, which is seldom the case in practice. Rather, the 
power in this concept is based on Actor A’s power to affect the behaviour or 
conditions of others through institutional arrangements such as decisional 
rules, division of labour, agenda-setting, and structures of dependencies 
because it stands in a particular position in the relevant institution to 
allocate differential rewards to the participants.19 As this is essentially a 
question of political organisation, this power dimension can be assessed by 
looking inside the EU’s own institutional framework and policy processes, as 
well as by looking at the institutions of global governance in which the EU 
participates. 
Productive power refers to the socially diffuse production of subjectivity 
and of meaning and signification. For instance, a particular meaning of 
development or, importantly for this study, “policy coherence for development”, 
orients social activity in particular directions.20 For Barnett and Duvall, 
productive power is the constitution of all social subjects with various social 
powers through discursive and social practices. Their point of departure is that 
discourse practices produce, fix, and transform meaning and are thus sites 
of social relations of power. Furthermore, discourses produce and reproduce 
social identities and capacities as they give meaning to them. Discourses are 
fundamental as they define subjects with certain types of identities; establish 
18 Structural power concerns the constitution of social capacities and interests of actors in direct 
relation to one another. One expression of this form of power is the workings of the capitalist 
world economy and the international trading or financial system, where global production 
relations are the constitutive structures defining what kind of social beings actors are. For 
instance, Gramscians and historical materialists see that the structure of global capitalism largely 
determines the capacities and resources of actors (Barnett and Duval 18-20; see for instance the 
work of Robert Cox and Stephen Gill). Compulsory power refers to relations of interaction that 
allow one actor to have direct control over another. According to Barnett and Duvall’s (2005: 
13-15) definition, compulsory power operates through conditionality and material and immaterial 
coercion.
19 Barnett and Duvall 2005: 15-17.
20 Barnett and Duvall 2005: 3-4.
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practices, rights, responsibilities, hierarchies and categories of classification. 
Related to these is how the “other” comes to be defined and how that definition 
is associated with the practices and policies that are possible, imaginable, 
permissible, and desirable. In addition, questions addressing issues such as 
how a particular discourse becomes dominant in governing global social life, 
how “problems” come to be constructed the way they do, and who is authorised 
“to govern” and who needs to be “governed” become equally important. 
Table 1. Types of Power in global governance
Source: Barnett and Duval 2005: 12.
One of Barnett and Duvall’s key arguments is that global governance without 
the power dimension looks very different from global governance with power. 
The former entails only the technical mechanisms of coordination whereas 
the latter takes into account the strong values that underpin the mechanisms. 
Barnett and Duvall consider that the governance without power approach 
actually emphasises global governance as a project to maintain liberal order. 
In Barnett and Duvall’s words: 
Liberalism as an idea of progress is the driving force behind global governance; 
that modernization processes and interdependence  (or, now globalization) are 
transforming the character of global politics; that institutions can be established 
to help manage these changes; that democracy is a principled objective, as well as 
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a question of peace and security; and that states and international organisations 
have an obligation to protect individuals, promote universal values, and create 
conditions that encourage political and economic freedom.21 
Barnett and Duvall stress that the very language of global governance is about 
the possibility and desirability of effecting progressive political change in global 
life through the establishment of a normative consensus around liberal values.22 
Following Barnett and Duvall’s line of thought, the prevailing liberal undertones 
of global governance largely mask the presence of power.23 Therefore I see 
strong linkages to the normative power Europe debate of the next chapter. 
Before dwelling on the normative power debate per se, I will briefly explain 
how I identify these dimensions of power in my work.
I will use the concept of institutional power to examine the EU’s contributions 
in the context of international trade and bilateral trade agreements. In order to 
do so, I address it through the lenses of political organization and institutional 
design. In this dissertation, institutional power is addressed in two contexts: 
inside the European Union to understand how the Union’s own structures 
effect the development and trade nexus; and outside in the wider institutional 
structure of global governance in the World Trade Organization, where the 
EU participates in establishing norms for developing countries’ trade. For this 
purpose, two definitions of the impact of the institutional design are central. 
First, Schattschneider (1975:69)24 defines institutional organisation as the 
mobilisation of bias: some issues are organised into politics while others are 
organized out. Second, Hall’s (1986:266)25 elaboration on how the chosen 
organisational structures tend to lead policy-makers into some courses of 
action and away from others; and each course of action tends to favour the 
interests of some social groups over others. Whereas classical institutional 
theory concentrates on analysing the influence of formal institutions such as 
constitutional rules, new institutionalism has increasingly focused on informal 
institutions such as procedures, codes and norms. For this study, it is relevant 
that both the formal and informal rules of decision-making bodies specify how 
decisions are to be made, narrow down the agenda, prescribe certain types of 
solutions, and specify actors’ obligations and even roles to play. By performing 
these functions, institutions provide a degree of certainty by structuring 
21 Barnett and Duvall 2005: 4-5, referring to Doyle 1997, 1995, Zacher and Matthews 1995, Keohane 
1990, Deudney and Ikenberry 1999. 
22 Barnett and Duvall 2005: 5-6.
23 Barnett and Duvall 2005: 6.
24 As quoted in Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2009: 30.
25 As quoted in Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2009: 30.
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expectations on the other actors’ behaviour  and the issues being addressed, how 
they are processed and, not least, how decisions are made and implemented. 
Therefore, institutions have an independent effect on policy decisions since they 
constrain certain actions and facilitate others.26 
Finally, the concept of productive power will be the backbone of the 
analysis of the EU’s development discourse and production of “collective 
purpose” as defined by the content of the “European Consensus Statement”. 
Among the variety of productive functions that such a statement has, one can 
be elevated above the others, namely that of the production of legitimacy. By 
legitimacy, Suchman (1995) refers to a generalized perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity, in this case the European Union, are desirable, 
proper and appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs and definitions. What follows is that as long as the same value 
base, beliefs and conceptions are shared by the involved parties, power is 
considered legitimate. 
However, in line with the liberal approach to global governance, it is generally 
assumed that actors have shared interests and ideas if they adopt common goals 
for managing global problems. In other words, actors allegedly share the same 
understandings of what are considered desirable objectives for a joint action 
and can eventually also agree on the actual means of getting there. Similarly, 
shared interests would more likely lead to more similar understandings or ideas 
over norms and principles such as policy coherence for development. But if 
we address this from the perspective of power, the picture looks much more 
complex and nuanced, whereby it is relevant to ask who actually has the power 
to produce its actual content, why this particular content is chosen and who 
should abide by it?
Whereas the role of interests in policy-making is more widely discussed, 
the importance of ideas has traditionally occupied less space.27 However, ideas 
do have very concrete implications. Goldstein and Keohane (1993:18) argue 
that ideas influence policy outcomes in three ways in policy formulation. First, 
ideas serve as road maps when actors are uncertain about the consequences 
of various means to obtain their goals. The choice of means is based on the 
expected effects of action. Ideas on causation “help determine which of the 
many means will be used to reach desired goals, and therefore, help to provide 
actors with strategies with which to further their objectives”. Second, Goldstein 
and Keohane argue that ideas may even serve as guidelines for decision- making 
when political actors must choose between a set of potential outcomes which 
all represent improvements for all, and when there are no “objective” criteria 
26 Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2009: 30-31. 
27 Daugbjer and Swinbank 2009: 30.
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on which to base their choice. Finally, ideas are institutionalised and may have 
impacts on future policy choices, even though the interest which an idea served 
is weakened over time. Furthermore, Hay and Rosamund (2002: 150) point 
out that actors tend to treat ideas as material straitjackets for defining what 
is actually possible or not. On the other hand, ideas are fuel for discourses as 
they do not surface by themselves. Ideas are the force that gets the discourse 
off the ground.28
In this study, I understand the interrelationship between values, norms 
and interests in the following way. On the one hand, norms refer to a certain 
standard mode of behaviour to conduct international affairs and, on the other 
hand, to an ideal way of organizing world politics in order to protect and promote 
certain core values. Essentially, actors, such as the European Union, establish 
norms to safeguard certain values. However, norms are not fixed but they are 
always shaped and influenced by perceived interests and prevailing ideas in a 
given context. What follows is that norms are underpinned with tensions. Thus 
one of the core functions of productive and institutional powers is to promote 
certain ideas so that they can become a norm by mobilising consent for a norm, 
legitimising it and making it dominant through diffusion. 
2.2 NORMATIVE POwER EUROPE AND gLObAL gOVERNANCE
Having defined the classifications of power in global governance, I look next at 
the debate on the EU’s normativity. The aim of this sub-chapter is to bridge the 
debates on the EU as a normative power and that of a power in global governance 
so as to better understand the EU’s norm-shaping role. In addition, this sub-
chapter presents previous studies that have shared the normative power Europe 
perspective, and identifies a gap in the field that this study is designed to fill. On 
the one hand, this mapping relates to the different forms of power that shape 
normative power in global governance as defined by Barnett and Duvall (2005), 
and to the need to address policy coherence for development in this context, 
on the other hand. Essentially, I suggest that the EU’s normative role cannot 
be understood independently of the uses of productive and institutional power 
that underpin EU action in the development and trade nexus. 
In fact, EU studies have increasingly focused on the normative or 
ideological features of the EU’s external relations. In essence, they suggest 
that the true power of the Union lies in its ability to project its core values 
beyond its borders and, in so doing, in its ability to redefine what is “normal”, 
“acceptable” or even “preferable” in international relations or, in this context, 
28 Derichs & Heberer 2006: 1.
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in global governance.29 In these discussions, norms refer on the one hand to a 
certain standard mode of behaviour in conducting international affairs and, 
on the other hand to an ideal way of organising world politics according to 
some normative standards, in order to protect and promote certain core values 
while dismissing others. However, the normative power is not necessarily a 
force for good as it can be used to legitimise norms and practices that are 
detrimental or dysfunctional. Rather, the rationale behind this debate seeks 
to understand the EU’s international role beyond the traditional concerns 
over whether the EU should or could be a civilian or military power in 
world politics. The “Normative Power Europe” debate has revolved around 
Manners’ argument (2002: 242) that the historical evolution of a normative 
basis for the EU, through the development of treaties, declarations, policies, 
criteria and conditions, provides a solid foundation for understanding its 
actions. According to Manners, the EU is constructed on a normative basis 
and this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics. “ … the 
most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it 
does or says, but what it is.” In the article in which he introduced the concept 
“Normative power Europe: A Contradiction in terms”? (2002: 252) Manners 
concludes that the EU can be conceptualised as a changer of norms in the 
international system; that the EU acts to change norms in the international 
system; and that the EU should act to extend its norms into the international 
system. However, in Manners’ work on “Values and Principles in European 
Union Foreign Policy” with Lucarelli (2006: 7), the authors clarify their 
stance on whether the EU should act in a normative way in the international 
system. As a matter of fact, the normative agency is not necessarily a benign 
or soft one, and worst practices can be based on strong values. That is to say 
that the EU can function both as a “force for good” or “bad” in international 
relations. 
Drawing on Whitehead (1996), Manners and Whitman (1998), and Kinnvall 
(1995), Manners (2002: 244-245) suggests that the EU’s normative power 
materialises through six channels (or what he calls factors). These channels 
firstly include contagion, namely the unintentional diffusion of ideas from the 
EU to other political actors. The second channel is informational diffusion, 
which is the result of a range of strategic communications. The third channel 
29 The concept of Normative power Europe has its roots in the discussion launched by Duchêne 
(1972), who depicted Europe as a “civilian power” that uses economic and political means rather 
than military ones. Authors that have particularly influenced my work on the EU’s normativity 
include in addition to Manners 2002, Manners and Whitman 2003, Lightfoot and Burchell 2005, 
Manners & Lucarelli 2006, Scheipers & Sicurelli 2007, Laïdi 2008, Ferraira Nunes 2011, Manners 
2012, and Pollack 2012. On the EU and its global role and agency, volumes by Bretherton & Vogler 
2005, and Orbie 2008 (ed) are among those that have been influential.
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refers to procedural diffusion, involving the institutionalisation of a relationship 
between the EU and a third party. The fourth is transference, which is a form of 
exchanging goods, trade, aid or technical assistance through largely substantive 
or financial means. The fifth form of diffusion is overt diffusion, which occurs 
as a result of the physical presence of the EU in third states and international 
organisations. The final channel shaping norm diffusion is what Manners calls 
the cultural filter, which affects the impact of international learning, adaptation 
or rejection in third states and organisations. In addition, Manners identifies 
a set of core norms (2002, 2006) that are common to the development and 
trade nexus that the EU seeks to promote through these channels. I will discuss 
them in more detail in Sub-chapter 2.4, Power and Policy Coherence in the 
Development and Trade Nexus. All these channels of normative power can 
be pinpointed both in formal and informal EU-ACP/Africa relations as well 
as at the level of global governance (the fifth channel) that prompts further 
exploration of the Normative Power Europe in these contexts. In this regard, 
my aim is not to investigate the actual use or impact of normative power in 
relations with developing countries, but rather to take a more in-depth look at 
the underlying issues that set pre-conditions on the Union’s normative model 
in the development and trade policy nexus. This kind of study has not been 
conducted to date.
If, as Manners argues, the EU’s predisposition to act in a normative way 
stems from its treaty base and its official policies, the basis for normative 
action in development and trade can easily be identified at a superficial level. 
The status of development policy as an EU policy was established in the 1992 
Treaty on the European Union (TEU), known as the Maastricht Treaty, with a 
juridical basis and common objectives.30 Although the Treaty provided a new 
institutional foundation for this policy, it was designed to govern the existing 
and expanding aid and economic co-operation relations formed since the 1957 
Treaty of Rome. Under the Maastricht Treaty, the Community development 
policy was defined as complementary to policies pursued by the member states 
with three main objectives: the promotion of sustainable economic and social 
development of developing countries; their smooth and gradual integration 
into the world economy; and  – most importantly for our purposes here – a 
campaign against poverty in developing countries.31 
30 Title XVII Development Co-operation Articles 130u, 130v, 130w, 130x and 130y. The 1997 Treaty 
of Amsterdam provided amendments to the TEU but did not change the content for development 
co-operation. Note that in the Amsterdam Treaty Development Co-operation is dealt with under 
Title XX, with new numbering of Articles 177 (ex 130u), 178 (ex 130v), 179 (ex 130w), 180 (ex 
130x) and 181 (ex 130y). 
31 Article 130u/177.
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In addition to the principle of complementarity in the Treaty, two other 
principles were established to support the pursuit of the policy objectives. These 
formed the so-called triple Cs: complementarity, co-ordination and coherence, 
which were later complemented with a fourth C component: consistency of EU 
external relations. The coherence principle refers to the relations of development 
policy objectives to other EU policies, and Article 178 (Ex Article 130v) of the 
Amsterdam Treaty states (1998) that: 
The Community shall take account of the objectives referred to in Article 177 in 
the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.
Since the establishment of the EU development policy, the “campaign against 
poverty” policy objective has been made more central by the EU’s involvement 
in international development processes as discussed in the Introduction. With 
respect to the commitments made to support the Millennium Development 
Goals, the EU has pledged to achieve them by the year 2015 both at the 
Community as well as at the Member State levels.32 In this context, the “campaign 
against poverty” objective has been redefined as poverty eradication. At the 
same time, the principle of coherence has become one of the main tools to 
govern the process towards this goal in EU development policy. This shift was 
consolidated in the “European Consensus” as follows:
We reaffirm our commitment to promoting policy coherence for development, 
based upon ensuring that the EU shall take account of the objectives of 
development cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely 
to affect developing countries, and that these policies support development 
objectives.33
In particular, the EU states that its non-aid policies, especially in areas such as 
trade, agriculture, fisheries, food safety, transport and energy, all have a direct 
bearing on the ability of developing countries to generate domestic economic 
growth, which in turn forms the basis of any sustained progress towards the 
MDGs, and particularly towards poverty reduction.34 This aspect of EU public 
policy impact is dealt with specifically in the official communications concerning 
the already mentioned principle of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), 
which are based on the legal obligations of the EC Treaties as described above.35 
32 COM (2005e): 3.
33 Ibid.: par. 9.
34 COM (2005b): 7.
35 TEU article 178 (ex 130v).
THEORETICAl AND CONCEPTUAl CONTExT   |  23
Therefore, the EU’s commitment towards policy coherence is not only a political 
commitment in the context of the MDGs, but it also has a legally binding basis 
in the EC Treaty (Art. 178).36 
However, for the purpose of this analysis, the normative basis only offers a 
point of departure for a more in-depth examination of the issue. As Manners 
and Whitman argue (2003: 398), the external identity of the EU is constructed 
around specific interpretations of internationally shared norms. In this case, 
my interest lies in exploring what the EU interpretations of the appropriate 
action under policy coherence for development entails, and how productive 
and institutional powers constitute the pre-conditions for the EU’s normative 
action. Although the channels of power that Manners indicates resemble 
those of Barnett and Duvall (2005), a fundamental difference is that Manners’ 
approach leaves the power element in itself largely unpacked, including its 
possible negative implications. Perhaps because of the theme of Manners’ first 
case study of the issue, the abolition of the death penalty, these dimensions were 
left to successive contributors to elaborate. Orbie (2008: 20) also observes that 
the EU’s normative and value-driven aspirations are now the focus of the EU 
literature, but the power dimension is less present in the explorations of the EU’s 
global role. In the field of development and trade, the EU’s normative power is 
largely based on the Union’s role as the largest donor of official development 
aid and its active involvement in the global trading system as the biggest trading 
block in the world. At the same time, this role must be seen in the larger context 
of the EU’s influence, or as Carbone (2009: 3) defines it, “the EU is a venue in 
which a large number of policies affecting developing countries are decided”. 
This is where strong economic interests also come into play. As Laïdi (2010: 1) 
rightly notes, “the concept of European norms is ambiguous: does it express a 
sort of European virtue claiming universal validity or is it a weapon in the hands 
of Europe to promote its own interests?”  
Without questioning the value of Manners’ rather optimistic view of the 
EU’s normative power, the case of policy coherence for development calls for 
a more critical account. In this regard, Forsberg (2011: 1190-1198) makes a 
crucial distinction between different features of normative power. These 
include “normative identity” (cf. Manners), “normative interests”, “normative 
behavior”, ”normative means of power” and “normative outcome”. By the same 
token, there are different mechanisms through which the EU uses its normative 
power. These include persuasion, invoking of norms, shaping discourse and 
leading through example. All these forms are very much present in the EU 
36 Furthermore, the draft text of the EU Constitution upheld this commitment to coherence in even 
stronger terms (Art. III - 292, Art. III - 316). The Lisbon Treaty re-affirmed the commitment in 
Article 208 on the functioning of the European Union. 
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development and trade policy nexus. In particular, the power to shape discourse 
as well as the promotion of certain kinds of norms are key to this study as well. 
However, my aim is to go one step further. By looking at the institutional and 
historical contexts, as well as the processes that have produced EU discourse, 
my task is to show their impact on the EU’s normative power.
Applying Dryzek’s (1997: 201; 204) observations on the use of power in 
defining concepts and discourse, we can assume that the way in which issues 
related to poverty eradication and sustainable development are constructed, 
interpreted, discussed and analysed has significant consequences for the type 
of policies that will emerge as a part of policy coherence for the development 
agenda. In the case of normative governance, the discourse and interpretation 
of policy coherence for development represents an important power struggle 
in the direction of the action. This struggle involves different interests with 
different substantive concerns trying to stake their claims in the conceptual 
territory of “What constitutes policy coherent norms for development”, and 
cast the terms of understanding the concept in terms favourable to them. 
Thus, my contribution to this debate is to reveal tensions that underpin the 
EU’s normative take on policy coherence. These tensions relate to the moral 
justification that certain core norms – such as sustainable development – 
feed into the EU’s efforts to advance its own standards, ideas and interests as 
international norms and practices.
Overview of Previous Discussions on the EU’s 
Normativity in the Trade and Development Nexus
An overview of previous literature of the EU’s normativity highlights three 
interesting features. First, there seems to be an inconsistency between the EU’s 
rhetoric and self-presentations as a normative power. In Nicolaïdis and Howse’s 
(2002) words, the EU is in fact projecting an “EUtopia rather than “the EU as it 
is” on the grounds of its normative foundations. Second, while acknowledging 
this gap between “what the EU is and what the EU wishes to be”, previous 
studies point to the EU’s relatively strong commitment to international efforts, 
for instance in the internationalisation of human rights and environmental 
policy (compared to the US, or to China or India in particular). Scheipers 
and Sicurelli (2007: 250-253) claim that it is the Union itself that typically 
stresses the appropriateness of specific instruments such as multilateralism 
to tackle global problems. It also presents itself as being more concerned 
about the creation of binding rules for the global community, since it aims at 
international law-making, namely the establishment of multilateral treaties and 
legal institutions. The third observation is related to this previous point, namely 
that the EU’s aspirations to act as a normative power in the context of the 
THEORETICAl AND CONCEPTUAl CONTExT   |  25
WTO have triggered quite active academic interest, whereas the development 
aspects of trade, not to mention development policy or PCD, have remained 
less covered.
With regard to the EU’s power in global governance, Van den Hoven (2007: 
186) argues that the EU’s power in the WTO contrasts markedly with its lack 
of power in international relations more generally. As a result, trade policy 
has become a kind of foreign policy through which the EU is able to actively 
project its own values and principles onto the world stage. This can be noted in 
the EU’s external promotion of its own interpretation of market liberalism and 
free trade as the primary economic value underpinning the European project. 
Of course, the common agricultural policy has been a notable exception to this 
rule. However, van den Hoven (2007: 187-188) points to the fact that the EU 
has progressively liberalised its economy in the multilateral trading system 
and respective GATT/WTO rounds. This has taken place in close association 
with the EU integration process following a distinct EU model that van den 
Hoven calls regulatory capitalism. According to van den Hoven, it is this model 
that the EU seeks to promote internationally in order to turn the WTO into a 
global regulator. Since 1996, the EU has called for a “comprehensive round” of 
trade negotiations at the WTO, based on EU interests and values in multilateral 
trade negotiations. In van den Hoven’s (2007: 185-188) analysis, the Union 
contribution has shifted the focus of the international trading system away from 
removing barriers to trade (often referred to as negative integration) towards 
the promotion of common rules to regulate the world economy through common 
domestic regulation and legal systems (positive integration). This broad agenda 
consists of trade-related issues that the EU wishes to be negotiated in the WTO, 
including investment, competition and transparency rules. To a certain extent, 
the EU is trying to shape the WTO in its own image. 
Similarly, Dür and Zimmermann (2007: 771-787) consider foreign trade 
negotiations to be among the most important and consequential manifestations 
of the EU as a global actor with a truly supranational, Commission-led 
representation and mandate. In particular, Zimmermann makes a strong case 
for the EU’s power, arguing that the EU also uses trade policy for the broader 
strategic goals of its external relations. While this conclusion on the EU as a major 
force in international trade negotiations is usually shared among EU scholars, 
the lack of trade policy coherence and inconsistency between the EU’s trade 
liberalisation agenda and protectionist approach to agricultural trade is seen as 
the key factor hindering the EU’s leadership in the WTO.37 However, as Young 
(2007) has shown, the question of EU trade policies in different sectors is more 
37 Bretherton and Vogler 1999, Dür 2006, Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006, Elgström 2007 and 
Daugbjerk & Swinbank 2009.
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nuanced beyond the simple liberal-protectionist dichotomy. This indicates in my 
view that the EU has indeed a range of different strategic options at its disposal 
to organise different sectoral (as well as internal/external) trade policies. 
In addition, EU member states’ motivations to delegate policy authority to 
the European level vary, even if this has been largely perceived as an attempt to 
insulate the policy process against protectionist pressures. Further, as Dür and 
Zimmermann (2007: 781) tentatively argued, the Commission seems to have 
more autonomy when negotiating with a relatively small country than when 
negotiating with China or in the WTO. This point calls for further elaboration 
in the context of regional free trade agreements with a relatively small number 
of poorer countries. Even though the Commission’s autonomy may differ from 
case to case, according to Meunier (2007: 905), the Commission’s authority 
stems from its ability to repackage member states’ preferences into a consensual 
doctrine. To summarise, the previous studies point to the fact that the EU’s 
normative role in the WTO is evident, but of a strategic nature which varies 
from one case to another. Moreover, the role is shaped by internal factors, most 
clearly by interests and member states’ preferences.
To shift the perspective from trade to development, the works of Lightfoot and 
Burchell (2005), Storey (2006) and Orbie (2008) suggest that there is more to be 
discovered in this under-explored field. Interestingly for my research, Lightfoot 
and Burchell (2005) present a critical account of the EU’s normative agency 
on the sustainable development-trade-environment policy nexus at the World 
Summit of Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002. In their contribution, 
they questioned the depth of the EU’s commitment to sustainable development 
in that international setting due to actors’ differences in recognising and 
conceptualising sustainable development as a norm. They point to the fact that 
within the EU, “sustainable development” does not fall neatly into its traditional 
bureaucratic competencies, but reflects the remits of different DGs and Councils. 
This, they argue, affects the EU’s capability to shape the WSSD outcome 
although environmental policy has been a growing area of EU competence and 
international action. However, as Lightfoot and Burchell (2005: 78) explain, “the 
EU has a strategic interest in shaping how the norm of sustainable development 
is understood in global policy terms, and that action is taken via multilateral 
agreements to prevent damage to the Union’s economic competitiveness”. 
In the context of EU-ACP trade relations, Storey (2006) revisits Normative 
Power Europe and the African Economic Partnership Agreements, showing how 
the European norm of social solidarity is absent in the EC-promoted form of 
good “economic” governance. In his work, Storey (2006: 342-343) also reflects 
upon the interrelationship between norms and interests. In his view, interests 
may refer both to short-term agendas of certain interest groups and, even more 
importantly, to the broader political economy concerns of European capital, EU 
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governments, the Commission and others. He illustrates this with an example 
of the EU promoting a norm of market liberalisation because it is committed 
to the extension and reinforcement of global capitalist relations – which it may 
genuinely see as the best route to development for poorer countries – even if this 
does not lead to any immediate profits accruing to European companies. Thus the 
EU, according to Storey, may promote a norm of “good governance” (including 
market liberalisation) for reasons that combine both (long-term, perceived) self-
interest and normative commitment. This may indeed constitute an attempt to 
project onto other countries and actors a specific model of behaviour, which 
supports the argument that the EU functions as a normative power. However, 
what Storey (2006: 334) is concerned about is that, in this case, the model could 
be ill-suited to respond to EPA partners’ needs and priorities. 
Sharing similar mixed emotions on the EU’s global role, Orbie (2008: 56-
58) explores the EU’s bilateral relations to the ACP countries, which he sees as 
the most important venue for Europe’s activities in the trade and development 
nexus. Orbie points here to the growing emphasis on pursuing normative 
objectives through trade, including development of the poorer countries and the 
promotion of environmental and societal goals. This constitutes an analytically 
distinct political cleavage which cannot be translated into the protectionist-
free trade dichotomy. In his analysis of the EU’s trade policy under the slogan 
of harnessing globalisation,38 Orbie (2008: 61-63) concludes that the EU’s 
commitment to realising normative non-trade objectives through trade policy 
is subordinate to the pursuit of market enhancing initiatives, in which the Union 
has been successful. The success has been based on the firm idea of progress 
and prosperity through the market, and the hybrid institutional setting that is 
characterised by, on the one hand, the asymmetric state of European integration 
and, on the other, by community competency. 
To conclude, the specific aim of this study is to address the issue of the EU’s 
normative power, primarily from the point of view of development policy and 
policy coherence for development. Drawing on the findings of previous studies, 
particularly those on trade policy, I tackle the issue of power in a field that 
has remained largely understudied. Yet the development policy angle provides 
an interesting basis from which to dig deeper into the different dimensions of 
power. Here, the global context of norm-setting includes the WTO and OECD 
DAC donor community in which the EU operates, while my specific interest lies 
in the EU’s relations with developing countries, most importantly in the EU-ACP 
relations in the development and trade nexus. As regards the global context, the 
interaction is predominantly indirect, whereas the EU-ACP relations are of a 
more direct nature. Furthermore, this setting provides a perspective on different 
38 I will return to this rhetoric of “harnessing globalisation” in Sub-chapters 4.2 and 6.1.
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types of power, most importantly institutional power, productive (discursive) 
power, and compulsory power, which sustain the global structures. Given that 
the nexus between development and trade polices is highly charged with values 
and both immaterial and material interests, my contribution focuses on the 
interplay between these elements. 
2.3 CONCEPTUALISINg POLICy COHERENCE 
fOR DEVELOPMENT 
Policy Coherence and Consistency in the Political Context
What makes the concept of policy coherence for development (PCD) particularly 
intriguing is that it is closely and often somewhat confusingly connected to 
two other related concepts, namely “consistency” and “policy coherence” in 
general. In addition, the concept is inherently politically sensitive as it implies 
assessing other, non-development policies vis-à-vis their possible impacts on 
the development policy objectives. Moreover, there is no uniform definition of 
policy coherence, much less of policy coherence for development, either in the 
academic or in the development practitioners’ debates. In different languages 
or in different academic disciplines the concepts have different connotations 
and degrees of interchangeability.39 Studying the European Union instead 
of national politics adds yet another challenge for conceptualising the PCD 
coherence debate in its multilevel institutional context. Here, the quest for 
coordination, on the one hand, and power relations on the other, becomes even 
more pressing. In the case of development policy, the Treaty text already obliges 
the principal actors – the Commission and the member states – to coordinate 
and complement each other in this area of joint competence. 
At a very general level, both Coherence and Consistency refer to the absence 
of and freedom from contradictions.40 But whereas consistency refers to a rather 
static, unchanging condition, coherence is a dynamic concept and more “a matter 
of degree” than an absolute state of something. Both concepts are always inter-
relational.  For instance, policy coherence does not stand alone as a concept 
but is to be assessed in relation to something, namely something coheres with 
something or is coherent to something. Coherence can also be conceptualised as 
a process (how something is achieved) and as an outcome (what is achieved).41 
This approach is particularly helpful in a two-fold sense. First, in discussing 
39 Se note on languages, Carbone 2009: 1-3; 18. On different disciplines, see Hoebink 2004: 184-187.
40 Hoebink 2004: 185.
41 Di Francesco 2001, as quoted in Carbone 2009: 4. 
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policy coherence for development in the context of development policy and its 
formulation, and second, in analysing the development and trade policy interface 
in the context of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). The alleged purpose 
of those agreements was to function as instruments for development and, in this 
sense, as manifest PCD-coherent trade policy. 
Furthermore, I stress the importance of perspective in my research, namely 
what should cohere with what and what are the criteria against which coherence, 
or a lack thereof, is evaluated. This leads to the very fundamental question of 
how we conceptualise development policy objectives, what means we regard as 
appropriate to pursue them, to what extent these views are shared with different 
actors in different sectors, and to what extent other policies should be changed 
for the sake of greater coherence. 
Since the Treaty of Amsterdam (1998), strong emphasis has been placed 
on the consistency of EU external relations, including security, economic 
and development policies.42 However, the linkage in EU policiesis not always 
that straightforward. Many scholars see that the motivation for emphasising 
consistency was to consolidate the EU as “a single institutional framework” and 
“an actor speaking with a single voice”.43 However, the call for greater external 
consistency may also put limits on discussing policy coherence for development, 
if overriding priority is given to the unity of the Union. In this case, pointing out 
incoherencies might be perceived as delegitimising the single approach. On the 
other hand, overly obvious incoherencies may have the effect of undermining 
the entire system.  
In reality, every sectoral policy has its own policy objectives in accordance 
with the Treaties which define the policy priorities for each area. In this respect, 
the EU external relations “family” is no exception. The respective policy goals 
not only direct the policy actions but also justify and legitimise the very existence 
of a given policy area in the wider political system of the Union. However, the 
Treaty provisions on policy coherence can be interpreted in different ways. As 
an example of a strong interpretation of policy coherence, the following extract 
from former European Commission Director General for Development Dieter 
Frisch (2008: 23) aptly illustrates the matter. 
Making coherence an imperative was intended to remove development policy 
from its isolation and turn it into a cross-cutting task. That meant that the 
measures planned in other fields – agricultural policy, environmental policy 
and so on – had to be examined to find out whether they were compatible with 
development policy and, where necessary, adjusted. 
42 Article C of the Amsterdam Treaty.
43 Carbone 2009: 2. 
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While this provision did not go as far as to give development policy primacy over 
other policies, it did make it necessary to harmonize other policies as far as 
possible with the goals of development policy.’ [Emphasis added].
What is notable in this account is that policy coherence (for development) as a 
Treaty provision is understood to impose changes in other non-development 
policies so as to harmonise them with development policy goals. In taking 
this task out of the development policy frame, we can find a parallel in 
environmental policy and in the necessity to integrate environmental policy 
principles into other policies, in a cross-sectoral manner. Importantly, policy 
integration at this level assumes a form of reciprocity between the policies in 
question. If one of the components is much weaker, it is likely to be diluted into, 
rather than integrated with, the others.44 This observation clearly reflects the 
debate over policy coherence for development. As Hoebink (2004:185) phrases 
it, “notwithstanding the efforts to achieve coherence of policy, incoherence is 
often given”. This is simply something that is inherent to politics, so a certain 
degree of incoherence is inevitable in a pluralist and compartmentalised 
political system, such as the EU. May et al. (2006) argue that a policy that 
has greater issue focus and is dominated by few interests is likely to have 
stronger policy coherence. However, so the argument goes, even very crowded 
policy areas can still cohere if they contain what May et al. call “integrative 
properties” that glue issues and interests together, such as a clear set of goals, 
a compelling policy image, well-defined targeting, and the strong involvement 
of the executive agency. 
To illustrate this dilemma of consistency and coherence in practice, we can 
simply compare the core objectives of the EU’s trade strategy of 2006, entitled 
“Global Europe”, with those of development policy, namely the Union’s global 
competiveness and growth through free trade versus poverty eradication, 
sustainable development and the specific Millennium Development goals. In 
addition, the aspects of EU trade policy for which the EU is most often criticised 
are its approach to agricultural protection and resistance to the liberalisation of 
world trade in agricultural products, which deviates from, and even contradicts 
its general trade policy approach.45 In this respect, the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) has been the origin of a number of disputes in the WTO and has 
had a profound effect on many developing countries.46 So what we have here is 
a situation which challenges the consistency of the EU’s external agency, on the 
one hand, and policy coherence for development, on the other. 
44 Liberatore 1997: 119.
45 O’Shaughnessy 2006: 190; Daugbherg and Swinbank 2009.
46 Flint 2008: 103.
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The Different Types of Policy Coherence 
Forster and Stokke (1999:21-23) were the first to outline the basic categories 
for coherence in the overall context of development policy. These categories 
are a) coherence of aid policy; b) coherence of policies towards the South; c) 
coherence of donors’ policies towards the South, and aid policy in particular, 
and d) donor-recipient coherence, with particular reference to development 
policies. Regarding these categories, my interest is mainly in the “b” and “c” 
types of coherence. This is because I am focusing on the EU development and 
trade policy interplay vis-à-vis the South and the EU’s role as a donor in the 
larger development community in global governance. 
In a similar manner, but with a specific focus on the EU, Hoebink (1999; 
2004) starts by defining “coherence” through the absence of “incoherence”, and 
suggests that “coherence of policy could be defined as: the non-occurrence of 
effects of policy that are contrary to the intended results or aims of policy”. On 
this basic definition, Hoebink (2004: 187-188) builds different classifications 
of (in)coherencies. The first division that he makes is between narrow or 
restricted type and broad (in)coherencies. In his rather complicated model, 
the first, narrow (in)coherence is further split into two subcategories. These 
subcategories of narrow (in)coherence refer, on the one hand, to (in)coherence 
within development policy, and (in)coherence within EU external relations, on 
the other. The second, broad definition looks at the way in which development 
policy goals are supported or thwarted by other EU policies in other fields. 
In practice, he notes, these may include those policies most likely to affect 
developing countries: the common agricultural policy, the common fisheries 
policy, certain consumer protection policies, and parts of (global) environmental 
policies and industrial policies.47 
Another highly relevant distinction for the purposes of this study is the 
distinction between horizontal and vertical coherence. The horizontal type involves 
the (in)coherence of the policies of different “Brussels bureaucracies”, as Hoebink 
(2004:192) phrases it. In practice, he looks at the different Commission services 
and cases where the policy on trade, agriculture and fisheries, the environment 
and possibly other subjects may clash with the objectives of development. From 
the point of view of this study, this horizontal dimension is particularly relevant. 
The vertical type concerns the coherence of the policy of the member states 
and developing countries, of the European Commission and of international 
institutions. Hoebink stresses that verticality does not necessarily mean a hierarchy, 
but refers in this field to diverse local and global spheres of decision-making. 
47 Cf. Hoebink 2004: 189-191. For the entire list of different kinds of classifications, see Hoebink 
2004: 187-196.
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In my study, horizontal coherence is closely linked to the question of 
consistency, especially between the EU external policies as discussed above. 
In addition, the Commission as the guardian of the Union’s interests and the 
executive centre of the Community, is often expected to keep a grip on the 
various policies of the EU system and the overall consistency. Both horizontal 
and vertical coherence are linked to the questions of competences between 
different services (i.e. DG Development and DG Trade) and between member 
states and the Community, defining who can speak and act on behalf of the 
Union in international organisations or with third parties in general. 
Drawing on the works of Hoebink (2004), Nuttall (2005) and Picciotto 
(2005), Carbone (2009:4) adds yet another layer to this coherence puzzle, 
namely that of multilateral coherence. This concept refers to the interaction 
between international organisations, such as the UN and the International 
Financial Institutions, which he sees as often promoting incompatible goals. 
In discussing this interaction between multilateral institutions, Simms 
(2005: 81-83) points out that in the current international system, social and 
environmental actors and agreements slip further down the power scale than 
those of the economy. Similarly, Ivanova (2005) points to the dominance of 
international economic institutions, which form the strongest of the three 
structures with a regime centred on the international financial and trade 
institutions, including the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO.48 Furthermore, 
the members of these institutions are not equal themselves as the power is 
defined by their economic weight. This again highlights the power aspects in 
global governance. 
(In)coherence can also be intentional and unintentional, as also noted by 
Hoebink (1999:335; 2004:193). In his view, incoherence is intended when the 
policy-maker or decision-maker acknowledges and accepts the negative impacts 
of a certain policy, as they believe that the positive impacts are more important. 
Unintentional incoherence exists where policy-makers are not aware of the 
impacts of a certain policy on development policy sectors and goals in a certain 
context. Reasons for unintentional coherence may include lack of information, 
problems with coordination, or simply that a policy context on the ground 
changes so rapidly that a policy cannot adequately respond. 
The Difficult “Coherence for Development”
Whereas Hoebink as well as Forster and Stokke take incoherence as their starting 
point, Ashoff (2005: 1) uses the term “policy coherence for development” in 
two senses. On the negative side, it means the absence of incoherence, which 
48 See Sampson 2005 for more on WTO-WB-IMF and WTO-UN Coherence. 
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occurs when other policies deliberately or accidentally impair the effects of 
development policy or run counter to its intentions. On the positive side, it 
means the interaction of policies that are relevant in the given context with a view 
to the achievement of development objectives. This type of conceptualisation 
has been increasingly used in the EU to emphasise the possibilities of finding 
win-win solutions between different policy goals.49 
In addition to the different policy coherence typologies, in order to analyse 
the EU conception of PCD, I have also used a definition put forth by the 
OECD (1996: 8) on policy coherence, and have applied it to the context of the 
development and trade interface. According to this definition, the principle of 
policy coherence in its narrowest sense implies that the objectives, strategies, 
mechanisms, intentions, motives and outcome pursued within a given policy 
framework are consistent with each other and are at the minimum – and most 
importantly here – not conflicting with the objectives, strategies, mechanisms, 
intentions, motives and outcome of other policy frameworks of the system. 
This definition can be applied to the EU development and trade relationship 
by embracing trade and development policies within it, and considering the 
EU’s external relations the policy framework and the Union the political 
system. Since it is in our interests to see how coherence works for development 
objectives, this “preposition” is necessary in terms of focusing the question 
of coherence on the very goals of the development policy. It also directs 
the assessment of the non-development policy, namely how it works for or 
against the attainment of the objectives of poverty eradication and sustainable 
development. The advantage of this definition is that it opens up the concept 
by singling out different elements that are crucial for PCD beyond just focusing 
on stated policy objectives.
Incoherence of policy – emerging from conflicting interests and values and 
reinforced by compartmentalisation of politics and public administration – is 
considered the main rationale for seeking policy coherence.50 However, the 
institutional structures of a political system itself may also constrain options 
for PCD. In particular, Elgström and Pilegaard (2009) point to the structure of 
autonomous sectoral policies as well as labour division, in accordance with the 
EU law. Elgström and Pilegaard (2009) have also studied this phenomenon in the 
context of the ACP-EU Economic Partnership Agreements and conceptualised 
this kind of situation by calling it imposed coherence. Essentially, imposed 
coherence implies the dominance of one sectoral policy over another. This 
dominance is manifested in the primacy of principles and interests that are 
49 See the biannual EU Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) Reports of 2007, 2009 and 2011 
compiled by the European Commission. 
50 Forster and Stokke 1999: 3. 
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characteristics of the dominant policy field that overshadows the principles and 
interests of other policy sectors. However, this dominance can be masked by 
referring to sectoral responsibilities that are allotted to one institutional actor, 
such as the responsibility to conduct international negotiations, in this case 
bilateral trade negotiations between the EU and the ACP countries. Defining the 
negotiations as the competency of the dominant sector tempers the apparent 
incoherency and inconsistency, as well as any inconsistency inherited from the 
institutional system.51 
Therefore, imposed coherence constitutes a sharp contrast to the ideal model 
of policy coherence for development, whereby development objectives should 
provide the yardstick for coherence. This would require a shared common 
understanding – a consensus on the objectives and what their achievement 
would entail. In reality, however, this type of consensus seldom exists. Or, if it 
does exist – as the European Consensus for instance suggests, the question is: 
Who has had the power to define the terms? In addition, the absence of clear 
criteria complicates the matter, as discussed in the next section.
2.4 POwER AND POLICy COHERENCE IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE NEXUS
If the core purpose of policy coherence for development is to advance the 
development policy objectives of sustainable development and poverty 
eradication, then the criteria for a “coherent policy” should logically stem from 
the policy objectives themselves. However, a cursory glance at the theoretical 
debates around the objectives reveals the inconvenient truth that the pursuit 
of sustainable development and poverty eradication is a highly complex issue 
in various respects. For instance, what does a coherent policy for sustainable 
development imply in a given context? Does it require an overhaul of the 
entire governance system or can it be achieved through gradual changes in 
policies and procedures? The purpose of this sub-chapter is to shed light on 
these complex inter-linkages, and on the fundamentally political nature of the 
objectives themselves. I start with a short note on governance for sustainable 
development and poverty eradication, and proceed by discussing these concerns 
for a “Normative Power Europe” in this context.  Finally, I shift the focus to the 
role of development policy, aid and trade in the broader framework of global 
governance.
51 Elgstöm & Pilegaard 2009: 55.
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Global Governance for Sustainable Development 
and Poverty Eradication
Essentially, global governance to promote “sustainable development” stems 
from the necessity to redirect human action towards more equitable and 
ecological paths. In this sense, sustainable development is a highly relevant 
issue for global governance and for policy coherence for development. The 
primary source for the concept or its conceptual core is the concluding report 
from the World Commission on Sustainable Development, Our Common 
Future (WCED 1987). This is the report that laid the foundation for the UNCED 
process leading up to the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit in 1992 (and its follow-
up conferences in Johannesburg ten years later, as well as Rio de Janeiro 
once again 20 years later), and provided the normative framework for the 
conventions and agreements adopted in the summit by all UN member states.52 
However, the origins of sustainable development thinking can be traced back 
to environmental activism and an increased understanding of the degradation 
of the natural environment based on scientific evidence gathered since the 
late 1950s and 1960s.53 These concerns were then coupled with questions 
of development and social justice brought up mainly by developing country 
governments in the 1970s. “Sustainable development” as defined by the WCED 
was the first attempt to embrace all of these dimensions globally. 
A few points are of particular importance from the point of view of this 
dissertation. First, as regards global governance, the task put forward by the 
WCED was clear: there is a greater need than ever for co-ordinated multilateral 
political action engaging both rich and poor countries but with differentiated 
responsibilities. The problem of unsustainable development cannot be resolved 
through a compartmentalised approach to the environment or to poverty, or 
consequently by those who deal with environmental issues or with development 
52 Lafferty 2004: 13.
53 For more on this background, see Baker 2006, Dresner 2002, Adams 1995, Purvis & Grainger 2004, 
and Weiss et. al 2004. The concerns of the first wave of environmentalism were partially taken 
onto the inter-governmental agenda, as the United Nations (UN) increased its activity on behalf 
of ecology from 1964 onwards and organised the first UN Conference on the Human Environment 
in Stockholm in 1972. The circle was closed between the UN and the early Environmentalist as the 
newly founded United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) commissioned the study Limits 
of Growth through the Club of Rome in 1972. In turn, political environmentalism was sparked by 
a set of popularised scientific works, most notably by Rachel Carson and her book Silent Spring 
(1962) on the destruction of wildlife by the use of the pesticide DDT, economist Kenneth Bouldin’s 
The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth (1966), Edward Mishan’s The Costs of Economic 
Growth (1967), as well as Population Bomb by Paul Ehrlich (1968). Perhaps the most influential 
was the Club of Rome report Limits of Growth (1972) by Meadows et al. Its findings were also 
published in a more popularised format in Blueprint for Survival (1972) by the Ecologist magazine.
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assistance. Instead, these two dimensions are an inseparable part of larger 
structures of the global economy.54  At the core of the report is the idea of finding 
balance through the integration of the economic, social and environmental 
aspects of development, which is needed to tackle poverty and inequality within 
the limits of the global ecological system. Most importantly for policy coherence 
for development, the report defines poverty and inequality both as the planet’s 
main environmental problem and its main development problem.55 Moreover, 
the report expressly states that the global ecological system and the world 
economy are interlocked, which urgently requires viewing the above-mentioned 
three main aspects of development within the same framework as institutional 
change. 
Second, policy coherence is of particular importance with respect to economic 
growth and its equal distribution, which the WCED sees as crucial both for 
developing countries and the international system as a whole. At the same time, 
growth should be socially and environmentally sustainable and the report states 
that it is largely the responsibility of developed countries to mitigate the harmful 
consequences of growth.56 Moreover, practices that have hindered sustainable 
growth in developing trade should be removed. These included barriers 
to trade in the wealthier nations, the unfair terms of agricultural trade and 
subsidised practices in the northern hemisphere, depressed commodity prices, 
protectionism, intolerable debt burdens, and declining flows of development 
finance.57 In addition, the WCED prioritises the developing countries’ needs for 
stable and sustainable economic growth over the accumulation of wealth in the 
developed countries. 
…[Sustainable Development] contains within it two key concepts: the concept of 
needs, in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding 
priority should be given and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of 
technology and social organization on the environment’s ability to meet present 
and future needs.58
Third, the report suggests that the essential needs of the world’s poor should 
be placed at the core of the sustainable development agenda. What is of 
crucial importance is that in order to give priority to the needs of the world’s 
poor, fundamental changes are needed in richer countries as well as in the 
54 WCED 1987: x-xi.
55 Ibid. 3; 5-6.
56 Ibid. xii; 31-32; 5-54.
57 Ibid. 6-17.
58 Ibid. 43. For more on this debate, see Baker 2006: 20 and Grainger 2004: 6.
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interrelationship between the North and the South. Of course, defining the 
“needs of the world’s poor” constitutes a conceptual challenge in itself. For the 
Brundtland Commission, this equates with the bare necessities such as food, 
clothing, shelter and jobs, as well as aspirations for an improved quality of life. 
However, the report also notes that perceived needs are socially and culturally 
determined.59 What is important is to balance growth and opportunities, and 
distribute resources across and among generations in a sustainable way. To 
quote: 
Living standards that go beyond the basic minimum are sustainable only if 
consumption standards everywhere have regard for long-term sustainability. 
Yet many of us live beyond the world’s ecological means.60 
… Meeting essential needs depends in part on achieving full growth potential, 
and sustainable development clearly requires economic growth in places where 
such needs are not being met.61
Fourth, the Bruntland Report refers to key values that underpin sustainable 
development. Most notably these include intrinsic value of nature, human 
well-being, social justice including gender justice and democracy. It also 
sets out priorities such as the needs of world’s poor, new type of growth in 
developing countries, adjustment in developed economies as well as principles 
directing implementation including common but differentiated responsibilities 
between developing and developed countries, intra- and inter-generational 
equity, citizens’ participation.62 
Obviously, many actors, while making a commitment to sustainable 
development, have not embraced the full agenda as envisaged by the WCED. 
What makes the question of promoting “sustainable development” particularly 
difficult is the way in which conceptual vagueness enables actors to use the 
concept for their own purposes by creating and changing priorities between 
the “environmental, economic and social” dimensions, or simply by using the 
“sustainable development label” without specifying its detailed content. In this 
respect, Attfield (1999: 106) for instance draws a parallel between the concept of 
sustainable development and other grand notions such as “democracy”, which 
are commonly accepted and adhered to at a superficial level, but when the 
meaning of the concept is analysed, it may contain conflicting interpretations. 
59 WCED 1987: 43-44. 
60 Ibid. 1987: 44. 
61 Ibid. 1987: 44.
62 See Baker 2006 and Dresner 2002: 31.
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Regarding sustainable development, the main concerns relate to the integration 
of economic activity, nature and social justice.63 Therefore, what we can 
conclude at this point is that using sustainable development as a yardstick for 
policy coherence opens up a new level of complexities. However, this does not 
undermine its importance. 
One way around this dilemma is to use poverty eradication and the 
needs of the world’s poor as the primary reference for PCD. However, what 
should be recalled is that the WCED went on to argue that if the health of the 
environment is compromised and limits exceeded, everything else will be then 
undermined.64 In fact, this argument provided fresh impetus for a full range of 
theories and models on sustainability and growth.65 One fundamental division 
revolves around the “sustainability” that defines the desired “development”. 
In the literature, a difference is made between “strong” and “weak” forms of 
sustainable development, ranging from fundamental changes in how we value 
nature, and how we produce and consume, to more moderate reforms related 
to “ecological modernisation” as a weak, insufficient form of sustainable 
development.66  According to Flint (2009: 45), the difference between strong 
and weak sustainability is important, offering two dramatically differing 
options. Building on Flint’s argument, I claim further that this distinction 
also influences global governance for sustainable development. The weak 
position suggests that reforms to the system and better accounting will allow 
for adequate levels of sustainability, whilst the strong position demands 
more active involvement from political institutions and a dramatic change 
in the global economic system. Along similar lines, Lafferty (2004: 4) and 
Bomberg (2004: 61) argue that the governance for sustainable development 
implies that those governments as well as major organisations, including the 
EU or the WTO, that are formally committed to sustainable development, 
are also willing to alter existing governing systems in order to better achieve 
sustainable development goals. Therefore, promoting sustainable development 
is not only a matter of new policies, but new modes of governance. Yet in 
order to change the existing modes of governance, the actors committed to 
sustainable development must have the political will to do so as well as a vision 
of what the change would imply. With this quest for change, the question of 
power arises. 
63 See for instance Adams 1995, Baker 2006 and Elliot 2006. 
64 WCED 1987: 8-9.
65 See Grainger 2004: 16-20 on ecological and environmental economics and different principles 
and levels of sustainability by Jakob 1991, Daly 1992 and Pearce 1994.     
66 On weak and strong sustainable development, see Baker 2006.  
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Sustainable Development: Concerns for “Normative Power Europe”
In the context of the normative power Europe debate, Manners (2002: 242-
244) originally defined sustainable development as a minor value amongst the 
more prevalent liberal values. In his view, the normative base of the Union had 
been developed over the past decades through a series of declarations, treaties, 
policies, criteria and conditions. In this process shaping the EU law and policies, 
Manners singles out five “core norms” comprising the acquis communautaire 
and acquis politique. These included peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, 
and human rights. In addition to this set of norms, more contested norms, 
such as sustainable development, social solidarity, anti-discrimination and 
good governance could be inferred, which were aimed at increasing the EU’s 
legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens as well as in response to global processes. In 
his later writings on values and principles in EU foreign policy, Manners (2006) 
has raised sustainable development to the level of the nine EU core values.67  
Along lines similar to those of Bomberg (2004) and Baker (2006), Manners 
(2006: 36-37) argues that the EU’s interpretation of sustainable development, 
however, involves an emphasis on the dual problems of balance and coherence 
between uninhibited economic growth and biocentric ecological crisis. At the 
same time, Manners also points to the Treaty base that involves the integration 
of sustainable development into the policies and activities of the Union in its 
enlargement, development, trade, environment and foreign policies.68 However, 
as Lafferty (2004) stresses, in reality the EU does not prioritise sustainable 
development concerns in the interface with other policies. Furthermore, the 
commitment to sustainable development is not equally shared by the EU actors 
or integrated into the EU system.69 This is convincingly explained by the fact that, 
as Bomberg (2004: 62) points out, the Union functions primarily as a system of 
economic governance developed and designed to pursue and implement goals of 
market liberalisation and free trade. The vast majority of its policies are linked 
either directly or indirectly to building, promoting or cushioning markets. Its 
governing rules and norms are concerned with removing barriers to trade, 
regulating markets and policing competition. Above all, it works to coordinate 
the economies of the EU with the goal of expanding trade and economic growth. 
As a system of economic governance, it has been successful (with the notable 
67 In addition to sustainable development, these values include: sustainable peace, social liberty, 
consensual democracy, human rights, supranational rule of law, inclusive equality, social 
solidarity and good governance.
68 The change in the status of sustainable development is grounded in the draft text of the EU 
constitution. Indeed, the Treaty of Lisbon 2009 contains similar strong wording. 
69 Baker 2005: 148.
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exception of agriculture) in encouraging supranational collaboration to achieve 
the goals of market liberalisation. 
Yet, sustainable development has had a legal base for all EU policymakers 
since the signing of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 1992. To a varying 
degree, sustainable development has been present in both domestic and foreign 
policy requirements, including the EU’s relations with developing countries 
as well as in the EU contributions to global governance. Although the EU has 
claimed a leading role internationally in promoting sustainable development 
since the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, a more systematic process was launched 
as a part of the preparations for the Johannesburg follow-up conference in 
2002. In this context, the EU first set out its commitment in June 2001 at the 
Gothenburg European Council, which adopted the EU Sustainable Development 
Strategy. This strategy was complemented with a global dimension in February 
2002 as the Commission launched its “Towards a Global Partnership for 
Sustainable Development” paper, which covers all the external policies including 
development and trade. The Sustainable Development Strategy was reviewed 
in the course of 2005 with the alleged aim of consolidating it as an overarching 
concept that underpins all union policies, actions and strategies, and requires 
economic, environmental and social policies to be designed and implemented 
in a mutually reinforcing way.70 
To continue in this positive vein, the EU’s constructive role in sustainable 
development rests on a relatively strong environmental policy.71 What is 
particularly important is that in the Fifth Action Programme sustainable 
development had the status of a Community task (Articles 2 and 6 EC Treaty) 
and launched the idea of the integration of environmental concerns into all 
other EU policy areas with a view to promoting sustainable development.72 This 
happened at the same time as policy coherence in the context of development 
cooperation objectives was also included in the Maastricht Treaty text. 
However, as Schrijver (2004: 83-84) points out, the wording for development 
policy coherence is notably weaker when compared to the text defining the 
environment. According to Schrijver, this is due to two reasons. First,  Article 
6 on the Environment was positioned in the opening section of the EC Treaty 
on Principles, thereby embracing all activities and policies of the Community. 
By contrast, Article 178 was placed somewhat paradoxically in the section 
concerning only development cooperation (Title XX). Second, the articles were 
70 COM 2005a: 6.
71 See, for instance, Baker 1997, 2006 for an analysis of the EU’s Environmental Action Plans 
and environment and growth relationship, and Liberatore 1997 for difficulties in integrating 
sustainable development into the EU’s policymaking. 
72 Stibbe Simont Monahan Duhot 1994: 41.
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worded differently. Whereas Article 6 on the environment contains compelling 
formulations such as “requirements” and “must”, as well as a reference to the 
nearly 20 fields of activities and policies of the Community, Article 178 on 
development policy coherence has a much milder tone of “taking into account” 
and “likely to affect developing countries”. These formulations, as Schrijver 
rightly notes, “leave considerable discretion to the addressees”. 
Therefore, on the negative side, Baker (2006: 148) reminds us that with 
respect to the EU’s global commitment, one of the key challenges facing the 
EU is to integrate sustainable development considerations into its policies 
across the sectoral divisions. At the EU institutional level, it impinges upon 
policy sectors managed by Directorates-General (DGs) within the Commission. 
According to Baker, the DGs find it difficult to see beyond the limits of their own 
competences. This is particularly true in the case of DGs of development, trade, 
fisheries and agriculture. Traditionally, within the DGs there is a widespread 
belief that the promotion of sustainable development is the business of those 
who deal with the environment, and to some extent of DGs of development. 
That said, policy-making segmentation is not only a problem for this nexus, 
but a factor that impacts the functionality of the European Commission as a 
whole.73 This has been further exacerbated by the different types of competences 
between the EU institutions and diverse modes of policy-making related to 
these competences that cut across the national and supranational axis of the 
Union policies. To conclude, the institutional structures, as well as the primacy 
of the economic sector as the core of the EU, are affecting the Union’s role to 
advance policies in line with sustainable development in global governance. 
Thus, they are also likely to affect the norms that the EU seeks to promote for 
policy coherence (for development). 
Development Policy and Aid in Global Governance
Having discussed the complexities inherent in sustainable development as 
a yardstick for policy coherence and the characteristics of the Union in this 
endeavour, I will move on to tackle the role of development policy in this 
constellation. In other words, what kind of contribution to the resolution of 
global problems can we expect from development policy, and what kind of 
influence can development policy exercise outside of its traditional framework 
of cooperation and aid-giving practices? Development policy is often used as 
a synonym for development cooperation. However, this is not the case. As 
Ashoff (2005: 13) clarifies, development cooperation constitutes only one level 
of action within the larger framework of development policy. By development 
73 Wallace 1996: 48, and also Nugent 2006.
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policy, I refer to an officially formulated and adopted public policy that consists 
of defined objectives (e.g. poverty eradication and sustainable development), 
and means (e.g. development cooperation, official development assistance and, 
increasingly, policy coherence for development), as well as actors that use these 
means for the achievement of the objectives (i.e. donor – recipient). In addition, 
development policy is also a distinct policy arena because its overall agenda is 
primarily set at the donor end, while the policy in itself is implemented and its 
impact felt in another sovereign entity. This constitutes a power relationship 
of a particular kind between those who intervene to “cultivate development” 
and those who are subjects of that intervention.74 In this respect, the interests 
setting and motivations to engage in such a policy are particularly complex as 
it involves different actors at both ends that operate with imbalanced power 
resources. Consequently, development policy involves a massive number 
of principles, norms, procedures and practices that are designed to govern 
the donor-partner relationship on the one hand, and can all be regarded as 
instruments of power on the other. Yet, the very purpose of development policy 
is to redress the imbalance between the “developed” and “developing” world. 
Hence an interesting dividing line in the debate lies in the very basic 
approach to the role of development policy in poverty reduction that links 
it to the larger governance framework. Namely, how we see the function of 
development policy, cooperation and official development assistance in relation 
to other policies.75 What is development aid going to remedy precisely, and 
would an adequate amount of “effective aid” be the answer to persistent world 
poverty as Sachs (2005), for instance, largely claims? Indeed, Sachs strongly 
asserts that ending world poverty is a doable task. All that is required is for the 
amount of aid to be doubled so as to help the developing countries get a “foot 
on the development ladder” and climb out of the poverty trap. What makes 
this kind of “aid optimism” very attractive is the fact that it does not imply any 
major changes to the structures of the world economy, as promulgated in the 
sustainable development literature. In contrast, for Baker (2006), the “ladder of 
sustainable development” constitutes an uphill struggle composed of different 
policy imperatives associated with the promotion of sustainable development. 
These include, for instance, the adoption of an altogether different mind-set of 
normative principles globally, bottom-up development, respect for nature, the 
74 Cf. Mosse 2005. 
75 I use the concept of official development assistance (ODA, or foreign aid) defined by the OECD-
DAC. Official development assistance includes grants or loans to developing countries undertaken 
by the official sector at concessional financial terms (where loans must have a grant element of at 
least 25 per cent). This definition also includes technical cooperation, but excludes grants, loans, 
and credits for military purposes. See Whitfield and Fraser 2009: 23 for more on this.
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democratic governance of policies, technology, as well as the civil society and 
state relationship.76  
Yet another angle to this debate is to stress the underlying structural factors, 
such as the position of developing countries in the world economy and the 
financial flows that affect developing countries’ perspectives and the effects 
of aid.  In fact, some argue that more important than providing aid is to look 
at other types of financial flows such as trade flows, foreign direct investment, 
remittances, and revenues from natural resource exports. Or, more negatively, 
the debt problem, tax evasion and other forms of illicit capital flight that clearly 
supersede the flows of official development aid. As Pogge (2010: 52-53) argues, 
in the modern world, the rules governing economic transactions both nationally 
and internationally are the most important causal determinants of the extent 
and depth of severe poverty and other human rights deficits. He bases this 
argument on the great impact on economic distribution within the jurisdiction 
to which they apply. Even small changes to the rules governing transnational 
trade, lending, investment, resource use, or intellectual property can have a 
huge impact on the global incidence of life-threatening poverty. At the same 
time, turning a blind eye to the underlying structural sources of unsustainability 
makes any other efforts to promote sustainability futile. 
To return to the debate on aid itself, another fundamental line can be drawn 
between those believing in aid as a tool to overcome poverty, such as Sachs, and 
those seeing aid and aid-giving as part and parcel of the poverty problem. Since 
the beginning of aid practices, some have regarded the role of aid as useless, 
even detrimental to true development aspirations. Interestingly, the aid critics 
constitute a highly diverse group of scholars and practitioners, characterised by 
their wider view of development and the nature of interdependence in North-
South relations, and as those concerned with the world economy, and financial 
flows and power in the global system.77 Nederveen Pieterse (2001: 80-83), for 
instance, draws the line between those advocating mainstream development 
and those who aim to provide an alternative view, focusing on local initiatives 
and global alternatives. This stems from the enormous growth of the NGO 
sector, the increased importance of environmental concerns (and sustainable 
development), the failure of several decades of the mainstream paradigm, as 
well as the growing procedural, institutional and policy challenges to the Bretton 
Woods Institutions advocating them. In the most recent critical debates, aid-
giving practices have been questioned because the aid relationship has been 
perceived as a kind of neo-colonial power relationship, or simply ineffective 
in terms of contributing to economic growth. Regarding the former, the neo-
76 Baker 2006: 30-31. 
77 For more, see Riddell 1987. 
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colonial power relationship is created in the relationship between the donor 
and recipients, in which the stronger party has the final say on the planning 
and implementation of development interventions in the recipient country. As 
regards the latter, Easterly (2005: 322) has strongly questioned what he sees 
as the false assumptions associated with development aid. Arguing directly 
against Sachs (2006), he claims that development aid cannot bring about the 
end of poverty. Instead, what is needed according to Easterly is homegrown 
development based on the dynamism of individuals and firms in a free market. 
The critical line of thinking clashes with one of the fundamental assumptions 
of the moral case for aid and the donor-partner relationship. Namely, the 
belief that the effect of aid is positive and it does help to eliminate poverty by 
promoting development.78 In a broader sense, it also indicates a counter-current 
against development cooperation or development cooperation policy per se.  To 
continue deeper into the critical direction, it is interesting to analyse what kind 
of motivations there are behind aid-giving, or withholding it for that matter, 
as Riddell (1987:3), for instance, discusses. In fact, Riddell points out many 
motives for granting foreign aid. These include national self-interest, commercial 
considerations, historical links, political goals, and the straightforward desire 
to accelerate economic growth in less developed countries, as well as moral 
reasons that tend to conceal the other less altruistic and less legitimate 
incentives from the public. However, an emerging feature in aid-giving is the 
aim to strengthen global public goods and to tackle the detrimental effects of 
global challenges. 79 That said, all the successful development projects and larger 
interventions that have enabled a change for the better in people’s lives again 
speak for development cooperation. Indeed, in the eyes of the wider public, 
development cooperation enjoys high legitimacy in general.80 Aid practitioners 
typically find themselves somewhere between these two positions, arguing that 
aid has made a difference but, with some changes to the way it is thought-out 
and delivered, could be far more effective (e.g. Riddell 2007). Pointing also to 
the fact that donor management systems and motivations for giving aid differ 
across donor countries, the OECD-DAC sets norms and standard practices for 
member countries and exerts peer pressure on members to adopt and abide by 
them.81 Having outlined some of the key features in the aid debate, the differing 
stances towards the role and functionality of foreign aid in global governance, 
as well as the motivations behind development cooperation, I will proceed to 
look at the specific goals that development aid is designed to achieve. 
78 Riddell 1987: 81.
79 Riddell 2007: 91-92.
80 On public support to development aid, see Riddell 2007: 107-177.
81 Whitfield and Fraser 2009: 18. 
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Since 2001, the main international, often referred to as universal framework 
for these efforts has been formed around the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs).82 Indeed, in the UN Millennium Declaration of 2000, the 
191 member states of the UN committed themselves “to halve, by the year 
2015, the proportion of the world’s people whose income is less than one 
dollar a day and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger”. This is 
the first and most prominent of what have come to be known as the eight 
MDGs. In this context, hunger and extreme poverty is defined as the inability 
to afford “a minimum, nutritionally adequate diet plus essential non-food 
requirements”.83 Intriguingly, the MDGs were designed primarily for developing 
countries, whereas the role of the developed countries was to support the 
achievement of these goals. However, the text of the Millennium Declaration 
itself also covers the global level of this endeavour, especially as regards global 
trade.84
12. We resolve therefore to create an environment – at the national and global 
levels alike – which is conducive to development and to the elimination of poverty.
82 The eight Millennium Development Goals, including their targets: goal 1 Eradicate extreme poverty 
and hunger. Target: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is 
less than $1 a day. Target: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer 
from hunger. goal 2 Achieve universal primary education. Target: Ensure that, by 2015, children 
everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling. goal 
3 Promote gender equality and empower women. Target: Eliminate gender disparity in primary 
and secondary education preferably by 2005 and in all levels of education no later than 2015. goal 
4 Reduce child mortality. Target: Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five 
mortality rate. goal 5 Improve maternal health. Target: Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 
and 2015, the maternal mortality rate. goal 6 Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. 
Target: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS. Target: Have halted 
by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases. goal 7 Ensure 
environmental sustainability. Target: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into 
country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources. Target: Halve, 
by 2015, the proportion of the population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and 
basic sanitation. Target: To improve the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020. goal 
8 Develop a global partnership for development. Target: Address the special needs of the least 
developed countries, landlocked countries and small island developing states. Target: Develop 
further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system. 
Target: In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent 
and productive work for youth. Target: Deal comprehensively with developing countries’ debt. 
Target: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, 
especially information and communications.
83 Cf. the basic needs in the WCED Report.
84 http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm
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13. Success in meeting these objectives depends, inter alia, on good governance 
within each country. It also depends on good governance at the international 
level and on transparency in the financial, monetary and trading systems. We are 
committed to an open, equitable, rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory 
multilateral trading and financial system.85
Perhaps on a more negative note, the goals as such remain very limited, even 
more limited than at the World Food Summit in Rome four years earlier when 
the idea of halving extreme poverty and hunger was first affirmed.86 When 
compared to the sustainable development agenda, it does focus on the basic 
needs but in the relatively minimalist way of using the World Bank established 
international poverty line as a computational basis for defining extreme or 
absolute poverty. This naturally sets the target for poverty reduction at a rather 
modest level both in terms of the number of people as well as in conceptualising 
poverty and the needs of the poor. Yet it was celebrated as the most important 
anti-poverty campaign. Importantly for policy coherence for development, 
MDG number 8 defines the targets for global economic governance under the 
title “global partnership for development”, calling for nota bene: a further 
development of an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading 
and financial system to service especially the least developed countries. This 
goal links the development policy-oriented agenda to that of global governance 
within the larger framework of sustainable development.
Trade in the Development Equation
Leaving the aid debate aside for a moment, I will now switch the perspective 
to the role of trade in development and development models. A fundamental 
question immediately emerges of how development and trade policies should 
consequently be organised so as to promote sustainable development. The 
beauty of the question lies in the fact that there is hardly any unambiguous 
answer, either in the history of development or in the theoretical literature that 
would provide a clear-cut answer for policy coherence for development. In this 
section, I will start with an overview of the debate and conclude with a summary 
of the key aspects for PCD in global governance. 
85 Millennium Declaration para. 12. – 13. 
86 Regarding this commitment, the Rome Declaration referred to the number of undernourished, 
while the latter Millennium Declaration speaks of halving the proportion of people suffering from 
hunger and extreme poverty by 2015. However, substituting ‘proportion’ for ‘number’ makes a 
considerable difference. The Rome Declaration promised a 50 per cent reduction in the number of 
poor by 2015. The Millennium Declaration only promised a 40 per cent reduction in this number. 
Pogge 2010: 58.
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Since the demise of development strategy through import substitution in 
the 1980s, and the apparent success of the newly-industrialised countries of 
Asia with export-led growth strategies, trade and more specifically free trade, 
has gained an increasingly important role in donor-led development strategies. 
In this context, trade is often presented as “an engine of economic growth” 
and, through growth, of development. On the other hand, “trade and not aid” 
was the slogan echoed by the developing world in the debates around the new 
international economic order (NIEO). So essentially, the question is not and has 
never been between autarky (no trade, no international trade) and free trade as 
Stiglitz and Charlton (2005:12) continue to stress, but rather a choice among a 
spectrum of trade regimes with varying degrees of liberalisation and protection. 
Trade’s potential to act as a driver for development depends fundamentally 
on the existence of prerequisites in the form of domestic policies, institutions 
and infrastructure.87 This again is an area where development cooperation and 
trade policies intersect. While the potential of trade per se in the development 
equation is often overemphasised or at least oversimplified, as even the most 
outward-oriented development strategies involve some degree of infant industry 
protection, domestic institution-building or government support, free trade 
as a key element in the development process is still largely undisputed in the 
development and trade nexus, especially in the Washington Consensus in the 
1990s and in the development discourse of the early 2000s.88 
According to Stiglitz and Charlton (2005:12), the notion that free trade is 
one of the most fundamental doctrines in modern economies dates back at 
least to the classical economists Adam Smith (1776) and David Ricardo (1816). 
Both contributed to the process which led to the abolition of protectionist 
laws governing Britain’s agricultural trade, especially the corn trade, in 1846. 
This reform occurred in parallel with the Industrial Revolution and helped 
Britain to transform itself from a largely agricultural economy into the world’s 
dominant industrial and commercial trading power.89 Even if Adam Smith is 
often best remembered for his metaphor of the invisible hand, Smith’s view 
of the functioning of the market is far less optimistic than what is commonly 
misquoted. However, it was in this specific context that he envisaged that a free 
market and free trade would benefit Britain.90 Based on the premises that Smith 
had initiated, David Ricardo suggested that other countries could benefit in the 
87 Cosbey 2009: 87-89.
88 Cosbey 2009: 86.
89 George 2010: 7-8.
90 George 2010: 8. However, this argument was most notably countered by Friedrich List (1885), 
who stated that the benefits of free trade elsewhere than in Britain can be gained only after a 
certain degree of development based on protectionist measures, which he also pictured as the 
ladders of British greatness.
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same way from free trade with Britain by applying the principle of “comparative 
advantage”.  This principle formed the very core of classical trade theory and 
its normative foundation in favour of free trade. Ricardo based his concept of 
comparative advantage on the assumption that free trade is beneficial because 
it allows each country to specialise in the goods that they produce relatively 
efficiently, and to gain from international trade by specialising in this way.91 
A free market, and free trade as a part of it, have had their more recent 
intellectual roots in the ideas of Friedrich von Hayek (1949) and Milton Friedman 
(1990), which became popular due to the disillusionment with planning, 
particularly as practised by the former Soviet Union and Eastern European 
countries. The role of the state in economic affairs came under new increased 
scrutiny by both economic theoreticians and practitioners alike. Most notably 
from this perspective, it led to the development of the so-called Washington 
Consensus – a term originally coined by Williamson (1989)92 to refer to an agenda 
of desirable economic reforms in Latin America. The reforms quickly came to be 
seen as a model for the wider developing world, as they were already embodied 
in the thinking of the World Bank and the IMF. The ideational content of the 
Washington Consensus was based on the assumption that free markets and free 
trade were needed for the achievement of more rapid economic progress, and 
included among its major objectives: the privatisation of state enterprises, trade 
liberalisation, particularly the replacement of quantitative restrictions on trade 
with low and uniform tariffs, and openness to foreign direct investment. In 
practice, these issues formed the core of the structural adjustment programmes 
(SAPs) which many developing countries were forced to embark on in return for 
loan support from the IMF and the World Bank.93 The benefits of the SAPs for 
poverty reduction were envisioned through the so-called “trickle down” effect 
from the rich to the poor.94 Interestingly, Drexhage and Murphy (2010: 11), 
and Reed (1996) see the Washington Consensus as a fundamentally different, 
competing paradigm to that of sustainable development.95  
The theoretical concept of free trade refers to trade without government 
restrictions.96 The concept of trade liberalisation thus refers to the process of the 
91 Stiglitz & Charlton 2005: 24-25.
92 See Williamson 2008.
93 Thirwall & Pacheco-López 2008: 18-20. 
94 Basically, the rich would benefit first, and then in the second round the poor would begin to benefit 
when the rich started spending their gains. Thus the poor benefit from economic growth only 
indirectly though the vertical flow from the rich. Although the poor will always gain proportionally 
less from the growth, poverty can still diminish; see for instance Kakwani & Pernia 2000: 2.
95 On the post-Rio 1992 Sustainable Development, see Drexhage-Murphy 2010, and more specifically 
on Structural Adjustment, the Environment, and Sustainable Development, see Reed (ed.) 1996.
96 Stiglitz and Charlton 2005: 12.
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reduction of tariffs and the removal or relaxation of non-tariff barriers.97 More 
specifically, the most common measure of trade liberalisation focuses on what is 
happening to tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade.98 In line with the Washington 
Consensus, trade liberalisation has often played a key role as an instrument of 
wider economic liberalisation and structural changes in a given society by re-
dividing the policy space between domestic and foreign actors. These features 
relate essentially to so-called trade-related policies that actually regulate policies 
and practices “behind the border” such as investment, government procurement 
and competition policies. Indeed, much has changed since Ricardo’s times in 
terms of the quantity of international trade flows as well as the types of flows: 
from tangible goods to normative forms for regulating different legal aspects 
related to trade. Yet, the idea of comparative advantage is still very influential. 
In theory, it is all very simple. If countries in favour of free trade would 
just adopt the notion that government restrictions to trade are unnecessary 
and harmful, every country need only remove all its barriers to trade for the 
assumed optimum to occur.99 In practice, the empirical evidence from the past 
shows that the model of free trade has been used very selectively. 100As Krugman 
97 Stiglitz & Charlton 2005: 12, xxvi.
98 Thirwall & Pancheco-López 2008: 48.
99 George 2010: 13-14. 
100 As Thirwall and Pacheco-Lopez (2008:17) point out, despite the putative arguments for free 
trade laid down by classical and neoclassical economic theory, it was never seriously practised by 
countries (except by Britain post-1850) until after the Second World War with the establishment 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 and the general commitment 
by developed countries to the freeing of international trade in goods. As a matter of fact, many 
developed countries maintained quite high tariff levels, and non-tariff barriers, until the early 
1970s, and many developing countries went down the protectionist route, particularly in Latin 
America (before the debt crisis) and parts of South Asia. Chang (2007) has conducted extensive 
studies into the role of protectionism in the early industrialisation phase of now-developed 
countries and reminds readers how none of the current developed nations of the world, including 
Britain, the US and the countries of continental Europe and Scandinavia, developed their 
economies on the basis of free trade. On the contrary, they heavily protected their domestic 
industries, and also did their utmost to prevent the countries that they colonised from competing 
with them. As for Latin American countries, Rodrik (2004:3) notes that the Latin America 
of the 1960s and 1970s was a region of import substitution, macroeconomic populism, and 
protectionism, while the Latin America of the 1990s was a region of openness, privatisation and 
liberalisation. The harsh truth is that per capita economic growth performance has been abysmal 
during the 1990s by any standards. The economies of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, 
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand have recorded some of the highest export growth 
rates in the world since 1965 (average over 10 per cent per annum) and some of the highest GDP 
growth rates (average nearly 6 per cent per annum), but some of these countries have been very 
interventionist, pursuing export promotion and import substitution at the same time, particularly 
Japan and South Korea.
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(1997) points out, if the conventional economic argument in favour of free trade 
were the only consideration, there would be no WTO and no trade negotiations. 
However, in reality, free trade is a subject of complex multilevel negotiations on 
trade rules and regulations due to the diverse interests related to international 
trade and the varying impacts that trade has in both developed and developing 
countries.  
In this regard, Stiglitz and Charlton (2005: 12-13) continue to state that the 
pro-development trade agenda is effectively a complex task, including reforms 
both at the level of the international trading system and at developed and 
developing country levels alike. They argue that despite the free-trade rhetoric 
in the post-GATT Uruguay round, protectionism in developed countries still 
prevails to the detriment of developing nations. In fact, some of the developed 
countries that have been the most ardent advocates of trade liberalisation, such 
as those in the EU, have been somewhat duplicitous in their advocacy. They have 
negotiated under the GATT rounds the reduction of tariffs and the elimination 
of subsidies for the goods in which they have a comparative advantage, but are 
more reluctant to open up their markets and to eliminate their own subsidies in 
other areas where the developing countries have an advantage (e.g. agriculture, 
textiles, and clothing). Consequently, this results in an international trading 
system that is disadvantageous to the developing countries, which is disturbing 
considering the magnitude of world poverty. Along similar lines, Sunanda Sen 
(2005: 1023, 1025-1026) concludes in her review of the evolution of trade theory 
and its impact on policy that the traditional trade theory continues to be used to 
justify trade liberalisation in developing countries, notwithstanding the serious 
theoretical and empirical limitations embedded in these theories. According to 
Sen, these theories defended by the advanced economies still inform agenda-
setting both at intergovernmental levels and in multilateral institutions like the 
IMF and the WTO. However, the policies pursued by the advanced countries 
themselves tend to rely on the new trade theory of strategic trade to protect 
their national interests. Young’s (2007: 789-808) work on the EU is a case in 
point as he provides a more nuanced account of how the Union applies different 
approaches from traditional trade policy, and commercial trade policy to social 
trade policy, depending on the trade sector and the EU interests at the WTO 
Doha Development Round.101 
101 Traditional trade policy focuses on so-called at-the-border measures such as tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions regulated by the GATT agreement including, most importantly, the 
Common Agricultural Policy CAP. Second, commercial trade policy addresses competition-
focused measures including so-called behind-the-border measures regulating competition within 
domestic markets regulated by GATS, TRIPS agreements and partially CAP subsidies in the form 
of price support, as well as ‘Singapore issues’ of investment, competition policy and government 
procurement. Third, social trade policy deals with so-called market failure-focused behind-the 
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That said, it would be logical to think that trade liberalisation should be 
strategically used as an alternative in the developing countries as well. However, 
freedom of choice is not that straightforward. Dornbusch (1992) has identified 
four major pressures on developing countries that have led to the adoption of 
the free trade paradigm. These include an intellectual swing in favour of free 
markets; institutional pressures from the international institutions, namely 
from the World Bank and the IMF; greater awareness of the efficiency losses 
from restricting trade; and finally the alleged, or apparent, poor economic 
performance of countries pursuing protection.102
But the picture is more complex than simply framing trade liberalisation 
as either good or bad. As Stiglitz and Charlton (2005:25) point out, trade 
liberalisation can promote development, but trade policies have varied across 
countries, and the evidence suggests that the benefits of liberalisation depend 
on a host of factors. Thus the implementation of trade liberalisation needs to 
be sensitive to national circumstances, and the sequencing of liberalisation is 
important. Further, Stiglitz and Charlton (2005: 25-29) define four channels 
through which trade liberalisation and free trade can deliver benefits and costs 
at a country level as assumed in the classical trade theory, and specialisation 
according to comparative advantage. First, on the beneficial side, trade 
liberalisation opens up foreign markets, expanding the demand for domestic 
firms’ goods and enabling them to serve a larger market or even create new 
markets through regional integration, and realise gains from economies 
of scale. Trade liberalisation may make available a range of inputs at lower 
prices, lowering the costs of production. Liberalisation may also introduce more 
competition from foreign firms to the domestic economy, which may result in 
improvements to the efficiency of local production. Finally, trade liberalisation 
may, through various channels, affect the rate of economic growth that the 
writers maintain is the criterion against which the long-term effects of trade 
border measures such as Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures and those that address the 
“negative externalities” of free trade, such as potential threats to consumer safety and pollution. 
Related to this category of trade policy is the idea to use this sector of trade policy to export social 
regulation, including core labour standards and minimum environmental standards.
102 Dornbusch as cited in Thirwall and Pacheco-López 2008. Regarding the latter two pressures, 
Thirwall and Pacheco-López (2008: 19-22) clarify that the major empirical studies on the efficiency 
loss from restricting trade were commissioned by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and the National Bureau of Economic and Social Research in the US, 
showing the apparent failure of import substitution policies (see, for example, Little et al. 1970; 
and summaries of this and other studies by Bhagwati 1978 and Krueger 1978). As for the premise 
of poor economic performance of developing countries under protective trade policies as a motive 
for liberalisation, this is not factually accurate in the light of the examples of Latin America, Asia 
or Africa as many of the states in these regions have experienced worse growth performance in 
the structural adjustment period of the post-1980s than in the pre-liberalisation era.
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liberalisation are determined. However, they also point out that there is actually 
weak evidence in favour of a direct relationship between trade liberalisation 
and economic growth. On the other hand, they refer to Rodriquez and Rodrik, 
who point out that there is no credible evidence that trade restrictions are 
systematically associated with higher growth rates either.103 Thirwall and 
Pacheco-Lopéz point to the fact that there are several analytical difficulties in 
conducting research in this area, and in assessing the results.104 When compared 
to the interrelationship between trade liberalisation and economic growth, the 
economic literature has been more successful in demonstrating the importance 
of variables other than trade liberalisation for economic development, including 
education, institutions, health and geography.105 
In addition, much hinges on the role that is given to trade policy in this 
equation. In other words, it requires an understanding of what it is that trade 
policy is expected to deliver and to whom. That said, in the short to medium 
term, the poor may disproportionately suffer the pains of transition associated 
with liberalisation, particularly in the absence of adjustment measures or 
social safety nets.106 This situation can be described in Bhagwati’s (1988) terms 
as “immiserizing growth” if high growth increases inequality. To tackle this 
phenomenon, the concept of pro-poor growth and redistribution with growth 
or broad-based growth was put forward by the World Bank reports of the early 
1990s. The Asian Development Bank (1999:6) defines growth as being pro-poor 
when it is labour absorbing and accompanied by policies and programmes that 
mitigate inequalities and facilitate income and employment generation for the 
poor, particularly women and other traditionally excluded groups.107 Kakwani 
and Pernia (2002) argue further that pro-poor growth as such marked a major 
shift from “Trickle-down development”, the dominant thinking of what can be 
considered the “neoliberal” paradigm that is also at the core of the Washington 
Consensus agenda. In particular, the role of the poor in pro-poor growth is 
one of active participants, whereas in trickle-down development the poor are 
103 Stiglitz & Charlton 2005: 34-35. 
104 For more on the question of trade liberalisation and economic performance in terms of growth, 
see Thirwall & Pacheco-López 2008: 85-100.
105 Stiglitz & Charlton 2005: 33. 
106 Cosbey 2009.
107 According to Kakwani and Pernia (2000: 1-3), promoting this notion requires a strategy that is 
deliberately biased in favour of the poor so that the poor benefit proportionally more than the 
rich so as to provide them with the necessary resources to meet their minimum basic needs. By 
reframing the pro- poor growth in these terms, they link it closely with Amartya Sen’s concept of 
well-being based on capabilities that are connected with the freedom people have in their choice 
of life. Drawing on Sen’s thinking, they define pro-poor growth as one that enables the poor to 
actively participate in and significantly benefit from economic activity.
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passive recipients of the benefits through the agency of the rich. In addition, with 
trickle-down development, there is no need for strategic thinking in terms of 
directing the growth benefits to the poor in a larger developmental framework. 
In sum, trade liberalisation may offer opportunities, but these opportunities 
should be handled with care.
Furthermore, in the context of developing countries’ economies, the free 
trade paradigm faces additional challenges. In some countries, the need for 
government revenue is a rational argument to maintain border tariffs to collect 
trade taxes. This is simply because in the absence of other functioning systems 
of indirect tax collection through income or commodity taxation (e.g. VAT), 
the tariffs are still the main stable source of government revenue and public 
spending.108 Also, the standard argument in favour of trade liberalisation is 
that it improves the average efficiency in a country, but this depends on the 
country context. Imports from foreign producers may destroy some inefficient 
local industries, but competitive local industries are supposed to be able to 
take up the slack as they expand their exports to foreign markets. In this way, 
trade liberalisation is supposed to allow resources to be redeployed from low-
productive protected sectors into high-productivity export sectors. But this 
argument assumes that resources will be fully employed in the first place, 
whereas in most developing countries unemployment is persistently high. In 
practice, trade liberalisation often harms competing local import industries, 
while local exporters may not automatically have the necessary supply 
capacity to expand. Hence the jury is still out on the question of whether trade 
liberalisation is actually the right way to go – or rather how far and under which 
conditions poorer countries should go down that path. 
At the level of trade governance, the GATT agreement recognises the fact 
that there are remarkable differences in countries’ needs and their capacities to 
engage in trade liberalisation. Therefore, a uniform set of multilateral rights and 
obligations would simply be dysfunctional and unjust. In an attempt to create 
a more balanced legal framework, GATT members adopted the premise that 
equal treatment of un-equals is unfair.109 This idea was enshrined in the special 
and differential treatment (SDT) principle and codified in the Tokyo Round’s 
GATT Enabling Clause.110 Since the establishment of GATT in 1948, special 
and differential treatment has been present in the development and trade 
debates. 111 Building on the debates under UNCTAD and the New International 
Economic Order in the 1970s, the SDT was further defined in 1979.  The main 
108 Stiglitz & Charlton 2005: 28.
109 Sampson 2005: 193.
110 Sally 2004: 109-110.
111 Keck & Low 2006: 147-148. 
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features of the SDT include improved market access granted to certain selective 
imports from developing countries to developed country markets at tariff rates 
lower than the most favoured nation (MFN) level that is applied to all other 
members of the GATT/WTO without reciprocal concessions. Hence the SDT 
principle is essentially related to non-reciprocity. This in turn facilitated the 
operation of unilateral preferential trading schemes between developed and 
developing countries such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). 
The SDT principle also allows exemptions from GATT disciplines; and more 
space for using certain restrictive trade policies, as well as longer phase-down 
periods and flexibility in implementation so as to safeguard what is perceived as 
development interest.112  However, as Sampson (2005: 193) notes, the number 
of different SDT-related provisions has increased to 155 since the creation of 
the GATT agreement. What makes their application difficult in practice is that 
these provisions do not constitute a single entity as such, but are scattered 
throughout the legal texts. This also leaves significant room for manoeuvre 
for those who are in a position to have a say on what passes for an acceptable 
interpretation. Furthermore, since the GATT Uruguay Round (1986-1994), 
the so-called Single Undertaking principle has complicated the application 
of the SDT principle. According to the Single Undertaking principle, all WTO 
members have to comply with the obligations of all the Uruguay agreements, 
with relatively minor exceptions.113 
To summarise, the tension between theory, principles and practice related 
to trade liberalisation makes the issue area an intriguing one for the analysis of 
power as defined by Barnett and Duvall (2005). In particular, it is interesting 
in relation to further enquiry into the normative power EU when examining 
the norms that are being advocated to direct North-South trade and policy 
coherence. In addition, it is of interest when probing who has the power to 
define what the enigmatic policy coherence “for” development entails and how 
the consensus has been reached. 
112 Özden and Reinhardt 2006: 189, Ismail 2006: 213, and Sampson 2005: 193.
113 Sally 2004: 109.
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3 CONTEXTUALISINg THE EUROPEAN 
CONSENSUS
In Chapter 3, I contextualise development policy by addressing the internal 
and external factors that have defined the role of development policy in 
the Union. This is essential for the further understanding of the nature of 
the EU’s development policy and its position in the EU’s political system. 
Methodologically, the contextualisation of policy is also very relevant from the 
point of view of discourse production and practices.114  First, I start with the 
institutional jungleland nesting the EU’s external policies before the period of 
the Lisbon Treaty. Second, I take a leap back in time and discuss the historical 
evolution of the European development policy and its key elements: development 
assistance and trade. In addition, I also follow the changes in norms that regulate 
them. Third, I look at the institutional position of development policy in the EU 
external relations inside the Union before the European Consensus (2005). Then 
I briefly discuss the international context and the EU’s own external relations 
context in which the European Consensus on development was conceived. In 
this section, I start to draw on my interviews, which complement the contextual 
background constructed from the literature and official documents. 
3.1 THE JUNgLELAND Of INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS 
While the EU’s claim to fame as the world’s leading donor of official development 
assistance (ODA) is widely acknowledged, it is far less clear “who” that “EU” 
in international development actually is. The shared competence between the 
Community and the member states raises the old question of who to call if you 
want to discuss the EU and world development. Therefore it is justified to proceed 
with a short overview of the key institutions, their main roles and relations in the 
Union. The first of these is the European Commission and its services, whose 
role I look at in a more detailed manner due to their central position in the EU 
development policy formation and development and trade nexus. Next, I will go 
on to discuss the role of the European Parliament, followed by the Council and 
its working groups. Acknowledging that the inter-institutional relations have 
been very much the focus of European studies, the purpose of this section is 
not to replicate what has been already said in various books on the European 
Union and its institutions. Rather, the aim here is to look at the modes of policy-
114 Cf. Heberer 2006:21, Fairclough 2003.
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making and inter-institutional roles in terms of the larger framework for the EU 
development policy and policy coherence for development. It is also the context 
which influences the policy initiation, formulation and content. The institutional 
structures are also important from the point of view of defining the EU’s stance 
towards development and trade-related coherence, and the resulting normative 
approaches in the pre-Lisbon era. 
The European Commission in the Institutional Context
In discussing the overall role and functions of the European Commission, Cini 
(1996:15-16) highlights the idea of Europeanism and the common European 
interest that the Commission seeks to safeguard. In her view, this often 
neglected Europeanism provides an excellent starting point for addressing 
this institution, as most of what the Commission does “either flows from this 
function or at the very least, is strongly shaped by it”. However, the difficulty of 
this role lies in the fact that being the protagonist where the European interest 
is concerned is largely a self-proclaimed institutional identity without any 
clarification in treaty texts. Cini also reminds readers that in the early days of 
the Community, it was commonplace to see the Commission as an institution 
capable of mitigating sectoral interests and as an actor above the day-to-day 
struggles of national politics. Pollack (2005:50) notes that at least by the EU’s 
institutional design, the Commission can play a central role as it was designated 
as both secretariat and proto-executive in the EU’s institutional system. By 
virtue of these capacities, the Commission has been well-placed to present an 
overview of an issue in Europe, as well as to adopt a European-wide position 
on policy issues.115 Indeed, the Commission has been centrally involved in EU 
decision-making at all levels and on all fronts. 
In defining the role of the Commission, Nugent (2006) argues that it is, in 
reality, more than the Union civil service that it is often portrayed to be. It is 
more in the sense that the treaties and political practices have assigned to it 
much greater policy- and law- initiating powers, as well as decision-making 
powers than those enjoyed by national civil services.116 In terms of actual powers 
vested in the Commission, Cini (1996) singles out the three most prevailing 
ones that constitute the Commission as a political, legal and administrative 
body.117 The list of related roles includes policy-initiator, formulator, think-
tank, manager, defender of legal order and consensus-builder.118 Nugent (2006) 
115 Cini 1996: 17. 
116 Nugent 2006: 155-160
117 Cini 1996: 32-35.
118 See Cini 1996. 
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sees the Commission’s roles as those of proposer and developer of policies and 
legislation, executive, guardian of the legal framework, external representative 
and negotiator, mediator and conciliator (especially in the Council of Ministers), 
as well as promoter of the common interest.119 The latter  according to Cini 
(1996), is first and foremost manifested in the function of policy initiation or 
policy formulation. I will return to these roles in Chapter 4.
Regarding policy initiation and formulation, there are two levels: those 
of sectoral policies and those related more generally to European integration 
per se and the very project of developing the European Union. 120 Therefore, 
the Commission plays a central role in shaping the Union’s normative power. 
121 However, this function is shaped by the Council in the areas of shared 
competence such as development policy.122 In other words, when analysing 
decision-making related to development policy and the process of policy 
formulation, in practice we look at the Commission’s involvement in trying to 
bring about these agreements on policy contents, and a great deal of its time 
is taken up looking for common ground. What is important to note is that 
the mediation takes place at two levels: within the Commission services (as 
will be discussed in more detail below) and between the Commission and the 
member states. According to Nugent (2006), this mediating and conciliating 
role sometimes obliges the Commission to be guarded and cautious with its 
proposals. He explains that: 
radical initiatives, perhaps involving what it really believes needs to be done, are 
almost certain to meet with fierce opposition. More moderate proposals on the 
other hand, perhaps taking the form of adjustments and extensions to existing 
policy, and preferably presented in a technocratic rather than an ideological 
manner, are more likely to be acceptable.123
119 Nugent 2006: 166-189.
120 In Cini’s (1996: 18-19) terms, the Commission may act as a catalyst for a policy-making process, 
or in broader terms, the institution responsible for the overall course of European integration. 
Similarly, 
121 Hewitt and Whiteman (2004) point to the fact that every time the EU has been taken forward in 
terms of integration (be it related to the setting up of the single European Market or the formation 
of its Treaty base), there has been an initiative from the Commission. These major development 
undertakings are often directly associated with Commission Presidents, such as Roy Jenkins 
(EMU) and perhaps most visibly with Jacques Delors (Single Market, the European Union and 
the Maastricht Treaty).
122 Similarly, Nugent (2006: 166-167) points to the fact that even before the Lisbon Treaty, the 
Commission had proposing and initiating powers under pillars two and three of the EU (in the 
latter case, since the Amsterdam Treaty), but these were shared with the member states. This is 
why the interaction between the Commission and the Council becomes so crucial. 
123 Nugent 2006: 187.
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The Commission as an institution is organised into Directorates-General (DGs), 
which were historically known by their numbers, but as of 1999 by the name of 
each main area of policy activity.124 The staff of the DGs consist of European civil 
servants, recruited mostly in competitions across the member states. The core 
staff are supplemented by seconded national experts and temporary staff. One 
DG leads on each policy topic (e.g. development, trade issues), as the so-called 
chef de file.125
In the pre-Lisbon context, from the EU development cooperation point 
of view, a notable issue here is the division of labour as regards the political 
organisation of development cooperation policy between DG Development and 
DG RELEX. In addition, with regard to development financing, DG Enlargement 
dealing with pre-accession funds played an important role in the 1990s and early 
2000s, but its role continues to be relevant. DG Ecfin, in turn, is responsible for 
economic monitoring and dialogue with third countries, and it also manages 
macro-financial assistance. Moreover, it has a say, for instance, in questions 
related to developing country debt issues.126 Finally, the thematic DGs work in 
development-related fields, for instance in relation to the environment with 
its increasing criss-cross development cooperation due to the climate change 
agenda, not to mention the often opposing camps around trade liberalisation, 
namely DG Trade and DG Agriculture.
In terms of policy process, Nugent (2006: 163-166) describes the route 
followed in drafting the Commission’s outputs according to a model whereby 
an initial draft is usually written at middle-ranking policy-grade level in the chef 
de file DG. Outside assistance from different sources is sought or contracted 
if appropriate. The sources include consultants, academics, national officials 
and experts, and sectional interest groups. The contents of the draft are likely 
to be determined through a combination of existing EU policy commitments, 
the Commission’s annual work programme, and guidelines that have been laid 
down at senior Commission and/or Council levels. The draft is passed upwards 
– through superiors within the DG through the cabinet of the Commissioner 
responsible, and through the weekly meeting of the chefs de cabinet – until 
the College of Commissioners is reached. During its passage, the draft may be 
extensively revised. Nugent (2006: 163-164) highlights the fact that the College 
of Commissioners can do virtually whatever it likes with the proposal. It may 
124 Pollack 2005: 53.
125 Nugent (2006: 167) reports that in an average year the Commission presents around 400 
proposals (often in the form of Communication), recommendations and draft instruments for 
adoption by the Council or by the EP and the Council, about 40 directives, 150 regulations and 
200 decisions. Additionally, it presents 300 or so communications and reports, plus a handful 
of White and Green Papers.
126 Carbone 2007a: 47.
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accept it, send it back to the DG for redrafting, or refuse to take a decision on it 
altogether. However, there may be departures from this “model” route in urgent 
cases and in cases that demand extensive consultations between different DGs. 
The latter is often the case with development and particularly where trade-
related proposals are concerned as they cut across the Commission’s services. 
This may also give rise to conflicts, which are often mitigated internally, 
however. 
Carbone (2007a: 4-5) points to the fact that although the European 
Commission should act like a unitary actor, tensions are likely to occur between 
the DGs, between Commissioners and the Services. So in fact, significant 
opposition to the chefs de file may arise from inside the Commission and, even 
more notably, from the individual member states, weakening the Commission 
vis-à-vis the Council. In a sense, the Commission has a sort of dual role: 
internally it is an arena of action for different sectoral DGs and interests, but 
externally it aims to be a single actor.127 What is crucial is that the Commission 
must first minimise the causes of its internal incoherence and inefficiency.128 
This may be difficult due to different interests that are linked to their briefs and 
sector logic rather than any national interests. Again, Carbone (2007a: 20-22) 
stresses that there are ideological conflicts manifested through preferences on 
policies and programmes which are, in turn, influenced by the mission, culture 
and policy of a given DG. Moreover, he argues that the inter-service or inter-
DG conflicts are not solely a matter of material interests, but also a matter of 
different world views. In addition, there are territorial conflicts between the 
DGs, which concern the responsibilities between the Commission services. 
These types of tensions are typical of the intra-institutional power within the 
Commission.129
Along similar lines on internal coherence, Nugent (2006: 166) maintains 
that relationships both within and between DGs tend to remain vertical. Some 
DGs are also more independent than others. Department and policy loyalties 
do not encourage integrated approaches if policy competences are jealously 
guarded. The sheer workload of Commission staff makes it difficult to look and 
plan beyond immediate tasks. 
In order to maintain a solid external image, however, the Commission 
has a number of mechanisms at its disposal that aim to rectify the problem 
of horizontal coordination. At the highest level (before the Lisbon Treaty in 
2009), Nugent (2006) for instance points to the role of the President of the 
Commission, which had a generally expected coordinating responsibility. Below 
127 Cf. Carbone 2007a. 
128 Carbone 2007a: 21, referring to Cram 1999 and Nugent 2000.
129 Carbone 2007a: 20-22.
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that remains the College of Commissioners, which in theory at least was in a 
strong position to coordinate activity and have a broad view of the Commission’s 
affairs. Everything of importance is referred to the Commissioners’ weekly 
meetings in portfolios, and these meetings are always preceded by other 
preparatory meetings. In addition, informal and ad hoc consultations may 
occur between Commissioners who are particularly affected by a proposal. 
Groups of Commissioners in related and overlapping policy areas exist for the 
purpose of facilitating liaison and cooperation, and enabling discussions at 
College meetings. For instance, amongst the groups of Commissioners in the 
first Barroso College (2004-2009) were Commissioners on the Lisbon Strategy, 
External Relations, and Competitiveness.130 In this context, development policy 
fell under External Relations, whereas the Global Europe Strategy of Trade 
formed a part of the external dimensions of the Lisbon Strategy as well as that 
of Competitiveness.
At the horizontal level of DGs, the main institutional agency promoting 
coordination is the Secretariat General of the Commission, which is specifically 
charged with ensuring that proper coordination and communication takes place 
across the Commission. In the day-to-day practices of the Commission DGs, 
inter-service groups and meetings are the most important of these coordination 
arrangements. This is also the case with development policy or other policies 
whose agendas tend to overlap with other sectoral policies. In practice, every 
significant initiative that the Commission launches goes through this inter-
service consultation process. The significance is assessed by the DG that initiates 
the process in terms of importance to its own agenda or to other sectoral DGs of 
the Commission. For instance, Commission Communications are an example of 
the type of documents that need to be discussed and agreed on internally before 
the services send the proposal to the college or to the body that has the power 
to adopt it. The purpose of the mechanism is to coordinate and streamline 
Commission policies so as to ensure that the Commission speaks and acts as 
one despite the differences between the sectoral priorities. 
In practice, therefore, the DG in charge of the issue area acts as the leading 
DG or the chef de file that informs other DGs that it sees as relevant to the issue in 
question, and asks them to comment on the draft proposal.131 In addition, there are 
also task forces, project groups, and numerous informal and one-off exchanges from 
Director General level downwards. It is also very common and recommendable that 
sectoral units inform their counterparts in other sectors from an early stage of an 
initiative and do not wait until a formal process is launched or any official meetings 
130 Nugent 2006: 164-165.
131 In fact, there are three possible categories of replies: positive opinion, positive opinion subject to 
comments, or negative opinion.
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are scheduled.132 However, despite these various coordinating arrangements, 
Nugent (2006) still argues that a feeling persists that the Commission continues 
to function in too compartmentalised a manner, with insufficient attention being 
paid to overall EU policy coherence.133 This of course begs the question of what 
position it leaves for policy coherence for development if overall EU coherence 
is difficult to achieve. And, on the other hand, if it is safe to assume that overall 
EU coherence is important for maintaining the integrity of the Union, how does 
this priority impact the developmental norms that the EU seeks to promote?
The European Parliament as a Policy-Maker
Compared to the member states and the Commission, the role of the European 
Parliament in development policy has been less central as its main power lies 
in the legislative and budgetary processes. As for the latter, in the development 
policy context, one should bear in mind that the European Development Fund 
(EDF) for EU-ACP development cooperation has throughout the years remained 
external to the Union budget (see Sub-chapter 3.2). The third dimension of 
parliamentary influence, the control and supervision of the executive, offered 
an avenue for inter-institutional encounters even before the Lisbon Treaty.134 
The difficulty stems from both the complexity and sensitivity of the task.  
At the level of day-to-day politics, the EP standing committees and their 
members may also exercise supervisory functions if they so wish. However, this 
possibility is under- utilised due to the limited resources that the committees 
have. On the other hand, the Commission does not encourage investigations 
itself.135 Nevertheless, as the only directly elected institution, expectations have 
been growing for the Parliament to use its increasing powers to remedy the 
democratic deficit of the Union. Particularly in the 1990s, the empowering of 
the EP was widely seen as a natural step towards a true “political union”.136 
Shackleton (2006:113) concludes that the Parliament was more likely to have 
an effect on outcomes at the level of policy-making (and of course also regarding 
legislation directing policies) rather than in “history-making” and “policy-
implementing decisions” before the Lisbon Treaty. 
132 This happens through a Commission IT tool called CIS-net (Consultacion inter Services, CIS). 
The DG in charge uploads the proposal with a cover note and addresses it to the coordinating units 
of the contributing DGs. A normal time frame for the response is around 10 days depending on 
the document and the kind of reply it receives. This specific information was not found elsewhere 
in the literature and was provided in an interview with the interviewee EC [12] 2009.
133 Nugent 2006: 166.
134 On the EP powers, see Nugent 2006: 240ff. 
135 Nugent 2006: 253. 
136 Shackleton 2006: 104-105.
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In this respect, most of the detailed work of the Parliament is conducted 
within twenty policy-specialised committees whose political composition 
broadly reflects the Parliament as a whole. In this constellation, there are, 
for instance, the Committees on Development (DEV), on Trade (INTA), on 
Agriculture, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs that work in conjunction with 
development and trade. What is notable is the degree of autonomy that these 
committees enjoy under the EP rules in the period of this research. All legislative 
(or policy) proposals are referred directly, without debate, from the plenary to 
the appropriate committee. The responsible committee appoints a rapporteur 
who follows a legislative proposal from its inception to the conclusion of the 
whole procedure. The role of the rapporteur is crucial as the committee adopts 
a position based on his/her work that will normally also prevail in the plenary 
unless the committee members fail to find a consensual ground and voting is 
needed.137 Another important function is that of the co-coordinators appointed 
by the different political group, whose role is to steer discussions and guide other 
MEPs to vote during parliamentary committee meetings and plenary sessions.138  
Shackleton (2006: 112-133) argues that when it comes to policy-making, the 
role of the committees is important in terms of providing an effective mechanism 
for finding agreement across political groups. In addition, when compared to 
the Council’s or to the Commission’s ways of working, all committee meetings 
have been held in public since 1999.139 This often results in overcrowded meeting 
rooms with lobbyists, national government officials, foreign delegates, NGO 
representatives, or officials from the other EU institutions in addition to those 
who are there “on duty”.140 In practice, the MEPs address the Commission and 
the Council with different types of questions: written and oral, with debate as 
well as issue opinions to shape the Union policies. However, the extent to which 
the inputs of the parliament (other than legislative) are taken into account varies 
by policy sector.141 However, Wallace (2005: 66), for instance, points out that the 
Consultation power that the parliament has applies to Commission proposals to 
the Council, which are passed to the EP for an Opinion. In this regard, the EP 
may suggest amendments, delay passing a resolution to formalise its Opinion, 
or refer matters back to its relevant committee(s). 
137 Shackleton 2006: 112–113. 
138 Karadenizli 2007: 42. 
139 Shackleton 2006: 112-113. However, in practice, gaining access to the Parliament and actually 
being present at the committee meetings as an ordinary citizen is not as simple as it sounds. I failed 
to gain access as a researcher although I had submitted an application to the accreditation centre, 
including a list of activities and meetings in the Parliament that had already been confirmed. In 
my case, the situation was resolved thanks to an invitation from a Committee member. 
140 Shackleton 2006: 112-113. 
141 This issue was also brought up in the interviews EC[1] 2008, CSO[20]2009 and EC[30]2009.
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The Council of Ministers in Development Policy
The Council of Ministers forms the arena where national interests are articulated, 
defended and aggregated by ministerial representatives of the member 
governments. Thus it is the main meeting place for competing or converging 
national views in Union politics. The Council of Ministers plays an important 
executive role, implying direct responsibility in some intergovernmental policy 
areas such as the CFSP. Perhaps even more crucially for our topic, the Council 
of Ministers provides an arena where the member governments participate in 
policy formulations in areas where the Union does not have a clear collective 
power.142 In addition, it is also an arena where historical processes are steered 
and the future orientations of the Union are decided. Most decisions are again 
taken by consensus; therefore the Council also has a strong mediating role. It 
also adopts Union legislation in tandem with the European Parliament. These 
key functions have also contributed to the fact that the EU member states 
remain very centrally placed in Union politics. 143 Thus they also have a strong 
say in the kind of normative views that emerge from the EU.
Since 2002 (and before the Lisbon Treaty), development policy has been 
dealt with under the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) 
in the Council’s configurations. On the occasion of the Seville Council in 2002, 
a separate Development Council was abolished and development issues were 
merged with the Foreign Ministry- dominated GAERC, which has the largest 
brief amongst the nine ministerial Councils, including foreign affairs matters 
and external trade.144 Nugent (2006:195) also points to its loose overall 
responsibility vis-à-vis policy initiation and coordination as well as in tackling 
politically sensitive issues. In addition, this includes responsibilities related to 
the operations of the European Council in terms of preparations and follow-up. 
Committees and Council working groups are set up to assist and prepare the 
work of the Council of Ministers and the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER). The latter consists of member-state delegates based in Brussels, as 
well as other senior officials from appropriate national ministries. COREPER 
prepares Council meetings and represents the Council in the meetings with the 
EP.145 The role of the Council working groups is specifically to carry out detailed 
analysis of formally tabled Commission proposals. In turn, they report on their 
analysis to COREPER or to one of the Council’s senior committees. These 
proposals include, for instance, Communications from the Commission and, for 
142 Nugent 2006: 191-195.  
143 Hayes-Renshaw 2006: 60, Nugent 2006: 194.
144 van Reisen 2007: 54-55, Carbone 2007: 48.
145 Nugent 2006: 199-200.
64  |  CONTExTUAlISINg THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS
the purposes of this study, the Commission proposal for the EU development 
policy, as will be discussed in the succeeding chapters on the policy process. 
In general, the number of working groups in existence depends on the overall 
workload of the EU and the preferences of the presidency in office. The main 
working group for development policy is the Working Group on Development 
Co-operation (CODEV). Despite the abolishment of the Development Council in 
2002, it has nevertheless maintained its rather institutionalised nature. Finally, 
the proposals are approved in the Council Conclusions agreed by the Council 
of Ministers concerned. 
Other development-related issues are discussed in their respective thematic 
working groups. Most importantly for our theme, the Article 133 Committee 
deals with trade policy with a view to ensuring internal coordination. Any 
significant action undertaken in the name of the Union in international trade 
negotiations is preceded by discussions in this Committee. In particular, it 
drafts the briefs that the Commission negotiates on behalf of the EU with third 
parties (the Committee’s draft is referred, via COREPER, to the Ministries for 
approval). It also acts as a consultative Committee, for instance, if problems 
arise in the negotiations and new directions are needed.146 
Although there are no formal obstacles to consulting other working groups 
on issues that are likely to have an impact on other policies, nor are there any 
established means to do so. van Schank et al. (2006) point to the lack of standing 
procedures for facilitating interaction between CODEV and other working 
groups, and to the scant evidence for such consultation. Building horizontal 
linkages is often considered something additional to the already heavy agendas. 
However, in respect of policy coherence and integration, it would be essential. 
Inter-institutional Rivalries and Competing Coalitions
If cross-cutting issues are difficult for intra-institutional cooperation, they are 
even more so for inter-institutional relations. Hayes-Renshaw (2006) describes 
the inter-institutional relations as being based on natural rivalry, cooperation 
and competition. Natural rivalry exists between the Council and the European 
Parliament, as is often the case in national politics between executive and 
legislator. By the same token, Council and Commission skirmishes are often 
presented as battles for dominance. In this respect, the EU development policy 
146 Nugent 2006: 200. In general, working groups meet as and when required, usually with an 
interval of at least three weeks between meetings. However, the Article 133 Committee meets once 
a week on Fridays, and the full line-up, including very senior officials in the national Ministries 
of Trade (or equivalent), meet monthly, while the middle-ranking level from the Ministries or 
Permanent Representations meet three times a month.
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provides an interesting angle to this debate. This is because the very existence of 
development policy in the Union is underpinned by a tension between the member 
states’ bilateral policies and the Commission’s attempts to create a common 
multilateral donor identity at the EU level. Often, the tension gets crystallised 
into the question of “Europeanisation” in the field of development policy. 
Loquai (1996: 1) explains the concept of Europeanisation based on Lingnau’s 
(1991: 99) definition, which singles out three elements of Europeanisation: 
coordination, harmonisation and communitisation. Drawing on these 
elements, Europeanisation has been defined as the “process of more intense 
co-operation and harmonisation, which will finally lead to a communitisation”. 
For Pollack (2005: 40), Europeanisation is more generally a process whereby 
EU institutions and policies influence national institutions and policies within 
the various member states. In this respect, it should be noted that the idea 
of Europeanisation of development cooperation has seldom been explicitly 
presented in terms of communitisation due to the member states’ strong 
interests in their bilateral development cooperation.147 Indeed, some of the key 
member states tend to consider development policy as an area of their national 
sovereignty which should not be intruded upon by anybody, not least by the 
European Commission.148 At the same time, coordination and internal coherence 
are needed in order to guarantee at least a minimal level of complementarity. 
As Loquai (1996) rightly notes, there was no grand design to European 
development cooperation either, until the Treaty of Maastricht came into force. 
Before that, European development cooperation was more of a patchwork of 
different legal provisions, and fragmented competences, marked by a great 
heterogeneity of policy interests (commercial, foreign policy, cultural and 
similar) other than those of development cooperation. In addition, the more 
recent debate on the harmonisation process of donors’ administrative norms and 
procedures has been mainly driven by development communities’ own pressures, 
rather than by the aims of EU integration. Nevertheless, Loquai (1996) maintains 
that the idea of Europeanisation was revived before the Treaty of Maastricht. 
However, the idea did not quite materialise in the Treaty itself, which leaves the 
policy area open to competing interpretations and power struggles between the 
Commission and the member states represented in the Council. 
According to a more equalitarian interpretation, the member states and the EC 
share competences which are demonstrated alongside each other. On the other 
hand, based on the principle of subsidiarity, some of the member states maintain 
that the EC development policy is actually subordinate to the development 
147 Loquai 1996: 6. 
148 Carbone 2007a: 5-6.
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policies of member states.149 Regarding this debate, the European Court of Justice 
has established two important guidelines: first that the EC and member states 
share development policy competences and second, that the interrelations are 
essentially a two-way street in the sense that if the EC adopts a decision, member 
states cannot undertake actions that have adverse consequences for the EC 
development policy. First and foremost, this decision implies that the European 
development policy should be free from internal incoherencies. 
In development policy-making, however, the right of initiative rests with 
the Commission. In addition, as Nugent (2006: 187) claims, in general the 
Commission is particularly well placed to act as mediator and conciliator. In 
many instances, the Commission is simply in the best position to judge which 
proposals are likely to gain support, both inside and outside the Council. This 
is because of the continuous and extensive discussions which the Commission 
has with interested parties, from the earliest considerations of a policy proposal 
through to its enactment. Unlike the other institutions, thanks precisely to its 
power to initiate proposals, the Commission is represented at virtually every 
stage and in virtually every forum of the EU’s decision-making system. 
Although the role of the Commission has been central to the endeavours 
to form a unified EU stance in development policy, this does not imply that 
the Commission would automatically play the leading role. In his study on the 
politics of EU foreign aid, Carbone (2007a: 2, 20-21) singles out three main 
factors that should be seen as preconditions for such a position. These include 
first, the Commission’s ability to act as what Carbone calls an institutional 
entrepreneur. This definition refers to a Commission service that is politically 
proactive and which enjoys the full support of its own administration. Second, 
the Commission is internally cohesive without major cleavages between its 
different services. Third, it is willing and able to use a repertoire of tactics. 
Additional conditions are then related to a number of contextual factors such as 
adaptation in member states, the opening of policy windows either internally or 
in international politics, and the nature of the EU presidency country, which can 
be co-operative or critical and which may increase or decrease the likelihood of 
a thriving Commission leadership.
The interrelationship between different member states and the Commission 
culminates in the Commission-EU Council Presidency interaction, as each 
member state holds the rotating presidency in turn supported by the Council 
secretariat.150 The presidency leads the operation of the Council on a six-month 
basis. This includes chairing and being responsible for the necessary preparations 
for all meetings of the Council. This central position gives the presidency country 
149 Hoebink 2004, Schrijver 2004. 
150 Hayes-Renshaw 2006: 60.
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a privileged position vis-à-vis policy formulation when compared to the other 
member states. How this position is then used depends on the country and 
issue in question. Carbone (2007a: 48) points to the differences between the 
presidencies; some are interested in achieving “good compromises” between 
different interests while others are more concerned with their national agendas. 
As one can imagine, the background of the presidency country has a great impact 
on the way in which development policy is approached during each presidency. 
Differences in orientations and resources invested in this policy field may vary 
considerably between member states. For some member states, the long-term, 
often historical ties and/or investments in development cooperation that form 
a part of their foreign policy cause this issue area to be particularly sensitive. On 
the other hand, the new member states that have joined the EU in the 2000s do 
not have similar linkages or national policy. Nevertheless, development policy 
discussions have provided an arena for highlighting their new international 
identity.151 Therefore, the diplomatic and organisational capacity to hold the 
presidency may vary between different member states. Additionally, their take 
on “packaging and selling the common European good” can also be swayed by 
their specific national interests. But this is not to say that any member state, 
especially the one holding the presidency, would not have strong opinions on 
what should be done, when, where and by whom.
What is important to note is that these types of challenges are by no means 
unique to development policy. As H. Wallace, W. Wallace and Pollack (2005: 8, 
21) point out, for the member states, the EU arena is only part of a wider pattern 
of policy-making beyond the nation-state. In many areas of public policy, 
including those within which the EU is active, there are broader transnational 
consultations and regimes that constitute global governance. In particular in the 
case of development policy, they are part of a continuum of policy-making that 
spreads from the member-state level, through the European arena, to the global 
level. Here, the EU provides the main junction through which connections are 
made between the country level and the global sphere. What makes this role 
even more challenging for development is this choice to link the EU’s common 
policy and the member states’ bilateral development policies with those of 
international organisations such as the WTO and the OECD/DAC, while at the 
same time contributing to and shaping the EU-level policy and its normative 
alternatives for policy coherence for development. 152 
151 The subject of old and new member states was a recurring one in the interviews, with several 
informants referring to this division: Council[6]2009, Academia[8]2009, CSO[19]2008, 
Council[28]2008, EC [30]2009, CSO[31]2008 and EC[34]2009. The subject was not evident in 
the previous literature, however.
152 Cf. Holland 2009: 37-38.
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To return to the question of “who” the EU is in development policy, one 
must understand the dynamics that underpin the shared competency between 
the member states and the Commission. I address this issue in two dimensions: 
the member states’ commitment to development in their bilateral policies and 
their approach to Europeanisation under the EC. In elaborating on the member 
states’ commitment to development policy, Carbone (2007a) has divided the 
member states into four groups according to their performance as donors.153 
These groups are the big three, the northern member states, the southern 
member states, and the eastern member states. The big three consist of the 
biggest bilateral donor countries of the UK, France and Germany. They are 
significant development actors both within the EU as well as in  international 
development at large.154 
From the point of view of Europeanisation, the UK stands out as a particularly 
difficult member state.155 Since 1997, it has enforced its role in international 
development and ranked high as a donor both in terms of quantity and quality.156 
It is a very active international player in its own right and masters a web of 
its own, including the Commonwealth countries and development partners 
worldwide. The UK also emphasises the poverty eradication objective and has 
focused aid allocations on Sub-Saharan Africa, paying special attention to the 
least developed countries in general.157 Furthermore, it has been able to maintain 
its aid volume, and decrease tied aid and project fragmentation. However, while 
focusing on its own bilateral endeavours, it also actively engages in development 
policy at the EU level with a view to improving the Commission performance 
and poverty focus. France has also increased its aid volume and reduced tied aid. 
However, it still continues to allocate assistance to relatively less poor and less 
democratic recipient governments. Compared to the UK and Germany, France 
also has larger shares of debt relief counted in its development aid package, 
which is not a recommended practice. However, it is the third largest European 
donor with historically close ties to the Community development policy and 
administration. Yet, similarly to the UK-Commonwealth relations, France has 
153 The member states’ performance is ranked in the Commitment to Development Index by the 
Centre for Global Development. The basic idea of the index is to rank countries according to their 
performance as donors by rewarding them for high volumes of aid. On the other hand, it penalises 
countries for tying aid, for overloading recipients with too many small projects, and for receiving 
debt payments for loans.
154 For EU donor profiles, see COM (2010) 159.
155 I return to this subject in more detail in Chapter 4, which focuses on the intriguing interplay 
between the Commission and the challenging Council Presidency – held by the UK – in the 
development policy process in the second half of 2005.
156 Riddell 2007: 60-61.
157 COM (2010) 159: 149.
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the Francophone countries as its priorities. Germany also competes with the 
UK and France over the position of the largest European development financer. 
However, it has prioritised middle-income countries of its own choosing over 
the least development countries, untrammelled by the extensive colonial legacy 
that the UK and France share.158 In its relations with the European Commission, 
Germany has contributed large shares of its assistance through the Community 
Channel.159 
The northern member states include Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden 
and Finland. In addition, Carbone (2007a: 46) has associated Luxembourg, 
Ireland and also Belgium with the group of northern member states because 
of their good performance in foreign aid. As regards member-state attitudes 
towards the possible Europeanisation of development policy, out of the best 
performing group, the Netherlands and Finland are more supportive towards 
EC efforts to coordinate and formulate development policy at the EU level, while 
Denmark and Sweden are much more critical towards the Commission and 
efforts to Europeanise development policy. In turn, Belgium and Luxembourg 
are situated very close to the Commission and their attitude is often supportive 
towards its initiatives.
In contrast to the northern group, the southern donor countries, namely 
Spain, Italy and Portugal, emerge as the worst performers. Their donor profile 
is characterised by low net aid as a share of their economy. With the exception 
of Italy, their relatively low volume of aid is partially explained by their own 
role as recipients of economic assistance until the 1970s (i.e. Spain and 
Portugal) or as late as the 1980s (i.e. Greece). Similarly to Germany, they also 
allocate aid extensively to middle-income countries with a view to promoting 
their own commercial and cultural interests. This has been particularly true 
of Spain in her relations with Latin America. This group in general allocates 
large portions of its resources through multilateral channels, but gives priority 
to the EC. In this respect, they are generally supportive of the Commission’s 
coordination role at the EU level.160 On the whole, a similar division between 
the Northern and Southern member states also prevails in their approach 
to the EU’s trade and agricultural policies with developing countries. In this 
respect, the Nordic group tends to be more liberal, whereas the Southern 
member states have stronger interests in maintaining more protectionist 
positions. The last group comprises the recipients of yesterday and the donors 
of today, namely the Eastern member states of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, 
158 Carbone 2007a: 42-43; 45-46 and COM (2010) 159.
159 Carbone 2007a: 45-46. COM (2010) 159.
160 Carbone 2007a: 45-47. 
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but also Cyprus and Malta, which are still seeking their role and resources in 
development policy. Their allocation is generally motivated by geographical 
proximity.161  
Taken together, the EU’s development policy chorus consists of a number 
of different voices that may find it difficult to perform in harmony or even to 
agree on a common song to start with. While much depends on the commitment 
to development in the member states, the overall EU identity in development 
policy also depends on how these elements play out in relation to the 
Community and vice versa. In this respect, the issue of shared competence may 
also complicate the matter as the member states are not obligated to agree on a 
Common European development policy with a single voice that could respond 
in a comprehensive manner. The internal struggle within the Commission, the 
somewhat external role of the European Parliament and the heterogeneity of 
member-state commitments are all likely to have an impact on the EU’s take on 
international development. Consequently, they constitute an important factor 
that shapes the EU’s normative position and creates conditions for policy (in)
coherence for development. 
3.2 THE bURDEN AND PROMISES Of THE PAST 
The EU is often described as sui generis in international relations, but this is 
particularly true of the development and trade nexus. What other institution 
could claim the role of a development actor with a first joint vision after 50 
years of development activities and be proud of it?162 The main purpose of this 
Sub-chapter is to look more closely at the peculiarities and promises related 
to the history of development policy in the Union. My aim is to show how the 
history of development policy was wired with different kinds of tensions that 
still today affect the EU’s response in global governance and policy coherence for 
development in particular. The tension between “the post-colonial ACP focus” 
and “the modern, global development policy” is one of them. The aim to build 
a coherent, albeit constantly shifting, understanding of trade and development 
is another. The attempts to create a single actor despite the sectoral policy 
and member states’ interests constitute the third underlying tension in this 
evolution.
An overview of the evolution of EU development policy is provided here 
using a dual approach. On the one hand, I look at the historical evolution of 
161 Carbone 2007a: 46.
162 Development Commissioner Louis Michel presenting the European Consensus proposal to the 
European Parliament on 13 June 2005. 
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the international development and trade architecture and the main ideational 
focus at a given period. On the other hand, a review of the transformation of 
the European Economic Community (EEC) into the European Union and its 
respective enlargements is necessary in order to make sense of the scope and 
content of the European development policy. Regarding the former, Fraser 
(2009: 45) provides a useful structure in his analysis of donor and recipient 
sovereignty in aid politics over time that is also applicable here. Fraser discusses 
five main time periods: the post-colonial period, when much of the international 
aid architecture first developed (1945-75); the mid-1970s turn (1975-80); the 
early structural adjustment era (1980s); the adjustment after the Cold War 
(1990-2000) and the partnership era (2000 onwards). 
However, as Karagiannis (2004: 7) points out, the particularity of the 
“European” approach and European development discourse must be stressed: 
“if we deny it and equate this discourse to the other international discourses, 
we erase a (post-)colonial past that weighs heavily on both sides, a past that is, 
in a distinct way European and neither American nor International”. Similarly, 
Young (2009), Flint (2008), Grilli (1994), and Holland (2002) point to the 
intertwined legacy of the colonial past and the history of European Community 
development cooperation. For Young (2009: 19-35), the colonial heritage is 
the necessary point of departure for any analysis of African, and in general for 
all developing regions’ international relations including the state system, the 
political and economic structures, as well as cultural and linguistic linkages. 
Thus, to understand the roots and rationale of European development 
cooperation one has to look at the colonial heritage and the colonial powers’ 
desire for continuity in the creation of the European Economic Community in 
the late 1950s.163 
The Early Years of Association and Free Trade
In the face of decolonisation, the French notion of association based on Euro-
Africanism was the solution when the old-style colonialism became impossible.164 
This associational approach was present in very tangible terms in the Treaty 
of Rome (1957) establishing the EEC. Due to persistent French insistence, 
provisions of “association” for all “dependencies” were included in Part IV of 
the Treaty, providing a model of a contractual treaty-based relationship for 
the subsequent development cooperation arrangements in the forthcoming 
163 See Nugent 2006 and Hix 2005 on the debate between France and West Germany and the 
respective vested interests regarding agricultural policy and the creation of a common market. 
On positions towards associationism, see Grilli 1994: 1-49.
164 Grilli 1994: 1. 
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decades.165 As an approach, “association” was unilaterally a European initiative 
in France’s own constitutional terms, which left very little, if any, say for the 
overseas collectivities and territories (OCTs) with “special relations” with an 
EEC member state.166 At the time, this only involved relations between 31 OCTs 
and four of the six founding EEC member states: most notably France with 
her colonial ties to French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, as well as 
island dependencies in the Pacific and elsewhere. France also had possessions 
in Asia. Similarly, Belgium still had large colonies in Congo and in Ruanda-
Urundi when the Treaty of Rome was signed.167 To a lesser extent, the colonial 
legacy also concerned Italy and the Netherlands. According to Ravenhill (1985: 
48), for France the inclusion and the content of the association agreement as 
Rome Treaty provisions was indeed a condition of its signature. Consequently, 
the French dominance in EC development policy was so strong that Bretherton 
and Vogler (1999: 113) speak about the early EC policy as an adjunct to French 
policy rather than a distinctive Community approach to development. However, 
the associational approach was not limited to former colonies, and the Treaty 
of Rome established the possibility of concluding agreements with third 
countries.168 
Similarly to today’s development approach, trade and development aspects 
formed the very core of the associational agreement of the Treaty of Rome. 
These cooperation elements have been presented in familiar terms also in the 
current development policy discourse.  
The purpose of association shall be to promote the economic and social 
development of the countries and territories and to establish close economic 
relations between them and the Community as a whole. (Article 131)
These objectives were pursued based on two main elements: trade liberalisation 
between the EC and the associates, and financial aid from the Community to the 
associates. With regard to the organisation of the trading relations, the Treaty of 
Rome unilaterally created a free trade area between the EC members and their 
dependencies (as well as among the dependencies themselves). In particular, 
this implied that duties on imports inside the free trade area were to be gradually 
and reciprocally abolished, even though the associates maintained the right to 
165 Holland 2002: 25-27. The Treaty of Rome established the sectoral divisions regarding Common 
Market and EEC trade rules as well as the framework to protect, most notably, agricultural 
interests under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). For more on this, see Nugent 2006.
166 Grilli 1994: 2. 
167 Holland 2002: 26, McCormick 2008: 207. 
168 van Reisen 2007: 37.
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protect infant industries and to keep or establish tariffs for revenue purposes 
based on non-discrimination between the EC members.169 However, for third 
parties such as the US and Latin America, this free entry of associated countries’ 
exports created a strong trade preference, and these preferences granted to a 
specific group of developing countries raised questions about legality under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) even at that time. This was the 
case despite the formation of the free trade area in line with GATT Article XXIV. 
It was the novel idea of extending the free trade area from the EEC Customs 
Union to the associated countries and territories of Africa that caused opposing 
opinions among the GATT parties.170 
In this trade-led context, the role of aid and its provider, the European 
Development Fund (EDF), was to “invest” in the development of the associated 
countries and territories. Importantly, the aid provisions also set up the two-track 
model to European development aid. In other words, the EEC states maintained 
the bilateral relations to their colonies and former colonies, and the EDF was set 
up to complement this by providing aid from all member countries under the 
Community administration.171 As Grilli (1994) notes, the association package 
of reciprocal free trade and economic aid reflected the perceived economic 
realities, and the dominant thinking in the area of development cooperation. 
Trade was seen as a means to increase the efficiency of local production, and 
thereby the surplus production of minerals and tropical agricultural products. 
In this paradigm, external aid was needed both to raise the amount of domestic 
savings and to provide opportunities for capital investment projects in order to 
facilitate economic growth.172 The developmental relationship was recognised as 
beneficial also for the EC itself at the time. Indeed, Europe would need access to 
raw materials and energy for its recovery, as well as free access to the common 
market for colonial exports and to expand its own export markets to its (former) 
colonies.173
In Fraser’s (2009) terms, the EEC moved, at least formally, to the post-
colonial period in the early 1960s when the majority of OCTs gained their 
independence and new arrangements became necessary. A manifestation 
169 Grilli 1994: 8-11, Holland 2002: 26-27. In addition, as Grilli (1994) notes, the free trade area also 
included the free circulation of labour from the associated territories to the EC countries and vice 
versa.  Nationals and corporations from the EC countries could freely establish themselves in the 
associated territories and vice versa. 
170 Grilli 1994: 12-13. 
171 Grilli 1994: 11. The amount of aid in the first EDF was 580 European Units of Account EUA ($58 
million), which represented an increase of 15 per cent in the bilateral aid flow. Grilli 1994: 13, 
and Flint 2008: 13.
172 Grilli 1994: 13-14. 
173 van Reisen 2007: 31. 
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of this new turn, the recognition of national sovereignty of the participating 
countries, became the basis of the successive Yaoundé Conventions 1963-1969 
(I) and 1969-1975 (II).174 Importantly for the future arrangements, the Yaoundé 
Convention set the format for a single, multilateral framework with joint 
institutions. Equally noteworthy was the contractual nature of the Convention, 
signed for the first time between the industrialised and the developing world 
as Holland (2002) defines it.175 In addition, what was ground-breaking at the 
time was the formal institutional framework that was created following the 
European Community pattern, but independently of it. Importantly, the main 
bodies such as the Association Council, Parliamentary Conference and Court 
of Arbitration comprised representatives from the EC and AAMS alike.176 
The contractual nature of development cooperation as well as the network of 
joint institutions manifested a normative EU model that was to prevail in the 
decades to come. 
Under this new framework, Yaoundé (I) covered trade and aid relations 
between the Community and the 18 Associated African States and Madagascar 
AAMS. However, this time the association had changed from unilaterally 
granted, to being voluntary and negotiated. In terms of joint objectives, the 
emphasis was on industrialisation of the AAMS and on the diversification of 
their economies.177 The aid model remained intact but with increased funds 
and operations. The Community provided grants and loans178 through the EDF 
(II), and financed investments, technical assistance and training. Differing 
from the previous agreement, the free trade between the EEC and the AAMS 
was organised based on reciprocal trade liberalisation and the free trade area 
between the EEC and each of the AAMS separately. Associated countries 
themselves did not establish a free trade area. The EC-AAMS trade relations 
were changed because of the independent status of the association countries, 
and by their consequent right to choose their trade policies vis-à-vis each 
other.179 The limits of sovereignty were drawn there, as the EEC nevertheless 
sought to organise trade based on reciprocal free trade between the European 
Economic Community and the AAMS. According to the Commission, the fact 
that trade provisions were in conformity with GATT rules and not harming third 
parties was considered important. However, the value of free trade lay in the 
174 Holland 2002:27-28. The Yaoundé Convention parties were the Associated African States and 
Madagascar AAMS countries, often referred to by the French acronym EAMA, and the EEC.
175 Holland 2002: 27-28.
176 Grilli 1994: 20-21.
177 Yaoundé Convention Preamble. 
178 These included special loans through the EDF up to 50 million EAU and an ordinary 70 million 
EAU provided by the European Investment Bank (EIB). See Grilli 1994: 20. 
179 Grilli 1994: 17-21. 
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equal treatment of all parties based on effectiveness and political significance. 
To quote:
While this system of free trade has in no way been damaging to third countries, 
far from it, it is an irreplaceable feature of the association [with Africa and 
Madagascar], because on it largely depends the association’s economic 
effectiveness and especially its political significance. It must therefore be 
maintained.180
Frasier (2009: 45-46) notes more generally that during the post-colonial 
period, economic, ideological, and political conditions left room for manoeuvre 
for developing countries themselves to opt for alternatives in negotiations with 
donors.  Referring to economic sovereignty, Flint (2008) asserts that the idea 
of the reciprocal free trade arrangements did not materialise as planned due to 
three key factors. First, in order to achieve economic development and thereby 
economic autonomy, the majority of the states in the newly independent AAMS 
chose to rely on import-substitution strategies and high levels of protection, 
instead of reciprocal free trade with the EEC. Second, France and Belgium, 
whose business interests had in practice enjoyed preferential access to these 
markets, were reluctant to compete with other European companies. And third, 
the US was (again) against the extension of the free trade arrangements to 
Africa, where she was also seeking stronger political influence.181 
Ravenhill (1985: 81) notes that the Yaoundé regime (1963-69, 1969-73) was 
already outdated when it was renewed because of the adoption of part IV on 
Trade and Development of the GATT in the mid-1960s. It is worth mentioning 
that after the Association agreement of the Treaty of Rome until the Lomé I 
Convention, the trading relations between the EC and the Associates were based 
on a different logic from what then became the rationale for the Trade and 
Development part of the international trade norms when developing countries 
started to have a say on a bigger scale. The forming of a free trade area and the 
exports from the Associates (again with the exception of certain “sensitive” 
products) would gradually receive duty-free access to the Community market 
with a common external tariff, thereby discriminating against third parties. This 
arrangement was justified under the GATT requirements based on reciprocity, 
as the Associates were required to abolish customs duties on imports from the 
Community and from each other at the same rate as the trade inside the European 
Community. However, as early as the Treaty of Rome, the European states 
180 SEC(71) 2700:25.
181 See Flint 2008: 13 and Grilli 1994: 20 on the French and Belgian companies in the former 
colonies. 
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had recognised that Associates could levy customs duties which correspond 
to the development needs and the requirements of their industrialisation. 
Furthermore, Associates that had prior international obligations to maintain 
nondiscriminatory tariffs were exempted from tariff reductions on imports 
from the EC.182  However, what is important to note is that the Associates were 
not actively involved in the negotiations, as the Treaty of Rome was negotiated 
between the six founding members. It was only the Lomé framework that 
provided the arena for negotiations between “equal” parties. 
Regarding the trading position of the AAMS during this period, Holland 
observes that the “preferential” treatment was actually quite limited. This 
position was eroded by the CAP, established by the Treaty of Rome, which 
excluded agricultural products that were in direct competition with the European 
producers from the Duty-free quota-free treatment. More importantly, due to the 
EC lowering and abolishing duties on a range of tropical products, the difference 
between “general” and “preferential” treatment became less significant. 
Furthermore, the main AAMS exports of copper, iron ore, cotton, rubber, and oil 
seeds were never subject to EC tariffs in general. Consequently, the preferential 
economic benefits appeared rather marginal and were openly criticised by the 
African parties, and by Germany and the Netherlands. Holland (2002: 29-31) 
also argues that whilst free trade was seen as assisting development, in practice 
the limited concessions tended to maintain, even strengthen, the dependency 
and paternalistic relationship under French tutelage.183
Policy Incoherence and Community – Member-State Cleavages
The Commission Memorandum on a Community Development Policy from 
July 1971 aptly captures the spirit of the time before the Lomé partnership 
negotiations. Drafted mainly to promote the Community as an independent 
development actor, the principal purpose of the Memorandum was to release 
the Commission from the shadow of the member states as an actor in its own 
right in international development. To illustrate the Commission aspirations:
… For most of these countries [all developing countries, not just the associates], 
while they had active links of co-operation with each of the Member States on 
a bilateral basis, the Community only seemed to be a customs and agricultural 
organization liable to be an obstacle to the expansion of their trade and, in 
182 See Ravenhill 1985: 50-51. These Associates included the Belgian Congo, Rwanda-Burundi, and 
French Equatorial Africa due to the Congo Basin Treaties of 1883 and the UN Trust Territories 
of Cameroon, Italian Somaliland and Togo. 
183 Ravenhill 1985 and Grilli 1994 draw similar conclusions.
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any event, without the means of actively co-operating in the solution of their 
development problems. Such an initial, excessively negative image of the 
Community has been corrected, as has been amply proved by the rapid growth 
of its trade with the Third World.184 
However, as discussed above, the perception of the promoted trade measures 
varied across the parties involved. Nevertheless, the EC had made progress 
in liberalising the EEC market, including the EC Generalised System of 
Preferences, in line with the GATT Enabling Clause and other measures to 
lower trade barriers and improve market access to “products of importance to 
the Third World”.185  This was claimed on the basis of dismantling agricultural 
(i.e. sugar) and industrial protectionism (i.e. manufactured goods and textiles) 
notwithstanding the perceived limited EC power, especially with regard to 
the former.186 With hindsight, it was still too early to declare that “the initial 
negative image of the Community had been corrected” as the call for major 
changes in the EC developing-country relationship was just about to begin, as 
will be discussed below. 
To compare the content to the current debates on development and trade, 
the issues raised as early as four decades ago were intriguingly similar. As a 
matter of fact, the Commission highlighted two key factors in the Memorandum 
that it saw as the main obstacles to development cooperation efforts even then, 
namely policy incoherence and insufficient coordination between the member 
states and the Commission. In addition, the text pointed to the division of 
responsibilities between the member states and the Community as a possible 
source of policy incoherence. The Commission saw both incoherence and 
lack of co-ordination as being related to the interrelationships between the 
EC common commercial policy and internal economic policies (agriculture, 
industrial, social, etc.), and the insufficiently integrated development co-
operation policy which, in the Commission’s view, was too inclined towards 
the member-state bilateral policies.187 The need for change was grounded in 
the observation that “the Community’s personality was growing and becoming 
more attractive for developing countries”. This view was based mainly on 
its identity in international trade.188 Moreover, the Commission stressed the 
three dimensions of the EU-Third World relationship: trade, financing and 
institutions, which it saw as its comparative advantage and the origins of the 
184 SEC (71) 2700: 3.
185 SEC (71) 2700: 3.
186 SEC (71) 2700: 16.
187 SEC (71) 2700: 7. 
188 SEC (71)2700: 6. 
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association of the AAMS to the EC.189 This was important since it was foreseen 
that the EC member-state configuration was about to change significantly with 
the United Kingdom’s membership. 
Loquai’s (1996) analysis also highlights the fact that the question of the 
Commission-member-state interrelationship had already been on the agenda 
in the early 1970s, prior to the British accession to the EEC. Interestingly for 
our overall topic, the emergence of this question coincides with the quest for 
improved coherence between development policy and other community policies, 
as both were brought up in the above-cited Commission Memorandum. The 
immediate priority for the Community was to tackle the “risks of incoherent 
action arising from the present division of responsibilities between the Member 
States and the Community”.190 The main concerns for the Commission were 
two-fold. On the one hand, they were related to development aid operations 
in terms of member-state independent and non-coordinated control over 
technical and financial co-operation and, on the other hand, to the Community 
common commercial policy. The Commission argued that this division had 
caused an increasing recourse to trade as a means of development co-operation. 
This was also considered important for the vision of stronger EC involvement in 
development cooperation, which would be more commensurate with the EC’s 
increasing economic power.  To overcome this situation, the memorandum 
stated: 
Consequently, the Commission thinks it is necessary to carry out an overall survey 
of this mixed bag of policies currently applied by the Community and the Member 
States towards developing countries, so as to arrive at greater coherence within 
the Community – the essential prerequisite for the effectiveness of everybody’s 
efforts, and for the very existence of a Community policy.191
To remedy this, the Commission recommended a gradual harmonisation of the 
Community and member-state policies under a “common policy of cooperation 
with the developing countries”, with the need for a Community Policy for 
Development Cooperation based on the Community position of a principal 
partner in international trade, and a key player in the UN process of the early 
1970s.192 However, it should be noted that the idea of the Europeanisation of 
development cooperation has seldom been explicitly presented in terms of 
communitisation due to the member states’ strong interests in their bilateral 
189 SEC (71)2700: 25. 
190 SEC (71) 2700: 7.
191 SEC (71) 2700: 7. 
192 SEC (71) 2700: 6, 8. 
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and complex administrative structures of development cooperation.193 This 
was also recognised in the Commission Memorandum text, which pointed 
out that “action by the countries individually will continue to exist, but its 
effectiveness will be improved by being concerted, and the guidelines will be 
defined jointly”.194
The EC-ACP Lomé Convention: a Normative Trend-setter of its Time
From the Community point of view, the most important factor behind the major 
changes was the entry of the United Kingdom (plus Ireland and Denmark) into 
the Community in 1973. Similarly to France, the UK had favoured a British form 
of associationism in the management of the colonies by establishing indirect 
government of the colonial possessions.195 Thus the first EC enlargement 
brought the issue of the African and Caribbean British Commonwealth countries 
back to the fore.196 In this situation, of primary importance was finding a 
satisfactory solution that would accommodate prevailing French interests and 
British demands in the EC policy towards these groups of developing countries. 
Under the leading role of the European Commission (Development), the nine 
EC member states were able to find common ground for the Convention.197 
Respectively, on the part of the 46 African, Pacific and Caribbean states, both 
old AAMS and new party countries organised themselves to negotiate as a group 
and were represented through a single spokesperson.198 This show of strength 
and common view led to the official formation of the ACP group in 1975 by the 
Georgetown Agreement.199 The basis of association between the EC and the 
former colonies – trade, financing and an institutional framework – was now 
taken to a new level by the first Lomé Convention (1975-1980) between the EC 
and the ACP group. 
Holland (2002: 35) describes the first Lomé Convention as “innovative” 
– emphasising that it established a First-Third world relationship that was 
progressive and unparalleled for its time. This new approach also marked the 
stated joint objectives resonating in the more general Third World discourse 
in the United Nations for the New International Economic Order (NIEO).200 
193 Loquai 1996: 6. 
194 SEC (71) 2700: 8.
195 Grilli 1994: 1-2.
196 The UK had sought EC membership as early as 1963, but entry had been blocked by France/
Charles de Gaulle. See Grilli 1994. 
197 Holland 2002: 33. 
198 Holland 2002: 33-34. 
199 Flint 2008: 14.
200 Karagiannis 2004: 11.
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Interestingly, the spirit of Lomé I was clearly informed by this kind of structural 
understanding of the world, dependency theory and theories of the unequal 
global division of labour.201 Notably for our topic, the EC was willing to accept 
this approach and go against the post-war liberal consensus on international 
norms that prevailed at the time.202 To demonstrate this, the preamble to 
Lomé I highlights economic and social progress and the establishing of a new 
model of relationships between the developed and developing world based on 
partnership and equality of relations. An even more important sign was the 
change in the EC’s willingness to challenge the norms of reciprocity in trade 
preference and the MFN principle of the GATT. Dickson (2004) sees that 
from the EU side, this heralded the need for special measures in order for the 
more economically disadvantaged countries to benefit from the international 
system.203 The fact that the EC was willing to recognise this special need in trade 
relations is noteworthy. 
As a part of the larger trade agenda, non-reciprocity as an expression of 
Special and Differential Treatment had also become one of the cornerstones 
of the G77 countries’ agenda for the UN and, subsequently, for the New 
International Economic Order agenda in the 1970s. This was a particular 
demand of the Commonwealth countries, which made it clear that any new 
agreement that they would become parties to would have to be based on new 
kinds of principles. These included non-reciprocity, equality and security in 
terms of contractual basis and export earnings204, which were then successfully 
enshrined in the first Lomé Convention. In this respect, in the 1970s the EC and 
EC countries were willing to go further than any other industrialised country in 
terms of providing preferences for the ACPs beyond the prevailing norms. In a 
sense, the EC established a limited New Economic Order between itself and the 
recipients of the time. This differed markedly from the preceding arrangements 
that the EC had provided in two respects. On the one hand, it was based on a 
new type of conceptualisation of North-South trade from free trade towards 
import substitution with improved market access to the European market. 
On the other hand, it was these new arrangements that elevated the ACP 
countries above other developing countries in terms of preferential treatment 
more favourable than the regular General System of Preferences allowed by 
the GATT. In this respect, it was also criticised for threatening the unity of the 
Group of 77.205 
201 Vogt 2006: 162.
202 Arts & Dickson 2004: 1-2; Dickson 2004: 43.
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According to Brown (2004), the partnership of equals was also an attempt 
to rid the EU-ACP relationship of “neocolonialism”, while for the ACP the 
need to reform the international political economy and the terms concerning 
how aid was provided were also crucial. In addition, in the era of the Cold 
War, Lomé aid and cooperation was to be non-political insofar as it was to 
be made available to all ACP states. Also, the Convention was explicit about 
recognising ACP sovereignty over internal political and economic matters, 
and seeing to it that Lomé cooperation would not infringe each ACP state’s 
right to determine development strategies.206 Ravenhill (1985), in turn, sees 
the Lomé Conventions as a means to establish and maintain what he calls 
“collective clientelism” between the ACP ground and the EEC so as to benefit 
from the emerging international economic order. However, in Ravenhill’s view 
the equality of partners remained clearly unfulfilled because of the patron and 
client relationship, as did the expected benefits of such a deal. 
However, with hindsight, Flint (2008: 15) observes that Lomé I may still 
have come the closest to an agreement between partners. From the ACP 
perspective, there was little or no conditionality to enforce EEC norms without 
their consent. In addition, Lomé I introduced a number of innovations. 
According to Grilli (1994), the most important ones were related to securing and 
stabilising commodity revenue. The need for that was officially recognised in the 
Convention and System for Stabilization of Export Earnings (STABEX), which 
was established for agricultural commodities by the EC funds. Importantly, 
reciprocity in trade relations was abandoned between the associates and 
the Community. Grilli (1994) notes that both changes reflected developing 
countries’ aspirations to transform the international trading system and the 
GATT agreement to accommodate development concerns. However, fulfilling 
these needs for the enlarged ACP group alone remained problematic. At this 
time, these provisions were safeguarded by a waiver because of the apparent 
breach of GATT rules in terms of discrimination against non-ACP developing 
countries in the absence of the free trade area that could have been used as 
grounds for exemption.207 
In addition to these trade aspects, a Sugar Protocol was included. Unlike 
the banana and rum Protocols of the Convention, the Sugar Protocol conferred 
special treatment including duty-free, quota-free access, and a guaranteed price 
for a competing product to the EC sugar production. According to Ravenhill 
(1985: 219), these Protocols represented a critical test of the efficiency of the 
Lomé arrangements. The trade provisions and trade cooperation were further 
complemented with sections on industrial cooperation. Crucially, the old 
206 Brown 2004: 18-19. 
207 Flint 2008: 14-15. 
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elements of Yaoundé I on financial and technical assistance remained important 
as well as the institutional framework.208 What is noteworthy is the increase 
in development financing through grants, loans and the newly established 
STABEX instrument as presented above.209  
Although the successful “unification” of the ACP countries certainly 
influenced the content of the Lomé Convention, Fraser (2009: 46-47) notes 
that the overall international context in the 1970s was conducive to this kind 
of outcome. In Fraser’s words, under the umbrella of a campaign for a New 
International Economic Order in the UN in 1974, “developing countries 
attempted to take advantage of these conditions, and negotiated a range of 
policies that would not have been the first choices of the donors”. According 
to Flint (2008: 14), the ACPs were successful in obtaining concessions from 
the EC because of European concerns regarding access to raw materials in the 
politically sensitive situation brought about by the outbreak of the Oil Crisis 
(1973) in the Cold War context. The dependency on imported energy also 
prompted the EC to establish new economic and development linkages to the 
Mediterranean210, but the emphasis of the EC development policy remained in 
the Lomé framework. However, as van Reisen (2007: 43-44) points out, the 
links between Europe and the Mediterranean region were strategic for the EC’s 
international role, particularly in terms of reclaiming European influence in the 
whole African continent. 
Lomé II (1980-85) introduced two further novelties. First, greater emphasis 
in aid was given to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and landlocked 
countries, due to the rising number of countries in this UN-set category. 
Second, similarly to STABEX for agricultural products, the SYSMIN facility 
was established for mining exports to the EC to secure the sector against loss of 
production or price collapses.211 However, after the peak of parity in the Lomé I 
Convention, the downhill spiral for the EC-ACP partnership had already begun.
DG Development in Perspective
The development policy Commission services have their roots in the early 
days of European associationism under the Treaty of Rome as the subsequent 
Commission structure was set up to carry out the tasks related to the West-African 
association. Unsurprisingly, from 1958 the Commissioners responsible for the 
association (and from 1975 for the Lomé partnership and development policy) 
208 Grilli 1994: 27-32. 
209 Grilli 1994: 33-34.
210 Grilli 1994: 42. 
211 Holland 2002: 37-38.
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were all French until 1999. Regarding the Commissioner’s assignments, Hewitt 
and Whiteman make an important observation on how the Commissioner’s 
portfolios were adjusted for the sake of political appointments, rather than for 
policy content-related reasons, which increased uncertainty in the Commission 
development policy.212 In the past, to counter-balance the Francophone 
dominance over development policy, the Directorate-General responsible 
for the association was led by German officials. In a sense, the Commission 
administration was combining “the best of the two neighbours”: heavy French 
bureaucracy with dedicated and determined German implementation. This 
combination was often the subject of criticism, both from the member states 
as well as from African partner countries.213 
Despite this formal balancing within the DG, especially during the decade 
prior to Lomé, the Commission was largely perceived as serving the interests 
of a one-member state, which then presented a distorted picture of the 
Community internationally. In particular, General de Gaulle had the idea of 
“Eurafrica”, which coloured the whole association policy of the Community 
until his resignation in 1969. It was only after his resignation that a really new 
approach became an option with new parties, which subsequently materialised 
in Lomé I. Of course, the new policy was also facilitated by new policymakers 
that had both the vision and skills to follow it through. In this respect, Hewitt 
and Whiteman (2004: 141) cite the role of Commissioner Cheysson as being 
decisive. He contributed to Lomé with the principles of non-reciprocity and 
partnership as a basis for the new developmental relationship. In addition, the 
appointment of the first British Deputy Director General, former Foreign Office 
Minister and known pro-European Maurice Foley, along with other newcomers, 
innovated the Community stance with ideas of Pan-Africanism, as well as the 
importance of the Caribbean and the Pacific, at least in terms of shifting away 
from the previous French concept of “Eurafrica”. This approach also served to 
bridge the Francophone and Anglophone divide. Hewitt & Whiteman (2004: 
143-144) describe the development cooperation of that period as “impossibly 
global” for the time, which also satisfied the like-minded British and Dutch 
governments.214 They also note that this period was just as unique in the sense 
that never again did the Commission really appear to be on the side of this 
radical international development thinking the way it did at the time of Lomé I. 
212 Hewitt & Whiteman 2004: 134-135. In particular, they refer to the need to split the development 
portfolio in 1984 in order to accommodate ex-development French Commissioner Cheysson’s 
comeback from the position of Mitterand’s External Affairs Minister. According to Hewitt and 
Whiteman, this split caused more than a decade of uncertainty in the Commission’s development 
policy. 
213 Hewitt & Whiteman 2004: 135. 
214 See Commission suggestion for a Community Policy SEC(71) 2700, 27 July 1971.
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Hewitt and Whiteman point to variations in the personalities at the helm 
of DG XIII, which then evolved into DG Development. In the chain of German 
Directors-General, Dieter Frisch stands out as a particularly significant 
contributor to the evolution of EC development policy. As a long-term official 
of DG XIII, he was one of the negotiators of the Lomé I agreement and became 
Director General in 1984.215 Most notably, he played a major role in influencing 
both the Directorate and policy, which then paved the way for the inclusion 
of development policy in the Treaty of Maastricht.216 It was his idea to seek 
“critical mass” in favour of harmonised development policy and to use it to 
develop a real European development policy in its own right.217 He has also 
been a strong advocate of policy coherence as well as development policy 
autonomy.218 Together with Frisch, Frenchman Bernard Petit joined the EC in 
1971 and continued to work on development issues until his retirement from the 
position of Deputy Director General at the EC DG DEV in 2009.219 
Also in more general terms during the Lomé I era, DG XIII was perceived 
both career- and substance-wise as an attractive, innovative place to be within 
the Commission services.220 What is also worth noting is the fact that when 
the Lomé framework was being outlined, the Commission as a whole was at 
the height of its powers compared to, say, the Community institutions of the 
European Parliament, the Court of Auditors and the Economic and Social 
Committee. Equally notable was the morphing of the development DG, which 
reached its peak towards the end of the 1970s with the second largest budget 
right after DG Agriculture. Hewitt and Whiteman (2004) also point to the skills 
of the then DG XIII staff to both deliver and gain support for the first Lomé 
Convention in the governments of both the South and the North. 
In addition to the actual Convention, a policy paper was produced in 1974 
by the same actors during the Lomé I negotiations entitled “The Fresco of the 
Community Action Tomorrow”. In a sense, the “Fresco” was to serve similar 
functions to the “European Consensus” three decades later as it conveyed for 
the first time a panoramic picture of a future, global development policy with a 
new set of elements in terms of themes and geographic extensions. Moreover, 
as a part of the Development Fresco, humanitarian issues came into the EC 
development picture for the first time.221 
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The European Take on the Washington Consensus
Even though the assessment of the actual successes and failures of the Lomé I 
and II provisions themselves can still be debated, Holland (2002: 40) points 
to oil, and the subsequent debt crisis (1982), decreasing commodity prices and 
global recession as the main factors leading to the end of the era of parity and 
non-interference. In Fraser’s (2009: 47) analysis, the period after 1980 saw the 
gradual and consistent evaporation of the major sources of developing-country 
negotiating strength, resulting in the imposition of structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs) as a condition for continued access to foreign capital in the 
1980s. The SAPs were put in place by the International Financial Institutions, 
most notably by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
(WB), which became increasingly powerful actors in the “economic crisis 
management” in the South. Dickson (2004: 44-45) refers to the dramatic change 
in development thinking, particularly in development economics, since the 
1980s. This had a major impact on the content of the successive Lomé III (1985-
90) and Lomé IV (1990-1995, IV bis 1995-2000) agreements. In particular, it 
changed the EU’s conceptualisation of development and trade.
Crucially, Grilli (1994: 38-39) notes that by the time Lomé III was negotiated 
most of the Sub-Saharan African countries were struggling with a profound 
economic and debt crisis, which effectively diminished any negotiation power 
they might have had. However, the EC chose not to act independently to assist 
Africa with additional financial assistance, let alone debt reduction through the 
Lomé framework, but aligned with the World Bank and IMF to tackle the crisis 
instead. While external factors causing the crisis were relegated to the sidelines, 
donor focus shifted to the inefficient domestic policies contributing to the 
poor economic performance of the developing countries in the ACP regions.222 
According to Flint (2008: 15), the international community’s response under 
this “Washington Consensus” marked a shift from project finance to “policy 
reform” and the implementation of economic practices, often described as 
neoliberal.223 In response to the generalised inability of developing countries 
to service their debt payments, donors, under the lead of the IMF and the World 
Bank, redirected the development process under a new paradigm whereby the 
aid allocation became dependent on the adoption of this programme and created 
cross-conditionality between bilateral donors, recipient states and International 
Financial Institutions.224 For instance, according to Brown (2004: 20), the SAPs 
222 Grilli 1994: 37. In contrast, the 1980s witnessed a period of phenomenal growth in the developing 
countries of South East Asia. Holland 2002: 40-41. 
223 Flint 2008: 15. Cf. Sub-chapter 2.4.
224 Brown 2004: 20.
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shifted the focus from the post-colonial interventionist state to an efficient 
market as the driving force for development. This shift was manifested in a 
one-size-fits-all set of measures of government expenditure cuts, anti-inflation 
drives though high interest rates, trade liberalisation, currency devaluation, 
privatisation and freeing foreign prices. In addition, aid and loans for balance-
of-payments support evolved into medium- and long-term programmes of 
economic restructuring. The poor development performance was no longer 
due to the hostile international system, as the dependency theory claimed, 
but incorrect policies in the developing countries.225 The newly industrialised 
countries (NICs) were looked up to as a model for market-oriented policies also 
for developing countries elsewhere.226
These new conditions, together with the apparent economic decline in 
Africa (and to a lesser extent in the Pacific and Caribbean States)227, changed 
the context within which Europe conducted its development policy. In addition, 
Greece had joined the Community in 1981 and Spain and Portugal were finalising 
their accession negotiations, bringing the issue of closer Latin American and 
Mediterranean relations onto the development policy agenda. The ACP group 
in turn had grown to 66 states, representing roughly half of the total number of 
developing countries. However, as Holland (2002: 41) notes (2002), their ACP 
group identity was clear only in relations with the EC and its members, not in 
other international contexts. Respectively, the importance of the ACP group for 
the EC gradually started to decline. 
In concrete terms, Lomé III introduced two major changes. Most significantly, 
during the early structural adjustment, the EC also brought the principle of 
economic conditionality into the ACP-EU “partnership”.228 At the same time, 
the EU nevertheless took a rather passive role. Despite the magnitude of the 
debt crisis, the Community and its members did not take, either alone or with 
other industrial areas, any debt reduction initiative vis-à-vis Africa until the 
late 1980s.229 On the other hand, the scope of the development cooperation was 
extended to cover new thematic issue areas, including climate, the environment 
and health, and social and cultural cooperation. Although the inclusion of new 
areas diversified the EU approach from traditional trade and the aid-centred 
model, the cooperation lacked substance, as Holland (2002: 41) points out. 
225 Dickson 2004:44-45. 
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However, it was the end of the Cold War that brought about a series of major 
changes to the EU’s development cooperation. As for the Lomé framework, the 
end of the era also marked an ending in terms of the political neutrality already 
questioned by the SAPs in the field of economic development. As Arts and 
Dickson (2004) observe, from the early 1990s, human rights and democracy, 
and subsequently governance considerations, became increasingly important 
in European external relations. This was particularly the case for the contents 
of the EU’s development policy towards the ACPs. The shift away from political 
neutrality was legitimised by the international “triumph of democracy” and 
the waves of democratisation in different parts of the world.230 In essence, the 
Union adopted a liberal model which embraced the two dimensions of Western 
political liberalism, namely electoral democracy with human rights, and market 
liberalism. So in addition to the general goal of forging good relations with 
(potential) political and economic partners across the globe, the Union started 
to use its position in international relations as a vehicle for advocating some 
of the values it considers important.231 For development policy, the political 
conditions of security, democracy and freedom, together with economic 
conditions, were viewed as necessary for the attainment of the development 
objectives.232 
Regarding economic conditionality, there was an attempt by the European 
Commission to call for an EU policy on adjustment, which would have 
differentiated between recipient countries, taking into account the position of 
the poorest and most vulnerable in society.233 Importantly for both economic 
and political reforms, in practice the EC and its members did not succeed in 
consolidating them, let alone in cooperating with the ACPs. In the absence of 
a distinct agreement, they continued to align with the World Bank and other 
International Financial Institutions in the organisation of donor-recipient 
relations.234 Thus, the last of the Lomé Conventions, Lomé IV (1990-2000), 
was coined under the same economic and political paradigm set out by the IFIs. 
The paradigm was followed through in the 1990s with the gradual expansion 
of aid conditions from macroeconomics into the realms of development policy, 
including public sector reform, governance, and social policy.235 
230 This “Triumph of Democracy” and Western Liberalism was discussed in very dramatic terms 
by Francis Fukuyama, who declared ‘the End of History’ in 1989. On different waves of 
Democratisation, see e.g. Samuel Huntington 1999, Larry Diamond 1993; 1996. On democracy 
in the developing world and globalisation, see e.g. Hadenius 1997. 
231 Arts and Dickson 2004: 1. 
232 Smith 2004: 61, referring to Council Resolution 1991.
233 Brown 2004: 21-22.
234 Cf. Brown 2004: 34.
235 Cf. Fraser 2009: 46-47. 
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In the fourth Lomé Convention, the emphasis on economic conditionality 
was for the first time directly linked to Structural Adjustment Support, with 
financial resources from the EDF budget comprising 10 per cent of all available 
funds. In this setting, it was clear that while ACP countries were included in 
the policy debate on economic reform, European approval was a funding 
prerequisite.236 Furthermore, the EC also extended conditionality to the sphere 
of politics, particularly in terms of commitment by both parties to international 
law on human rights and democratic rule.237 This caused a significant change 
in the terms by which the “partnership” principle of the Lomé cooperation was 
conceptualised. As Holland (2002: 44-45) notes, Treaty Article 2, defining the 
ACP-EC partnership and stressing the principle of sovereignty and the “right 
of each State to determine its own political, social, cultural and economic 
policy options”, sat uncomfortably with the frame of economic and political 
conditionality. 
Flint’s (2008), Karagiannis’ (2004) and Brown’s (2004) analysis describes 
the European actors’ role in the evolution of the Washington Consensus as 
conformist and consensual. While the shift to structural adjustment was led by 
the International Financial Institutions, according to Flint (2008: 15-16), the 
same course was soon adopted by the EC and some of the key member states, 
with the UK notably maintaining that structural adjustment was unavoidable. 
Therefore the Washington Consensus was, at least to this extent, a consensus 
shared by the EC. Another noteworthy observation by Karagiannis (2004: 14) 
pertains to the fact that despite the role of individual EC member countries in 
the IFIs, the SAPs were presented as a pragmatic choice, and instead of fighting 
against this current, the member states did not try to actively use their weight 
to change its course. Similarly, Lister (1997) notes that the EC broadly echoed 
the Washington Consensus and, in particular, the views of the World Bank 
on Structural Adjustment Programmes, despite any strong empirical evidence 
that such an approach was generally beneficial for development. However, 
the Consensus was not completely “owned” by Brussels, as Brown (2004) 
points out.  In particular, at the beginning of the adjustment period, the rise 
of conditionality posed a problem for the EU Commission. The fact that the 
World Bank and the IMF supported the SAPs in 39 ACP countries meant that 
the compatibility between the Lomé framework and the SAPs became a major 
issue for EC-ACP cooperation. This prompted the Commission to look for a 
more moderate approach, especially after the first adjustment period because 
of the rising criticism by the developing countries, development agencies, NGOs 
and UNICEF. However, according to Brown, the more moderate approach 
236 Holland 2002: 43-44. 
237 Karagiannis 2004: 14.
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was abandoned for two reasons. On the one hand, the Commission lacked the 
financial resources, technical personnel and support from the member states to 
challenge the World Bank leadership. On the other hand, many member states, 
especially the UK, represented by then British Overseas Development Minister, 
Chris Patten, consciously opted for closer cooperation with the World Bank 
in order to maximise the expected results.238 According to Arts (2004: 107), 
the final result was that the EU as a whole financed 64 per cent of the cost of 
structural adjustment programmes in Africa. 
Intriguingly, Hellinger, Weinberg and Graham (2000: 47-50) point out that 
starting from the 1990 World Bank Development Report, the International 
Financial Institutions themselves started to slowly acknowledge that poverty, 
inequality and human suffering had actually increased in countries implementing 
the adjustment programmes. By the mid-1990s it had also become apparent 
that despite the SAPs, economic performance had not improved.239 However, 
it took a decade to change the course towards softer, more “inclusive” Poverty 
Reduction and a good governance agenda, as Dough and Porter (2006: 1-4) 
describe the new paradigm. However, according to Dough and Porter, in terms 
of development rhetoric, the change itself took place rapidly. The SAPs were 
turned into the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility and re-named the 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility in 1999, stressing the joint nature 
of the developmental efforts by donors and recipient countries. Again, this 
IFI-led approach was to be renewed under the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs) with an increasing “ownership” by recipient governments 
themselves. These measures paved the way for Poverty Reduction development 
and good governance, which would then steer international development 
forwards towards the new millennium. Fraser (2009) calls this phase (from 
2000 onwards) the era of “partnership”, but with complex conditionality and 
aid-monitoring regimes. Despite the cordial language, according to Fraser, 
partnerships in practice leave strikingly little room for national design and for 
manoeuvring across a wide range of policy areas. Ownership here could be 
achieved, as Fraser (2009: 45-46) puts it, “simply by recipient governments 
finding the “political will” to present their own preferred programme in the 
form of a multi-year development plan, in order for it to be supported by donors 
committed to ownership and partnership”.240 
238 Brown 2004: 21-24. 
239 Flint 2008: 16. Flint also points to the debate on whether the failure of the SAPs lay in the 
programme itself or in its poor implementation.  
240 Fraser 2009: 45-46.
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Towards a Global Development Policy
The campaign against poverty, and for sustainable development and the 
consolidation of democracy and respect of human rights, together with the 
gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy, 
became the normative base of the Union’s development cooperation, covering 
all developing countries in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992.241 The revision of 
the fourth Lomé Convention took place in 1994, only two years after the signing 
of the Maastricht Treaty. Importantly, these objectives were also included in 
the renewed Lomé IV Convention in 1995. Although initially only the financial 
protocol was to be reviewed, largely on EU insistence, the review process was 
extended beyond EDF funds. These new areas included institutional and political 
issues as well as trade and other sectoral issues. With respect to EDF funding, 
a two-tranche system was introduced for indicative programming. In addition, 
the policy dialogue between the partners was established in order to see how 
the EU development policy objectives were being taken into account in the ACP 
states’ respective development approaches. To ensure that these commitments 
were followed, the EC reserved the right to withhold 30 per cent of funds until 
the effective implementation of a programme had been established.242 
Regarding the trade aspects, the conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round 
and the establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1995 increased the 
pressure to re-assess the preferential treatment. In particular, the GATT panel 
ruling in 1994 found that non-reciprocity elements contained within the Lomé 
Convention as well as its discriminatory nature against non-ACP developing 
countries was incompatible with the multilateral trading system. Therefore, the 
Lomé IV bis (1995-2000) required a WTO waiver before the trade provisions 
could be implemented. According to Flint (2008: 17-18), the panel decision was 
a decisive factor in the EU abandoning the preferential treatment approach and 
starting to look for WTO-consistent alternatives for the ACP-EU trade. In general, 
the thorough revision of Lomé IV foreshadowed changes that were then outlined 
in the Commission Green Paper on the Future of the ACP-EU Partnership in the 
following year. We will return to these changes in Sub-chapter 6.4.
Whereas economic conditionality in such a form was abolished by the 
expiry of Lomé IV, the political dimension and the new dimensions of 
development cooperation in the ACP-EC framework continued growing in the 
EC development policy. Notably, these dimensions were not only limited to the 
ACP-EC framework but, to varying degrees, towards new “partnerships” which 
Europe was actively re-launching and expanding throughout the 1990s. Smith 
241 Dickson 2004: 45. 
242 Holland 2002: 48-49.
CONTExTUAlISINg THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS  |  91
(2004: 60) points out that these new partnerships with the Mediterranean non-
member countries, Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe were based on the 
Lomé model with trade, aid and institutionalised dialogue on a regional basis, 
but with more limited scope and emphasis. 
The new approach became possible due to fundamental changes in world 
politics and in Europe itself. van Reisen (2007: 59) summarises these changes, 
which were connected to the creation and expansion of the EU itself in the 
post-Cold War era.243 First, progress towards the Maastricht Treaty (and the 
subsequent Treaties) increased and intensified European integration with both 
legal and political implications for the EU’s development policy. In particular, 
the linkages between the three branches of external relations: trade, the 
emerging common foreign and security policy, and development policy became 
more crucial than before.244 Smith (2004: 61), too, notes that since the end of 
the Cold War, the EU has actively sought a more global role and endeavoured 
to project a more united stance in international relations. Second, the end of 
the Cold War had a profound effect on the “special nature” of the relationship 
with the African continent, as African countries lost their strategic importance 
at least in the geopolitical sense.245 Instead, the EU’s development cooperation 
saw an increased emphasis on neighbouring countries in the East and in the 
Mediterranean as well as in the area of the former Soviet Union after the demise 
of the East-West divide. Despite the poverty focus of the Maastricht Treaty and 
the Northern enlargement in 1995, embracing Austria, Finland and Sweden, 
the importance of the near-abroad regions was paramount also in terms of 
development aid allocations.246 Third, the scope of the European development 
policy started to reach a global dimension with the renewed and formalised 
ALA partnerships to Latin American and Asian countries in the post-Cold War 
situation.247 In this situation, the evident developmental needs in the ACPs and 
the old colonial ties were no longer enough to maintain the privileged position. At 
the same time, the EU’s immediate interests in the neighbourhood bypassed the 
ACP concerns.248 As a result, the EU’s special partnership with the ACPs started 
to become just one of the many arrangements in the enlarged web of external 
relations inside the development policy area. These developments placed the 
EU in an interesting position. By the beginning of the new millennium, the 
Union had evolved into a treaty-based, increasingly global actor at least in terms 
243 van Reisen 2007:59.
244 On foreign and security policy concerns in the EU’s development policy, see Sub-chapter 3.4.
245 Flint 2008: 16-17.
246 On the increasing aid allocations of PHARE as well as the TACIS and MEDA programmes (the 
predecessors of the ENPI policy), see van Reisen 2007: 50-51 and Smith 2004: 60-77.
247 On EU-Asia and Latin American Partnerships, see e.g. Holland 2002. On early relations, see Grilli 1994. 
248 Smith 2004: 61.
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of the scope of its development and external relations to the development world. 
However, the development policy objectives per se were sliding towards the 
margins of the EU agenda. 
3.3 THE COMMISSION REfORM AND THE INSTITUTIONAL 
POSITION Of DEVELOPMENT POLICy IN THE EARLy 2000S
Notwithstanding the successes of European integration in terms of the Single 
European Market, EMU or the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht, there have 
also been more critical turns. Most notably, this was the case with Jacques 
Santer’s Commission resignation in 1999 due to issues of accountability and bad 
governance.249 Under the pressure of the European Parliament, a mass resignation 
took place after a Committee of Independent Experts examination. Tomkins (1999) 
describes the event as the most dramatic in the history of the European Community, 
bringing the issues of democratic deficit and lack of responsibility to the fore. 
If the early 1970s held great promise for the Community development policy, 
the “Fresco” at the time of the Commission resignation and its reformation looked 
much murkier. This crisis also had an impact on the European development 
policy because some of the accusations of fraud and mismanagement were 
also related to the Mediterranean programme, MED, and to the European 
Community Humanitarian Aid Office, ECHO. Although no clear case of fraud or 
mismanagement was found, the new development policy dimensions of MEDA, 
PHARE-TACIS as well as the separate ECHO office had stressed the Commission 
management and control capacity beyond sustainable levels.250 Strong criticism 
was levelled against the Commission in a series of evaluations in the late 1990s, 
calling for a clearer poverty focus and better organisation of the policy.251 As 
for the ACP group, and in particular for Africa, Hewitt & Whiteman (2004: 
144-145) point to the 1980s and the year 1990 as a huge African crisis.252 They 
go on to argue that at the time “the long-lived Lomé arrangement had been 
comprehensively overtaken by other interests – by all the other interests, really”. 
This lost preferential position was reflected in the EDF negotiations, which had 
by that time become a formality without even an imaginary degree of equality, 
“where, after the play-acting, the ACP had to accept what was given”.253 
249 Hewitt & Whiteman 2004: 133. 
250 Hewitt & Whiteman 2004: 144-145. 
251 Maxwell & Engel 2003: 1. 
252 Often referred to as the lost decade of Adedeji (Executive Secretary of the UN Economic 
Commission for Africa from 1975 to 1991). 
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The confusion over the status of development policy in the EU’s external 
relations was also played out in favour of extending the Commission mandate 
in external relations. In 1999 the Romano Prodi Commission renamed the 
Directorates-General, and DG XIII became DG Development while DG I became 
DG Trade. In the new Commission configuration, EC development policy 
was set to be reformed as a part of external relations, now referred to as the 
Common Service for External Relations, RELEX or even as the “RELEX family”. 
The formal purpose of the RELEX reform was to strengthen the organisational 
structure of the European Commission by integrating the services dealing with 
political issues, trade and development more strongly within a single entity.254 
On the development policy side, these changes were also linked to suggestions 
made in the 1998 DAC Peer Review, whereby the European Commission was 
encouraged to redefine its development policy and ways of working. According 
to the European Commission agenda of April 2000, the stated purpose of the 
reforms was to bring about an ambitious overhaul to increase its efficiency, 
effectiveness and accountability by focusing on performance and results.255 
However, as van Reisen (2007: 52) for instance maintains, whereas the 
institutional changes were to serve the EU as a global player, the interrelationship 
between the CFSP and development policy remained problematic because 
it exerted increasing pressure on European development co-operation for 
resources and the institutional capacity to be utilised in support of common 
external action, other than for development purposes. In this respect, the 
principle of Consistency of External Relations was applied to the detriment of 
development policy. From the Commission’s point of view, these changes were 
needed in order to strengthen DG RELEX vis-à-vis the Council. 
The institutional changes fragmented development policy internally by 
separating the political responsibility from actual implementation. Hence it 
led to an unsustainable situation whereby the Commissioner for Development 
was still politically responsible for development co-operation, but had no 
administrative structures to ensure the implementation of his policies. Even if 
the Prodi Commission decided to give the Commissioner for Development, Poul 
Nielson, the former Danish Minister for Development Cooperation, a formal 
overview and portfolio for all developing countries, including the ACP, Asia, 
Latin America, Southern Africa, and the Mediterranean, this was mostly a paper 
portfolio. In factual terms, the policy for countries in Asia, Latin America, and 
the Mediterranean came under the responsibility of the Directorate-General for 
External Relations (DG RELEX) under the British Commissioner Chris Patten. 
In addition, the management of policy implementation of the remaining ACP 
254 van Reisen 2007: 47.
255 Maxwell & Engel 2003. 
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regions was transferred from DG Development to DG RELEX. So under the lead 
of Commissioner Patten, the DG RELEX managed the implementation of all 
aid to developing countries and was in charge of policy and programming for 
the Mediterranean, Latin American, and Asian regions.256 At the same time, aid 
programming towards the ACP countries was increasingly being decentralised 
to the EU Delegations, which was rational from the point of view of planning 
operations closer to the field, but also increased the sense of fragmentation. 
These changes, combined with the problems of the past, prompted then British 
Secretary of Development, Clare Short, to name and shame the EC as “the worst 
development agency in the world” in 2000.257
However, Hewitt and Whiteman (2004) see this situation as a conscious 
choice and stress Commissioner Nielson’s own role in the division between 
planning and the operational side. During the first years following the reform, 
the Development Commissioner did not, at least publicly, refer to problems 
that, with the benefit of hindsight, were very likely to arise from this kind of 
situation. Instead, he played the role of leading Commissioner responsible for EC 
development policy and development co-operation in all third countries. What 
he saw as important was that this overview position, together with humanitarian 
aid, could steer the EC towards greater internal coherence. This optimism 
did not last, however. The Common Service for External Relations was soon 
to be replaced by a new organisation, named EuropeAid in 2001. A board of 
Commissioners, chaired by Chris Patten, supervised this new structure. As a 
result, the Development Commissioner was appointed as the director general of 
EuropeAid, while Nielson’s DG was left with few staff and even fewer tasks, which 
played down the self-proclaimed independent role of development policy in the 
Commission.258 According to Hewitt & Whiteman (2004: 146), this division was 
detrimental to the morale within the DG Development. In addition, it eroded the 
development policy position in the internal Commission hierarchy by narrowing 
down its institutional space. This was something that Commissioner Nielson 
himself felt towards the end of his term, as he commented to the European 
Parliament that “the CEO of EuropeAid was a joke. It was a bad joke”.259
But it was not only the RELEX-DG Development turf war that affected 
the development policy position. Once again, competing views prevailed on 
whether trade- and development-related issues, particularly EU-ACP trade 
matters, should be maintained inside DG Development or transferred to DG 
Trade under Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy. Due to practicalities related to 
256 van Reisen 2007: 53, Hewitt & Whiteman 2004:146. See also Carbone 2007a: 47.
257 Clare Short, “Aid that Doesn’t Help”, Financial Times, 23 June 2000.
258 van Reisen 2007: 53-55.
259 Nielson as cited in van Reisen 2007: 54.
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the Doha Development Round and emerging plans for EU developing-country 
free-trade relations, a pragmatic choice was made to bring these arrangements 
under the same unit. As agreed between Commissioners Nielson and Pascal 
Lamy, trade policy with the ACP countries was removed from DG Development 
and transferred to a new unit, Trade and Development of DG Trade.260 
Although some of the previous staff that had been dealing with trade and 
development since the Lomé arrangements were to continue in DG Trade, it was 
DG Development that suffered a great loss in terms of trade and development 
expertise due to this shift.261 In addition, EuropeAid also needed personnel, 
which further weakened the mother DG.  This was especially problematic 
because of the timing, which coincided with the preparations for the Cotonou 
Agreement and also impacted the first years of the EPA negotiations. However, 
opinions on this transfer tend to vary a great deal. For some, it marked an 
altogether new era in EU-ACP trade relations with a different approach to the 
issue areas in question, as well as the organisational culture. For others, it was 
just a rational choice that remarkably improved coordination between the 
units.262 The shift in approach can also be inferred from the related documents 
of the time, to which we will return in the Sub-chapter on the EPAs. 
Despite the meagre institutional stand, DG Development led the Cotonou 
Agreement to its conclusion in 2000, and launched a set of policy papers that 
showed a greater commitment to poverty eradication. In addition, in the midst 
of all this, the Commission published the first European Community (EC) 
development policy statement as a part of the Council Conclusions in April 2000. 
The development policy statement was significant in that it was published to re-
establish the credibility of the Commission as a development policy agent. Even 
more importantly, the lost objective of poverty eradication was reinstated at the 
fore of the EC development policy.263 Furthermore, the Conclusions also identified 
the need for the policy frameworks in different regions to be “aligned”.264 However, 
this was perceived as challenging from the point of view of development objectives 
due to differences in orientation between DG RELEX and DG Development.265 
To redress the balance between the different DGs, an inter-service quality 
support (IQSG) group was set up as a part of the Commission overhaul and the 
subsequent external relations reform. The main task of the group was to examine 
the coherence and quality of the development cooperation programming 
260 Interviews EC[1]2008, Academia[8]2009, CSO[11]2009 and EC[15]2009. 
261 Interview CSO[20]2009.
262 Interviews EC[1]2008, EC[14]2008 and EC[15]2009.
263 DPS Study Report ECDPM/ICEI/ODI 2005: 7.  
264 van Reisen 2007: 56. 
265 Interviews Academia[8]2009, EC[14]2008, Academia[21]2008, EC[30]2009 and EC[34]2009.
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documents and to come up with common guidelines for all the countries and 
regions regardless of their geographical standing. The members of the inter-
service quality support group are elected to cover the whole RELEX “family” 
– DG AIDCO, ECHO, DEV, TRADE and ECFIN – but the representatives do 
not represent their respective DGs. Membership is based on  overall expertise 
and the work is of an advisory nature.266 
At the same time, the rival idea that the Commission development policy 
should be focused and limited to Africa seemed to gain ground. This was 
expressed during a debate in 2003 when the Commission stated in the Budget 
Committee that development policy was no longer a basis for its activities in Asia 
and Latin America, although the European Parliament did not accept that view. 
However, in the same year, the Commission changed the budget nomenclature 
and removed Asian, Latin American and Mediterranean countries from the 
budget chapter on development co-operation and re-introduced them under 
a chapter on external relations. Additionally, during the preparations for 
the review of country strategy papers, DG-RELEX refused to accept general 
guidelines for all developing countries, and stated that it would have separate 
guidelines for Asian, Latin American, and Mediterranean countries.267
However, the problems kept accumulating. During the second Barroso 
Commission (2004-2009), the institutional set up for development deteriorated 
further. The board of EuropeAid, which had been jointly established to represent 
the external DGs, was abolished and the agency came directly under the DG for 
External Relations with Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner, appointed at the 
time to be in charge of policy towards Asia, Latin America, and the neighbouring 
countries, as well as implementation for all the developing countries. The new 
Commissioner for development, Louis Michel, no longer had a say in EuropeAid 
and had to settle for the even lighter portfolio of DG Development and ECHO.268 
Compared to his predecessor, the Dane Poul Nielson, former Belgian Deputy 
Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Minister for Institutional Reform Louis 
Michel was seen as more of a reminder of the past.269 Moreover, his strong 
foreign policy orientation and limited experience in the development field 
aroused mixed feelings.  However, in more positive terms, he was seen as a kind 
of “political animal”, eager and able to get things going.270 In this respect, he was 
regarded as an appropriate candidate to raise the development policy profile. 
266 Interviews EC[13]2009 and EC[23]2009.
267 van Reisen 2007: 56-57.
268 van Reisen 2007: 55.
269 Interviews EP[3]2009, CSO[11]2009 and CSO[33]2009.  
270 Interviews Academia[8]2009, CSO[11]2009, EC[30]2009, CSO[33]2009, CSO[31]2008, 
CSO[19]2008, Academia[21]2008 and Council[28]2008.
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3.4 THE DEVELOPMENT POLICy MOMENTUM 
Of THE EARLy 2000S
Development Commissioner Michel took up office in November 2004. Upon his 
appointment, the new Commissioner made it clear that he was planning to create 
a new framework for development policy, covering both the Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement and other regional cooperation arrangements.271 The idea of an 
overarching policy statement had, however, already been germinating inside 
the DG DEV before the arrival of the new Commissioner.272 Such a framework 
was envisioned to polish and to raise the overall image of development policy 
both internally as well as in relation to other external policy areas.273 Although 
an undertaking of this kind was perceived as necessary and long overdue, no 
one expected it to be an easy task. Neither the Commission nor the Council 
had a definitive view on the exact scope of the policy or the actors that it would 
eventually involve. What there was, however, was a clear momentum for such 
a process provided by increased international interest in development-related 
issues. In this sense, the launch of the WTO Doha “Development” Round in 
2001 had placed “Development” at least figuratively speaking at the centre of 
international trade talks; the UN Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 
had continued the debate on the environment and development in a global world; 
and of course, the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) had already 
been jointly adopted in September 2000. Equally important for development 
cooperation was the subsequent UN Financing for Development Conference 
in Monterrey in 2002, which was designed to mobilise development funding 
upon the adoption of the MDGs.274 Finally, there was the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness, which took shape during the first six months of the European 
Consensus process in the first half of 2005, as discussed previously. 
Specifically for the EU, the Monterrey process had proved to be a success for 
two reasons, as van Reisen (2007:58) points out. First, in preparation for the 
Summit, the EU finally committed itself to jointly increasing aid to €39 billion 
by 2006, equivalent to 0.39 per cent of the joint GNP of the 25 member states. 
Such an agreement ended (at least momentarily) the downward trend and 
subsequent impasse in the debate on development financing.275 Furthermore, 
271 InfoContonou 2005: 1.
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in May 2005, in preparation for the 2005 World Summit on MDGs, the EU 
ministers from the same member states agreed on a new collective target of 
0.56 per cent to be achieved in the upcoming five years. This was set to provide 
an additional €20 billion in aid by that time. In addition, the EU 25 also set 
2015 as the date for reaching the level of 0.7 per cent.276 Although the promises 
to raise development financing seemed rather modest initially, the decision 
to continue with increased assistance was significant given the background of 
the previous decades. Aid fatigue was still tangible during the first years of 
the millennium because, despite the formal commitment to the MDGs, the EU 
member states had initially failed to make concrete plans to pursue them.277 
So finally reaching an agreement on these targets restored and perhaps even 
increased the EU’s credibility as an actor in international development. “The 
Monterrey miracle” also gave the EU a certain norm-setter role. It was after the 
Union’s commitment that the US showed her willingness to follow suit with the 
aid targets two years later in the arena of the G8.278
At the level of Commission-member state interaction, the Monterrey 
Conference demonstrated that the European Commission could exercise 
leadership and take the European front forward not only as a loose group of 
bilateral actors but also as a single multilateral donor.279 This turn of events was 
particularly significant from the point of view of the Commission because these 
joint commitments were opposed at first by a number of member states (i.e. 
Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and initially also France).280 Regarding 
the Millennium review in 2005, the Luxembourg Presidency of the first half of 
2005 was a success in this case both in terms of concrete results as well as in 
terms of coordination efforts for the EU contribution to the Millennium Goals.281 
It also demonstrated that smooth cooperation between the Commission and 
the Presidency was both possible and fruitful. Most notably, however, having 
a common agenda for aid at the ready made it much easier to embark on the 
negotiations for a joint European development policy undertaking.282 
Essentially, the international processes of the early 2000s had also triggered 
the momentum for development policy inside the Union, as the EU participation 
had required inter-sectoral coordination and negotiations on key issues such as 
aid, but also on trade and security, as will be discussed in the related chapters. 
Equally important were the joint positions on the aforementioned issue areas, 
276 van Reisen 2007: 58.
277 Carbone 2007: 1.
278 Interview Academia[8]2009.
279 Carbone 2007: EC [1]2008 and Interviews [8], [21], [28], [30] and [34].  
280 Carbone 2007: 5-6. 
281 Interviews Academia[8]2009, Council[28]2008 and EC[30]2009. 
282 Interview Council[28]2008.
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as well as the resulting international agreements, which would serve as building 
blocks and guidelines for the envisioned new development policy statement.283 
So in this sense, these external aims were also decisive for internal politics, and 
vice versa. When it comes to development policy, the two dimensions seem to 
be particularly intertwined. 
As Carbone also (2007a) acknowledges, faith in the EC’s success in 
leading the development front is inevitably part of the larger question of 
complementarity and coordination between the Commission on the one hand, 
and the growing number of individual member states on the other. Despite the 
general acknowledgement that these ‘two Cs’ improve foreign aid and increase 
the overall visibility of the Union, some of the key member states tend to 
consider development policy an area of their national sovereignty which should 
not be intruded upon by anybody, not least by the European Commission.284 
This, at least to a certain extent, explains why the Commission-Council and 
Commission-member state interrelationship has been marked by a degree of 
tension. In addition, it is also significant that the quality of the EC development 
action has been constantly challenged, which has not improved the relationship 
either.285
It is important to note, therefore, that there were still a number of other 
obstacles to overcome during the development policy momentum phase of the 
early 2000s. In their review of the past decades of EC Development Policy, 
Hewitt & Whiteman (2004) foresaw that the period of EU enlargement and 
the post-Lomé consolidation of the ACP (in 2002-2007) would be the most 
challenging ever for the Commission. To overcome the past decades of “lost 
development” as well as to consolidate the policy area inside the Union, the 
Development Commissioner had to start, in their view, with three pressing 
tasks. These included first, restoring policy-planning and implementation 
under a single institutional structure, thereby reintegrating development policy 
planning and action inside the Commission.286 Second, and crucially, building 
good relations with critical member states and regaining legitimacy for the EC 
as a development actor. Similarly to Carbone’s (2007a) argument, Hewitt and 
Whiteman (2004: 146-147) also point out that there were member states that 
didn’t hesitate to challenge the Commission’s authority, claiming that “they can 
do better under bilateral development policy, and that the rules of subsidiarity 
shall apply also to development policy”. This attitude hinted that relationships 
283 Interviews [8], [21],[23] and [28].
284 Carbone 2007: 5-6.
285 Interviews [2], [3], [8], [20], [28] and [34].
286 Development policy had been separated from development operations as a part of the RELEX 
reform in 1999. See Sub-chapter 3.2.
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with the developing world could be better dealt with at a national level and that, 
consequently, there would be no need for a Common European development 
policy. Third, and interestingly for our topic, Hewitt and Whiteman saw tackling 
the EU’s own internal incoherence and contradictions, particularly in respect of 
agricultural protectionism, as the litmus test for the new Commissioner. This 
question was, of course, inevitably related to the wider role of development 
policy in the EU External Relations and Common Policies and not just to the 
individual capacity of the Commissioner, which was, however, also important 
in building inter-policy relations. 
Furthermore, the DAC Peer Review of 2002 had again pointed to the 
weaknesses in development policy in terms of considerably differing regional 
strategies and programmes, problems in policy implementation and aid 
disbursements, an insufficient focus on gender, the incoherence of the CAP 
in relation to development policy, as well as the lack of analytical capacities at 
the country level. It also pointed to the need for continuing reform in order to 
focus on results rather than procedures and so forth. These weaknesses had 
already been highlighted as concerns in the previous review process of 1998.287 
In addition, it was recommended that the structural responsibilities and 
accountability inside the external relations should be further clarified and that 
development policy should promote political and trade partnerships as well as 
use the linkage between development and humanitarian aid inside this setting. 
It was also regarded as important to develop the policy coherence framework 
following the findings of the 3C evaluation and review of internal policies. This 
included developing linkages between development policy and the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy.288 However, the review also acknowledged the 
progress made in forming an overall EC development policy and the new 
Cotonou Agreement, major improvements to country strategy processes, setting 
priority areas for the Commission, as well as setting up policies for private 
sector support and linking food aid and food security.289
To summarise, the challenges that development policy was facing were both 
internal and external. They were internal in terms of resources for development 
cooperation and the functional division of labour between the Commission and 
the member states. In turn, the external challenges were largely linked to the 
issue of policy coherence (for development). This latter dimension came to the 
fore with the increasing interest in development issues and substantial overlaps 
between security and development agendas on the one hand, and between trade 
and development in the early 2000s on the other. This happened both within 
287 DAC Peer Review 2002: I-15.
288 Ibid. 
289 Ibid. 
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the Commission as well as in the larger institutional framework. What makes 
this role even more challenging for development is this choice to link the EU’s 
common policy and the member states’ bilateral development policies with 
those of additional international organisations.290 In the ensuing sections, I go 
on to discuss the role of development policy, firstly in relation to the emerging 
European security policy of that time, and then in relation to the EU trade 
policy. 
3.5 A SHARED SHOw? SECURITy AND TRADE MATTERS IN 
THE CONTEXT Of THE DEVELOPMENT MOMENTUM
The aim of this sub-chapter is to show how development policy and development 
concerns were perceived in other branches of the EU’s external relations in the 
early 2000s. In particular, I discuss the overlaps of the emerging agendas that 
influenced the formulation of the European Consensus and policy coherence 
for development. I start with security policy, which in the aftermath of 9/11 had 
increased significantly in importance. I then shift the focus to trade policy, to 
the promises of the WTO Doha Development Round (November 2001-), and 
to the EU’s unilateral efforts to improve the trading possibilities of the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) on the eve of the global trade round.
“A Secure Europe in a Better World” – What Role for Development?
Nothing happens in a vacuum, and particularly so in the web of EU external 
relations. In this setting, for the EU development policy process, a new European 
Union security strategy document, entitled A Secure Europe in a Better 
World, provided both a model and a challenge that prompted the rethinking 
of development policy in many respects. The document was adopted by the 
European Council in Brussels two years before the European Consensus on 
Development (on 12 December 2003) as suggested by the Thessaloniki European 
Council in June 2003. Submitted directly by Secretary-General of the Council/
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Javier 
Solana, it conveyed the key message that the Union needs a multilateral and 
global approach to security in Europe and throughout the world.291 
The European Security Strategy was crucial for the initialisation of the 
European Consensus statement for two main reasons. First, the Security Strategy 
provided a model for a high-level and high-profile policy statement that was 
290 Holland 2009: 37-38.
291 European Security Strategy 2003. 
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jointly endorsed in this intergovernmental area of EU external relations.292 Of 
particular importance was the fact that the statement touched upon a policy of 
the CFSP which had been firmly in the grip of the member states. The fact that the 
policy was put forward by the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, 
added symbolic value and conveyed the image of a unified EU stance.293 Almost 
daringly, the chosen title – European Security Strategy – evoked an image of 
Europeanisation in this delicate issue area.  The second reason relates to the 
content of the European Security Statement. Crucially for development policy, the 
text of the Security Statement overlaps in a major way with questions traditionally 
attached to development policy. This called for an official, preferably equally 
high-level response from the development policy side. The thematic overlaps 
started with the introductory chapter of the European Security Strategy, as the 
text refers to the EU’s global role and calls for Europe to “share in responsibility 
for global security and in building a better world”. However, it is the first chapter 
outlining the “Security Environment: Global Challenges and Key Threats” that 
places poverty at the very core of the security debate as the global challenge. The 
following sample from the Union Security Strategy makes the linkages clear:
In much of the developing world, poverty and disease cause untold suffering and 
give rise to pressing security concerns. Almost 3 billion people, half the world’s 
population, live on less than 2 Euros a day. 45 million die every year of hunger 
and malnutrition. AIDS is now one of the most devastating pandemics in human 
history and contributes to the breakdown of societies. New diseases can spread 
rapidly and become global threats. Sub-Saharan Africa is poorer now than it was 
10 years ago. In many cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and 
violent conflict.294
Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys 
infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, 
deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number 
of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty.295
Interestingly, the European Security Strategy provided a model for framing the 
poverty and policy context for the EC. Two years later, the European Consensus 
on Development statement started in an almost identical manner (cf. Sub-
292 Interviews CSO[11]2009, Academia[21]2008, EC(34)2009 and EC[30]2009. 
293 Interview Academia[8]2009. 
294 European Security Strategy 2003:2. Cf. the opening paragraphs of the European Community’s 
Development Policy 2000 and the European Consensus 2005.
295 European Security Strategy 2003:2.
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chapter 5.2). Both understand the question of poverty as “a challenge” with 
very similar parameters. Both documents highlighted upfront the magnitude of 
world poverty. In the Security Strategy, poverty is defined as afflicting half of the 
world’s population, who has to subsist on less than two euros a day. In a similar 
vein, the European Consensus takes as its starting point the UNDP statistics 
and World Bank poverty line, according to which one billion people are still 
struggling on less than one dollar a day.296 Whereas the European Security 
Strategy reported that Sub-Saharan Africa is now (2003) poorer than it was 10 
years ago, the European Consensus understandably does not highlight this type 
of failure in the developmental efforts and instead discusses the importance of 
Africa in more general terms. 
Of equal interest, the Security Strategy defines poverty as an economic 
failure linked to political problems and violent conflicts. However, even 
though the rationale is poverty- and human-focused development, the text 
addresses the lack of development as a security threat for Europe, and not 
for those immediately affected. The text defines security as a precondition 
of development, contributing to the “chicken or egg” debate regarding the 
interrelation between security and development policy, to which the European 
Consensus on Development responded two years later.297 In addition, the 
European Security Strategy referred to a set of issues such as competition for 
natural resources, global warming, state failure, neighbourhood policy, as well 
as multilateralism in the context of the WTO.298 This bundle of security-related 
issues clearly extended the agenda not only to the area of development policy 
but also to the issues of global trade and the environment. 
However, setting security as a precondition for development was regarded 
with a certain amount of suspicion in the development community because 
framing the interrelationship in this way could legitimise the use of ODA for 
security policy purposes.299 In this respect, there was growing concern that 
this could cause development policy to lose its autonomy as a policy field in 
296 Note that here the poverty line measurement is not used in World Bank terms, but in European 
terms.
297 Although this analysis was later shared in the European Consensus, the Development Policy 
diluted straightforward presentations of the affair by including insecurity and violent conflict 
amongst the main obstacles to achieving MDG development objectives when discussing the 
Security-related PCD (para. 37).  In the context of Globalisation, the Consensus statement strikes 
back by stating that “Achieving MDGs is also in the interest of collective and individual long-term 
peace and security. Without peace and security, development and poverty eradication are not 
possible, and without development and poverty eradication, no sustainable peace will occur” 
(para. 40). 
298 European Security Strategy 2003.
299 Interviews EC[30]2009 and EC[34]2009.
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its own right, possibly reducing it to an instrument for European Security 
Policy. In particular, many European NGOs expressed concerns about the 
possible subordination of development to foreign policy.300 On a more positive 
note, the European Security Strategy had put poverty on the EU agenda 
and therefore drawn attention to development questions. Many welcomed 
this turn of events, even though the premises were different from those of 
development policy.301
Certainly, this approach came as no surprise to the development community 
because discussions on the interrelationship between security and development 
had been ongoing for a good while.302 In particular, after 9/11, Maxwell 
and Engel (2003) refer to overarching issues related to foreign policy and 
development, especially from the point of view of the perceived threat of 
terrorism. They summarise some of the main concerns in  questions such as 
“Will the development landscape shift towards security-related issues, away 
from poverty reduction?” and “Does the experience of Afghanistan and Iraq 
suggest that the emphasis will shift towards humanitarian aid/rehabilitation 
and the enforcement of democratization, with less focus on pro-poor policies 
and on partnership and cooperation?”303 The debate on the possible root causes 
of terrorism also raged in the background. By the same token, the reasons for 
continuing acts of terrorism were sought in poverty, inequality as well as the 
lack of rights and participation.304 Also from a conflict prevention perspective, 
the Cotonou Agreement (2000) had already interconnected development with 
security, as clause 11/4 of the agreement commits parties to reduce conflicts. 
This alone gave grounds for those willing to use EDF funds for such a purpose.305 
These discussions continued in the context of the African Peace Facility.306 
In addition, as van Reisen points out (2007: 47-48), in both foreign and 
defence policy, the entry point for greater EU common action has been in areas 
closely linked to existing development co-operation and emergency action, 
as can also be noticed in the European Security Strategy. The availability of 
financial resources and a mandate, as well as public support for action in these 
areas, have also facilitated and legitimised the inter-linkages. On the downside, 
van Reisen (2007: 50) sees that this has also jeopardised the autonomy and 
distinctions between these two policy areas in terms of their specific aims. This 
300 Maxwell & Engel 2003:7. They refer to the Liaison Committee of Development NGOs to the 
European Union (CLONG), BOND and Eurostep reports and discussion papers. 
301 Interviews Academia[21]2008 and EC[30]2009.
302 Interviews Academia[8]2009 and EC[30]2009. 
303 Maxwell and Engel 2003: 6.
304 On the complexity of these interrelationships, see for instance Malkki & Paastela 2007.
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observation highlights what appears to be a recurring tension in the inter-policy 
relations: the tension between the need for cooperation and convergences for 
the sake of greater consistency, and the necessity at that time for safeguarding 
specific priorities such as the development goals. As a matter of fact, the Treaty 
of Amsterdam (1997) had introduced the concept of consistency between the 
external relations branches, which also indicated that development policy 
should be consistent with the CFSDP and vice versa.307 In addition, in 1999 
Javier Solana was appointed as the High Representative of the CFSDP and as 
the Secretary-General of the Council, but without a clearly defined programme 
of action. The changes to the Nice Treaty (2001) added to this confusion, with 
the inclusion of a new Treaty heading – Co-operation with Third Countries, 
which ensured a legal base for assistance for the former Warsaw Pact countries. 
This situation was corrected in the text of the EU Constitutional Treaty (2004), 
which more clearly delineated the separate provisions for developing countries 
and non-developing countries.308 
What is also noteworthy is that even as an area of shared competency, 
development policy still had a stronger institutional position as an area of 
the EU’s external policy than the CFSDP, which nevertheless remained an 
intergovernmental arrangement based on the Maastricht Treaty at that 
point.309 Unlike in the development policy area, the Commission was not 
given a role in the implementation of the CFSDP in the pre-Lisbon era. What 
the CFSDP also lacked compared to the EC Development policy budget was 
a resource base in the EDF for the ACP countries outside the Community 
budget. This also ran the risk that the degree of flexibility provided by the 
EDF status might actually become an objective in itself. According to van 
Reisen (2007:57), this may imply that development sources could be used for 
non-development areas such as security, defence or migration. On the other 
hand, Carbone (2007a:6), for instance, saw this as a strategic choice of giving 
development policy a new policy image, namely linking it to international 
security rather than only to poverty per se. This kind of broader thinking 
was also extended to external trade, which seemed natural given the trade 
aspects of the key development cooperation agreements of the past. For 
those supporting this choice, the rationale behind this approach was to move 
development policy away from its “Cinderella role” and reposition it more 
strategically on the agendas where foreign and trade affairs with developing 
countries were discussed. In the Commission, it was understood that this 
could be done by giving in to the idea of complete autonomy for the sake of 
307 van Reisen 2007: 49. 
308 van Reisen 2007: 48.
309 van Reisen 2007: 50. 
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complementarity and consistency within external relations.310  As one of my 
interviewees in the Commission explained:
…In the European Consensus we tried to get this recognition for the special role 
of development policy in its own right, but also as a coherent and complementary 
policy with the other policies of external action.311 
So, in this respect, the aim of the European Commission was precisely to 
overcome the subordination and to gain support for development objectives 
across the spectrum of external affairs. However, the tension remained between 
those in the Commission who still saw safeguarding the independence of 
development policy as important, and those who thought that development 
policy may actually benefit more from closer cooperation and inter-linkages 
with the neighbouring policies.312 
Interestingly for our theme, the European Security Strategy returns to the role 
of development and trade policies again in the chapter entitled “International 
Order Based on Effective Multilateralism”.313 The chapter paints a world of 
global threats, global markets and global media in which European security 
and prosperity depend on an effective multilateral system. This multilateral 
system is characterised further by well-functioning international institutions 
and a rule-based international order, which is also the Union’s objective.314 The 
fundamental framework for European international relations is the United 
Nations Charter, whereby the EU is committed to upholding and developing 
International Law. In the text, the EU approaches global governance through 
key international institutions, regional organisations and the transatlantic 
relationship, specifically under NATO, where it is designated to act. As for 
peace and security, it sees the reformed UN as the main forum. However, in 
more general terms, the EU calls for “international organizations, regimes and 
treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, 
and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken”.315 With this 
strong normative statement, the EU goes on to discuss international institutions 
such as the IFIs and the WTO, where the Union acknowledges its objective “to 
widen the memberships while maintaining their high standards”. As regards the 
regional organisations, the OSCE, ASEAN, MERCOSUR and AU are mentioned 
as contributors to “a more orderly world”.  However, the statement goes further 
310 Interview EC[34]2009.
311 Interview EC[30]2009.
312 Interview EC[34]2009, EC[26]2009 and EC[32]2009. 
313 European Security Strategy 2003: 9-10. 
314 European Security Strategy 2003:9.
315 European Security Strategy 2003:9. Cf. the Iraq War.
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in that direction by stating: “the quality of international society depends on the 
quality of the governments that are its foundation”. Quality here is characterised 
by good governance at the state level, enhancing democracy by supporting 
social and political reforms, dealing with corruption and the abuse of power, 
establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights.316 In this normative 
context, EU trade and development policies have been assigned a special task in 
reforming international society by reforming individual states:
Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform. 
As the largest provider of official assistance and its largest trading entity, the 
European Union and its Member States are well placed to pursue these goals.317 
Just Add “Development” and Stir: The WTO Doha Development 
Round and the “Everything But Arms Initiative”
In addition to the re-invention of the security and trade nexus, the term 
“Development” also became the grand epithet for the first round of 
international trade talks since the end of the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) and 
the establishment of the WTO. If the Uruguay Round had failed “development 
aspirations” and developing county interests, as many suggest, the Doha Round 
was allegedly designed to reform the global trade regime (see Chapter 6). Indeed, 
the WTO Ministerial Declaration and the negotiations mandate entitled “Doha 
Development Agenda” (DDA) were built on the concept of “Development” 
(and not on trade or trade liberalisation per se) as the basis for the postponed 
negotiations round.318 However, in this context “development” practically 
became synonymous with trade liberalisation, but in terms of dismantling 
protectionism in the developed economies and granting better market access 
for the poorer countries. This was particularly important in the aftermath of 
the chaotic and dramatically collapsed WTO Seattle Ministerial in 1999. I will 
return to these issues and focus on them in more detail in Chapter 6.
In line with the GATT principle of Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) 
of the Enabling Clause (Article 2b), the EU launched a new idea for improving 
the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) for the least developed countries, 
which would then constitute the EU’s approach on the multilateral front in 2001 
for the poorest countries. The initiative came to be known as the “Everything 
But Arms” (EBA) initiative, designed to guarantee duty-free, quota-free market 
access for exports originating from the least developed countries. The EBA 
316 European Security Strategy 2003: 10.
317 European Security Strategy 2003: 10.
318 See Doha Development Agenda 2001. 
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initiative was introduced to kill two birds with one stone: get the developing 
countries interested and engaged in multilateral trade liberalisation, and review 
the GSP system after 30 years of existence.319 
The reason why I discuss EBA in the context of the development momentum 
is that, similarly to the security agenda, development became a central issue, 
first of all for actors other than those directly involved in development policy, 
and second, for reasons other than those directly related to development policy 
objectives. Despite these characteristics, the idea of “development” provided 
“added value” for both of the agendas while still advancing the original security 
or trade liberalisation goals. This pattern was later repeated with the Economic 
Partnership Agreements but, taking a  few steps back, it also underpinned the 
policy coherence concept in the European Consensus on development statement 
(as I will show in Chapter 5). 
To start with my first observation, the EBA initiative did not engage development 
policy actors in the same way it involved trade and agriculture officials in the 
European Commission. In other words, the core debates were arranged between 
DG Trade and DG Agriculture, while DG DEV was conducting an internal debate 
about the EBA issue.320 As Carbone (2007b: 45-55) shows, in this debate DG 
Trade promoted multilateralism and adopted a liberal stance (supported by the 
coalition of liberal member states), while DG Agriculture promoted protectionism 
(supported by conservative member states). The DG Trade position was further 
extended to discourse on pro-development liberalisation.321 Although the EBA 
initiative was of high importance to the ACP countries, DG DEV was relegated to 
the sidelines in this triangular setting, and it was left to DG Trade, most notably 
Pascal Lamy, then EU Trade Commissioner and currently Director General of the 
WTO, to lead the pro-development and pro-liberalisation front.322 Crystallised in 
his motto of “Harnessing globalisation”, he highlighted the importance of EBA 
as a crucial step in the development of the poorest countries.323 The  “Harnessing 
globalisation” motto subsequently reverberated across the Commission services 
and was most visibly adopted as the title of the first Commission proposal for the 
European development policy in 2005 (see Sub-chapter 4.2).
Certainly the minor role of DG DEV was also attributable to the transfer of 
its unit dealing with ACP trade to DG Trade during the Commission overhaul 
in 1999-2001. However, the point that Carbone makes relates back to the very 
role and autonomy of development policy inside the EU’s external relations. 
319 Interview EC[1]2008. See also Orbie 2007. 
320 Carbone 2007b: 53-54. Also Carbone in Orbie 2008.
321 Meunier 2007.
322 Interviews EC[15]2009, CSO[11]2009, CSO[20]2009 and Academia [7].
323 Faber and Orbie 2007: 1
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Precisely regarding this concern, there had been significant disagreement over 
EBA inside DG DEV. Interestingly, Carbone (2007b) notes that the disagreement 
was not first and foremost about the possible developmental prospects of EBA 
or their improvement, as one might have assumed, but rather whether EBA 
would downplay the special position of the ACP countries as the initiative 
covered all LDCs. In this disagreement, Commissioner Poul Nielson and his 
cabinet supported the EBA initiative, while senior officials in DG Development 
wanted to retain a privileged relationship with the ACP countries. In this sense, 
the debate over EBA was not related to development policy questions per se, 
and DG Trade went forward with the proposal. What was noteworthy politically 
was that the ACP group was not consulted while drafting the EBA initiative.324 
Instead, as van den Hoven (2007:72) concludes, the EBA process was directed 
and driven, at times, by very contradictory strategies – one directed by Trade 
Commissioner Lamy and the other by Agricultural Commissioner Fischler. 
Allegedly, EBA was about “fully” liberalised access (arms and ammunitions 
excluded) to the EU market in order to support their trade and development, and 
this was the stance that DG Trade was willing to promote. However, internally, 
the DG Trade position created a clear conflict of interest between the like-minded 
trade liberalisers of the Northern member states, and the Southern protectionist 
sugar lobbyists and DG Agriculture.325 Indeed, DG Agriculture came out with an 
impact assessment in November 2000, pointing to the “potentially disruptive 
consequences” of EBA for the European agricultural sector in terms of competition 
and budgetary pressures. 326 Especially concerned were the major sugar beet 
producers of Belgium and Spain, the rice producers of Italy, Greece and Spain, as 
well as France, Spain and Portugal because of their banana crops in the Caribbean 
and Atlantic. In addition, France was arguing in support of DG Development 
insomuch as the EBA commitment would undermine the EU commitment to the 
ACP countries.327 At least to a certain extent, this position was backed by the ACP 
countries themselves, which were against the tariff liberalisation that would have 
eroded their own privileged position.328 As France had the advantage of holding 
the EU Presidency, it could effectively postpone the adoption of the initiative.329 
On the other hand, the liberalists of the North were willing to put the overall 
aim of the EBA proposal before their national interests. This was particularly 
the case with the UK. In turn, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands were even 
324 Carbone 2007b: 50.
325 Carbone 2007b: 43-49 and Orbie 2007: 24. 
326 Orbie 2007: 24, Carbone 2007b: 46.
327 Carbone 2007: 46.
328 Van den Hoven 2007: 72.
329 Carbone 2007b: 47, Pilegaard 2007.
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prepared to extend the EBA to include all developing countries or all products. 
The situation was compounded with reform processes taking place within EU 
agriculture, particularly in the EU sugar sector, which was then reflected in the 
EBA transition periods. In addition, van den Hoven (2007: 68-72) argues that 
EBA had another function regarding these reform processes, namely to lock in 
more liberal commitments using the pressure coming from the multilateral level 
and European civil society. However, as a result of the protectionist resistance, 
the duty-free, quota-free (DFQF) access was narrowed with a longer transition 
period for bananas (2006) and rice and sugar (10/2009) than what was initially 
planned. In addition, the EU maintained restrictive rules of origin for EBA as 
well, which, according to Brenton and Özden (2007: 132), risked undermining 
the developmental benefits of the whole initiative. As van den Hoven (2007: 60) 
sarcastically put it, Everything But Arms was transformed into Everything But Farms. 
What is important to note, however, is that the original idea for this kind of 
solution did not emerge in the EU, but at the highest level of the WTO. In fact, the 
EU delayed its involvement. Even more importantly, due to the internal struggle 
between DG Trade and DG Agriculture, the EU offer was a diluted version of the 
one first put forward in the WTO. In his EBA process tracing, Orbie (2007: 21) 
points to the fact that it was the then WTO director, Renato Ruggiero in 1996, 
that first put forward a proposal to bind all tariffs that LDC exports face at zero, 
and eliminate all remaining quantitative restrictions on their exports by a firm 
date. Orbie (2007: 21) explains how Ruggiero managed to place this idea at the 
core of the international trade agenda at the G7 and the EU, US, Japan and 
Canada “Quad” meetings, and from there to the WTO Singapore Ministerial of 
December 1996 of the newly established organisation.330 However, the outcome 
did not materialise into a concrete proposal, but instead took the form of a 
consensual idea “to be explored”. In this context, the EU did not yet show any 
interest to take the issue any further. 
As Orbie (2007) notes, the very low-key position of the EU in the run-up 
to Singapore was in stark contrast to its eventual EBA initiative and bold 
discourse around it. First, it took a relatively long time to get an official EU 
position on the matter, which indicates low priority. In the first meeting, the 
WTO sub-committee meeting on the LDC, where duty-free, quota-free market 
access was first debated, the EU representatives remained silent. In addition, 
the subsequent EU position on the LDCs at that stage did not go beyond the 
existing G7/Quad consensus. Instead, the EU was strongly into extending the 
WTO agenda beyond the issue areas negotiated during the Uruguay Round to 
“new issues” such as investment, competition policy as well as labour standards 
and the environment, rather than promoting market access for the sake of 
330 This G-7 meeting took place in Lyon in June 1996, and the Quad meeting in Seattle in September 1996. 
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LDC export interest.331 In terms of a normative model for development and 
trade, these two approaches represent two different alternatives as part of the 
liberalisation package: on the one hand, dismantling protectionism for the 
poorest countries’ market access, but on the other hand, pushing forward an 
ever-broader liberalisation agenda, including strong regulatory measures for 
the developing countries as well. Whereas there was much less controversy 
regarding the former dimension, the broadening of the trade agenda to “new 
issues” was perceived primarily as the EU’s offensive trade interest.332
LDC market access became prominent in 1997 as the EU member states 
took the lead, starting with the Netherlands and followed by Luxembourg. The 
pressure was increased from the UN side to organise a third conference on 
the LDCs, resulting in a decision to hold it in Brussels in May 2001. This was 
the first time that the European Union had hosted a major UN conference, 
coincidentally six months before the eventual launch of the WTO Round, 
which also provided a venue to present the EU undertakings in this area.333 
Subsequently, the EU came up with a new LDC strategy in June, comprising 
two main measures: in the short term, to provide the nine non-ACP LDCs 
(Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Laos, Maldives, Myanmar/
Burma, Nepal and Yemen) with market access similar to the ACPs and, in the 
medium term, to provide all LDCs with duty-free access “essentially for all” 
their imports. According to Orbie (2007: 22-23), this strategy formed the very 
basis of the future EBA initiative. Interestingly, it was DG Trade that was taking 
the lead with an unexpectedly radical stance which, trade-wise, was even more 
extensive than that of the overall EU LDC strategy. In Faber and Orbie’s (2007: 
4) analysis, EBA can be understood as a radical application of this provision by 
the Union to specifically support the LDCs under the GATT/Enabling clause.
Additionally, the market access offer that the Union was planning to make 
was no longer bound to similar decisions by other leading WTO member 
countries, but other countries were asked to follow the EU example, as proudly 
declared by then Trade Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan. By October 1997, in the 
High-Level meeting on LDCs, the EU had already adopted a high-level leading 
role in the matter.334 In this respect, the US reacted and adopted its response 
to EBA in 2000, known as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).335 
At the same time, due to the protectionist interests, the policy coherence for 
development in EBA remained even more modest than what was put forward by 
331 Orbie 2007: 21.
332 Interviews EC[10]2009, EC[4] and CSO[20]2009.
333 COM 2001: LDC conference summary website. 
334 Orbie 2007: 23.
335 Stiglitz & Charlton 2005: 60-61
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Trade Commissioner Lamy. To put EBA into perspective, Stiglitz and Charlton 
(2005: 60-61) refer to Brenton’s (2003) EBA impact assessment and point to 
the fact that as early as 2001, more than 99% of all EU imports from LDCs were 
eligible for preferences under other schemes (GSP and Lomé). Thus EBA was 
relevant for only 80 products of the EU’s 10,200 tariff lines. In addition, the 
CAP was there to block the imports from sensitive sectors as discussed above.336 
However, this modesty did not influence the way in which the EBA initiative was 
presented and promoted by the Union. Despite these internal turbulences and 
PCD limitations, EBA quickly became a showpiece of the development-friendly 
nature of the Union at large.337 
In particular, for Pascal Lamy, it was essential for Europe’s global role that 
the Union takes a clearer place in the world by building its constitution and 
policies more firmly on common values and normative action to protect them. 
In his words:
…while this will eventually have to encompass all fields of foreign and security 
policy, we should start with a common roadmap on the governance of globalisation, 
notably in North-South relations. This is a long-standing concern of the EU, as 
various instruments show: the EU/ACP agreements, the Generalised System of 
Preferences for developing countries, regional trade agreements, the “Everything 
But Arms” initiative which grants duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market 
to the 49 poorest countries. But we now need to devote all tools of external 
policy (trade, development, diplomacy) to harnessing globalisation, towards 
sustainable development and a global partnership with Developing Countries. 
[emphasis added]338 
With regard to the development and trade agenda, it brought the market access 
question to the fore according to the wishes of the developing countries, while 
still safeguarding the sensitive areas of the Common Agricultural Policy. On the 
other hand, in their EBA impact assessment, Stevens and Kennan (2001) argue 
that much also depends on the supply side capacity of the LDCs, which needs 
to be improved. However, they see the overall EBA impact as being positive for 
development, although its greatest impact may be indirect. Interestingly, they 
point to the political importance of the EBA proposal by concluding that this 
show of the Union’s goodwill was necessary to avoid an adverse impact in the 
WTO, which would have been the case if the Union had failed to adopt EBA. 339 
336 Stiglitz and Charlton 2005: 61, citing the World Bank 2003.
337 van den Hoven 2007: 60.
338 Lamy as cited in Faber and Orbie 2007: 3. 
339 Stevens and Kennan 2001: 1-2. 
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CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS
My main task in this chapter was to contextualise the European Consensus 
on development and trade against its background. I started this section with a 
historical overview of the burden and promises of the past. While proceeding 
in chronological order, my purpose was to highlight different tensions along 
the way that still affect the EU development policy and the EU’s normative 
power in international development. The first tension was related to the post-
colonial ties with the ACP countries and the emergence of a global and modern 
EU development actor. From the point of view of the EU’s normative power, 
the format for a norm diffusion and normative influence were formed with the 
association agreement in the Treaty of Rome. These linkages were consolidated 
by the contractual nature of the Lomé partnership and the joint institutions 
between the parties. Development aid and trade have constituted the core 
elements within this framework. 
The constant changes in the understanding of trade and development 
constituted another feature in this evaluation. Although at a very general level 
the definition of the main goals to – advance economic and social development 
– have remained the same throughout the decades, the ways in which these 
goals have been presented and pursued have changed over time. The practice 
of aid-giving and cooperation has maintained its key position although the 
modalities and conditionalities have changed respectively with the periods 
of Lomé I, the Washington Consensus and the Cotonou Agreement. Despite 
the inherent unequal power relationship between the donor and the recipient 
parties, direct use of compulsory power has not been typical of the Community. 
Rather, EC power has manifested itself indirectly in terms of these unilaterally 
posed changes defining the partnership at different times (with the exception 
of Lomé I). 
The role of trade has remained central in these arrangements, but in 
comparison, the way in which trade relations have been organised has varied 
a great deal, reflecting the ideational and interest changes in the domain. The 
free trade area with the EEC Customs Union and the associated countries was 
a novel idea in the governance of international trade of the time. In the spirit of 
the NIEO, Lomé I constituted a new type of model of North-South relationship 
based on non-reciprocal preferential treatment with the ACP countries. While 
granting the latter this position, the EEC actually created a problematic model 
that was not in line with the GATT enabling clause. Pressure to dismantle this 
has been exerted since the new hype of trade liberalisation with the Washington 
Consensus, and increasingly, after the EU’s global developmental role started 
to emerge. 
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In all, the alterations in the EEC/EU development policy have reflected the 
changes in the EEC/EU in itself, on the one hand, and the changes in the global 
environment on the other. Apart from Lomé I and the processes that centred 
precisely on development, it appears as if the development policy domain has 
absorbed and adopted ideas in relation to the external changes rather than its 
own objectives. As regards policy coherence for development, the review of 
the past shows how the core questions of incoherence between protectionism 
and development cooperation, as well as problems working in unison with the 
member states, entered the development agenda as early as 1971 (Sub-chapter 
3.1 ). In this sense, the promises of the past remained to be fulfilled. 
In terms of the institutional context that defined the development prospects, 
the Commission reform at the turn of 2000 did not improve the development 
policy position. On the contrary, development policy actors found themselves 
very much on the defensive. The trade agenda of the EU-ACP partnership 
became the domain of EU trade policy, while the turf war between DG RELEX 
and DG DEV was still unsettled. However, together with the changes in the 
international as well as in the EU institutional set-up, the relationship between 
the EU security and trade policies became key. Again, the interest towards 
the development policy domain stemmed from both branches of the external 
relations, while development policy had a more reactive stance at this stage. The 
European Security Strategy embraced the idea of “development” at the core of 
its agenda. At the same time, the EU took, albeit after a delay and with strong 
protectionist safeguards, a leading role in setting new standards for trade with 
the LDCs in the WTO setting. Yet, the core of the consensus on a pro (sustainable) 
development trade agenda started to emerge around the question of improved 
market access. This highlighted the consistency of the EU’s external relations, 
but the role of development policy was still unclear beyond the traditional donor 
role. However, the Monterrey Conference development finance was a victory for 
the EC in this respect. In addition, this period opened up possibilities to explore 
a Europeanised policy on a global level with the member states. The attempts 
to create a single actor despite the sectoral policy and member states’ interests 
constitute the third underlying tension. These tensions also remained central 
to the European Consensus development policy that I will now go on to explore.
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4 DEVELOPMENT POLICy PROCESS  
AND POLICy COHERENCE
Chapter 4 explores the pre-conditions for policy (in)coherence within the EU 
machinery. The chapter takes us through the process of development policy 
and policy coherence formation that resulted in the European Consensus 
for Development statement. In the ensuing Sub-chapters 4.1-4.4, I deepen 
my analysis of the Commission-Council Presidency (the UK) interaction and 
the prospects for the Europeanisation of development policy. I also look at 
the attempts to enhance the development policy position vis-à-vis the trade 
and security policies. In particular, my aim here is to show how the European 
Consensus document was formulated and how the understanding of policy 
coherence for development was shaped in this interaction.340 
Fairclough would call this stage of the policy process “discourse production”, 
whereby the elements of the EU development discourse were selected and 
organised with a view to constituting the first joint EU vision. Understanding 
the way in which the EU’s discourse is produced relates directly to Barnett 
and Duvall’s (2005) model of discursive power. Moreover, it sheds light on 
the prevailing conditions and pressures under which development policy is 
made. 
In particular, my task in this section is to analyse how the European Consensus 
on Development was formulated, and what this process of formulation tells 
us about development policy-making in the EU in terms of inter-institutional 
cooperation and competition, and the position of development policy in the 
external relations of the EU.  Finally, I will also map out the main elements that 
came to constitute the discourse of the European Consensus on Development, 
as well as show how they emerged on the EU agenda.
I begin from the genesis of the development consensus and continue until 
the adoption of the final statement.341  As far as possible with the data that I have 
at my disposal, I engage in process-tracing so as to understand what happened 
at each stage, what the main conceptual changes to the development policy 
content were, and by whom they were initiated. In addition, I apply Carbone’s 
(2007) model of opportunities and tactics, which the Commission can deploy 
at different stages of the policy process.342 To highlight the choices that have 
been made, I also present alternative views that were left out or dismissed. 
340 Hill 2005: 8. 
341 Hill 2005: 4-5. 
342 Carbone 2007a: 5. 
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Interviews once again provide an important primary source for the research, 
with the caveat that the reader needs to bear in mind the subjectivity of this 
type of data. 
4.1 THE gENESIS Of THE CONSENSUS: POLICy 
INITIATION AND THE ROLE Of THE COMMISSION 
As we can safely conclude from the previous chapters, the entwining external 
and internal factors triggered the policy process towards the European 
Consensus. In addition, the fact that a new Commission was taking up office in 
November 2004 provided an opportune moment for a policy review. Indeed, it 
was expected that the incoming Commissioner would take the lead and draft a 
policy of his/her vision. However, the preparations for a new policy statement 
had been well underway in DG DEV Policy Planning Unit343 long before the 
arrival of the new Commissioner. Indeed, the preparations had already started 
with an assessment study of the previous EC development policy of November 
2000, which was issued in the form of a joint statement by the European 
Commission and the Council. The purpose of the evaluation was to take stock 
of the achievements of the previous policy, as well as to plan ahead for a possible 
new policy.344 For this purpose, a study team was set up comprising a group of 
independent researchers from the European Centre for Development Policy 
Management (ECDPM), the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and Instituto 
Complutense de Estudios Internacionales (ICEI), with the close cooperation of 
the Commission policy-planning unit and then Director DG DEV/B Bernard 
Petit.345 In particular, the study team was tasked with focusing on the thematic 
scope of the 2000 development policy, its position in external relations, its 
geographical scope and its role in the Union politics of shared competence in 
terms of remaining a Community policy statement or expanding towards truly 
European dimensions. These issues were already brainstormed by EC officials 
and external experts under the heading “The Future of EC Development Policy” 
in October 2004 while the study was in progress.346 
The study was largely a desk study but it also included reflections on country 
case studies with a DPS 2000 focus in terms of analysing its application in 
Country Strategy Papers and Regional Strategies (if applicable). In addition, 
343 Officially, DG DEV, Unit for forward looking studies and policy coherence, led by Franҫoise 
Moreau. Interview Academia[21]2008. 
344 Interview Academia[21]2008. 
345 The study team was led by James Mackie from ECDPM.  
346 DPS Study Report Feb 2005 – ECDPM/ICEI/ODI: Annex Brainstorming Report 187.  
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the views of key actors were included through structured interviews and 
documentary summaries. As discussed earlier, the study provided a framework 
for the forthcoming discussions based on three main premises: the world has 
changed, development and development objectives have changed and Europe 
itself has changed, which were reflected in the study as well as in the formal 
presentations of the assessment study by DG DEV. Whereas the first two 
changes called for new responses to global problems – insecurity, increasing 
inequalities and intensified globalisation – the last premise was directly linked 
to the ways of working in the enlarged Union. With regard to the latter, it was 
stated that the model (at that time) of 25 member states + 1 Community actor 
would no longer be functional and new, more integrated ways of working and 
conceptualising development would be needed.347 And of course, there was the 
question of the timing of the previous development policy statement that had 
actually been released somewhat hastily under Poul Nielson in April 2000 while 
preparations for the MDGs were still underway. In this sense the EC process 
was driven more by internal factors, most notably due to the EC reform process, 
and as a consequence it lacked the momentum of the Millennium Development 
Declaration launch.348 
The DPS study was commissioned by DG DEV but financed by the UK 
government Department for International Development (DFID). Although the 
obvious need for a policy assessment was shared by both parties, the underlying 
reasons for revision were very different. For the Commission, the review was 
seen as an opportunity to raise both the development policy profile as well as 
the EC role in terms of expanding the scope of the Community policy towards a 
Common framework that would ideally also include a joint policy statement as 
well as the operationalisation of the policy action and division of labour.349 In 
other words, the Commission was strongly in favour of further Europeanisation 
of the policy.  By contrast, the aims of the British government were overtly the 
opposite. Despite the need for policy assessment, the primary aim of the UK was 
to limit the scope to a scrutinisation of EC performance and to update the policy 
accordingly. In this sense, the underlying objective was to maintain the status 
quo in terms of separate but complementary member-state and Community 
policies. 
However, this type of negotiation setting did not come as a surprise to 
either party. Indeed, just two years earlier, the British Government had issued 
a statement in which it called for the improved efficiency of the EC development 
policy. Although these types of debates have been typical of these two parties, 
347 DPS Study Report Feb 2005 – ECDPM/ICEI/ODI: Annex Brainstorming Report. 
348 Interviews Academia[8]2008, Academia[21]2009, EC[23]2009 and EC[30]2009.
349 Interview Academia[8]2008.
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this time around the stakes were raised with the British threat to “nationalise” 
its development policy if tangible improvements did not take place at the EC 
end.350  In this light, it was anticipated that the Commission would need to do 
its utmost to firstly convince the UK government, that the way in which the 
Commission had been working had improved and could lead to more effective 
EC aid. What is important to note is the fact that the study team was not tasked 
with looking at  EC performance per se, but rather at the overall functionality 
and political purpose of the policy statement as such.351 From the discourse 
production point of view, this makes it even more interesting as it emphasises 
the importance of this type of political document. As one of my interviewees 
noted:
A high-level policy statement of this nature is expected to perform a number of 
tasks. It is first of all a statement of intent against which action can be measured 
and accounted for, but it is also a rallying point around which various actors and 
stakeholders can unite in a common effort and provides an overall framework 
for continuing policy debate.352  
The DPS study report concluded that in this regard, the overall assessment was 
generally positive. In particular, it highlighted that the 2000 DPS statement 
had been well-received by various stakeholders including the DAC community, 
and that it compared well with similar statements from other donors. Even 
more importantly, the previous statement had served to distill the EU vision 
into a single authoritative statement to guide development towards a limited 
number of objectives and priorities at different levels of cooperation.353 
Regarding the latter dimension, the role of the EC was linked to that of the 
member states, proposing that the EC could be used as a focal point for a more 
collective development action by the Union. However, it was acknowledged that 
this would depend on the political will of the member states and could not be 
advanced by the EC alone.354 However, the Commission needed to show that it 
was both willing and able to play such a role in the process of the new statement 
formulation provided that the member states accepted it. However, as the UK 
was at the same time preparing its own EU presidency term for the second half 
of 2005, the pressing question was how big a role the presidency was actually 
willing to give to the Commission in this regard. 
350 Riddel 2007.
351 DPS Study Report Feb 2005 – ECDM/ ICEI/ ODI:  7. 
352 DPS Study Executive Summary: para. 1, p. 7.
353 DPS Study Executive Summary: 7.
354 DPS Study Executive Summary: 8.
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Concerning this type of potentially adversarial dynamics, the national 
governments may use the presidency to promote and pursue their national 
interests rather than act as mere Council chairs. In order to mitigate this, the 
Commission should try to establish good working relations with the country 
holding the presidency at a very early stage, especially if the Commission 
wants to have any influence over the agenda, as is clearly the case here.355 
Indeed, engaging in the joint DPS study process could be read as a sign of 
preparing the ground well beforehand so as to gain an understanding of the 
common points of departure as well as possible disagreements. These kinds of 
preparations can be beneficial if there is a risk from the Commission point of 
view that an adversarial presidency may try to exclude issues from the agenda, 
delay decisions by deliberately presenting impossible solutions, or even steer 
negotiations towards their preferred outcome.356 Should the Commission 
proposal be radically different, it must be particularly careful and choose the 
appropriate time to submit a proposal if it wants to be successful.
At the outset, a number of factors played in favour of the Commission. First, 
the previous international success of the Monterrey Financing for Development 
conference (2002) had shown that the Commission could take the lead on the EU 
front. Second, the international development community was heading towards 
a consensus on donor harmonisation and improved coordination, which then 
resulted in the Paris Declaration prior to the beginning of the UK Presidency. This 
tendency had already increased the legitimacy of a joint framework option. Third, 
the first six months of the new Commission coincided with the Luxembourg 
Council Presidency, which was known to be close to the Commission and 
would therefore guarantee sufficient room for maneouvre for the Commission 
leadership. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Commission was expected 
to use its institutional power to initiate such a process. With this power, the 
Commission clearly had the advantage of being the first to define the name of 
the game. Of course, policy ideas may emerge from a variety of sources such as a 
request from member states in the Council or from the Parliament, or ideas may 
stem from international processes and/or organisation agendas in which the EU 
and its member states participate. In this case it was the latter, the OECD DAC 
Committee and its peer review of the Union. Ideas may also be put forward by 
interest groups and partner countries, or they may emerge from the commitments 
made in the international arena, from external shocks, and so forth.357
However, Carbone points to the fact that it is the Commission which is the 
driver of the process, regardless of where the ideas originate from. As Nugent 
355 Cf. Carbone 2007a.
356 Cf. Carbone 2007a.
357 Cf. Carbone 2007a: 24 where he refers to Peters 1994 and Cini 1996. 
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phrases it: “Once the Commission begins working on them it can do much to 
frame the terms in which they are considered, when they are considered, by 
whom they are considered, and with what receptivity they are considered.”358 
Indeed, the beginning of the European Consensus process was a textbook 
case when it came to the official policy-making pattern in the Union, at least 
regarding the Commission’s strong role in the initiation of a policy. In terms 
of policy process, the wheels started to turn as the Commission DG DEV policy 
planning unit launched an Issues Paper on the future of, nota bene, not just EC 
but European Union development policy at the beginning of January 2005. 
The Issues Paper was produced inside DG DEV to look precisely at the above-
mentioned challenges and, most importantly, to engender a stakeholder debate 
on the key issues and the role of the EU in this regard. One of the underlying 
questions was whether the primary objective for Community development 
policy should remain poverty reduction, or whether it should be changed 
according to the pressures arising from the EU external relations. In keeping 
with the call for changes, the Issues Paper highlighted that in the face of the 
accelerated globalisation process (including trade and economic matters as well 
as major issues related to the environment, health, migration and security), 
the scope of the development policy should aim to integrate these aspects in 
conjunction with aid for development as such. In this context, the introduction 
of the paper presents development policy as the privileged instrument for 
managing globalisation.359 
The stated purpose of the document was to launch a consultation process 
with a view to getting various parties to take part in the formulation of the new 
policy, and particularly to inform stakeholders about the Commission’s stance 
in the first stage. Interestingly, the Issues Paper was deliberately released in 
this informal format and not in the form of a Commission Communication, 
for instance. This was done in order to avoid the Inter-Service Consultation 
process, which would have presumably added issues of interest from other 
policy sectors or changed the wording of the presented development policy 
issues. The idea was to put forward a paper directly from DG Development 
to the EU development policy stakeholders.360  However, even in this format, 
the Commission does not have a totally free hand in what it does. As Nugent 
observes (2006: 167-168), from its earliest deliberations on a possible policy 
initiation, the Commission has to take note of many of these outside (and of 
course inside) voices if its proposals are to find broad support and be effective 
in the sectors to which they are directed. The Commission must concern itself 
358 Carbone 2007a: 24, citing Nugent 2001: 220. 
359 DG DEV European Union Development Policy Issues Paper: 2. 
360 Interview EC[30]2009.
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not only with what it believes to be desirable but also with what is possible. 
The policy preferences of others must be recognised and, where necessary and 
appropriate, be accommodated. So in this sense, it is safe to assume that the 
freedom of the Issues Paper was also effectively limited by these anticipations. 
The exercise was structured around ‘why?’ ‘who?’ ‘what?’ and ‘how?’ 
questions in order to attach the future policy to as concrete a level as possible.361 
The question of ‘why?’ was linked to the objectives of EU development policy. 
Should poverty reduction remain the chief objective, or should the European 
Commission seek to achieve a much closer link between development and other 
fields of external action, such as migration, security and trade? The purpose 
of asking ‘who?’ was to define the European development cooperation actors 
and to examine how they could be involved in the EU’s development policy. 
Unsurprisingly, central to this question were the considerations regarding 
complementarity and cooperation between the Commission and the member 
states, but also of importance was the role of aid recipients as well as civil society 
organisations and private sector stakeholders in this context.  ‘What?’ refers to 
the fields of action and priorities that should be covered by the development 
activities, either through the Commission or the member states. Should the 
Commission focus on certain pre-selected sectors even though that may reduce 
flexibility in responding to the needs of the partner countries and regions? And 
lastly, ‘how?’ relates to the means that are needed for pursuing the development 
objectives. Most concretely, this refers to development funding, the modalities 
of distribution and other means for implementing development policy.362 
Related to the thematic inter-linkages with other policy sectors, the Issues Paper 
provided a presentation of the state of play regarding the overall objectives for 
both the Community and EU development policy on the topics as well as points 
for discussion.363 
This type of early state engagement with different actors can also be seen 
as a strategic move to map out the territory and ascertain on what grounds the 
official position could be built in order to prevail against possible competing 
views. The Commission engages in debates with a wide range of non-state actors, 
361 Interview EC[30]2009. 
362 DG DEV European Union Development Policy Issues Paper:  2-4.  
363 Objectives of the Community/EU development policy (Issue 1.), Development and security 
(Issue 2.), Integrating Trade and Development (Issue 3.), Migration and development (Issue 4.), 
Environment and development (Issue 5.), An EU policy or a 25 + 1 policy? (Issue 6.), Partners: 
reinforced ownership and broader participation (Issue 7.), Policy sectors and cross-cutting 
themes (Issue 8), A Common thematic framework for the European Union and Member States 
development politics (Issue 9), Differentiation (Issue 10),  Transition situations – Linking relief 
and development aid (Issue 11). Allocation of financial resources (Issue 12), Global Initiatives 
(Issue 13).   
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not only to add expertise and legitimacy to its proposals, but also to activate 
and put pressure on member states.364 We can approach this process from 
two possible directions. First, we can regard the texts as a policy instrument 
to be used for formulating new approaches to current policies, with a view to 
organising support for the Commission in the inter-institutional situation. Or 
we can look at it from the point of view of discourse production and the way in 
which the presentation of the issues already sets the course for the debate. In 
this regard, the conclusions part of the Issues Paper openly defines the limits 
of the discourse:
… not everything can be opened up for discussion however: there is an established 
framework in the shape of international commitments, the Treaty and the 
draft Constitution, cooperation and partnership agreements and the Financial 
Perspectives for 2007-2013. A number of important points from the 2000 
Declaration need to be reiterated for reasons of credibility and relevance. A long-
term policy should not be subjected to radical changes every five years.365
Alternatively, the task could have been to encourage debate for the sake of 
evaluating  the actual results of EU development policy, but this was not the case 
here. However, this choice is legitimised by the rationale for the very survival 
of development cooperation in a turbulent context where new priorities, 
particularly those of security, are attracting the attention of the public and 
political decision-makers alike. In this respect, the conclusions suggest two 
possibilities for a future strategy: adopting a defensive approach by avoiding 
interaction with other policies in order to ensure the autonomy of development 
or, conversely, seeking closer interaction by clarifying both positive and 
negative links with other policies to distinguish development cooperation and to 
demonstrate its role, which is to address the root causes of problems.366 Framed 
in this manner, it is clear that the intention of DG DEV was to have the audience 
opt for the latter. 
DG Development does not use the policy coherence for development term, 
although most of the main issues that it raises are directly related to this concept. 
Even the introduction calls for “a wide-ranging debate to clarify the role of the 
European Union development policy and aid, in order to review the way the 
EU policies are articulated with the policies pursued by member states and 
with civil-society initiatives, in a spirit of coherence and complementarity”.367 
364 Cf. Carbone 2007a: 25 where he refers to Cowles 1995 and Christiansen 2006.
365 DG DEV European Union Development Policy Issues Paper: 21-22.
366 DG DEV European Union Development Policy Issues Paper: 21:22.
367 DG DEV European Union Development Policy Issues Paper: 2.  
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The point put forward for discussion was actually a statement to the effect that 
“the EU must take full advantage of any synergies between different external 
objectives. This means that all concerned must recognize the importance of a 
foreign and trade policy geared towards prosperity, peace and global security 
and development policy aimed at reducing poverty and inequality in developing 
countries now and for the benefit of future generations”.368 What is interesting 
in this formulation is that the other policies are not given an active role in 
poverty eradication nor obligated to work towards these objectives.  
Overall, the trade policy issues in the Paper were framed along the usual 
lines of trade being a powerful tool to foster economic growth, and necessary 
for achieving development and poverty reduction objectives in developing 
countries. In this respect, the issue of market access is raised once again as a 
key element, as well as developing countries’ appropriate domestic policies and 
capacity to take the opportunities of increased openness. Here, an important 
question also emerged on the redistribution of gains to reduce poverty and 
inequality. The underlying assumption is that trade liberalisation will bring 
about major opportunities that countries need to be in a position to seize. The 
task that the EU had in this regard was to further liberalise its own agriculture 
and fisheries policies, as well as provide an adequate and predictable regulatory 
framework for trade and investment in developing countries and regions. 
What followed was a list of EU trade measures that facilitate this task either 
unilaterally and bilaterally or through “development-friendly and sustainable 
trade negotiations to which the EU is committed.” This includes addressing 
the erosion of preferences brought about by multilateral trade liberalisation 
and, even more importantly, the liberalisation of EU agricultural policy in 
terms of decreasing trade distortion caused by subsidies. It goes on to note 
that the agricultural reform in this respect also required removing tariff peaks 
and tariff escalation. By the same token, the text addressed the fisheries policy 
reform so as to improve the management of fishery resources and sustainable 
exploitation, pointing again to the problem of subsidies that are recognised 
to be a part of the over-fishing and over-capacity dilemma.369 In essence, the 
normative model that the Issues Paper aimed to put forth rests on two pillars. 
First, trade liberalisation in terms of dismantling protectionism at the EU end 
and addressing clear incoherencies between the fisheries and agriculture in 
more general terms. And, second, reforms in the partner countries. 
Although the Issues Paper was produced and delivered by DG DEV and not 
by the Commission as a whole, its ethos on trade and development was very 
similar to the overall liberalisation discourse of DG Trade. In this respect, the 
368 DG DEV European Union Development Policy Issues Paper: 3-4. 
369 DG DEV European Union Development Policy Issues Paper: 5-6. 
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areas of improved policy coherence were related to dismantling obstacles to 
further liberalisation and to the facilitation of developing countries’ trading 
opportunities for development purposes. In more concrete terms, these included 
less restrictive and more simplified rules of origin to counteract preference 
erosion, which were needed to take advantage of EU market access, which was 
under the competence of DG TAXUD. Non-tariff barriers related to veterinary, 
technical, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, which fell under the remit 
of DG SANCO exports, were also brought up. In addition, the loss of customs 
revenue in developing countries was listed as a point for further discussion.370 To 
sum up, the issues that DG DEV regarded as incoherent fell under the sectoral 
domains of DG Agriculture, DG Fisheries, DG TAXUD, DG SANCO and, to a 
lesser extent, under the competence of DG Trade, as the trade liberalisation 
agenda was largely portrayed as a development agenda. Only the issue of revenue 
loss due to reciprocal tariff liberalisation was directed to DG Trade. 
Regarding the respective roles of the EC and the member states, DG DEV 
stated in the paper that the proper implementation of “the 3 Cs” (cooperation, 
consistency and coherence) calls for a special role for the Commission. By and 
large, this constituted the reason why European development policy would require 
a consensus on a common platform of action.371 Within the aid agenda this call 
was justified by the commitments to “more and more effective aid” made in the 
Barcelona European Summit in March 2002. Here, the Issues Paper referred to 
the member state and EC donor practices that the Council had examined and 
also to the international processes in which the EU was envisaging a greater role.
With regard to the EU’s global role in the sphere of the Bretton Woods 
Institutions, the Issues Paper points to the claim that the EU’s involvement in 
shaping the strategies of those IFIs was still well below its potential in terms of its 
30 per cent equity in the IMF and World Bank. Here, it was foreseen that the EU 
could actually influence positively by preventing and managing financial crises, 
as well as by promoting reforms in debtor countries. In addition, the EU was seen 
as being capable of steering conditions in the direction of politically and socially 
sustainable development with reinforced co-ordination and representation.372 
The Issues Paper marked the launch of the official consultation process 
that took place in January-March 2005.373 First, the Commission launched an 
internal dialogue within the Commission and between the Commission and 
key actors in the policy cycle. These included the member states, the European 
Parliament and, somewhat unexpectedly, the European Economic and Social 
370 DG DEV European Union Development Policy Issues Paper: 6.
371 DG DEV European Union Development Policy Issues Paper: 8-9.
372 DG DEV European Union Development Policy Issues Paper: 9-10.
373 The report takes account of all comments received up to April 22, 2005.
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Committee and the Committee of Regions. Second, it organised a series of 
meetings and workshops. Third, it launched an electronic debate and online 
questionnaire.374 The results were published on the Internet with complete 
texts of the contributions that the Commission received so as to guarantee 
transparency of the process. The subsequent report on the public consultation 
was published by the DG DEV Development Policy, Coherence and Forward 
Studies unit in June 2005. In his foreword to the report, Commissioner Louis 
Michel declared the consultation a big success. The Commission received 529 
contributions in all from different types of stakeholders, two-thirds of them from 
the donor countries. A notable fact here was that the majority of respondents 
were from Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom 
and Spain. Although the Commission received contributions from developing 
countries covering almost all geographical areas except MEDA, the input was 
based on a relatively small number of respondents.375
The model for this type of process was taken from the consultations prior to 
the launch of the Green Paper on the Future of the EU-ACP Lomé Convention 
in 1996. However, this time around it was clear from the outset that there would 
be neither sufficient time nor resources to engage in a more comprehensive 
debate with developing country partners at the level of delegations or beyond.376 
A notable exception here was Bangladesh whose pro-activeness indicated clear 
interest in broadening the EC development policy towards the non-ACP LDCs 
in particular. 
Regarding the results of the consultation, according to the respondents, the 
objectives of a new EU development policy should be based on the Millennium 
Declaration (39%) and not only on the narrower frame of the MDG goals. 
However, these goals were regarded as important in operational terms. What is 
interesting is that 37 per cent of the participants considered that the Millennium 
Declaration plus other objectives of the external action should be used as 
landmarks in the development field. This inclination was further enhanced in 
the meetings with and statements from key players and stakeholders, suggesting 
a clear consensus that eradication of poverty should be the main objective. 
Sustainable development as such was not referred to in the development chapters 
but in the context of environment and development. In addition, the need for 
coherence in the elements of the EU external action was widely emphasised. 377 
According to the report, a vast majority of the respondents agreed that 
development policy should never be subordinated to the CFSP or trade policies. 
374 DG DEV 2005: Report on the Public Consultation on the Future of EU Development Policy: 4. 
375 DG DEV 2005: Report on the Public Consultation on the Future of EU Development Policy: 6.
376 Interviews Academia[21]2008 and EC[30]2009.
377 DG DEV 2005: Report on the Public Consultation on the Future of EU Development Policy: 20.
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Furthermore, the objectives of the other external policies should be taken into 
account in development policy in terms of recognising that development activity 
is an effective tool for addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity, 
while security and a peaceful environment are key to any development strategy. 
This framing was quite close to the one in the resulting European Consensus 
statement. The report concludes that development can be seen as a tool to 
address the root causes of insecurity but should not be subordinated to security 
policy. This implies that security-related expenditure should not be seen as 
official development aid and that security in this context should be approached 
through the larger perspective of ‘human security’.378
The questionnaire was also designed to gather suggestions for appropriate 
models of trade policy to help developing countries reap the benefits of trade 
liberalisation. Here the respondents emphasised three key aspects: the need 
for a balanced multilateral trade system, further improvements in market 
access, and a wish that the EU should support developing countries in their 
efforts to create a stable and attractive environment for trade and investment. 
Interestingly, the report was designed to nominate only one option as the 
basis for an appropriate trade policy, rather than implying that a policy would 
possibly require all these dimensions in order to be “appropriate” in terms of 
poverty eradication. What is also worth noting was the importance given to the 
need for a balanced multilateral trade system.379 In addition, a key message that 
emerged from the meetings and statements made by stakeholders was that any 
new policy should be more cautious about celebrating the substantial benefits 
brought about by trade liberalisation, pointing to the complexity of trade, and 
the fact that growth and poverty reduction would not be automatic. In this light, 
developing countries should not be forced into liberalising their markets, but 
should have the right to protect their industries and farmers. At the same time, 
their capacity to face non-tariff barriers should be increased, while the EU itself 
should deal with the Union’s trade distortive tariffs and subsidies, as well as 
address supply-side constraints in developing countries. 
The report also included a section on the Economic Partnership Agreements. 
In this regard, the report raised a concern related to reciprocity and the risks 
associated with insufficient development benchmarking. Finally, the report 
concluded that trade is, on the whole, seen as an important tool for combating 
poverty, but apparently there was no agreement on how it should be used.380 
378 DG DEV 2005: Report on the Public Consultation on the Future of EU Development Policy: 14-16.
379 DG DEV 2005: Report on the Public Consultation on the Future of EU Development Policy:  17. 
However, the final version of the European Consensus does not touch upon this, but starts with 
the assumption that the current system is “free and fair” (Sub-chapter 5.4).
380 DG DEV 2005: Report on the Public Consultation on the Future of EU Development Policy: 16-17.
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Regarding the hot topic of EC and member-state roles, a majority of the 
respondents (59%) were of the opinion that the Commission should assume 
a bigger development role. It was also recommended that the EC could more 
actively pursue a common EU platform for development policy rather than limit 
itself to coordination and harmonisation of EU aid only, as was the case in the 
DPS2000.381 This bigger role would also imply a bigger EU standing in the WB/
IMF, either by individual representation, or at least that the Commission should 
become a member and represent the Community. However, opinions to the 
contrary were also expressed, although they formed a minority in this group.382 
In addition, several contributions referred to the EU values and principles 
that should underpin the EU development policy. In all, this type of response 
provided a strong enough basis for building a Brussels Consensus, or even “a 
leadership model for global development thinking” as one of the respondents 
extravagantly phrased it. 
At this point, it was stated in the introduction that policy orientations would 
be drawn from the new Commission Communication on the proposal for a new 
development policy, not from the report itself. However, the Issues Paper and 
the Report on the Consultation process provided a good strategic instrument 
for the Commission to pick and choose appropriate issues for further debate. 
In this sense, all these activities can be understood in terms of institutional 
entrepreneurism that aims to mobilise consensus by publishing documents, 
engaging in the public debate, and organising bilateral or multilateral 
meetings.383 In addition, by doing this, the Commission could maintain control 
over the process in terms of framing the debate and furnishing collective 
evidence of broader support on central issues that it wanted to influence. In 
the following section we will move on to look at the kind of policy proposal that 
was actually put forward by DG DEV and the European Commission as a whole 
to its institutional counterparts to debate. 
4.2 THE COMMISSION PROPOSAL: “HARNESSINg 
gLObALISATION fOR DEVELOPMENT” 
Having outlined the preparatory stage of the European Consensus process in 
DG Development and in the public consultation, I will now proceed to the policy 
initiation phase in the European Commission. In particular, I will focus on 
the Commission proposal for a European Union Development Policy and the 
381 DG DEV 2005: Report on the Public Consultation on the Future of EU Development Policy: 21-22.
382 Ibid.
383 Cf. Carbone 2007a: 5, 25. 
DEvElOPMENT POlICY PROCESS AND POlICY COHERENCE   |  131
mandatory impact assessment that the Commission had issued to accompany 
the proposal. My aim is to demonstrate how the Commission discourse had 
changed compared to the Issues Paper, and how this change reflected the 
overall understanding of the role of development policy and policy coherence 
for development within the EU.
Drawing on the internal debates, various meetings and the consultation 
process, the Commission issued a communication proposing a joint declaration 
on the European Union development policy entitled “The European Consensus”. 
384 By “joint” DG Development was not only referring to the EC member-state 
axis, but also to the enlarged constellation including the EP, with which it had 
already conducted preliminary discussions. However, this was not the first time 
that this kind of tripartite arrangement had been sought, as Commissioner Poul 
Nielson had invited the parliament to take part in the DPS2000 exercise during 
his term. Unfortunately, on that occasion too much haste and insufficient 
attention to the provided comments did not lead to joint results. This failure 
was then reflected in a certain disinterest and passivity on the part of the EP.385 
On the other hand, there was also a structural difficulty hindering the process 
simply because there was no official procedure in place to facilitate a joint 
formulation between these institutional parties (sic).386 
The Commission proposal was timed to coincide with the very beginning of 
the UK Presidency as it was launched on 13 July, 2005. It was accompanied by 
a document that was labelled as an Impact Assessment. However, this impact 
assessment was largely a summary based on the DPS2000 study, presenting 
the rationale for policy changes, including an assessment of the impact of the 
“no policy change” option, highlighting the importance of the objectives of the 
proposed EU Development Policy Statement, as well as envisaging the necessary 
instruments to move towards them.387 
What is noteworthy is that conducting a (sustainability) impact assessment 
had been mandatory for every new and significant initiative by the Commission 
since 2003.388 This fact also constituted a very important aspect of the overall 
sustainable development strategy of the Union when it came to understanding 
the economic, social and environmental imprint of the EU action.389 What 
was problematic in this case was that the way in which the concept of impact 
was understood had very little to do with sustainability impact assessment. 
384 COM (2005c).
385 Interviews Academia[21]2008 and CSO[31]2009. 
386 Interview EC[30]2009.
387 COM (2005d) Impact Assessment SEC (2005) 929: 3-6. 
388 Interview EC[16]2009.
389 Interview EC[16]2009. See also Baker 2006.
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Rather, it was an estimation of the political impact achieved with the former 
DPS2000 statement, as well as an exploration of the potential political value 
of the envisioned European Policy. So somewhat strikingly, a section entitled 
Economic, social and environmental impact of the 2000 EC Policy statement 
does not discuss the impact in sustainable development terms at all.  It jumps 
directly to exploring the different functions and their impact, what the DPS 
2000 had performed in terms of policy focus, and the consequent priorities 
as a policy paper and not in terms of actual poverty reduction outcomes. 
Although problems related to insufficient integration of cross-cutting issues 
or lack of shared ownership by the European Parliament and non-state actors 
are recognised as impact issues in a broad sense, the discrepancy between the 
title and its content is still notable.390This is further emphasised since, curiously 
enough, regarding the envisioned European Development statement and its 
expected impact, there is an identically entitled chapter later on in the same 
document which states that: 
no quantitative analysis of economic, social and environmental impact has 
been possible due to the general and political nature of the proposed (European 
Consensus) Declaration and the number and range of players involved.391 
However, some likely trends were still identified, based on common evaluation 
findings of development aid, but there was no reference to any specific 
evaluation of aid. On these meagre grounds, it was nevertheless boldly assumed 
that the European Consensus policy would have a positive economic, social and 
environmental impact. In other words, if the European Consensus were adopted 
and implemented as the Commission planned, it would have a better impact 
than the previous development policy in both developing countries and in the 
Union itself. However, the process is not based on the actual impact of the policy 
in relation to its objectives, but rather on the likelihood that improvements to 
the policy will lead to improved outcomes. Although this is one way to approach 
the effectiveness of the EU development cooperation, it failed to explicitly state 
the most challenging question: Does EU development policydeliver on its own 
objectives and to what extent do other policies help or hinder this endeavour?392
Instead, the positive outcome that the impact assessment presented was 
based on a list of causal assumptions. First, sharing the Consensus would 
improve and facilitate coordination among member states and thus increase the 
overall effectiveness and impact of EU aid. Second, more flexibility in applying 
390 See COM (2005d) Impact Assessment SEC (2005) 929: 7-8 
391 See COM (2005d) Impact Assessment SEC (2005) 929: 3-4 and compare ibid: 7-8. 
392 Riddel 2007.
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EU priorities and recognition of all stakeholders would improve ownership by 
partner countries. Third, enhanced differentiation would allow the EC to respond 
efficiently and coherently to the heterogeneity of partners. Fourth, the social and 
environmental dimensions of sustainable development as mainstreamed, specific 
objectives of EU aid would have a positive impact. This would be combined with 
a clear focus and recognition of the validity of the European development policy 
which, in turn, would lead to greater consistency of EC aid across regions. Lastly, 
and perhaps most interestingly, it was assumed that the European Consensus 
statement per se would automatically build a causal link to greater coherence 
among EU policies affecting development cooperation (migration, security, 
trade, etc.).393 As the end result, the impact assessment foresaw benefits both 
for developing countries and for the Union. The developing countries would 
receive more effective and sustainable EU aid, aligned to the PRPS and national 
development strategies, while the EU would raise its profile in international 
development as well as in the political system of the Union. 
Intriguingly, the envisioned bigger role for the EC would also contribute 
to the achievement of shared development objectives in a more efficient and 
effective way.394 This was stated acknowledging the risk that at least some 
member states would disagree on this assumed direct causality. By the same 
token, the European Consensus was designed to strengthen policy coherence 
for development, which was then assumed to produce economic gains for 
developing countries in the form of increased exports, reduced costs of 
remittance by migrants, a reduction in the brain drain, improved environmental 
sustainability and mitigation of climate change, increased human and state 
security, better working conditions, and improved access to services such as 
transport and energy.395 This was all dependent on the European Consensus 
delivering on these objectives. Even if not stated outright, it is assumed that the 
Commission proposal will provide these links. Regarding the respective impact 
for the EU, DG DEV furthermore claimed that the stronger EU voice in the 
international development arena would be important for EU citizens because 
it may contribute to a stronger EU role in international affairs and promote EU 
values worldwide. Hence, the EU norms were seen as important also on a global 
scale. This claim was further legitimised with an assumption that the EU would 
produce more public goods by helping to prevent conflicts, reduce the spread of 
disease and protect the global environment.396 This was why a new development 
policy – and a consensus on the EU’s role – were needed.
393 COM (2005d) Impact Assessment SEC (2005) 929: 7-8.
394 COM (2005d) Impact Assessment SEC (2005) 929: 8.
395 COM (2005d) Impact Assessment SEC (2005) 929: 8.
396 COM (2005d) Impact Assessment SEC (2005) 929: 8.
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Regarding the policy objectives, the impact assessment document packages 
them in the following way: 
The overall objective of the new DPS will remain the reduction and ultimately 
the eradication of poverty within the framework of sustainable development. The 
operational definition of poverty eradication will be based on the Millennium 
Declaration and the MDGs in particular. The policy will also seek to achieve 
greater coherence among Member States and the Commission as well as among 
the various Commission services in EU external action and those in charge of 
internal policies with an external dimension.397  
This presentation was followed by a discussion which links the objectives to the 
international development policy contest and already established international 
development commitments, especially those related to the MDGs, but also to 
the Monterrey Conference on financing for development and the Johannesburg 
Summit on sustainable development. Related to the MDGs, the Commission 
also had an important “carrot” to bring to the table. Namely, the UN High 
Level Event in September 2005 and the WTO’s Fourth Ministerial Conference 
scheduled for Hong Kong in December 2005 were approaching.398 These 
occasions would provide a global arena for the Union’s voice and vision, to 
which end a joint declaration would certainly be beneficial.   
With regard to the debate on an appropriate development policy instrument, 
the impact assessment paper put forward three options for readers to consider. 
First, review and update  the 2000 DPS, keeping the focus on EC aid only; second, 
launch a common platform for all EU member states and the Commission, 
defining common objectives, principles and broad guidelines for the design 
and implementation of EU aid; and lastly, follow a two-pronged approach 
with a policy offering a common platform for EU and MS aid on objectives and 
principles, which would then be referred to as the so-called “Brussels Consensus”, 
but keeping an EU focus for implementation guidelines.399 To evaluate these 
options, DG DEV also provided an ex-ante analysis of the rationale behind 
each option and its likelihood of being accepted. Regarding the first, status quo 
option, a proposed rationale would have been that a long-term policy should 
not be changed too frequently. However,  here too, the right to alter policy was 
reserved to include all developing countries and not only the ACP states. Still, 
this kind of light update was not seen as sufficient to support and promote 
397 COM (2005d) Impact Assessment SEC (2005) 929: 5. 
398 COM (2005d) Impact Assessment SEC (2005) 929: 5.
399 COM (2005d) Impact Assessment SEC (2005) 929: 5-6.
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a stronger EU role in international development.400 Concerning the second, 
and by far the most radical option of having an entirely common European 
development policy, it was acknowledged that such a formulation would have 
entailed replacing each member state’s development policy statements with a 
joint one, including objectives, principles, values and priorities. In this respect, 
it was immediately stated that this model would be unrealistic as member-state 
aid structures were seen as too diverse. DG Development was also cautious 
about the fact that promoting such an option could easily have been interpreted 
as a move to undermine the spirit of the shared competences of the Treaty or 
even to push towards a unification of EU aid.401 
In this light, the middle-road option stood out quite naturally as the best 
possible choice. DG Development explained that “it is still politically ambitious 
but also realistic on operationalisation”. Actually, as the Commission pointed 
out, it would only make official at the EU level what the member states had 
already agreed individually in international commitments. From here, a 
“Brussels Consensus” could be drawn up to encompass objectives, principles 
and a vision for the future.402  
At this stage, it was already clear that the Commission’s preferred option 
was a combination of the purely Common EU policy and the third alternative, 
whereas the UK government stance was strongly in favour of the status quo with 
minor modifications.403 In this type of setting, the framing became crucial. 404 
In this regard, the Commission had done its homework by laying down facts 
that made the policy change a necessity, linking it to international development 
agendas, and presenting the division of labour between the EC and member 
states as a practical issue that would simply improve the policy outcome. After 
all, who would have the audacity to argue against the outcome of a public 
stakeholder consultation and a proposal for an improved policy framework?  
The Main Discursive Elements of “Harnessing 
Globalisation for Development”
After the preparatory work, the next challenge in the pipeline for DG DEV 
was to find common ground within the Commission. Whereas the preparatory 
phase had been firmly in the hands of DG DEV, the framing was now opened 
to the entire Commission. The common foundation was found in the EU’s 
400 COM (2005d) Impact Assessment SEC (2005) 929: 5-6. 
401 COM (2005d) Impact Assessment SEC (2005) 929: 5-6. 
402 COM (2005d) Impact Assessment SEC (2005) 929: 5-6. 
403 Interviews Council [28]2008, Academia[8]2009 and EC[23]2009. 
404 Cf. Carbone 2007a: 5, 25-27.
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global role and the essential part that development policy was to play in this 
international identity.405 More precisely, “globalisation” became the key word 
in the Commission’s proposal for the new development policy. Indeed, there 
was an interesting shift in focus. To begin with, the concept of “globalisation” 
was hardly mentioned in the preparatory documents, although the question 
was hovering in the background. DG DEV was clearly more concerned about 
the issues related to “competency” and “poverty”. However,  globalisation as a 
new over-arching theme also provided a new kind of entry point to the debate 
for DG DEV. As a result, the Commission proposal text does not depart from 
the rationale of global poverty as in the impact assessment but, rather, it places 
the role and function of development policy in the midst of the globalisation 
discourse. As a matter of fact, the text stated that the main challenge for 
the international community is to ensure that globalisation is a positive 
force for all of mankind, as its benefits and costs are unequally distributed. 
Hence, “harnessing globalisation” became the main motivation for the EU’s 
development action.406
The idea of harnessing globalisation certainly did not emerge out of the blue. 
For instance, Carbone (2007:45) cites it as one of the most original elements of 
the French development policy, according to which development policy should 
be designed to mitigate and manage the negative effects that globalisation has 
on developing countries. What was practically common knowledge was that 
“harnessing globalisation” was also the “motto” of the then Trade Commissioner, 
Pascal Lamy of the Prodi Commission (1999-2004). But Commissioner Nielsen 
also used the idea of “harnessing globalisation” and adding “a human face to 
globalisation” while addressing the World Bank development committee (in 
April 2000).407 The EC approach to globalisation was a depoliticised one in 
terms of accepting globalisation almost as an ungovernable phenomenon. 
Rather than focusing on the governance of globalisation, the emphasis was 
placed on developing countries and their capacities to cope with it.408 
 Second, the impact assessment, although issued on the same date, still spoke 
about a “Brussels Consensus” and not yet about a “European Consensus”, but 
the Commission proposal boldly starts with the European Union Development 
Policy, labelling it “the European Consensus”. The notion of a “Brussels 
Consensus” had surfaced in the early discussions on the future of the development 
policy, referring to particular elements such as values, commitments and the 
principles of the EC as a European alternative to the Washington Consensus. 
405 Interviews EC[15]2009, EC[17]2009 and EC[39]2009.
406 COM(2005c) 311 final: 4. 
407 Dickson 2004: 50.
408 COM(2005c) 311 final: 4
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In the Commission proposal, the Brussels Consensus had been enlarged into 
the European Consensus for the simple reason that “Brussels” as such could 
have risked giving the impression that the Consensus was only limited to the 
EC development policy, focusing on functions in Brussels. In this sense, it was 
a strategic choice to widen the consensus from Brussels to cover the whole of 
“Europe”.409 This wider scope was also directed at the UK to demonstrate the 
EC’s ambition. In the words of one interviewee: 
After all, it is a different thing to say that the whole Europe shares a view on 
development than only Brussels.410 
The Commission proposal starts with a presentation of the EU action, which 
includes both the external and internal policies that jointly form the European 
model. Interestingly, this model is said to build on coherence and synergy 
between these two dimensions, which are, in turn, prerequisites for advancing 
the EU agenda. For the Commission, it is clear that the policy they are proposing 
is meant to be Europe-wide. Hence the choice of title: “A European Union 
Strategy for Development”.
Here, development policy is placed at the core of EU external action. The 
thematic spearhead is structured around the Millennium Development Goals.411 
These goals are framed within the context of a common EU vision, scope, values 
and development objectives. Interestingly, the common vision of development 
starts from the self-proclaimed assumption that: 
… the EU is a major player on the international scene. It aims to be a positive 
force for change by contributing to better harnessing of globalization and more 
equitable sharing of the opportunities and wealth it generates. Its action supports 
the efforts of the developing countries themselves.412 
Notably, development aid is not mentioned before page 6. However, the 
Commission leaves undefined what “harnessing globalisation” entails and 
how exactly it is to contribute to the development efforts. Rather, it appears 
as if it was taken for granted that the EU’s own action in development policy, 
as well as the re-direction of other policies, would be sufficient. In this 
regard, development policy provides a strategy for equitable globalisation by 
establishing links between development and other policy sectors based on the 
409 Interview Academia[21]2009, Interview Council[28], Interview EP[3]. Interview 2009.
410 Interview Academia[21]2008.  
411 COM (2005c) 311 final: 4. 
412 COM (2005c) 311 final: 6.
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model that was already presented in the Issues Paper. These included security, 
migration, trade, the environment, and the social dimension of globalisation, 
which was now brought in for the first time.413 
As regards trade and policy coherence for development, the Commission 
proposal differed quite remarkably from the DG DEV Issues Paper. Most 
strikingly, the references concerning areas of improvement vis-à-vis agriculture, 
fisheries, rules of origin and loss of tariff revenues in developing countries were 
all deleted. Instead, the section starts with a definition of the EU as the most 
open trading partner of developing countries in the world.414 In practical terms, 
these cuts narrow down the original agenda of trade liberalisation, market access 
and the previously identified incoherencies in the trade and development nexus. 
This type of framing significantly limited the scope of the policy coherence for 
development. It also demonstrated how the development-oriented agenda was 
streamlined with the overall agenda of the Commission to the detriment of the 
development policy. 
As an alternative to DG DEV’s Issues Paper, the Commission proposal on 
trade was structured around three elements: market access, trade for aid, and 
regional integration. As regards the first elements, the Commission language 
reinforced the Commission’s positive role as well as the overall optimism vested 
in the world trading system as being open, rules-based, and one in which EU 
action protects weaker nations. In fact, this characteristic was seen as something 
that is “inbuilt into its rules book and modus operandi”. However, this noble 
position is not sufficient to guarantee good results but the text states that 
developing countries “for their part, are also increasingly aware of the need to 
systematically incorporate trade into their development and poverty reduction 
strategies while ensuring the implementation of the necessary internal reforms 
to enable them to take advantages of these opportunities”. From the trade and 
development aid perspective, the EU recognises that developing countries need 
more substantial support for this often complex process of trade opening and 
integration, and here the EU will further improve and coordinate trade-related 
programmes and, nota bene, provide additional support for adjustment and 
integration into the world economy, in cooperation with the international 
community. 
In this respect, two observations require further analysis. First, it was through 
aid that developing countries were to be supported for trade and not through 
changes in the trade policies or trading systems per se. Second, to this end, the 
Commission proposed additional aid for these purposes. Given that the financial 
references were fixed then as they are now to the EDF and member-state 
413 COM (2005c) 311 final: 8.
414 COM (2005c) 311 final: 8.
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budgets, this question requires further elaboration. So in practice, this proposal 
was related to the re-allocation of existing funds for this purpose. The third 
element, regional integration, had not been emphasised by DG DEV either.415 
However, the Commission did not connect these dots to the debate on Policy 
Coherence for Development. Instead, PCD was discussed under a separate sub-
chapter at the very end of the proposal. An interesting aspect in this respect 
was the assumed positive causality between the EU intentions and the expected 
results. In particular, the Commission proposal referred to the May 2005 
Council conclusions identifying the 12 key policy areas that were to characterise 
the EU PCD commitment.416 In turn, these commitments were to constitute “a 
substantial additional contribution to the fulfillment of the MDGs”.417 To this end, 
the Commission recognised the importance of progress to be made at three levels: 
(1) at Member State level, by the reinforcement of procedures and instruments 
relating to policy coherence, based on best practices developed by certain 
Member States; (2) at Council level, by the strengthening of genuine integration 
of development issues into the work of the Council’s sectoral groups; (3) at 
Commission level, including by the reinforcement of impact analyses from a 
development perspective.418 
To anticipate the future implementation, the Commission’s preferred option 
would have included a common operational guideline to direct both the 
Commission and the Member States’ policies.419 However, in the resulting 
proposal the guidelines for actual implementation of development policy were 
limited to the Community itself.420 
4.3 bETwEEN PRESIDENCy PRIORITIES AND 
PARLIAMENT’S PREfERENCES
If 2005 was considered a super year for the international development community 
as a whole, it was even more so for the British government in this sphere of global 
governance. On top of the long-term focal and critical role in EU development 
circuits, it was the twin presidencies of the EU and the G8 that gave Britain a 
415 COM (2005c) 311 final: 8.
416 Cf. COM (2005b).
417 COM (2005c) 311 final: 13.
418 COM (2005c) 311 final: 13.
419 Interviews Academia[8]2009 and EC[30]2009. 
420 COM (2005c) 311 final: 13.
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unique opportunity to steer and influence not only the European development 
policy, but also to a certain degree the global one. Even though it was officially 
declared that Britain would continue along the lines that it had inherited from 
the Luxembourg Presidency, the UK had a strong opinion both on the content 
of the Commission proposal as well as on the institutional position of the future 
development policy.421 In this respect, it is interesting to examine how much of the 
Commission proposal the UK would actually agree on and choose to eventually 
put forward to the Council for adoption. Certainly, it posed a challenge for the 
Commission leadership for the first half of the year. Furthermore, notwithstanding 
the question of who would have the last word on the EU development policy, it was 
also time to strike a balance between Europeanisation and national sovereignty 
in development policy for the years to come. 
As discussed earlier, the institutional right to initiate policy processes that 
is vested in the Commission relates to the beginning of the policy circle. Thus 
it does not imply that the same power position would last until the end of 
the process, although this is also possible. Although the very function of the 
Commission proposal is to start off the process and provide the Council with an 
informed basis to build on, it is difficult to say to what extent the Commission 
stance usually prevails. This varies from one policy sector to another, on the one 
hand, and from presidency to presidency on the other. So it is not completely 
unheard of for the country holding the presidency to open up the proposal 
for major changes or dismiss it altogether by submitting its own paper for 
this purpose.422 In this case, the Commission had already invested substantial 
resources and showed determination in the policy overhaul as discussed in the 
previous sections. To stress the urgency of the matter, the Commission had 
directly asked the Council and the Parliament to endorse its proposal in the 
closing chapter of the introduction. This plea was supported with a note on how 
a tripartite statement would contribute significantly to the aims of coherence 
and effectiveness in the area of EU external action.423 However, this was not 
enough to convince the UK government.
Despite the Commission’s efforts in policy initiation, it was rather 
striking how the Commission’s preparatory work was largely ignored by the 
presidency. Indeed, the Brits were altogether disinterested in promoting the 
work already done at the Brussels end. Of course, this alleged indifference 
was more strategic than anything else, as the British government had been 
involved as a financier of the DPS 2000 assessment and the parties had been 
in contact with government and Commission officials, as well as with the MEPs 
421 DFID, The UK Presidency Priorities 2005.
422 Interview Academia[21]2008, Council[28]2008, EP[3]2009, EC[30]2009.
423 COM (2005c) 311 final: 5.
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of the Development Committee.424 Furthermore, since the very beginning of 
the British Presidency, there had already been a strong official commitment 
to a joint tripartite agreement as this sample from then Secretary of State 
for International Development, Hilary Benn’s first address to the European 
Parliament Development Committee clearly shows: 
… Adopting a successor to the 2000 Development Policy Statement will be among 
our most important tasks during the next six months. I hope that the Parliament, 
Council and Commission will reach a collective agreement by the end of the year, 
and agree on a new statement that reaffirms the reduction of poverty as the 
primary objective for our work in developing countries…425
However, this type of firm support was not to be taken unconditionally. 
As discussed above, the UK’s take on the process was very different from 
the Commission’s. First, its preferred option was to limit the reform to the 
Community policy and to do it thoroughly. Second, while the UK stressed this 
focus, it was very reluctant to start discussing a common framework for the 
policy, let alone any joint operational guidelines for both EC and member-state 
bilateral development action. To secure these preferences, it had to take the 
leadership from the Commission.  
This quest for leadership became evident right after the G8 Summit in 
Gleneagles in Scotland (6-8 July 2005). On that occasion, the host government 
had strongly promoted its own global agenda to the group of leaders of the 
allegedly most powerful countries: the United States, Canada, France, Italy, 
Japan and Russia. What was remarkable in this meeting was the British decision 
to build the G8 agenda around two main development issues: poverty in Africa 
and climate change. This focus had already been accentuated by campaigners 
and NGOs around the globe, united around the Global Call to Action against 
Poverty. One of the key purposes of this coalition was to increase the pressure 
on world leaders to live up to their promises of reducing poverty. In the UK, 
the “Make Poverty History” campaign was the flagship of this process. Indeed, 
huge machinery was harnessed behind the initiative, including pop stars such as 
Bob Geldof, who again led massive Live 8 concerts around the world. For Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, the G8 meeting provided him with a possibility to position 
himself as the leader of this global front, despite the then already unpopular 
“war on terror” and raging protests outside the G8 venues. 
The DFID paper on the UK’s EU Presidency highlights the possibilities 
afforded by the twin presidential roles that the Prime Minister would take, 
424 Interview Academia[8]2009.
425 Speech by Hilary Benn to the EP Development Committee on 12 July 2005. 
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both in the context of the EU and the G8 “to make real progress on climate 
change and Africa in a complementary manner”. In addition, it was seen at 
the outset that this package was part of the larger deal in terms of the UK’s 
global agenda. In terms of specific priorities, the DFID summarises matters 
as follows: 
Our priority is to secure decisions related to poverty reduction, AIDS, development 
Africa and the revision of the EC Development Policy that ensure that the EU 
provides more and better aid that maximizes its contribution to the fight against 
poverty. We will also continue to work towards an ambitious outcome to the Doha 
Development Round that makes trade work for developing countries and strive to 
ensure that greater account is taken of developing countries in EU trade policies, 
including in negotiations for Economic Partnership Agreements. We will also 
take forward work in a number of other areas. These include untying regulation, 
migration and illegal logging.426 
Unlike the Commission, the UK did not share the need to package these 
objectives under one policy framework but, rather, preferred dealing with the 
issue areas of poverty reduction, AIDS, and African development separately in 
the context of the bilateral development policy and its presidency priorities. 
To highlight the division between the national and European development 
agendas, the whole EC Development policy review was discussed as a single 
item on the list of “tasks to do” and not as the all-encompassing European 
policy, the way the Commission had framed it.  In addition, the UK position 
links the traditional development cooperation agenda directly to the one on 
international trade. Here, the 2005 Doha Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong 
offered a new possibility to demonstrate the EU’s will and vision – in UK terms 
– “to make trade work for developing countries”. 
Regarding the actual outcome of the G8 meeting, the results on climate 
change were more important symbolically than they were in terms of substance. 
If the purpose was to pave the way for the actual climate talks (UNFCC/COP) 
by the main economic powers, the UK could take the credit for providing such 
an opportunity, even though no pledges were made by any of the countries. 
Perhaps more promisingly, the G8 was able to agree on $25 billion a year more 
development and potentially $55bn in debt cancellation to be delivered globally. 
Two-thirds of the aid package was pledged by the EU. This commitment was 
linked to the breakthrough during the Luxembourg Presidency in May 2005 
when the EU made “the historic commitment to double its aid by 2010” to €66 
billion, with half going to Africa. Now, under the UK’s leadership, the group 
426 DFID UK Presidency Priorities 2005.
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could count on getting the US, Japan and Canada on board. In the words of then 
Secretary of State for International Development Hilary Benn:
….The G8 Summit last weekend discussed Africa and Climate Change. In 
September world leaders will meet at the UN Millennium Review Summit to 
assess progress on the MDGs, and in December trade ministers in Hong Kong 
will have the chance to reach agreement on a development round. As the world’s 
largest provider of international aid, and as the main trading partner of developing 
countries, we in the EU have both the opportunity and the responsibility to act…. 
….This [May 2005 Commitment] showed Europe at its best. Council, Commission, 
Parliament and civil society – all working together towards a common goal: 
reducing global poverty. The US, Japan and Canada have also now committed 
to increase their aid.427   
Interestingly, in the presentation of the UK’s Presidency priorities to the 
Parliament, Hilary Benn highlighted the importance of the Luxembourg 
Presidency contribution and promised explicitly to build on that. In a similar 
way, the EP report drafted by British MEP Glenys Kinnock on the EU’s role in the 
achievement of the MDGs was fully acknowledged, while the entire preparatory 
work carried out by Commission on the very same issues was largely ignored 
in this important address to the EP. Apart from this apparent downplaying 
of the EC by the UK, this demonstrates how differently the Commission and 
the presidency saw the same endeavour of a collective agreement. For the 
Commission, something historic was happening in this policy reform both in 
terms of the future of European Development policy and its own position. In 
turn, the UK presented the issues per se as politically important – so important 
that the country did not want to leave them entirely under the control of the 
Commission. Based on this claim, it could justify its own position as the leader 
of the Council in the global context. What is also crucial to understand is that the 
perception of a collective agreement differed radically. Whereas the Commission 
aimed at a separate high-level statement that would have followed the model 
set by the European Security Strategy, the UK wanted a joint text but as a part 
of the Council Conclusions, as was the format previously with the DPS 2000.428 
In this situation, the UK used its presidency power and position and decided 
to start the policy reform process “anew” with its own text, which replaced the 
Commission proposal in the Codev and in the subsequent tripartite working 
427 Hilary Benn’s speech, 12 July 2005 at the EP Development Committee.
428 Interviews Academia[21]2008 and Council[28]2008. 
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group proceedings.429 Perhaps most importantly, the UK stated that it wanted 
to reinstate poverty eradication in European development cooperation and 
to have an instrument to support this with a collective agreement and proper 
financing – and spend it well.430 
This type of critical formulation was a dig at DG Development and its concerns 
about the EU’s external role. Without declaring the UK’s moral superiority in 
this respect, the UK certainly had a point. Development and poverty would 
need to be focused on, not as a strategic interest but in terms of substantive 
importance. However, the way in which this question could be addressed in the 
UK vision was still open, apart from the increased development financing and 
trade liberalisation as a whole. On the other hand, Britain simply had no interest 
in playing along with the Commission in promoting the EU’s global role in 
development, let alone beyond it. It was just embarking on a presidency that was 
full of international landmarks where it could demonstrate its own power as the 
leader of the EU front. Certainly, it was well positioned to do so: in June 2005 
Tony Blair had informed the EP about the UK’s presidency priorities, including 
global development with a particular focus on Africa, which gave the DFID a 
strong position within the government. Second, it could rely on a number of 
Eurosceptic member states or states that had neither the tradition nor the will 
to work side by side with the Commission on development. And thirdly, it had 
just successfully led the G8 talks on these issues, in particular on development 
financing. The comment by then Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown 
on the UK’s Development Agenda to European Financial Ministers’ colleagues 
aptly conveys these sentiments:
From Scotland this summer, the decisions of the G8 on debt relief, aid and trade 
justice, can lead the world – and put it on course to meet the MDGs…
…Taken together the proposals – which combine action on debt aid and trade with 
good governance, transparency, an attack on corruption and the encouragement 
of private investment – are a new deal between rich and poor countries, a 
Modern Marshall plan for Africa and the developing world.  [emphasis added]431 
So to summarise, the UK clearly aimed to launch a development policy 
process that had these international objectives at heart.  But contrary to the 
Commission’s position, the UK saw that the EU could play a role in the process 
under the UK’s coordination, and not vice versa. 
429 Interviews EP[3]2009, Academia[21]2008 and Council[28]2008. 
430 Hilary Benn’s speech at the EP Development Committee on 12 July, 2005.
431 Gordon Brown on the UK’s Development Agenda, Edinburgh, 3 June, 2005.
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More importantly for development policy perspectives, the UK brought 
Sub-Saharan Africa to the fore as an EU policy priority in the second half of 
2005. This chimed well with the EC priorities that had already been pencilled 
in with regard to the first EU strategy for Africa. This priority was also timely 
as the UN’s September review of the MDGs was fast approaching. Putting 
Africa at the top of the agenda was also justified due to the fact that it was 
least likely to meet any of the MDGs.432 Consistent with the MDG agenda, the 
UK government also wanted to focus on health issues. This provided common 
ground and an opportunity to build on, as they had during the Irish, Dutch and 
Luxembourg presidencies. In this African-MDG context, the question of AIDS/
HIV and other poverty-related diseases was highlighted. This topic was also 
important because the Council had agreed on a new programme for Action on 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria back in May, and the British wanted to 
have the Parliament on their side to support its implementation.433 Again, the 
EC efforts on the MDG front were relegated to the sidelines, despite the fact 
that the Commission had strongly rallied around the questions and issued the 
so-called EC Spring (2005) package on the MDGs and PCD for the Council. 
Disappointingly for policy coherence for development, the opportunity was not 
taken, although Hilary Benn herself highlighted the interconnection between 
development and trade, as well as the development and security agendas. Again, 
in Hilary Benn’s words: 
In the long-term, fairer and freer trade, and the economic development it brings, 
holds the key to improving the lives of poor people. Europe has provided real 
leadership on development in 2005. We now need to do the same on trade. Only 
an ambitious outcome to the Doha Round in Hong Kong in December will make 
trade for the poorest countries. We need your [EP] help in building the case for 
this. [emphasis added]434
Indeed, there was a lot of optimism in the air. Regarding trade, the UK was 
willing to press forward with the liberalisation agenda, which would then 
benefit developing countries by increasing access to the European markets. 
In particular, the Brits pointed to the case of sugar, certainly central to 
the whole trade and development agenda including the EBA initiative, the 
Economic Partnership Agreements, rules of origin, as well as the entire Doha 
Round.435 However, the development impact of these initiatives remained 
432 Holland 2009: 26-27. 
433 Hilary Benn’s speech at the EP Development Committee on 12 July, 2005.
434 Ibid.
435 Hilary Benn’s speech at the EP Development Committee, 12 July, 2005.
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to be defined in the actual negotiations (see Chapter 6 and Sub-chapter 
6.4). Regarding security, the G8 agenda and the unpopular war on terror 
intersected dramatically as there was a series of bomb explosions on the 
London underground during the G8 meeting. In her address to the European 
Parliament, Hilary Benn made the connection between terrorism and 
poverty: 
…Europe’s values of humanity and of hope. The best chance we have to ultimately 
defeat terrorism, and part of this fight will demand of us that we defeat poverty 
as well.436 
As regards the role of the EP, its stance towards the MDGs was explicated in 
the Report and Motion for a European Parliament Resolution on the role of 
the Union in this endeavour, which was adopted in March 2005. The timing is 
interesting because it was the EP that published its report first as a contribution 
to the EU’s preparations for the 2005 progress review.  Referring to the 
Commission’s draft text on the MDGs and PCD, the EP called for the EU to 
take responsibility for, and an unequivocal position on, the MDG8 policies to 
increase coherence for development.437 
In this task, the EP’s point of departure is much more demanding compared 
with those of the Commission and the forthcoming presidency. For the EP, 
the MDGs were to be assessed as part of a larger poverty eradication agenda 
promoting sustainable development, justice, equity, governance and the rule 
of law. Its point of departure was based on three challenges: first, recognising 
that the number of people living in extreme poverty has more than doubled 
over the last thirty years as reported by the UNCTAC LDC report 2002; second, 
recognising that meeting the MDG targets implies doubling the current amount 
of aid and maintaining it at that level for at least a decade (cf. Sacks/UN 
Millennium Project Task Force) while improving the quality and content of aid 
vis-à-vis the MDGs as well as donor coordination; and third, and perhaps most 
importantly, recognising that: 
[the] action against poverty requires above all a radical change of policy in 
both industrialized and developing countries in order to address the structural 
causes of poverty, including unfair world trade rules, unaffordable debt payments 
by developing countries to international financial institutions, and unfair 
distribution of wealth. 
436 Ibid.
437 EP Report A6-0075/2005 Committee on Development, Rapporteur: Glenys Kinnock: 14-15.
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… MDGs should not be seen as a technical matter which will be resolved simply 
by providing money without identifying and tackling the underlying causes of 
poverty (…) Regrets that whilst MDGs 1-7 have clear deadlines, this is not the 
case for MDG8. 438
Importantly for our topic, the EP called on the EU to take concrete action 
against poverty by adopting a coherent policy between its trade, development 
cooperation and common agricultural polices to avoid direct or indirect negative 
impacts on the economy of developing countries. To include trade aspects in 
the DEVE report, DEVE called on the EP International Trade Committee to 
give its opinion, which was then drafted by MEP Caroline Lucas and largely 
incorporated into the resulting DEVE report. l will return to these issues in the 
next section on the comparison of alternative content. 
Another issue area that needs to be highlighted in the EP Report is health. 
Similarly to the UK presidency agenda, together with trade, the issues related 
to poverty and health were seen as a priority for the whole Union. According to 
the EP position, the EU should take the lead in supporting public social services 
such as basic education and health services, including sexual and reproductive 
health. This question was also linked to more structural issues such as the 
unbearable debt servicing-public expenditure ratio, with the report highlighting 
how two-thirds of developing countries spend more on servicing debt than on 
basic social needs.439 In addition, the EP report points to the fact that higher 
HIV/AIDS infection rates exist in Sub-Saharan Africa where expenditure 
on health and education has been drastically reduced, while simultaneously 
some tropical diseases would be treatable but for the fact that drugs are either 
unaffordable, no longer produced, or lacking in quality or effectiveness. In this 
context, the gender issue was also brought to the fore as one of the conditions 
for achieving the Millennium Development Goals.
4.4 fROM bRUSSELS TO EUROPEAN CONSENSUS: A 
SHORT COMPARISON Of ALTERNATIVE CONTENT 
In this sub-chapter, I take a closer look at how and on whose terms the content 
of the first European Consensus statement was negotiated during the UK 
presidency in 2005. I also explain what these terms were and what kind of 
model they provided for the EU’s normative model in development governance 
and the discursive and institutional power related to it.
438 EP Report A6-0075/2005 Committee on Development, Rapporteur: Glenys Kinnock: 4-5.
439 EP Report A6-0075/2005 Committee on Development, Rapporteur: Glenys Kinnock: 5. 
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Although it was anticipated within the Commission that the UK presidency 
would prove to be testing for the Commission’s authority, it was nevertheless 
acknowledged that Britain was also in a position to attract political attention 
and resources for the purpose of development policy.440 Besides, both parties 
shared an interest in policy reform, albeit on diverse grounds. In this equation, 
the role of the Parliament was to balance and provide development policy with 
much needed legitimacy and political value. Also, in more pragmatic terms, 
and by virtue of the selected MEPs, the Parliament’s input was expected to 
improve the content of the statement and perhaps make it more acceptable to 
a wider range of stakeholders.441 In other words, it would be advantageous to 
have this type of tripartite setting facilitate the building of the consensus, be 
it of the Brussels variety or, more grandiosely, of the European kind. As one 
interviewee put it:
… A statement like that needs to pull people together (…) bring the European 
Union development sector together, not only the officials but also the Parliament 
and non-state actors. It has to have strong symbolic importance.442 
However, it was not only the Brits that the Commission needed to convince. 
There were also other member states, such as Denmark, that either strongly 
opposed the idea in the beginning or at least wanted to keep the common 
dimension as limited as possible and concentrate more on the EC role in 
development. These Council members were eager to challenge the Commission 
and did not hesitate to ask for evidence on what the EC 2000 policy had actually 
achieved before moving forward to discuss any joint frameworks. In addition, 
there was resistance inside the Commission. In particular, this was the case 
between DG DEV and RELEX on development aid allocation, as well as on 
more general terms between DG DEV and trade- and agriculture-related DGs.443 
From the EP perspective, there was very little knowledge in general on 
the EC development policy in the Parliament, let alone this type of guiding 
policy statement, which should have been renewed in the first place before the 
European Consensus process took place.444 This was partially explained by the 
failure of Poul Nielson to have an inclusive process for the DPS 2000, which 
was eventually signed only by the Council and not by the parliamentarians. This 
was due to a simple, but politically costly miscalculation in the process as the 
440 Interviews Academia[21]2008, Council[28]2008, EC[30]2009 and EC[34]2009.
441 Interviews EP[3]2008, Academia[21]2008 and EC[30]2009.
442 Interview Academia[21]2008.  
443 Interviews CSO[11]2009, CSO[20]2009 and EC[15]2009.
444 Interview Academia[21]2008.
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EP was not given enough time to react before the Commission communication 
was submitted to the Council for approval.445 This time around the EC simply 
could not afford a similar error.
As the time was at hand to start the official debate on the future of the 
European Consensus at the Council, it became clear that the UK would not use 
the Commission proposal as the basis for discussion. This was the case despite 
the Commission’s hard preparatory work and active engagement with different 
actors in Brussels and abroad. The UK decision to start the debate in CODEV 
on the future of the development policy with an altogether new tone and focus 
was a bitter, yet not entirely unexpected blow to the Commission leadership. 
Also, the EP stand on the Commission proposal had not been too enthusiastic, 
and consequently the poverty-centred text was welcomed by the MEPs.446  As 
one might expect, the Commission did not agree to this change at first, and the 
issue was debated.447 It had been the Commission’s role to initiate the process 
by the Treaty, yet it was much less clear who should then take it forward and 
how far: the Commission or the presidency. In this particular case, both parties 
were envisioning this leadership role. 
As a result, the Commission proposal was opened and redrafted again, but 
this time with the EU presidency holding the pen. In this kind of situation, 
it would be very difficult to claim leadership if the presidency backed by 
critical member states was not willing to accept the Commission proposal 
as a basis for discussion. However, the tripartite approach provided the 
Commission with an alternative route to the regular CODEV proceedings. 
Instead of processing the development statement manuscript only between 
the Commission and the member states, the process was opened up to a group 
of members from the European Parliament Development Committee. So the 
DPS review continued with three well-informed parties: the Commission that 
had invested a lot in the preparations, the UK that had chaired the G8 with a 
development focus, and the parliament that had also been proactive in terms 
of producing opinions and reports that were directly related to the MDGs and 
the EU’s role in development. 
What they all had in common was a focus on the MDG process and EU-
Africa relations and, also importantly, on development and trade concerns. In 
addition, the Parliament and the UK both had a strong focus on health issues 
in terms of poverty-related diseases and AIDS/HIV. What is also noteworthy is 
that out of this group the environmental dimension of sustainable development 
was by no means most advanced by the EP, although the UK had climate change 
445 Interview Academia[21]2008. 
446 Interview EP[3]2009.
447 Interview EC[30]2009, Academia [8]2009 and Council [28]2008.
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high on its G8 agenda. Yet, it was not clear on what terms, and in what kind of 
framework these issues would be presented in the collective statement. 
 This was to be decided in a joint process, which started with the UK presidency 
and lasted until the GAERC Council meeting of November 22 and, of course, 
eventually until the moment the tripartite statement was successfully signed on 
20 December 2005. During this process, the representatives from CODEV chaired 
by Finland, the UK presidency presented by Development Counsellor/external 
relations Peter Landymore, and the Commission DG DEV Bernard Petit, Françoise 
Moreau, and Louis Michel, met regularly to discuss and debate the format and 
content of the future development policy statement. In parallel, MEPs from the 
DEVE Committee, most notably Anders Wijkman, Luisa Morgantini, Glenys 
Kinnock, and Max van der Bergh were invited to informally offer their insights 
into the DPS review. In terms of procedure, the presidency and Commission were 
redrafting the proposal jointly, and presenting it for close scrutiny by the member 
states at the CODEV sessions. At the same time, the MEPs were asked to feed in 
their views on what they regarded as the key aspects of the proposal, which were 
in turn checked and discussed under the lead of the Presidency, the Commission, 
and CODEV representatives. In practice, the EP DEVE Committee representative 
Anders Wijkman was meeting with the person in charge of the UK mission, Peter 
Landymore, as well as Bernard Petit on a weekly basis. The DEVE Committee 
was informed on the evolution of the statement every other week so as to secure 
institutional support for the process.448 
So it was the presidency document that went through CODEV almost 
weekly with the amendments made by the Commission, taking account of the 
parliamentarians’ remarks. However, in terms of procedure, it is important to 
point out that there was no clear blueprint for how this process would eventually 
evolve. An element of great uncertainty was that, despite the preliminary support 
for a collective endeavour, the tripartite outcome could not be taken for granted 
unless this second proposal was officially accepted by each institution.449  In the 
words of one participant: 
… it all happened in bits and pieces and it was really learning by doing and 
inventing a procedure.450
The nature of the process also made it possible for strategic maneouvring 
in terms of not always providing feedback on time or completely ignoring 
initiatives to take the process forward. What is more, member states did not 
448 Interviews EP[3]2009, Council[28]2008 and EC[30]2009.
449 Interview EC[30]2009.
450 Interview EC[30]2009.
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hesitate to voice reservations about issues that they felt uncomfortable with 
or request additional changes. As one may expect, sometimes the negotiations 
turned difficult and debates became very heated, especially when the pressure 
and stakes increased towards the end of the process. This was the case 
particularly between the Commission and the presidency when neither party 
was willing to capitulate on a point that they considered crucial for the future 
statement.451 
Although driven by circumstances, the process was also marked by ambition. 
It was oriented towards what each of the parties considered to be the best 
possible yet politically acceptable outcome, both in terms of the format and 
functions of the document. In other words, the process was very much about 
presenting their views on what the EU should and could do, and why. On the 
negative side, the process hinged largely on the group members’ personal 
qualities as well as on the authority vested in their respective institutions. In 
addition, the way in which the leaders of this process were perceived by their 
counterpart institutions and their members was also important.452 Perhaps 
even more concerning, apart from the issue of increasing development aid, 
was the fact that there was very little time to discuss the actual pre-conditions 
of development, let alone the EU’s role in providing them. 
 In this inter-institutional configuration, the Commission position was 
to defend and promote the work already done and agreed across the EC. 
Compared to the presidency and the EP, in this respect the Commission staff 
had an additional burden to bear. First, the idea of “harnessing globalisation” 
was largely rejected by the other parties because of its insufficient poverty focus. 
This, combined with the EC’s past reputation, inaccurate development-aid 
data management, as well as the personal characteristics of the development 
Commissioner himself, slowed the process down in the beginning.453 DG DEV 
also had the most to lose because it was primarily in its interests to have the 
development policy renewed in the spirit of a more harmonised common policy. 
Furthermore, DG Development needed acceptance of its role from the larger 
development community for the sake of the legitimacy of its own functions 
inside the Commission Services. Intriguingly, it could not, however, turn 
directly to the official ACP institutions because of the global focus that it was 
now advocating. 454
451 Interview Council[28]2008. See also Louis Michel’s speech at the Palace of Westminster on 28 
November, 2005. 
452 Interviews EP[3]2008, Council [28]2008 and Academia [8].
453 Interviews Academia[8]2009, EC[23]2009 and EC[30]2009.
454 Interviews CSO[11]2009 and CSO[31]2008.
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Agreement on the Agenda-Setting
To start first with the elements on which all three – the EC, the EP and the UK 
Council presidency – could agree, the Millennium Development Goals stood 
out as an uncontroversial element for a common foundation. In addition, the 
previous joint EU contributions to the other UN processes of the 1990s and 
early 2000s constituted the very basis for the European Consensus.455 This 
was also important for extending the poverty focus beyond the MDGs.456 In 
addition, there appeared to be a growing understanding of the importance of 
reaching a joint EC position, although the end results had not always been very 
successful in these multilateral arenas.457 As a matter of fact, the member states 
had expressed substantial national reservations about the final declarations and 
conclusions of these conferences.458 On the positive side, the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness of May 2005 provided a fresh and positive example of 
successful coordination. Hence, it seemed that “A European Consensus” was 
already in place, at least regarding development aid and cooperation. It only 
needed to be brought together under a single framework. 
In addition to the substance, the scope and packaging of the Consensus 
also needed to be agreed on. In other words, the parties needed to make a 
choice between a joint European framework encompassing both the EC and 
the member states, or just the renewal of the existing European Community 
development policy (2000). Second, the parties needed to agree on the very 
rationale for this EU development policy – in other words, to what extent the 
new paradigm would have centred on “harnessing globalisation” or on poverty. 
Consequently, this required a joint understanding of how aid should then be 
allocated so as to best serve the chosen purpose. Perhaps most importantly for 
our focus, the issue of trade was high on the agenda but with different degrees 
of optimism between the parties in the ongoing Doha Round. This naturally 
had implications for the notion of policy coherence that was to be included. 
And finally, the member states were particularly keen to debate the role of the 
Commission in development policy.459 
455 These included the International Conference on Financing for Development (Monterrey 2002), 
the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg 2002), the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Least Development Countries (Brussels 2001), the Fourth World Trade 
Organization Ministerial Conference (Doha 2001), the International Conference on Population 
and Development (ICPD, Cairo 1994), the UN General Assembly’s 1999 special session to review 
progress towards meeting the IPCD goals (Cairo + 5), and the World Education Forum (Dakar 2000). 
456 Interview EC[23]2009.
457 See for instance, Lightfoot & Burchell 2005. 
458 EP Report A6-0075/2005 Committee on Development, Rapporteur: Glenys Kinnock.
459 Interviews Academia[21]2008, Council[28]2009 and EC[30]2009.
DEvElOPMENT POlICY PROCESS AND POlICY COHERENCE   |  153
Even though one might expect that it would not be much of an effort to 
jointly state something that had already been agreed elsewhere, this was not the 
case. In actual fact, one of the main points that the Commission succeeded in 
getting through was that the Common Part which constitutes the first part of the 
Consensus could be agreed on and maintained, albeit with different content. In 
fact, the resulting text was largely fine-tuned according to the UK preferences. 
Consequently, the joint part was no longer called a Common Framework or 
anything remotely hinting at a common policy, nor was it called “European 
Union development policy” as was first suggested in the Commission proposal. 
Instead, it was entitled the “European vision of development”. The request for 
the name change came from the member states, most notably from the UK. 
These two excerpts aptly illustrate the matter:
Well, in the Commission proposal we had this idea of having a Common 
Framework and the idea was that we would agree at the EU level on the main areas 
for our cooperation, but the member states could not accept that because for them 
it was too much like telling them what to do and where they should be doing it.460 
I guess it was the wording [European Union development policy] that disturbed 
them and gave the impression that they would be tied by it. (...) So the “vision” 
was better for them because it was more about the objectives of the policy and 
not on how to do it. And that was the compromise.461 
This decision clearly put paid to the prospects of having a policy statement 
that could have contained both a shared understanding of the development 
objectives as well as a shared agreement on operationalising them and dividing 
the task between the parties. This was something that the Commission would 
have seen as its ideal option at the beginning of the process. However, the 
concession that the member states wanted the EC to make was that Part 
Two of the Consensus would focus entirely and extensively on the role of the 
Commission. In addition, the member states proposed including a clause 
according to which they would monitor how the Commission managed to 
implement the European Consensus statement. Interestingly, they were not 
equally eager to have a similar clause imposed upon themselves. Of course 
this was not something that the Commission could have agreed on as DG DEV 
regarded it as necessary to assess the implementation of both parts of the 
statement.462  However, in the final text it essentially says that the Commission 
460 Interview EC[30]2009.
461 Interview EP[3]2009.
462 Interviews Council[28]2008 and EC[30]2009.
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should develop a set of measurable objectives and targets for implementing 
this Policy, and assess progress against this on a regular basis in the Annual 
Report for implementation of the European Community Development 
Policy, while seeing to it that all its services and delegations managing and 
implementing this Community Development policy use the document as their 
key reference.463 The first part that concerns all the actors did not result in 
similar obligations.464 
As for the European Parliament, aiming at and eventually accepting a 
common European policy statement was not similarly problematic. The 
document to which the EP gave its assent was still referred to as the “EU 
Development Strategy” just a few weeks prior to  actually being signed by the 
institutional parties.465 But for the British presidency this really was a bone of 
contention. Indeed, it became one of those factors that hindered the process 
right up to the final weeks.466 As part of the resulting compromise, the role of 
the Commission was defined in stricter terms than what the EC had hoped for. 
There was broad support for the EC to underline its areas of excellence; building 
on its strengths and experiences and to identify where at the Community level 
we need to further develop expertise. However, there was recognition that this 
should not restrict the Commission from working in other areas. What is needed 
is a balance between the need to concentrate efforts in a country, whilst retaining 
the flexibility to respond to a range of partner countries’ priorities.467
Apart from this battle between different document formats, the very function of 
the document was also debated by the three parties. Here the Commission was 
keen on promoting its own innovative approach to development policy under 
the banner of harnessing globalisation. However, despite the strong push by DG 
DEV, the idea did not get very far as the Brits made it clear that they actually 
regarded harnessing the Commission as being much more in line with their 
interests than harnessing globalisation. In fact, the UK saw globalisation largely 
in the light of opportunities, especially in terms of globalisation of economies 
and international trade.468 In this sense, the coinciding processes of the 
development statement renewal with the WTO Doha Round and its Hong Kong 
ministerial meeting provided a unique opportunity to seek a combined outcome. 
463 European Consensus Statement 2005, paragraphs 125-126.
464 However, progress was made in 2007 when the EC and the member states agreed on a Code of 
Conduct and Division of Labour.
465 European Parliament Resolution P6_TA-PROV(2005)0528.
466 Interviews Academia[8]2009 and EC[30]2009.
467 Hilary Benn, Letter on the Informal Meeting of EU Development Ministers 2005.
468 Interview Academia[7]2009. 
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In a nutshell, this meant an outcome based on further trade liberalisation at 
the multilateral level in order to dismantle at least some of the protectionist 
obstacles to trade, thereby unleashing trade potential for the benefit of poverty 
reduction. Interestingly, the DG DEV position was much less optimistic towards 
the prospects of trade liberalisation and its development potential. 
…If you look back, still at that time [2005] we had this mantra that globalisation 
is good for everyone and we just have to accept it fully. It was globalisation equals 
trade liberalisation and voices that were not singing from this hymn sheet were 
not accepted, particularly from some of the member states. So we paid attention 
to the language of globalisation, making sure that it works and that its impacts 
would be assessed, and there were a lot of discussions around it.469 
This tension merits scrutiny for three important reasons. First, the Commission 
approach clearly went against the official view of the dominant view in the 
Commission on trade liberalisation, thereby signalling that there was an internal 
battle over this issue, which did not exist officially. However, in the Commission 
proposal it was already narrowed down a little in terms of strategic trade 
liberalisation (see the previous Sub-chapter). Rather unrealistically, the EC 
had tasked development policy with cushioning the effects of the globalisation 
process for the poor, without changing the parameters of globalisation per 
se. Second, the differing positions demonstrated what was already reflected 
in the public consultation, namely the ambiguity around the role of trade in 
development. In other words that “trade is important to development but 
there is no agreement on how it should be used”. 470 Third, the UK interest in 
this was to promote trade liberalisation with a view to making progress during 
the Doha Round, while at the same time focusing on poverty in development 
cooperation in terms of increasing aid and directing it to the LDCs, especially 
in Africa. In addition, what the UK was willing to do was reinstate the rules of 
origin on the PCD agenda as a key issue for the pro-poor trade liberalisation 
agenda. What is important to note is that for the UK, the emphasis of the 
liberalisation agenda was clearly more on the market access side in the EU 
and not on pressing reciprocal liberalisation onto developing countries.471 This 
position was concretised in a call for lower export subsidies and import barriers 
on the agricultural products of developing countries as a part of the presidency 
agenda for the Doha Development Round.472 
469 Interview EC[30]2009.
470 DG DEV Report on Public Consultation June 2005. 
471 See Sub-chapter 6.4., Khor 2005.
472 Michael White, the Guardian 21. 12. 2005. 
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This view was also in line with the EP DEVE committee’s vision. The EP 
DEVE committee (with support from the EP International Trade Committee) 
was calling for improved market access for developing country exports. In 
addition, the DEVE committee suggested that the development and trade 
interrelationship should be extended to cover both social and environmental 
aspects of trade liberalisation. Furthermore, what they also wanted to see was 
a concrete timetable to eliminate agricultural export subsidies, and further 
elaboration on food security and rural development as being “among the most 
effective elements in poverty eradication”.473 To this end, the EP suggested the 
introduction of a so-called “Development” in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
to enable poorer countries to better address the question of food security. Here, 
the issue of price stability for commodities and a review of international supply 
management mechanisms were also brought into the debate.474  
Of equal importance was the establishment of common ground between 
the committees on the question of Special and Differential Treatment to 
meet developing countries’ concerns on the impact of trade liberalisation and 
reciprocity. In this respect, it was also important for the DEVE committee to 
bring the larger issue of WTO reform onto the European agenda. The argument 
was based on the importance of sustainability and poverty eradication for the 
WTO “Development” Round. Importantly for our topic, the EP position on policy 
coherence was also stronger because it pointed to the lack of clear targets for 
the MDG 8 on global partnership, including international trade and financing. 
Furthermore, it changed the terms of the debate from positive coherence and 
pointed instead to incoherencies between its trade, development cooperation 
and common agricultural policies as a part of the EU MDG agenda.475 
In this broader trade governance framework, the EP also included a provision 
on the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and the MDGs. The main 
points included, first and foremost, that no ACP country should find itself in a 
more unfavourable situation after such an agreement, and that there should be 
no a priori guarantee or commitment that ACP countries sign up to any EPA 
arrangement.476 At the level of specific requirements, the EP then called on the 
EC to ensure the availability of instruments for ACP development and poverty 
eradication, including the continuation of non-reciprocity in market access, a 
focus on supply-side constraints and safeguards for sensitive products, as well 
as the strengthening of existing regional integration efforts. I will return to this 
issue in Sub-chapter 6.4 on the EPAs. 
473 EP Report A6-0075/2005 Committee on Development, Rapporteur: Glenys Kinnock 7, 11.
474 EP Report A6-0075/2005 Committee on Development, Rapporteur: Glenys Kinnock: 11-12.
475 EP Report A6-0075/2005 Committee on Development, Rapporteur: Glenys Kinnock: 6.
476 EP Report A6-0075/2005 Committee on Development, Rapporteur: Glenys Kinnock: 12-13. 
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To summarise, what all three parties had in common was the need to 
dismantle protectionism in Europe and thereby improve market access for 
poorer countries. However, there were also variations in this respect regarding 
the issues that each party saw as crucial. Both the UK and the EP shared the 
same concern over the possible negative side of trade liberalisation related to 
reciprocity. In this regard, the EP’s elaboration on the EU’s role in development 
and trade in achievement of the MDGs provides the most thorough account of 
the aspects that a joint development and trade agenda should include. 
To shift the focus to the aid element, the progress made in Monterrey and 
Paris regarding development financing and its effectiveness was crucial. In 
particular, the prior commitments made in terms of assuring sufficient resources 
certainly saved a lot of time. What still needed to be decided was the resource 
allocation so that they would best serve the overall objectives, most concretely 
those of the MDGs. This aspect proved to be problematic, however. On the one 
hand, the Commission did not have a shared understanding, as the views of 
DG DEV and RELEX varied. On the other hand, the member states were not 
in unison either on where the newly agreed aid resources should be placed.477 
DG DEV advocated an LDC-country and low-income country priority at first, 
whereas for RELEX the middle income countries in Latin America and Asia 
were of equal importance from a general foreign policy perspective. Similarly, 
the Nordic+ Group of member states were more inclined to direct aid to the 
group of the poorest countries globally. Thus at this point, there was no longer 
a division between the ACP group and the others. In turn, the Southern donors 
and new member states were more in line with the RELEX view.478 
A compromise was reached with a joint focus on Africa that would then 
guarantee this geographical LDC priority but also enable aid allocation to 
the middle income countries. The choice was justified by the fact that the 
majority of the LDCs are actually Sub-African states. In this respect, the role of 
Commissioner Michel was important. He saw this as his personal opportunity, 
as DG RELEX had indicated that DG DEV could also play a bigger role in terms 
of foreign and security policy matters in Africa.479 
With regard to the main issue of the statement, the development objectives, 
the EP’s contribution was important because it expanded the scope of 
development goals to take the environment and the livelihoods of the poor into 
account more concretely. In the EP’s view, these aspects received alarmingly 
little attention from the EC.480 In line with the DAC (2004 Povnet) notion 
477 Interviews Academia[8]2009, Council[28]2008, EC[30]2009 and EC [34]2009.
478 Interviews EC[30]2009 and EC[34]2009.
479 Interview EC [34]2009.
480 Interview EP[3]2009.
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of poverty, the Group of Nordic countries wanted to expand the concept to 
achieve as comprehensive an approach to poverty as possible. This resulted in 
the final formulation as “multidimensional aspects of poverty”.481 The EU MDG 
goals were also streamlined towards sustainable development. In addition, 
the parties agreed to include human rights and good governance in the three-
dimensional (economic, social and environment) concept of sustainable 
development.
The Commission and the Liberal Member States 
Despite the debates on policy coherence for development both within the 
EC and in the member states, its role in the future Consensus was far from 
clear. In the first versions produced by the UK presidency it was coupled with 
“Aid Effectiveness and Policy Coherence for Development” and later on with 
“Development Cooperation and Policy Coherence for Development”. 482 In 
this respect, the Nordic countries again played an active role in ensuring that 
PCD would not remain associated with development policy, but that it would 
constitute a standalone concept in its own right. The Nordics maintained that 
it was necessary to discuss PCD both in the context of the development goals 
as well as in relation to the other 12 policy domains indicated in the May 2005 
Council Conclusions. However, again there was insufficient time to re-open 
the debate. 
I think that the PCD issues were mentioned and discussed, both coherence and 
consistency, but we had very little time and there was pressure to finish this by 
the end of the year.483 
The rush resulted in a text that largely followed the lines of the Commission 
proposal, but which then remained disconnected from the main goal of poverty 
eradication and “multifaceted poverty”. With hindsight, this was a missed 
opportunity given that the text was supposed to constitute a European and 
inter-institutional Consensus on development and not just a sectoral policy 
statement.  
For Britain, policy coherence for development was also important, but it 
approached the matter in a very pragmatic way. A lot of optimism was invested 
in the Doha Development Round and in particular in the fourth Hong Kong 
ministerial meeting. The timing was also crucial, as the issue was discussed 
481 Interviews EP[3]2009 and Council[28]2008. 
482 Interview Council[28]2008.
483 Interview EC[30]2009. The time limits and pressure were mentioned in other interviews as well.
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towards the end of the European Consensus process, which coincided with 
the preparations for the WTO ministerial conference.484 These two tracks 
were discussed in parallel in an informal gathering of all EU Development 
Cooperation Ministers in Leeds on 24-25 October 2005.485  More precisely, the 
key issues on the agenda included the European development policy, MDGs, 
Africa and trade. 
Interestingly, the meeting was also attended by the Trade and Development 
Commissioners and parliamentarians, together with other prominent external 
speakers from the UN.486 On this occasion, it was confirmed that the final objective 
of the emerging development policy statement would be poverty eradication 
in compliance with sustainable development and the implementation of the 
specific Millennium Development Goals. In addition, the EU ministers also 
agreed that the EU would strive towards reducing trade obstacles and towards 
positive and development-oriented negotiations in the WTO.487 
At the core of this task was the pledge made by Trade Commissioner 
Mandelson to have all OECD countries to join the EU’s EBA initiative for 
duty-free, quota-free access for LDCs, and to dedicate more resources at EU 
and national levels to help poorer countries build their capacity to trade. The 
Secretary of International Development, Hilary Benn, reported on the outcome 
in the capacity of the EU presidency and chair, reaffirming the consensus on 
the need to “put trade at the service of development”. Specifically, this was 
deemed to imply increased market access for products in which developing 
countries have a comparative advantage (especially agricultural products); 
the need for all agreements to reflect the different levels of development of 
developing countries, and South-South trade. In addition, ministers joined 
France in calling for an urgent WTO response to the plight of West African 
cotton producers. Whilst Benn stated that “negotiating specifics are clearly 
a matter of trade colleagues, development ministers agree that they have an 
important role to play in ensuring priority concerns of developing countries are 
addressed both before and after the WTO Ministerial in Hong Kong”. The EPAs 
were also to be viewed in this context of fairer rules and more focused Aid for 
Trade. Indeed, a special Aid for Trade package was marketed to be published 
prior to the Hong Kong Ministerial.488 
484 Interviews EC[1]2008, Academia[7]2009 and CSO[20]2009.
485 Khor 2005 TWN Info Service on WTO and Trade Issues (Nov 05/4). 
486 Letter from Hilary Benn 2005. 
487 Press release 25.10.2005 
488 Hilary Benn, Letter on the Informal Meeting of EU Development Ministers 2005.
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A European Consensus – After All 
Coming back to the Commission-Presidency interaction, both parties saw 
the end result as positive regardless of the twists and challenges during the 
process. Most importantly, a consensus was reached on key issues. As Hilary 
Benn reported to her government on the European Consensus: 
…there was consensus that poverty eradication remains the primary objective, 
while globalization provides the context within which development is pursued. 
There was broad agreement that whilst our development objectives for working 
with both Low Income Countries and Middle Income Countries are the same, 
the way in which we implement and approach development assistance will be 
different, according to partner countries’ situations and needs.489
Much of the pressure was now off the Commission by virtue of the fact that 
the UK finally chose to agree to have a common thematic framework after 
the informal development ministries meeting in October 2005. The reason 
for this agreement was the growing support among the member states, which 
saw the common platform as beneficial for “more effective and coherent 
development work, in line with the Paris declaration”.490 As Benn explained 
to her compatriots: 
…Doubts were expressed on the need for and feasibility of a single thematic 
framework for all EU development activities. However, it was important to 
indicate in a comprehensive way common objectives and principles, and shared 
understanding of the breadth of activities needed to eradicate poverty…. 491
Respectively, in his speech on the newly adopted European Consensus to 
the House of Commons and invited European MPs and MEPs, Development 
Commissioner Louis Michel admitted that the single European approach had 
raised concerns and questions related to division of competence. By way of 
reassuring the audience gathered in the House of Commons, Michel stated:
Let me address now an often voiced concern. Subsidiarity. The Commission has 
no ambitions to encroach on the competences of Member States. Each Member 
State will of course continue to define its own development policies and priorities. 
The European Consensus is inspired by the spirit of complementarity. 
489 Ibid.
490 Ibid.
491 Ibid.
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We have agreed a common framework for bilateral and Community policies. 
With this common vision, we can be more effective in bringing about change. In 
plain English, the whole is more than the sum of the parts.492  
Although by the end of October it appeared to be clear that the Council would 
approve the text for the European Consensus, it was still uncertain whether 
the European Parliament would actually join the celebrations and co-sign 
the document. So together with the promotion to the House of Commons, 
Commissioner Michel used this occasion to persuade parliamentarians to 
support this “historic step”.  Without any irony, the fact of not having had a 
common vision for the past 50 years and now finally having one was brought 
to the fore. And certainly in this sense, it was an improvement. 
… And I cannot stress enough what a breakthrough this is for EU development 
policy. For the first time in 50 years, the Council and the 25 Member States have 
agreed on a common vision for actions, not just multilaterally, but also bilaterally. 
At last, we have a common set of values, principles, objectives and means to truly 
combat poverty. 
Now we have agreed to enhance the effectiveness of aid. And to ensure greater 
coherence between development and other EU policies.493   
Perhaps even more importantly, Commissioner Michel also highlighted that 
in its nature as a jointly adopted document, the European Consensus made 
the eradication of poverty the central aim for the Union as a whole. This unity 
reached completion with the long-waited assent from the European Parliament. 
From the Commission’s perspective, this “detail” was left in the air until the very 
last moment. By the end of November 2005, there was only the Council approval, 
while the EP kept the other two parties waiting. By that time, the Commission 
knew that the EP was working on the Consensus resolution. However, the news 
about the EP’s assent came as a surprise to the Commission. Curiously, it was 
the president who was the first to get to know about this historic decision.494 
In its resolution, the European Parliament welcomed the statement as 
a common and updated frame of reference for all Commission services and 
delegations on the Community’s objectives and principles for implementation 
of all development cooperation. Also highlighted was the fact that the EU and 
the member states had agreed to promote a common EU vision of development 
492 Louis Michel, the House of Commons, 28 November 2005. 
493 Louis Michel, the House of Commons, 28 November 2005.
494 Interview EC[30]2009. 
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with a renewed poverty focus, together with the MDGs, resources and policy 
coherence for development. Especially welcome was the intention to tighten the 
control of EU arms exports. What the EP was not that satisfied with was the 
insufficient attention to children’s rights, and human development in terms of 
health and education. But in all, the resolution concluded that the document 
largely corresponds with the Parliament’s priorities in the field of development 
policy. In addition, the EP expressed its intention to actively promote the 
“European Consensus on Development”, particularly by working towards 
greater policy coherence for development in Community policies, and by 
seeking dialogue with citizens and the civil society. Crucially, the EP instructed 
the Commission and the member states to operationalise the policy, in other 
words to “develop a set of measurable objectives and targets for implementing 
the agreed policy and for assessing its progress at regular intervals”.495 Lastly, 
the EP was also very satisfied with the process through which the Consensus 
was eventually reached, calling on the Council and the Commission to “regard 
this process as a model for future negotiations on crucial policy matters”. 
However, there was still one more hurdle to overcome. Namely, there was 
no official procedure to bring these three parties together to undersign the 
statement. The Council secretariat did not want to create a precedent of inviting 
the Parliament to the Council.  However, functionality superseded formality 
as the formulation was found to satisfy the parties involved.496 This special 
arrangement was also reflected in the rather formidable title: Joint statement by 
the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States 
meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on 
European Union Development Policy: “The European Consensus”.  
The words of the chair of the British International Development committee 
aptly encapsulate the prospects for collaboration stemming from the newly born 
statement. After the examination of witnesses hearing, he noted to Commission 
representatives Bernard Petit (DG DEV) and Giorgio Cocchi (DG DEV) that:
The one thing that seems to be coming out of this is we are moving into a new 
era where we are trying to get more partnership between Member States and the 
Commission and we wish you well. In reality, what you have to do is add value to 
the Member States and the Member States have to add value to the Commission 
and I guess that that is a matter of trust and time.497 
495 European Parliament Resolution on a Joint Statement. EU Development Strategy P6_TA-PROV 
(2005)0528.
496 Interview EC[30]2009.
497 Examination of Witnesses 6 December 2005. International Development Committee, the UK. 
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CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS
My main aim in this chapter was to trace the process that led to the joint 
adoption of the first European development policy statement. The negotiations 
in their different framings, conceptualisations, elements, presentations and 
priorities can also be read as the product of a joint European discourse. While 
my focus was on the inter-institutional cooperation and competition, it was 
equally important to examine how the trade aspects of policy coherence for 
development were shaped and presented in this context. I structured my 
analysis around three phases: policy initiation (including preparatory work), 
and policy formulation up to policy adoption. 
To draw conclusions on the policy process, I will start with a few observations 
on the policy initiation. Under the leadership of Commissioner Michel, DG DEV 
embarked on a process that was strategically prepared, timed and established. 
The DPS2000 assessment provided common ground both for the EC as well as 
the Council. What was interesting was the way in which the policy consultation 
that took place before the official policy proposal by the Commission was kept 
in hands of DG DEV as the chef de file and shared with the entire institution. 
In this sense, DG DEV could have the first say on the framing and defining of 
the new policy directly with the parties that were engaged in the consultations. 
Even at this stage, the approach to development policy was as a single policy 
both for the EC and the member states with a global, not ACP-specific scope. 
However, the main idea was that of poverty eradication and the MDGs, while 
highlighting the importance of the EC in this respect. 
Regarding policy coherence for development, the Issues Paper suggested 
a normative model that rested on two pillars: first, trade liberalisation in 
the North in terms of dismantling protectionism at the EU end and, second, 
addressing clear incoherencies between the fisheries and agriculture in more 
general terms. Specifically, DG DEV brought up a concrete list of issues that had 
constituted a bone of contention within the Commission services. In addition, 
the Issues Paper suggested reforms in the partner countries themselves. 
However, the resulting Commission proposal, negotiated through inter-
service consultations, took a more cautious and protectionist approach. 
Furthermore, the proposal was packaged with an impact assessment which, 
rather than assessing impact ex post vis-à-vis development policy goals, focused 
on the assumed political impact of a new development policy ex ante. 
Regarding the official policy initiation by the Commission, there were 
interesting changes in the policy focus and rationale. Compared to the Issues 
Paper, development and policy coherence was framed differently in the 
actual Commission proposal. The poverty perspective had been converted 
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to the idea of “Harnessing Globalisation for Development” from then trade 
Commissioner Lamy, and it was the dominant discourse in DG Trade on the 
eve of the 2005 Hong Kong ministerial of the Doha Development Round. This 
type of framing again presented an altered perspective on the development and 
trade interrelationship. Most importantly, it defined a joint task for all external 
branches to harness globalisation as something external to the political sphere, 
and shifted the focus from the EU trade and development interface. In this 
exercise, the EU was defined as a positive force that can help in this endeavour 
based on its own values and policy objectives. 
Globalisation per se became something that should be addressed through 
multilateral governance by the respective EU policies. This approach manifested 
aspirations to exercise normative influence. While focusing on poverty, the UK 
and the EP did not share the EC’s enthusiasm to harness globalisation in these 
terms, and rejected it as the foundation for the EU development discourse. This 
kind of internal confusion on the very purpose of development policy risked 
weakening the EU’s normative stance.
In the policy formulation, however, the Commission or the member states’ 
stance towards the existing order was a very conservative one, and did not 
include reforms beyond the duty-free, quota-free market access norm for the 
least developed countries. In this respect, the European Parliament had the 
most encompassing view. The understanding of policy coherence was structured 
around EU market access and trade liberalisation measures at the EU end 
that could support developing countries’ trade with the Union. However, the 
concrete list of issues for policy coherence was remarkably narrowed down 
compared with that of DG DEV and the EP’s broader proposals towards 
the overall Commission agenda. At the same time, the role of development 
policy was largely reduced to development assistance for trade and regional 
integration. Therefore, the normative standard also remained rather narrow 
within the trade liberalisation paradigm. But thanks to the EBA initiative, the 
Union could already portray itself as the leader of the market access agenda for 
the LDCs. However, the EBA had a bigger task than this, namely to show “that 
the EU was serious about getting the most disadvantaged to share in the fruits 
of trade liberalisation”.498 This approach provided common ground for DG DEV 
and DG Trade at the Commissioner’s level. It was also something that the UK, 
as the Council president, could agree on. 
As regards the Commission-Council interaction in the development policy 
process, it would be tempting to ask which of the following two questions was 
more important: how and by whom development policy is made, or what kind 
of development policy is made in order to respond to the global challenges? 
498 Pascal Lamy describing the EBA, as cited in Faber and Orbie 2007: 1, Orbie 2007: 20.
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Quite paradoxically, the EU development actors found it easier to advance their 
respective agendas internationally than to agree on a common course at a joint 
Union level and to take these commitments forward. Both the Commission 
and the Council president, the UK, were ambitious in their own right. For its 
part, the Commission was raising the development policy profile within the 
Commission services and promoting the Europeanisation of development 
policy vis-à-vis the Council. At the same time, the UK was active in the G8 
context as an individual member state, placing poverty eradication in general at 
the core of the G8 agenda in the WTO Hong Kong ministerial.  In addition, the 
UK put pressure on the Commission to sharpen its development policy stance. 
However, the UK was clearly seeking to boost its own singular role, rather than 
promote the Union as a whole. 
The time spent on inter-institutional competence, procedural questions 
and internal coordination was time taken away from the policy substance. This 
was particularly the case with policy coherence for development, which was 
adopted from previous Council documents. Regarding the trade aspects, the EC, 
Council and, in particular, UK support for the WTO Doha Round did not create 
sufficient pressure for a more compelling development perspective. 
To what extent then could the EC play the role of an institutional entrepreneur 
and a leader of the Union front? Clearly, the adoption of the tripartite European 
Consensus marked a success in this respect. However, the EC failed to promote 
its original idea of a single EU development policy framework as the document 
resulted in two parts: The “joint vision” and the EC development policy. In 
sum, the EC skilfully applied the internal processes of security and trade to 
generate momentum for the new policy. Similarly, it linked the future policy 
to the global processes and changes in the external environment. It bypassed 
the other services first, and then allied with DG trade. It also brought the 
parliamentarians actively on board and broadened the Council-EC aquis. This 
improved not only the quality of the cooperation but also the quality of the 
resulting Consensus statement. Yet, the EC could not retain control of the 
agenda after the UK took up the presidency. On the other hand, the UK did not 
get its own way either. Its preferred option – a new EC policy in the context of 
the Council conclusions – was rejected as less adequate than a joint European 
statement. Thus, a step towards Europeanisation was taken. 
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5 CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALySIS Of THE 
EUROPEAN CONSENSUS STATEMENT
In Chapter 5, I will unpack and analyse the content of the resulting joint 
statement entitled “The European Consensus”, which formed a new foundation 
for the EU’s development action from 2005 onwards.499 In this section, I apply 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in line with the overall theoretical framework. 
Again my focus is twofold in that I examine the issues that define the kind of 
normative model for development policy that the EU launched vis-à-vis its peers 
and partners, and analyse the trade-related coherence for development in this 
equation. Consequently, I will focus my analysis on both the general frame that 
was to constitute the European vision both for the EC and the member states, as 
well as on the parts of the statement that define policy coherence for development.
5.1 UNPACKINg THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS wITH CDA
The purpose of this sub-chapter is to bridge the policy process and the actual 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of the final European Consensus document. 
In more methodological terms, I will proceed with a three-dimensional analysis 
that includes text, discourse production (i.e. discourse practice) and social 
practices (i.e. the application of discourse to naturalise the ways in which reality 
is perceived, cf. Fairclough 1992). Drawing on the previous chapter, my focus 
now shifts from the discourse production to the final text and argumentation 
that constitute the core elements and ideas of the EU’s development discourse. 
From there, I move on to discuss the European Consensus as a frame for social 
practices that have normative implications (i.e. normative influence here).500 
These elements are reflected against the Barnett and Duvall (2005) model, 
according to which discourse is one of the main manifestations of power shaping 
social relations and our conception of social reality.501 In line with CDA, key 
excerpts from the European Consensus text are included to facilitate reading, 
following the sequence of the original text.502 
499 The time frame for the future policy was planned for a five-year period. However, as of the 
beginning of 2013  it still constituted the main reference for developmental action in the Union. 
The full text was published in the Official Journal 2006/C 46/01.  
500 Fairclough 1992: 73.
501 See Chapter 2.2.
502 The full text is available at http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/european_
consensus_2005_en.pdf
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As a method of text analysis, CDA focuses on the details in interrelationship 
with external linkages in order to constitute a bigger picture, in this case of the 
EU’s normative agency for international development. In this respect, the concept 
of inter-textuality is useful.503 Fairclough defines inter-textuality as a property that 
texts have as responses to other texts and voices. It refers to the nature of a text as 
being full of snatches of other texts.  They may be explicitly demarcated or merged 
in, echoed or contradicted and so forth.504 Whereas “discourse analysis” would 
only describe the text and its structures, CDA systematically tries to connect text 
with discourse and social practices, and their institutional and political contexts.505 
It is important to note that due to the evolution of the EU’s development 
policy, the discourse is not limited to any specific geographical area, but aims 
instead to provide a joint, overall basis for developmental partnerships across 
the world. In a sense, what we are about to analyse are global policy guidelines by 
a global actor who seeks to streamline and coordinate its policies. Constituting 
this kind of framework has required an intensive process of policy formulation 
inside the Union, involving different institutional actors at the Brussels and 
member-state levels in this area of joint competency. As in the past, EU 
development policy reflects the changes in the international environment by 
reacting, but also by anticipating emerging challenges such as globalisation.506 
As discussed above, many of the core areas of the Consensus can be inferred 
from the positions adopted by the Union and the key member states during the 
major international conferences of the early 2000s. Some of them have been 
opened again for debate and consolidated inside the Consensus. Others have 
been accepted, as they were adopted elsewhere in international conferences and 
then merely pasted into the European Consensus document, as I will show in a 
more detailed manner in the ensuing section.
The magnitude of the development policy formulation exercise also raised 
high expectations for the European Consensus policy. These expectations were 
largely defined at the outset of the process. They included both internal and 
external functions that would support the EU’s role and goal attainment as 
discussed above. Of course, the presentation also served the implicit political 
aim of consolidating the joint position and transferring the image of the united 
approach to other EU policy sectors, development policy partners, and other 
donor agencies as well as to the wider public.507  
503 The concept of inter-textuality is often associated with Julia Kristeva’s work. 
504 Fairclough 2003: 47.
505 Maingueneau 2006: 230. 
506 DPS Study Report ECDPM/ICEI/ODI 2005: 7.  
507 Interviews Academia[8]2009, CSO[11]2009, CSO[19]2009, Academia[21]2009, EC[23]2009, 
Council[28]2009 and EC[30]2009.
168  |  CRITICAl DISCOURSE ANAlYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS STATEMENT
To analyse a public document of this kind, the notion of “preferred reading” 
is useful. By preferred reading, I refer to the explicit message of the statement 
that the EU seeks to convey.508 At this public level, the European Consensus 
celebrates EU development policy in the light of the past, present and future 
commitments that the Union has adopted or is aiming to adopt in order to 
reach its own objectives. As such, it is also a statement of past records and 
future intentions. In addition, it is an overview of the content of this public 
sector policy inside the European Union but, also importantly, in the broader 
global context. At a more operational level, the statement provides common 
policy guidelines for EU development policy which should be followed both at 
the national, bilateral, as well as at the Community levels. In addition to the 
broad vision, the guidelines point to a new path for the planning of development 
co-operation activities. In so doing, the Consensus statement directs both the 
national and Community development-related processes of the world’s largest 
donor in terms of EC and member-state official development assistance. At 
the same time, the guidelines also serve as a basis for assessment for the 
recipient countries in the developing world, as well as for the international 
NGO community working on development issues. 
The Consensus statement is constructed to provide a unified EU vision 
of development and globalisation, as well as to define the “partnership” 
between the EU and developing countries in this context. The European 
Consensus Statement consists of an Introduction entitled “The Development 
Challenge” and two main thematic parts. The first part provides a Common 
Vision of Development, including issues such as common objectives, multiple 
aspects of poverty eradication as well as common values and principles. The 
second part sets out the European Community Development Policy to guide 
implementation of the common vision at the Community level, and specifies 
priorities for concrete action by the Community. The public message that the 
parties to the Statement seek to convey to the various audiences can be inferred 
from the summary of the Statement. The message as such is a manifestation of 
the Union’s intention and capacity, which can be harnessed for the purpose of 
poverty eradication and global equity. It reads as follows:
… the European Consensus reflects the European Union willingness to make a 
decisive contribution to the eradication of poverty in the world and to help build 
a more peaceful and equitable world.509 
508 That is, “how the text seems to want to be read and what it publicly wants to represent”. See also 
O’Regan 2006: 183-186.
509 The European Consensus on Development Summary: 1.
CRITICAl DISCOURSE ANAlYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS STATEMENT  |  169
This expression of willingness and motivation takes us towards a more implicit 
level of the Consensus, namely the level of discourse and normative power that 
the EU exercises through it. In this sense, “The European Consensus” offers 
a unique sample of the EU’s development discourse – jointly worded and 
eventually agreed with all key actors – which contains a set of ideas, assumptions 
and interest-driven motives related to the EU’s role and its identity as a 
normative power in international development. This single policy framework 
also provides a single sample of the EU approach to the way in which the field of 
development policy is conceptualised in its entirety, while emphasising certain 
elements and marginalising others. In so doing, it is designed to promote certain 
norms directing development action and construct certain possibilities, but also 
exclude other combinations. Through this discourse, the European Consensus 
reflects and reinforces the power that the EU and its member states use in the 
field of international development. To what degree this use of power is regarded 
as legitimate also depends on how successfully the EU’s argumentation is 
constructed. The European Consensus Statement – being a high-level political 
document – is a typical example of persuasive political rhetoric.510 
In the following, I first address the European Consensus statement through 
a textual and inter-textual analysis. In this respect, attention is focused first on 
the text itself and how it simultaneously represents reality including the need 
for development and development policy, as well as a certain kind of framing 
of problems and defining available solutions that the Union will provide in 
this given context. In addition, it establishes guidelines on how the Union 
should enact social relations and establish identities between the actor and 
the objectives of the developmental action. In this sense, discourse contributes 
to the constitution of the social structure of international development: it 
reflects its own norms and conventions, as well as the relations, identities and 
institutions which lie behind them. In addition, as described above, the EU 
development discourse is also a reaction to social reality related to development 
policy and external relations at large. Based on the publicly stated purpose of 
the Consensus statement, the EU has expressed the intention to contribute 
decisively to poverty eradication and global equity. Next, I proceed to analyse 
what this contribution entails, how the Consensus statement constructs the 
EU’s agency in this context, and the actual response for global governance. 
In the analysis, I focus on the Introduction to the European Consensus 
Statement entitled “The Development Challenge” and the first thematic part 
called “The EU Vision of Development”, which characterises the joint EU 
position in the development debate. In addition, I also analyse Part II of the 
510 See e.g. Palonen & Summa, 1996 and Jokinen et al., 1999. On rhetoric and justification, see 
Karagiannis 2004: 7.
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Consensus Statement concerning the EC to the extent that it is relevant to 
the overall topic of policy coherence for development at the development and 
trade interface. Within this scope, I look particularly at the conceptualisation 
of development policy as a whole, with a particular focus on policy coherence 
for development in the text. My aim is to probe beneath the explicit surface of 
the preferred reading of the Consensus Statement and to connect it to other 
ongoing discourses of development as presented above. 
I conduct the analysis in three stages. First, I look at the text itself in terms of 
vocabulary and text structure, as well as formal properties in the argumentation 
of the text paragraphs. The formal properties include different types of speech 
acts such as promises, requests, threats, persuasions and ideational propositions 
that constitute the discourse. In addition, I look at the attitudes, positions, facts 
and conceptual categories that the text constructs. Second, I connect and assess 
these in relation to external discourses on the key themes of the European 
Consensus Statement. In terms of presenting the analysis, the first two phases 
are described simultaneously. Finally, more theoretical reflections (i.e. social 
practices) are presented in the chapter conclusions.
5.2 THE EUROPEAN UNION AND  
“THE DEVELOPMENT CHALLENgE”
The European Consensus Statement text begins with an Introduction entitled 
“The Development Challenge”. It describes the EU position on development, 
states the main goals of development policy and defines the global context 
within which these goals are pursued. In addition, the Introduction identifies 
the roles, responsibilities and motives of the key pre-constituted development 
policy actors: the European Community, the EU member states and the recipient 
countries themselves. The following text sample is the first paragraph of the 
Introduction, which sets the task and provides justification for the Union’s 
development policy. 
The Development Challenge
1. Never before have poverty eradication and sustainable development been 
more important. The context within which poverty eradication is pursued is an 
increasingly globalised and interdependent world; this situation has created new 
opportunities but also new challenges. 
Combating global poverty is not only a moral obligation; it will also help to 
build a more stable, peaceful, prosperous and equitable world, reflecting the 
interdependency of its richer and poorer countries. In such a world, we would 
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not allow 1,200 children to die of poverty every hour, or stand by while 1 billion 
people are struggling to survive on less than one dollar a day and HIV/AIDS, TB 
and malaria claim the lives of more than 6 million people every year. Development 
policy is at the heart of the EU’s relations with all developing countries.511
The beginning of the European Consensus Statement text connects the EU’s 
development policy discourse directly to the debate on poverty eradication 
and sustainable development, highlighting the significance of the attainment 
of the policy goals in general in a new type of global context. Although not 
explicit, the beginning offers inter-textual linkages to the wider discussion on 
the UN Millennium Development Goals and more generally to sustainable 
development. It draws on the statistics produced for the UNDP and refers to 
the one dollar a day poverty line set by the World Bank. At the same time, the 
text both defines the EU’s approach to the debate and presents the grounds for 
its new contribution.512 
The text divides the context in which EU development policy will be 
implemented into two conceptual categories: global and interdependent, which 
set the conditions for the development policy formulation and objectives. The 
categories are followed by another pair of conceptual categories: new opportunities 
and challenges, which are attributes of “global and interdependent”. As the 
heading of the Introduction states, the EU sees development as a challenge 
and the EU itself is going to confront the challenge by combating global 
poverty. In the light of the first paragraphs of the Introduction, the statement 
text is designed to describe how the EU combats global poverty by means of 
development policy. However, the opportunities of the global world are not 
discussed here. More importantly, sustainable development, which according 
to the text is as important as poverty eradication and more important than ever 
before, is not defined but is taken for granted as something that automatically 
goes together with poverty eradication. Mentioning sustainable development, 
however, conveys the understanding that the “European Consensus Statement” 
is written to serve this goal too.
The latter section of the text sample elaborates the manifestations of poverty 
as the motivating force for development policy in the interdependent world. 
The texts points out two main reasons why it is in the EU’s interests to confront 
the development challenge and to combat global poverty. Firstly, the text sees 
it as a moral obligation, but extends the obligations beyond the moral ground. 
511 The European Consensus: para.: 1. Cf. European Development Strategy 2003. Cf. also The 
European Community’s Development Policy 2000.
512 The goals were already included in the Treaty of Maastricht but were further defined by the 
Commission in the context of the UN multilateral negotiations. See Commission 2002 and 2005a.
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Namely, it points out that combating poverty could help the EU to contribute 
to the construction of a more stable, peaceful, prosperous and equitable world 
that would at the same time benefit the EU. This argument provides the EU 
developmental action with a rational, interest-driven motive. But there is also 
a moral dimension: the Union – represented by the personal pronoun We – 
would not allow 1,200 children to die of poverty every hour, or stand by while 
one billion people are suffering from poverty and related diseases.513 Here 
the text presents the EU as a privileged group, capable and willing to act as 
one, with a collective we referring to a dual EU, including the institutions and 
citizens of the EU.514 
Also of interest here is the phrase “in such a world”, which points to an 
ideal state of an equal and interdependent world (still under construction) 
where inaction would not be tolerated. As discussed in Sub-chapter 3.4, the 
joint motive is formulated similarly to the way it was in the European Security 
Strategy two years earlier, but with a stronger moral motivation.
Again, poverty in the interdependent world is described in an emotionally 
appealing way, and is supported with statistics. Numerical data give us 
an impression of the magnitude of the challenge and, as a consequence, 
emphasise the importance of the EU’s development policy. Although 
describing and presenting development as a “challenge” is very common in 
political documents and speeches, it is worth a closer look. If we compare the 
content of this “challenge” with the dramatic facts about poverty  which the 
text builds on, then categorising development as a “challenge” is a strikingly 
neutral position. For instance, one could question this neutral categorisation 
by asking whether the presented fact of 1,200 children dying of poverty every 
hour is really a “challenge” or more of a “state of emergency”. A challenge is 
something that the EU can presumably respond to by the traditional means of 
its development policy, namely development co-operation, external assistance 
and trade partnership, whereas an “emergency” would require radical changes 
in the EU’s approach. Thus, by defining development – required due to the 
magnitude of world poverty – as a challenge, the EU distances itself from the 
possible immediate effects as well as the causes of poverty. 
In fact, an analysis of the root causes of poverty is absent from the document. 
This position is reinforced with the term combating poverty, as if the EU were 
automatically there on the side of good versus evil, with development policy at 
the heart of its relations with all developing countries. 
Despite the proclaimed interdependency, the EU position on development is 
clearly one of an external actor: people who live in the middle of the presented 
513 Riddel 2007: 142 makes a similar observation. 
514 See Krzyzanowski 2005: 137-163.
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“development challenge” would describe it with different attributes. What is also 
important is that the text explicitly underlines the fact that development policy 
is a Union policy towards all developing countries. This approach is further 
clarified with a footnote explaining that by developing countries the EU means 
all those countries in the reviewed list of ODA recipients compiled by the DAC 
in April 2006. Hence this statement officially puts an end to the special position 
of the APC group for the Union, compared with other developing regions. 
However, the ACP group as such has been further dismantled by the special 
attention paid to Africa and to the emerging African Union in the subsequent 
parts of the Consensus document. 
The external position in the European Consensus appears even stronger 
if we contrast it with the key EU countries’ colonial past and with the EEC’s 
associational arrangements.515 The Consensus Statement neither refers to the 
colonial heritage nor discusses Europe’s central role in the construction of 
the interdependent and global world system. Instead, the development policy 
statement text is formulated, in a way, as if the EU, the developing countries and 
“the development challenge” had only recently converged. Karagiannis (2004) 
has addressed this feature of the EU approach. In particular, she points to how 
the European policy has shifted from accepting responsibility for colonialism 
to a more amnesiac politics in which post-colonial countries are responsible for 
their own fate.516 This line of thinking is manifested in the second paragraph 
of the Introduction in terms of responsibility for development, laying the 
foundation for the donor-recipient relationship in the European Consensus. 
The second paragraph of the Consensus statement shifts the focus of the 
document away from the pressing need for poverty eradication back to entirely 
different types of internal challenges for the Union. It starts with a juridical 
definition (cf. Treaty of Maastricht) of shared competencies of development co-
operation between the European Community and the Member States whereby 
“the Community policy shall be complementary to the policies pursued by the 
Member States”. In the light of Chapter 4, this line is there to reassure those 
who were against further Europeanisation. The wording emphasises the role 
of the bilateral policies to which EC policy should be aligned, rather than the 
other way around. In this sense, the Commission failed in this final attempt to 
act as an institutional leader.
Interestingly for the developing policy sector and its objectives, the text 
proceeds from the question of competency to the question of responsibility. It 
states that “developing countries have the prime responsibility for their own 
515 On the EU’s development policy and co-operation background, see Holland 2002, Grilli 1993 and 
Rodney 1982.
516 See Karagiannis 2004. 
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development”.517 This position has twofold implications. On the one hand, it 
could be read as an expression of sovereignty whereby the partner countries 
take the decisions and responsibility regarding their development strategies. 
On the other hand, if we take development policy as a public policy of the 
Union, this position to a certain degree discharges the EU of the prime liability 
regarding the possible failures in policy delivery. At first glance, and compared 
to the dramatic description of the development challenge above, this strong 
definition of responsibilities seems rather startling. On the other hand, this 
attitude is consistent with the EU’s external position on the problems caused 
by poverty. 
Regarding the Union responsibility, paragraph 2 continues by stating that 
the developed countries have their responsibilities too and that the EU is 
committed to meeting these responsibilities both at the levels of the Community 
and the member states.518 One might assume that these responsibilities would 
refer to the previous development commitments. Conversely, the text does 
not name these responsibilities or define what would be the specific Union 
responsibility in development, but instead shifts immediately to describing how 
“Working together, the EU is an important force for positive change.”519 
In the text, this role of a force for positive change is based on the EU’s 
action in the field of development and trade policies, especially as regards the 
LDCs.520 For this reason, I will also follow this argument more closely across the 
document. Regarding foreign aid, the argument goes that the EU provides over 
half of the world’s aid and has committed itself to increasing this assistance. The 
commitment is not only limited to increases in terms of development funding 
per se but also in terms of the quality and effectiveness of development aid. 
Although not yet made explicit, there is a linkage to the previous commitments 
of the Paris Declaration (2005), concluded in March of the same year as the 
European Consensus, which therefore explains the frequent referencing and 
similar language.521 
The Paris Declaration was adopted to improve donor harmonisation, 
alignment, and the management of aid for better results. In addition, the 
Declaration states that these donor-focused processes should be monitored and 
progress assessed on a regular basis. The European Union member states are 
parties to the agreement as bilateral donors and OECD member countries. Out 
of the main international donor organisations, the European Commission, the 
517 The European Consensus, para. 2, lines 1-4. 
518 Ibid. para. 2, lines 4-5.
519 Ibid. para. 2, lines 4-6. 
520 Ibid. para. 2, lines 6-9.
521 Interviews EC[23]2009 and Council[28]2008. 
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IMF and the WB have also made this commitment to adhere to the so-called Paris 
principles. At the same time, the majority of the individual country members 
of the Paris Declaration are recipient states from different geographical areas. 
The five main principles that the declaration sets out are, first, ownership, 
implying that developing countries should set their own strategies for poverty 
reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption. Second, alignment, 
meaning that donor countries should align behind the developing country set 
objectives and use local systems. The third principle refers to harmonisation 
and donor country coordination with a view to simplifying procedures and 
sharing information to avoid duplication. The fourth principle is development 
results and their measurement. The fifth refers to mutual accountability 
whereby donors and partners are accountable for development results.522 
In this respect, the above-described EU stance towards responsibility is 
interesting. In the light of the Paris Declaration wording, the EU could have 
used a more precise formulation of responsibility and established a normative 
stance on what mutual accountability implies for the Union. If the developing 
countries are to bear the main responsibility for their own development, the 
Union would have defined its own task up front in terms of development 
policy. What we have now is the EU’s commitment to more and better aid with 
improved results, which of course is a positive intention in and of itself. 
Related to being a positive development policy force, the EU’s role as the most 
important economic and trade partner for developing countries is also brought 
up in this development policy context as contributing to positive change.523 This 
was grounded in the fact that “the Union offers specific benefits to developing 
countries, mainly to the LDCs among them”. In practice, this refers to the EU 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), including the Everything But Arms 
(EBA) policy towards the LDCs.524 The regional free trade agreements are 
not specifically mentioned in this context, although they are an issue for the 
majority of the LDCs.  I will return to this issue in the section in this chapter 
on the trade-related PCD, as well as in the context of the role and comparative 
advantage of the community. 
In paragraph 3 of the Consensus, the text continues by linking the force 
for positive change role to an assertion of how the “Member States and the 
Community are equally committed to basic principles, fundamental values 
and the development objectives as agreed at the multilateral level”. In this 
context, which again reflects the Paris Declaration, the text states that the EU 
efforts, referred to as our efforts at coordination and harmonisation of aid 
522 The Paris Declaration 2005.
523 The European Consensus  para. 2, lines 6-9. 
524 Cf. Sub-chapter 3.4.
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must contribute to increasing aid effectiveness. In fact, the strong emphasis on 
effectiveness makes it the leading function for the whole European Consensus 
Statement.525 In addition, at the end of the Introduction, the EU states that 
the activities to this end build on the progress made in recent years.526 The 
European Consensus uses this progress in terms of formulating common 
positions for the major international conferences, as well as the internal reform 
of the Commission as the momentum for the “historic joint vision” presented 
below.527 However, the significance of the EU as the promoter of development 
and partner for developing countries is taken for granted. 
The closing paragraph of the Introduction presents the structure of the 
Development Policy Statement and lists the development policy actors that 
have agreed on the policy, including the Council and the representatives of the 
governments of the member states meeting with the Council, the European 
Commission and the European Parliament.528 
5.3 “THE EU VISION Of DEVELOPMENT” 
AND ITS NORMATIVE POSITIONS
Following the introduction to the “Development Challenge”, the first part of the 
European Consensus Statement presents the content of the joint “EU vision of 
Development”. The vision consists of seven sections which lay the foundation 
for an EU development policy, although it is not explicitly called that.  In the 
light of the interview data, the reason for that was simple. Some of the member 
states supporting the UK felt more comfortable with the idea of having a joint 
(informal) vision than a more politically sensitive “EU development policy” 
that would have manifested a more Europeanised approach and overshadowed 
national efforts.529 This type of attitude highlights the paradox of the matter: why 
is it that member states can individually agree on the same issues multilaterally, 
but not in the official form of a European development policy? However, the key 
sections that amount to a joint policy and define the main discursive content 
are: Common objectives, Multi-dimensional aspects of Poverty Eradication, 
Common values, Common principles, Delivering more and better aid, Policy 
coherence for development, and finally, Development, a contribution to 
addressing global challenges. 
525 Ibid. para. 3, lines 1-6. 
526 Ibid. para, 3, lines 2-6. 
527 Interviews EC[23]2009 and EC[34]2009.
528 European Consensus 2005: para. 4. 
529 See Sub-Chapter 4.4.
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In the following, I look at how the EU describes the basis for its development 
policy through the definition of common objectives, values and principles. In 
addition, I analyse the means by which the goals are sought as defined in the 
statement – development aid and policy coherence for development – in the 
development vision. In this respect, it is of particular interest how the EU formulates 
the objectives and means in relation to one another, and how the respective roles 
of the EU and the recipient developing countries are constructed in the envisioned 
application of these tools in  pursuit of the development objectives. 
“The European vision of development” at the beginning of the statement is 
connected to several thematic discourses which can, in turn, be regarded as elements 
of developmentalist or interventionist meta-discourses as well as discourses on the 
EU’s normativity. Developmentalist discourse is produced by actors that allegedly 
steer processes towards a desired outcome or goal labelled “development”. The 
goal can only be achieved by planned action, and active development interventions 
are therefore needed through development aid and co-operation. The content and 
ideological underpinnings of developmentalism may change over time but the 
development goal (although reflecting these changes) and the moral obligations 
to promote development, albeit through the logic of intervention, stay the same.530 
From this point of view, the common objectives, principles and values, as well as 
the tools of EU aid and policy coherence for development discourses, are part of 
this developmentalist discourse, related essentially to the creation of what are 
seen as the preconditions for development.  As such, it is a manifestation of a 
certain form of global governance.  Furthermore, developmentalism is nested in 
institutions that both produce and supervise development-related practices. 
While the developmentalist discourse is in itself embedded with norms, 
principles and values, the normative dimensions are further reinforced by the 
overt statement of common values and principles that constitute the foundation 
of EU developmental agency in particular. 
Common objectives
5. The primary and overarching objective of EU development cooperation is 
the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including 
pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
6. The eight MDGs are to: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve 
universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; 
reduce the mortality rate of children; improve maternal health; combat HIV/
AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability and 
develop a global partnership for development.
530 Koponen 2004: 6-7. 
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7. We reaffirm that development is a central goal by itself; and that sustainable 
development includes good governance, human rights and political, economic, 
social and environmental aspects.
8. The EU is determined to work to assist the achievement of these goals and 
the development objectives agreed at the major UN conferences and summits.
9. We reaffirm our commitment to promoting policy coherence for development, 
based upon ensuring that the EU shall take account of the objectives of development 
cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing 
countries, and that these policies support development objectives.531
The common objectives of the European Consensus Statement are founded 
on the Maastricht Treaty provisions, which have been extended to include 
the United Nations Millennium Declaration and the related Millennium 
Development Goals. More specifically, the common objectives were re-defined 
in spring 2005 with the so-called “Commission Spring Package”, including 
three Communications and Council conclusions in May 2005. 
At the level of preferred reading, the EU sustainable development thinking 
refers to the UN-led process on the environment and development as set out 
in the report Our Common Future (1987).532  In more concrete terms, the 
limits of the EU approach can be inferred from EU action in terms of unilateral 
EU measures and international commitments, as well as the degree of policy 
integration within the Union.533  As discussed in Chapter 2, “Conceptual 
Context”, the EU’s stance towards sustainable development has been defined 
as weak sustainable development by Baker (1997, 2005) and Flint (2008), as 
in terms of normative principles the declaratory commitment to principles 
is stronger than in practice.534 Regarding poverty eradication in the context 
of sustainable development, the EU text and suggested action emphasises 
the Millennium Development Goals. Similarly to the Paris Declaration, the 
language that has been widely used in the Consensus, and the timing of both 
processes – aid effectiveness and the MDG review of 2005 – explain the strong 
emphasis on the MDGs as the main benchmarks in poverty eradication. 
What is important in the paragraph is that it brings poverty eradication to 
the fore, naming it as the primary and overarching objective for development 
531 The European Consensus, paragraphs 5-9.
532 See Baker 2006. 
533 In particular, at the UN Conference on Environment and Development Rio de Janeiro 1992, and 
the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development Johannesburg 2002. 
534 Baker 2006: 30-31. Flint 2008.
CRITICAl DISCOURSE ANAlYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS STATEMENT  |  179
cooperation at the European level. This focus is in line with the original 
approach of the Brundtland Commission. Logically then, everything else should 
be directed to serve the attainment of this main goal.  Therefore it is crucial 
how the primacy and the scope of the poverty eradication objective are framed. 
In this respect, while Paragraph 6 just lists the MDGs to clarify the section on 
objectives, Paragraph 7 includes an important reaffirmation – development as a 
central goal in itself. Given the debate on the role of development policy within 
the external relations (see Sub-chapter 3.4), this statement makes sense in the 
context of reclaiming the role as a Union policy. Also on a positive note, this 
statement can be read as a manifestation of the importance of the development 
objectives, which should not be compromised.535 
Paragraph 7 continues by defining the dimensions of sustainable development. 
Here, the European Consensus prioritises good governance, human rights and 
the political aspects, which are then complemented by the more traditional 
approach in the sustainable development literature, including the three pillars of 
sustainable development – environmental protection, economic development, 
and social development. This approach can be traced back to the early 1990s 
and debates in the Council on the Lomé IV agreement, according to which 
sustainable development required sound governance, human rights and political 
reforms.536 At the same time, the subsequent Paragraph 8 links the EU action to 
the multilateral UN level and to the major UN Conferences and Summits since 
the early 1990s, as reaffirmed in 2002 and 2005 by the Millennium Declaration 
and MDGs, Monterrey (2002), Johannesburg Sustainable Development (2002) 
and the MDG Review of 2005. In this context, the Consensus defines the EU’s 
role to assist the achievement of the development policy goals, and not to be the 
main policy actor regarding the EU responsibilities. This gives the impression 
that the success of the development outcome would almost entirely depend on 
the recipient side. While this is in line with the Paris Principles on ownership, 
it nevertheless shifts the focus away from the EU’s own role and responsibility. 
In this respect, one could look at each of the processes and issue areas that 
are listed under the MDG8 in order to understand the kind of roles that the 
Union could take. For instance, in relation to the question of international trade 
and debt, the term “assist” masks the power and dependence embedded in the 
donor-recipient relationship. 
The Union commitment to the multilateral, global targets is further 
reinforced with a reaffirmation regarding policy coherence for development 
in Paragraph 9. The EU promises that it shall take account of the objectives 
of development cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely 
535 Interviews Council[28]2008 and EC[30]2009.
536 Arts and Dickson 2004. 
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to affect developing countries, and that these policies support development 
objectives.537 This formulation opens up possibilities for both positive and 
negative interpretations. On the positive side, this kind of phrasing could be 
used for very strict and compelling forms of policy coherence, provided that 
take account of has tangible positive effects on development policy objectives. 
Furthermore, are likely to affect could be read as a precautionary principle, 
in other words that an ex-ante possibility of a detrimental impact would be 
sufficient to renounce such an action. However, this would require a clause to 
clarify the actual implications at the EU level. On the negative side, the wording 
leaves considerable room for different definitions of what taking into account 
implies. Equally alarming is that it does not define who is actually in a position 
to decide on this matter. Taking into account may also imply a notification and 
inaction. It could also imply action that is not considered policy coherent by 
all the actors. Given that the developing countries themselves bear the prime 
responsibility for development, would it be logical then that there would be a 
way for them to bring up the possible negative effects of the EU’s action? Yet 
this type of bottom-up approach to PCD was not foreseen. 
Chapter 1 (European Consensus) on the common objectives concludes with 
a paragraph regarding the allocation of development aid. It states that “aid will 
continue to support poor people in all developing countries, including both 
low-income and middle-income countries (MICs)”. In addition: 
The EU will continue to prioritise support to the least-developed and other 
low-income countries to achieve more balanced global development, while 
recognising the value of concentrating the aid activities of each Member State 
in areas and regions where they have comparative advantages and can add most 
value to the fight against poverty.538 
Thus, in the light of this statement on recipients, the poverty focus does not imply 
that the poorest or least-developed countries would automatically be prioritised. 
In this respect, it is the Union that oversees the overall trends in distribution of 
aid with a view to securing the LDCs while the member states have the autonomy 
to decide where to target their developmental action. Although this position is 
grounded in the economic theory arguments of comparative advantage and 
added value, in practice the importance of certain MICs in Latin America, Asia 
and the near-abroad regions in the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood play 
a role for certain member states beyond the poverty eradication objectives.539 
537 Cf. EU Treaty texts on Coherence. 
538 European Consensus para. 10. 
539 Interview Council[28]2008. 
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In this respect, the poor are the object of developmental action despite the 
country context or differences in state capabilities discretionally. The question 
of aid impact on the poor is not raised, but it is assumed that aid has supported 
and will continue to support poor people in all developing countries. Again, the 
framing emphasises a global approach. 
Chapter 2 (European Consensus), “Multidimensional aspects of Poverty 
Eradication”, defines further the EU’s developmentalist task in global 
governance. This task is approached by defining the very poverty that the Union 
aims to combat. The text reads as follows: 
11. Poverty includes all the areas in which people of either gender are deprived 
and perceived as incapacitated in different societies and local contexts. 
The core dimensions of poverty include economic, human, political, socio-
cultural and protective capabilities. Poverty relates to human capabilities 
such as consumption and food security, health, education, rights, the ability 
to be heard, human security especially for the poor, dignity and decent work. 
Therefore combating poverty will only be successful if equal importance is given 
to investing in people (first and foremost in health and education and HIV/
AIDs, the protection of natural resources (like forests, water, marine resources 
and soil) to secure rural livelihoods, and investing in wealth creation (with 
emphasis on issues such as entrepreneurship, job creation, access to credits, 
property rights and infrastructure). The empowerment of women is the key 
to all development and gender equality should be a core part of all policy 
 strategies.  
The EU approach to poverty is firmly based on the contribution to the Consensus 
statement made by the European Parliament and the Nordic countries.540 In 
actual fact, it owes a lot to the conceptual thinking already approved at the 
OECD/DAC on poverty/POVNET 2004. This type of definition was put forth 
by the then chairperson of CODEV to streamline the Union approach to what 
had already been discussed and widely accepted at the DAC level.541 
In terms of recognising the dimensions, it is indeed balanced and in line with 
the sustainable development agenda as set out in the literature above. As such, 
it takes a strong and more analytical stance, drawing on Amartya Sen’s notion 
of capability as well as sustainable livelihoods discourse. The text combines 
these with the MDGs, particularly regarding investment in people. In addition, 
it refers to gender equality as being the key to all development. This takes the 
EU stance way beyond the technical debates on income-based poverty lines 
540 See Sub-chapter 4.4, and also the EP resolution regarding the European Consensus. 
541 Interview Council[28]2008.
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and improves the understanding of the very rationale of development policy. 
However, this type of elaboration on poverty is not linked back to the principle 
of policy coherence for development or vice versa. 
The Consensus text proceeds from this notion of poverty to a definition of 
the MDG agenda and the economic, social and environmental dimensions of 
the poverty eradication task in the context of sustainable development. The 
definition is arrived at by listing the development activities across the key 
areas that were raised in the UN Conferences referred to above. The extensive 
list starts with democratic governance and progresses to political, economic 
and social reforms. Pro-poor economic growth, trade and development, food 
security, access to public services as well as social justice, human rights and 
social cohesion are also mentioned.542 In terms of recognising the key aspects 
to look into, mapping out all these aspects is important. However, what we can 
observe here tallies with Bomberg’s (2004) description of the EU’s engagement 
with sustainable development as multifaceted, evolutionary and as complex as 
the notion of sustainable development itself, which also gives rise to difficulties 
in internalising the key tenets of the concept.543 In this sense, the European 
Consensus offers common ground for more strategic planning, but does not 
contain a vision of what that strategy should entail. 
The common objectives of the European Consensus Statement and the 
multiple dimensions of poverty eradication are followed by a chapter on common 
values. This chapter actually consists of a single paragraph, highlighting the 
importance of the value base for the EU’s agency and hence its normative 
difference: 
3. Common values
13. EU partnership and dialogue with third countries will promote common 
values of: respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, peace, democracy, 
good governance, gender equality, the rule of law, solidarity and justice. The EU 
is strongly committed to effective multilateralism whereby all the world’s nations 
share responsibility for development.544
The common values agreed on by the parties to the European Consensus 
Statement are closely associated with those of Western liberal democracy. 
In addition, the text includes two traditional motivations of development 
co-operation: solidarity and justice.545 However, the formulation of the first 
542 European Consensus para. 12. 
543 Bomberg 2004: 88.
544 The European Consensus para. 13.
545 See Sub-chapter 2.4.
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phrase in the paragraph leaves it unclear as to whether the common values 
promoted in the EU partnership and dialogue are actually only common EU 
values or jointly agreed and shared values between the EU and the developing 
country partners. As defined in the introduction, the “European Consensus” 
is a statement between European actors, and elsewhere in the text the word 
“common” only refers to the European parties. 
Nevertheless, these two interpretations of the nature of the values may lead 
to very different kinds of partnerships. On the one hand, to a developmental 
partnership in which values are transferred to the partner as a part of the 
cooperation or, on the other hand, where the partnership is already founded on 
a consolidated value base, and value promotion has more of a role of reinforcing 
the shared normative dimension. In terms of partnership, “common” would 
logically refer to those values shared by the partners or, alternatively, the 
values will be diffused in the development cooperation. Otherwise, there is a 
discrepancy in terms of normative power in the partnership to the advantage 
of the Union. In addition, the inclusion of a value base as such can be read as 
an attempt to raise the legitimacy of the EU’s developmental agency, even if the 
interrelationship between the action and the value were negative. For instance, 
this could be the case with the more subjective values of good governance, 
solidarity and justice, which do not have a defined basis in international law 
the way human rights do, for example. 
What is important to note is the intentional wording that the EU partnership 
and dialogue with third countries will be promoted based on common values. 
This intention has at least a double function: while it serves as an instruction to 
the actors that in practice their conduct in such relations might have a bearing on 
the common values, it simultaneously legitimises the action in itself. In reality, 
however, as discussed in the theoretical chapter, the motivations surrounding 
development cooperation are not rooted in such high ground perhaps. 
Interestingly, the EU reaffirms its commitment to “effective multilateralism 
whereby all the world’s nations share responsibility for development”.  What 
makes this particular statement important is the EU position on responsibility 
that is shared by all the world’s nations without specifying how. However, the 
text does take into account the different capacities of the world’s nations in the 
multilateral system. This stance differs from the common but differentiated 
responsibility principle of sustainable development where the responsibilities 
and tasks of sustainable development are distributed differently between the 
developing countries and advanced industrialised economies.546 A similar 
attitude also characterises the following chapter of the European Consensus on 
common principles. The principles include, first, ownership and partnership, 
546 Baker 2006: 36-38.
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political dialogue, participation of civil society, gender equality and addressing 
state fragility. 
4. Common principles
4.1. Ownership, Partnership
14. The EU is committed to the principle of ownership of development strategies 
and programmes by partner countries. Developing countries have the primary 
responsibility for creating an enabling domestic environment for mobilising 
their own resources, including conducting coherent and effective policies. These 
principles will allow an adapted assistance, responding to the specific needs of 
the beneficiary country.547
The first common principles that the European Consensus Statement names 
are those of ownership and partnership, specifically in this order.548 The term 
“partnership” has its roots in the terminology used in the Lomé Conventions 
(1975-2000) between the EU and its former African, Caribbean and Pacific 
colonies. The concept of partnership was borrowed from the UN discourse on 
the New Economic Order of the 1970s to highlight the new, more equal and less 
paternalistic relationship between the EU and the ACP countries, as discussed 
previously in this dissertation.549 
The concept of ownership became, in turn, a central attribute of the 
EU-developing country partnerships more generally in the late 1990s with 
different regional groupings. With the ACPs, its content was re-debated in 
the negotiations on the political, economic and aid provisions of the Cotonou 
Agreement, which replaced the Lomé Conventions and entered into force in 
June 2000. However, as Whitfield and Frazer (2009) point out, the use of the 
term “ownership” in discussions on aid can be traced back at least to donor 
concerns in the mid-1980s when recipient governments were signing up 
to policy conditions as part of aid agreements, particularly the World Bank 
structural adjustment programmes, which largely failed to deliver. Whitfield 
and Frazer point to two explanations for this problem, which appear in the 
literature of the time. In one version, researchers claimed that, although key 
African decision-makers recognised the need for the free-market economic 
“reform” donors were promoting through structural adjustment, they did not 
have the political will to push through contentious programmes in the face 
of domestic opposition. In the other version, researchers claimed that state 
547 The European Consensus, para. 14, lines 1-5.
548 The other common principles in chapter 4 are an in-depth political dialogue, participation of civil 
society, gender equality and addressing state fragility.
549 Holland 2002: 33; Karagiannis 2004: 11.
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elites were not, in fact, committed to free-market policies, but accepted donor 
conditions in order to access funds (see Collier 1997).550 The World Bank 
labelled the problem as insufficient “ownership” of the policies on the part of 
either local elites or local populations.551 
In the light of the text sample, the EU puts a lot of emphasis on the concept 
of ownership in development strategies between the EU and the developing 
country partners. This shift has both positive and negative implications. On the 
positive side, the ownership approach can lead to more genuine leadership of 
the developing countries in terms of decision-making power over development 
strategies, and in choosing the modalities, instruments and sectors of the co-
operation. This is indeed one of the core objectives of the Paris Declaration. 
The first sentence of paragraph 14 expresses the EU’s commitment to the 
principle of developing country ownership, defined in terms of responsibility 
for creating an enabling domestic environment for mobilising their own 
resources which would, in turn, allow for adapted assistance from the Union. 
But to be precise, the text leaves the matter open concerning the degree to 
which the ownership of the content and conduct of development strategies and 
programmes is actually exercised. 
Crucially, as Whitfield and Frazer point out, two competing, and potentially 
contradictory, understandings coexist: ownership as commitment to policies, 
however and why they were devised; and ownership as control over the process 
and outcome of choosing policies. The first understanding of ownership 
refers to an obligation to accept responsibility for implementing policies as 
encouraged or imposed by donors, whereas ownership as control stresses the 
recipient’s right to choose the policies to be implemented.552 In this sense, it is 
not explicitly clear to which type of ownership the EU Consensus is referring. 
What the text does tell us is that, again, the theme of recipient responsibility is 
strongly emphasised also in relation to ownership. 
Interestingly, however, the following paragraph (15) in turn states that the 
EU and the developing countries share the responsibility and accountability 
for the joint efforts in partnership. “The EU will support partner countries’ 
poverty reduction, development and reform strategies, which focus on the 
MDGs and will align with partner countries’ systems and procedures.” The use 
of progress indicators and regular evaluation of assistance are also mentioned. 
In terms of ownership and partnership, the development cooperation is 
focused on the MDGs which, in a sense, also set limitations on ownership 
and partnership. 
550 Whitfield and Fraser 2009: 3.
551 See Devarajan, Dollar, and Holmgren 2001, as cited in Whitfield and Frazer 2009: 3.
552 Whitfield and Frazer 2009: 3-4. 
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Although the MDGs are at the core of the EU’s development policy, the 
developmental task is much wider, for instance in terms of political and 
economic reforms (industrial strategies, agricultural reforms, developing 
businesses, legal and fiscal institutions etc.) or providing Aid for Trade 
and infrastructure development, which do not fall directly under the eight 
MDGs. Furthermore, the MDG focus also suggests that these objectives are 
already “owned” by the recipient and that this is the beneficiary country’s 
understanding of the international development agenda553, as the statement 
words it. In these efforts, the EU’s role is to support the partner, who has 
the primary responsibility for creating an enabling domestic environment 
by mobilising their own resources for development, including conducting 
coherent and effective policies in order to guarantee the functionality of 
country-specific, adopted assistance from the EU side. On the other hand, 
the EU “acknowledges the essential oversight role of democratically elected 
citizens’ representatives and therefore encourages an increased involvement of 
national assemblies, parliaments and local authorities”.554 These are certainly 
decisive determinants in terms of defining the “owners” in line with democratic 
principles, which was somewhat lacking in the early conceptualisations by the 
World Bank. 
What is absent, however, are the external factors that influence the 
recipient country’s capacity to conduct coherent and effective policies for the 
MDGs. Given the huge challenge of these very same conditions for coherent 
and effective policies that the EU itself is facing, both in terms of the Paris 
Declaration and Policy Coherence for Development, the fact that the EU links 
coherence and effective policies with the developing countries’ responsibility is 
noteworthy.  In this respect, the Union missed a chance to concretise its role in 
the promotion of PCD, as the EU’s own role and responsibility were not linked 
back to the MDGs in the Consensus text, as was the case in the Commission 
Spring Package in May 2005. In these EU development policy documents, the 
Union’s position is based on the view that development aid, essential as it is, 
is not enough to achieve poverty reduction, let alone poverty eradication. This 
emphasis is particularly strong in the Commission’s official communications 
regarding the EU’s contribution to the MDGs.555 However, in the European 
Consensus text the key understanding related to PCD, which stated that the 
Union action may affect the recipient partners’ possibilities to attain the MDGs, 
was ignored. As Whitfield and Fraser (2009) warn, rather than waiting for 
donors to reform themselves, recipient governments are being urged to “take 
553 European Consensus 2005: paragraphs 15-16.  
554 Ibid. para. 16.
555 The specific MDGs and coherence documents include COM (2005) 132, 133 and 134.
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ownership” of aid activities, and country ownership is now being promoted as 
the default solution.556 
Chapter 4 (European Consensus) on the Common Principles continues with 
the text on “An in-depth political dialogue”, according to which the dialogue is 
an important way to further the development objectives. As such, this type of 
dialogue can alternatively be seen as a means of norm diffusion between the 
Union and the recipient. Thus, it constitutes an important channel for the use of 
normative power. The political dialogue is conducted by the member states, and 
by the European Union institutions – the Council, Commission and Parliament 
within their respective competencies. It designates “good governance, human 
rights, democratic principles and the rule of law” as the key elements of this 
dialogue, which “will be regularly assessed with a view to forming a shared 
understanding and identifying supporting measures”.557 From this formulation, 
it is quite clear that the political dialogue as established in the Lomé IV 
framework has maintained the function of a one-way channel of normative 
direction by the EU vis-à-vis the partners. The fact that the text appoints the 
EU member states and Community institutions to conduct the dialogue narrows 
the basis for the EU-developing country partnership and reinforces the unequal 
normative power relationship between donor and recipient. The paragraph goes 
on to state that “this dialogue has an important preventive dimension and aims 
to ensure that these principles are upheld”.558 However, it is quite obvious that 
the prevention and ensuring the adherence to the principles are not meant to 
be applied to the EU institutions.
Furthermore, the fight against corruption, the fight against illegal 
immigration and the trafficking of human beings are seen as other important 
themes of the dialogue.559 Whereas corruption concerns the political elite and 
is largely perceived as one of the main obstacles to aid effectiveness and thus 
also concerns development at both ends, the fight against illegal immigration 
is largely the fight against one of the manifestations of poverty and the lack of 
livelihoods in the country of origin. It is also a manifestation of inaccessible 
legal access to Europe. Hence, this issue area is more of an EU interest than 
an interest of the country of origin. As regards the trafficking of human beings, 
the issue area is directly linked to international crime and is a matter of gross 
violations of human rights with linkages to poverty and vulnerability. 
In addition to extending ownership to democratically elected representatives, 
the European Consensus also includes an entire paragraph on the participation of 
556 Whitfield and Fraser 2009: 1-2.
557 European Consensus 2005: para. 17.
558 Ibid. para. 17, lines 3-7. 
559 Ibid. para. 17, lines 7-8. 
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civil society both in Europe and in the partner countries in development policy 
(following the example of the EU-ACP civil society consultation model).560 
In the text, the EU supports the capacity-building of civil society in order to 
strengthen their voice in the “development process” and the political, social and 
economic dialogue. 561 The scope of “civil society” includes in this context both 
economic and social partners, such as trade unions, employers’ organisations 
and the private sector, as well as NGOs and other non-state actors, in this 
order. These actors are considered vital as promoters of democracy, social 
justice and human rights, in other words, as promoters of these normative 
principles. The importance of the European civil society is recognised as 
well. However, this importance is left unspecified as regards the stakeholders 
in the European Consensus and the counterparts in development policy-
making, although their importance in awareness-raising and development 
education is acknowledged. The civil society participation reflects the same 
ongoing challenge as the concept of ownership if its scope and content are 
not specified. In this case, the formulation of the “development process” 
leaves it open as to the stage at which the civil society participation should be 
included, namely, are they playing a role throughout the process from policy-
planning, implementation and evaluation both in the EU as well as in the 
South, or are they called upon ad hoc to participate in a pre-structured and 
pre-formulated policy?562 On the other hand, the open formulation provides 
these actors with an important entry point, and the actual extent can be 
tested in practice. Given that the European Consensus Statement covers all 
developmental relations, this text can also be read as widening the provisions 
negotiated in the ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement to include every 
development policy arrangement. In addition, according to the text, the civil 
society actors’ voices should be heard in the political, social and economic 
dialogue. Here, the inclusion of the economic dialogue is of particular interest 
as the economic sphere has traditionally been regarded as a sphere excluded 
from participatory action.563  
Gender equality
19. The promotion of gender equality and women’s rights is not only crucial in 
itself but is a fundamental human right and a question of social justice, as well as 
being instrumental in achieving all the MDGs and in implementing the Beijing 
platform for Action, the Cairo Programme of Action and the Convention on the 
560 Ibid. para. 18. 
561 Ibid. para. 18, line 6.
562 For more on the EU development policy and civil society, see Hurt 2006: 112-113.
563 Trommer 2012.
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Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Therefore the EU 
will include a strong gender component in all its policies and practices in its 
relations with developing countries.564
The European Consensus Statement presents gender equality as a common 
value as well as a common principle.565 The text places gender issues within the 
larger framework of fundamental human rights and social justice, and regards 
it both as a crucial goal in itself as well as an instrument to achieve all the 
MDGs and to implement the key UN agreements on gender. In this respect, the 
EU stance is very much in line with the sustainable development principle of 
gender equality.566 However, the joint commitment of the member states and 
the Community to gender equality could have been enhanced by extending “a 
strong gender component” to all EU policies and practices in a more precise 
manner, as formulated in the second part of the European Consensus Statement 
on the European Community Development Policy.567 However, importantly for 
our focus on the development and trade interface, the Commission’s Global 
Trade strategy, “Global Europe” (2006), does not make one single reference 
to gender or women, although it includes all trade relations with developing 
countries. 
The chapter on Common Principles concludes with three paragraphs on 
Addressing State Fragility and the EU’s role in three different cases. 
These cases comprise difficult partnerships and fragile states, transition 
situations, and disaster prevention and preparedness. Regarding “difficult 
partnerships and fragile states”, the EU pledges to improve its response 
through state systems and strategies to fulfil a range of basic functions and 
citizens’ needs so as to increase capacity in fragile states. The means of 
accomplishing this include conflict prevention work, governance reforms, 
the rule of law, anti-corruption measures and institution-building. The task 
is seen as important because a third of the world’s poor live in fragile states. 
Importantly, the EU advocates remaining engaged even in the most difficult 
situations to prevent the emergence of failed states.568 This pledge to not 
pull back from these situations reinforces the EU commitment and provides 
a normative reference for other actors in the international development 
community.569 
564 The European Consensus, para. 19.
565 Ibid. paragraphs 13 and 19.
566 For gender equality in sustainable development, see e.g. Baker 2006: 45-46.
567 The European Consensus, see paragraphs 101 and 104 on EC development policy.
568 European Consensus 2005: para. 20. 
569 Interview Academia[8]2009.
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When it comes to “transition situations”, the EU promises to act as a promoter 
of linkages between emergency aid, rehabilitation and long-term development. 
The action takes place within a multilateral framework, including the UN Peace 
Building Commission. In this context, the EU sees its role as re-establishing the 
principles of ownership and partnership, together with providing integrated 
transition strategies for building institutional capacity, essential infrastructure and 
social services, food security and general security for refugees, displaced persons 
and citizens in general.570  Regarding “disaster prevention and preparedness”, the 
text notes that some developing countries are particularly vulnerable to natural 
disasters, climatic change, environmental degradation and external economic 
shocks. The promised action by the member states and the Community includes 
disaster prevention and preparedness in these countries. As important as this is 
at the country level, no references are made to global-level initiatives to prevent 
or mitigate further catastrophes, or to the EU’s own global responsibility. 
“Delivering More and Better Aid”
The European Consensus Statement on EU development aid is based on 
pledges of increased financial resources and improved quality of the delivered 
aid, together with better coordination and complementarity. The text defines 
development as a long-term commitment which calls for additional EU 
resources from some of the member states lagging behind previous targets, and 
for others to sustain their efforts as set out in the May 2005 Council conclusions. 
This is done with a view to achieving the target of 0.7 per cent of GNI by 2015, 
including an intermediate collective target of 0.56 per cent by 2010.571 According 
to the collectively agreed timetable, the commitments should see annual EU aid 
double to over €66 billion in 2010 (see Sub-chapter 3.3).
In addition, the EU considers further debt relief and innovative sources of 
finance to increase the volume of aid. Africa is named as the main beneficiary 
of this commitment, with a pledge to allocate at least half of the increased aid 
there. The EU commitment reflects the G8 agreement in July 2005 to double 
aid to Africa.572 In order to meet the MDGs, the Union will prioritise LDCs 
and other low-income countries as reflected in the high proportion of EU aid 
(67%) flowing to these countries, as if the flow were a natural phenomenon. 
However, this commitment will be further defined by individual member states’ 
priorities in development assistance, in line with paragraph 10.573 Moreover, 
570 European Consensus 2005: para. 21.
571 Ibid. para. 23, line 1. 
572 Easterly 2007: 161.
573 Ibid. para. 23, lines 1-7. 
CRITICAl DISCOURSE ANAlYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS STATEMENT  |  191
the aid allocation will be carried out based on two main criteria: needs and 
performance, taking account of specific situations.574 However, the text does 
not specify how and by whom these criteria will be defined and measured. On 
the other hand, the statement does not present concrete results of the EU aid 
so far, and in that sense the focus remains on future intentions to increase and 
improve aid rather than on “the progress made in recent years”, as declared in 
the introduction.  
The text continues with a strong focus on difficult partnerships, fragile states 
and donor orphans.575 The main argument here is that the least-developed and 
low-income countries deserve special attention in order to meet the MDGs. 
However, aid will also be allocated to middle-income countries to support pro-
poor development in line with the overall development policy goals of these 
countries.576 With regard to the latter case, providing aid might also benefit the 
donor party.577 In this respect, the metaphor of donor orphan and its antonym 
donor darling is interesting. In the statement, the EU is also committed to 
looking after those “donor orphan” countries which the other OECD/DAC 
donor community is reluctant to “adopt” into their development cooperation 
programmes. This is often due to their instability and foreseen difficulties in 
aid delivery, as well as in development at large. In the light of the interviews, 
this constitutes quite a unique position.578  
The European Consensus on Aid continues with paragraphs on “More 
Effective Aid”. The determinants of effective aid for the EU include better aid 
in terms of reduced transaction costs and promised improvements in global 
impact. However, the causal linkage between these two is not made explicit 
although, logically, less transaction costs will of course result in more funds 
available at the recipient’s end. According to the text, “the EU is dedicated 
to working with all development partners to improve the quality and impact 
of its aid as well as improve donor practices, and to help recipients to use 
the increased aid flows more effectively”. But again, concrete examples are 
not given. Instead, the EU refers directly to the Commitments on Paris 
Aid Effectiveness agenda, which the Union promises to implement, while 
monitoring the implementation with concrete targets for 2010. Once again, 
national ownership, donor coordination and harmonisation from the field level 
up, alignment with the country systems and results orientation are cited as 
574 Ibid. para. 23, lines 8-9.
575 Ibid. para. 24. 
576 Ibid. paragraphs 20 and 24.
577 See Roeskau 2005.
578 The European Consensus, para. 24, lines 1-6. Interviews Academia[8]2009, Council[28]2008 
and EC[30]2009.
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the core principles.579 The section on different aid modalities takes the text 
to a tangible level in terms of presenting different complementary channels 
through which aid can be provided. These include traditional project aid, sector 
programme support, sector and general budget support, humanitarian aid and 
assistance in crisis prevention (cf. the European Security agenda), support to 
and via civil society, as well as the approximation of norms, standards and 
legislation, etc.). The country context is the criterion whereby modalities are 
chosen. However, who or what should define “what works best in each country” 
is not specified.580 On the positive side, “where circumstances permit”, the EU 
is willing to use general or sector budget support to strengthen ownership, 
national accountability and procedures, as well as to finance national poverty 
reduction strategies (PRS). In addition, the list of aid improvements also 
includes commitments to more predictable and less volatile aid mechanisms, in 
the light of those which were reported as being problematic for EU development 
cooperation in the past.581 
The chapter on development aid also includes paragraphs on debt reduction 
and the untying of aid as ways of improving the development financing. As 
regards debt, the EU pledges to find solutions to unsustainable debt burdens, 
in particular for the remaining multilateral debts of so-called Highly Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPCs), as well as for countries affected by exogenous shocks 
or countries in post-conflict situations.582 However, the section does not 
specify what these solutions might be or how they would be reached. Given the 
magnitude of the debt question in development, the EU member states have 
not been able to formulate a common stance which would be commensurate 
with their role either as bilateral creditors or actors in the IFIs, let alone able to 
formulate a Union-wide approach. In this sense, this commitment to improve 
the predictability of development financing by debt reduction is an opening 
which should be followed through. 
The European Consensus chapter on development aid concludes with 
paragraphs on coordination and complementarity between the Community and 
member states. In this context, the Union promises to improve these aspects, 
again referring to the Paris Declaration, and states that “the best way to ensure 
complementarity is to respond to partner countries’ priorities at the country 
and the regional level”. Again, “the EU encourages partner countries to lead 
their own development processes and support a broad donor-wide engagement 
in national harmonisation agendas”. In this sense, the recipients are given the 
579 European Consensus 2005: para. 25. 
580 Ibid.: 26. 
581 Ibid.: 27. Interviews EC[13]2009,EC[23]2009 and EC[34]2009.
582 European Consensus 2005: para. 28.
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responsibility for the overall coordination of various developmental initiatives. 
The EU acts as a facilitator and provider of roadmaps for its member states’ 
contributions. Further, it commits itself to multiannual programming based on 
partner countries’ strategies and budget processes, to common implementation 
and shared analysis, as well as to donor-wide joint missions and use of co-
financing.583 The task of coordinating multilateral channels is further 
emphasised by the EU’s readiness to take a lead role in implementing the Paris 
Declaration provisions on aid delivery with four additional commitments. These 
commitments consist of capacity-building through multi-donor arrangements, 
channelling 50 per cent of government-to-government assistance through 
country systems including budget and sector-wide approaches, avoiding new 
project implementation units, and reducing the number of uncoordinated 
missions by 50 per cent.584 
The mixture of development policy-specific language and expressions 
such as “roadmaps” and “missions” gives an impression of a controlled and 
targeted operation with very limited consideration of the complexities of the 
reality at both ends. Similar optimism marks the concluding section of the 
chapter on the EU’s pledge to capitalise on new member states’ experience in 
transition management and to strengthen their role as new donors.585 In this 
cross-cutting web of donor-recipient relations, the EU promises to co-operate 
with partners and bilateral and multilateral institutional actors. This promise 
also encompasses promotion of the enhancement of the voice of developing 
countries in international institutions.586 However, the text does not specify the 
concerns that the Union would put forward with the poorer nations. 
5.4 THE fRAMINg Of POLICy COHERENCE fOR 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS
Together with development assistance, policy coherence for development (PCD) 
is the other main tool that the European Consensus Statement presents to 
support poverty reduction and the achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals in developing countries. In the statement, the EU commitment to policy 
coherence is presented in the section on common objectives, and is further 
defined in a separate section on policy coherence for development.
583 European Consensus 2005: para. 31. 
584 Ibid 2005: para. 32. 
585 Ibid 2005: para. 33. 
586 Ibid 2005: para. 34. 
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6. Policy coherence for development (PCD)
35. The EU is fully committed to taking action to advance Policy Coherence 
for Development in a number of areas. It is important that non-development 
policies assist developing countries’ efforts in achieving the MDGs. The EU 
shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies 
that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries. To make this 
commitment a reality, the EU will strengthen policy coherence for development 
procedures, instruments and mechanisms at all levels, and secure adequate 
resources and share best practice to further these aims. This constitutes a 
substantial additional EU contribution to the achievement of the MDGs.587 
[emphasis added]
This definition of the PCD commitment largely builds on the EU Commission 
Communication of April 2005 on “Coherence for Development”. In the 
communication, the EU explores the possibilities different policy sectors 
have to support development policy goals. The reference to a number of areas 
connects the paragraph to the May 2005 Council conclusion on the 12 policy 
sectors that have been recognised as crucial, particularly for the attainment 
of the Millennium Development Goals.588 The focus on the MDGs was chosen 
strategically because of the timing, as well as the concrete commitment 
made with regard to these specific goals by the international development 
community.589 Linking PCD to the MDGs has been further reinforced by the 
actual difficulties in achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals, which 
developed countries, especially the EU, are claiming to be able to meet.590 In the 
“European Consensus”, the EU position on poverty eradication builds strongly 
on policy coherence for development as a tool to bring about development and 
to achieve the MDGs. 
However, the overall task is much larger as, according to the treaty, the 
policy coherence principle should direct all possible developmental linkages 
between all EU actions with a view to supporting recipient countries’ own 
efforts to improve the social, environmental and economic dimensions of 
sustainable development. Therefore, 12 areas were chosen in the May 2005 
Council conclusions including Trade, Environment, Climate change, Security, 
Agriculture, Fisheries, Social dimension of globalisation, Employment and 
decent work, Migration, Research and Innovation, Information Society, 
587 Ibid. para. 35.
588 Council Conclusions May 2005.
589 Interviews Academia[8]2009, Academia[21]2008, EC[23]2009, Council[28]2008 and 
EC[30]2009.
590 Picciotto 2005: 313-314.
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Transport and Energy. By way of a historical side note, some of these issues 
of incoherence were first discussed as early as 1971 by the Commission of that 
time.591 In particular, the issue of trade policy and development was brought to 
the fore, as discussed in Chapter 3.
Two observations can be made at the outset here. In the so-called 
Commission Spring Package (2005) on Development and PCD by the DG 
Development unit of PCD and Forward-looking Studies592, each of these policy 
areas were discussed against the development objectives, including synergies 
but, to a certain extent, also obstacles to promoting PCD. However, in this 
introductory chapter, the framing of the PCD commitment is done in a manner 
which shifts the focus away from the possible incoherencies between the 
development objectives and the 12 listed EU sectoral policies. Such a starting 
point is interesting given that together with possible “synergies”, many EU 
policies such as the CAP, the Common Fisheries Policy and External Trade 
have documented detrimental impacts for developing countries.593 Historically, 
these problems constituted the main reason to start the coherence discussion 
from the point of view of development cooperation and its incorporation into 
the Maastricht Treaty.594 
Interestingly, there has been a gap, on the one hand, between the juridical 
incorporation of the coherence principle and the first action regarding the 
reduction of beef export subsidies by the Commission in 1994, and the overall 
integration of the coherence principle into the EU development policy as late 
as 2005, on the other.595 In 1992 and again in 1997, the Council asked the EC 
to produce a report on coherence, but only a non-paper was submitted to the 
Council in 1999.596 In a study on Commission practices, these sectoral DGs were 
against the inclusion of the coherence for development reporting in the late 
1990s, which highlights the political sensitivity of the coherence question. In 
particular, this was the case with the inter-relationship between development 
and agriculture, as well as between the development and fisheries policies.597 
Furthermore, the chosen approach also disregarded the ongoing debates and 
initiatives raised especially by civil society actors in relation to these sectors and 
591 SEC (71) 2700: 7. 
592 The specific MDGs and coherence documents include COM (2005) 132, 133 and 134.
593 On EU policy incoherence, see e.g. Hoebink 2004, Carbone 2009, as well as NGO campaigns 
for PCD: Call for Coherence (http://fi.kehys.oneworld.net) and Eucoherence (http://www.
eurocoherence.org). On Gender, Trade and Development, see WIDE (http://eurosur.org/wide/
home.htm) and on Fisheries, CCFA (http://www.cape-cffa.org). 
594 Interviews EC[34] and [23]2009.
595 Picciotto 2005: 315. 
596 Concord: October 2009. 
597 ECDPM study 1999.
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development policy, although civil society actors were encouraged to take part 
in development policy as discussed above.598 
Instead of looking back, the European Consensus looks forward.  As the text 
defines it, “To make this commitment a reality, the EU will strengthen policy 
coherence for development procedures, instruments and mechanisms at all 
levels, and secure adequate resources and share best practices to further these 
aims”. What can be noted at the outset is that the PCD question is framed as 
an administrative issue and not as a political one. Consequently, the European 
Consensus suggests that the problem can be tackled administratively by 
improving mechanisms and procedures, rather than by opening PCD to the 
debate on what actually constitutes poverty-reducing EU action in line with 
sustainable development principles in different policy sectors and at different 
levels. What we have here is a textbook case of de-politicisation in practice.599 
Without arguing that development-oriented remedies for incoherence could 
easily be found in political processes, however, the de-political, administrative 
discourse effectively stops the emergence of political debates and, even 
more importantly, hinders the finding of more balanced outcomes through 
appropriate decision-making. 
Of course, PCD depends on a number of context-related issues and 
the approach chosen to assess them, as discussed in Chapter 2. However, 
reducing PCD to an administrative question is unlikely to lead to a “substantial 
additional EU contribution to the achievement of the MDGs” as the European 
Consensus claims. What is also important to bear in mind is what the theoretical 
conceptualisation of coherence points to, namely the different types of 
coherence/incoherence that are present at different levels, which again is not 
elaborated on in the European Consensus. In this respect, the text could have 
named the most important forums where the PCD question is addressed. 
For instance, the ECDPM and ICEI study (2005) divides the coherence 
mechanism into three different categories: a) overall policy and political 
decision-making, b) government institutions and administration, and c) 
assessment and advisory capacity. Although not named in the text, the 
procedures, instruments and mechanisms at the time were most developed 
at the level of the Commission DGs. Most notably, these included the Inter-
Service Consultations (ISC) as well as Sustainability Impact Assessment 
(SIA) studies falling under the two latter categories. However, as discussed 
in Chapter 4, the EC position on the trade-related PCD in the Commission 
proposal was narrower than that first discussed by DG DEV or suggested by 
the European Parliament.
598 On the role of the NGOs and PCD promotion, see also Picciotto 2005: 317-318.
599 See and compare, for instance, Ferguson 1990, The Anti-politics Machine. 
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In addition, the PCD unit and PCD inter-service group were established 
after the adoption of the Consensus statement in 2006. Regarding the Council, 
the individual member states and the European Parliament, the mechanisms 
referred to were still very much in the making.600  (I will return to this question 
in Chapter 6.) Although adequate mechanisms are important, their importance 
comes into play either as ways to negotiate PCD or to monitor the integration 
of the chosen PCD policy into a given question. Interestingly, the framing of 
PCD in this manner implies that there is already a solid vision of what can be 
regarded as PCD, as the specific section on PCD in the context of Trade and 
Security policies shows. In addition, the pledge to strengthen the procedures, 
instruments and mechanisms gives a slightly more positive impression of PCD 
in policy-making, as the process of identifying the working methods was yet to 
begin for the Council, the member states and the Parliament. 
Second, reflecting the complexity of coherence for development, the EU 
argumentation in this context is characterised by rhetorical discrepancy. 
By rhetorical discrepancy I refer to the construction of an argument which 
simultaneously consists of extreme expressions such as “fully”, “in all policies”, 
and “at all levels” and elements that are at variance with such expressions. 
Although this kind of structure is common in persuasive political statements, 
the fact that the text is discussing policy coherence makes this rhetorical 
discrepancy more evident. In the text on PCD, all the main arguments are 
affected by rhetorical discrepancy. 
In the first sentence, the EU commits itself fully to taking action to advance 
PCD in a number of areas. These areas include a huge array of policy sectors 
ranging from Trade, Environment, Climate change, Security, Agriculture, 
Fisheries, Social dimension of globalisation, Employment and decent work, 
Migration, Research and Innovation, Information society, Transport and 
Energy.601 Considering the diverse functions, interests and goals of these 
600 In the spirit of the European Consensus, the Commission initiated a biannual reporting cycle on 
Policy Coherence for Development in 2007 consisting of an assessment of the Commission and 
the member states, and an informal PCD network was also established. In addition, PCD desks 
were assigned to different sectoral DGs. As regards the Council, at the time of the European 
Consensus formation, the mechanisms for PCD were still in the making. However, as the CEPS 
report (2006) recommended, improving the capacity of GAERC and the CODEV group was 
seen as important in this respect. After the adoption of the European Consensus Statement, the 
Commission and the Development Cooperation Working Party of the Council (CODEV) prepared 
a Work Programme 2006-2007 for Policy Coherence for Development. See CEPS 2006: Executive 
summary and Report. Furthermore, a rolling work programme was established by the German 
2007 Presidency. As for the Parliament, its engagement with PCD was  sporadic during that 
period. 
601 The European Consensus Statement, para. 35, footnote on the May 2005 Council PCD 
Conclusions.
198  |  CRITICAl DISCOURSE ANAlYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS STATEMENT
sectors, the full EU commitment is, in fact, an expression of intention without 
concrete examples and guidelines for PCD advancement. As noted above, what 
the EU actually promises is to improve the administrative action to support PCD 
and adequate resources, but sidesteps the political criteria for PCD in a given 
cross-sectoral question, which should be the basis for advancing PCD. 
However, the EU also firmly states in the text that it is important for non-
development policies to assist developing countries’ efforts in achieving the 
MDGs. In order to ensure this, the EU is committed to taking account of 
development policy objectives in all policies that it implements which are likely 
to affect developing countries. As noted above, this kind of commitment was 
already made in the Treaty of Maastricht and leaves considerable room for both 
positive and negative interpretations. 
The structure of the key coherence argument raises the question of which 
actors will be the ones that will ultimately decide and define the criteria by which 
the policies that are likely to affect developing countries are verified? Similarly, 
the EU’s promise regarding strengthening PCD procedures, instruments and 
mechanism at all levels contains an imbalance between the extreme expression 
all levels and the PCD procedures, instruments and mechanism that were yet to 
be defined at that time. In addition, with regard to the implementation of the 
PCD principle, the EU’s full commitment to taking action to advance PCD in 
12 different policy areas is problematic. The list of 12 sectors includes common 
policy sectors such as external trade, the CAP, and fisheries. 
Given the complexity of the question of coherence between development 
policy and these sectors, this full commitment does not appear as realistic 
without a proposal to bridge the differing premises of these sectors and 
development policy goals. In the light of the statement text, it seems that the 
EU’s approach is limited to advancing development policy goals sector by 
sector, within one selected sector at a time, case by case, rather than trying to 
put a more overarching normative framework into place. 
This approach is similar to that of promoting sustainable development in 
the statement. In this sense, the introduction to PCD leaves the content of the 
concept ambiguously open as in the Maastricht Treaty. As Piocciotto (2005) 
points out, the Maastricht Treaty did not mandate the implementation of PCD. 
Nor did it specify modalities for PCD. All in all, the considerable ambiguity 
and consequent room for manoeuvre in PCD application still exists for the 
Consensus parties.602 The European Consensus process did not fill this gap.
As discussed in Sub-chapter 4.4, policy coherence for development was 
not originally meant to gain this much visibility as a standalone concept. In 
fact, it was meant to be discussed in conjunction with Aid Effectiveness issues. 
602 On the Maastricht Treaty and PCD, see Picciotto 2005: 315. 
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However, it was a Nordic state grouping that insisted on having PCD in a 
separate section.603 This points to two differences in approach when it comes 
to policy coherence for development. The former is much narrower, referring 
to PCD more as an attribute for securing the impact of development aid, while 
the latter links it to the larger reform of inter-policy relations and integration. 
Policy Coherence for Development and International Trade
Out of the twelve policy areas, the external policies of trade and security were 
given the leading role as regards the imperative to achieve PCD in the European 
Consensus. These two were also the policies whose agendas overlapped, most 
notably with that of development at the time when the European Consensus was 
formulated.604 In the ensuing section, I focus first on how the formulators of the 
European Consensus on Development saw the role of trade and in what kind of 
terms policy coherence for developmental purposes was called for.  For the sake of 
clarity, the issue of agricultural trade and PCD is addressed separately, and after 
that I briefly discuss the main security issues as raised by the European Consensus.
36. The EU strongly supports a rapid, ambitious and pro-poor completion of 
the Doha Development Round and EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs). Developing countries should decide and reform trade policy in line with 
their broader national development plans. We will provide additional assistance 
to help poor countries build the capacity to trade. Particular attention will be paid 
to the least advanced and most vulnerable countries. The EU will maintain its 
work for properly sequenced market opening, especially on products of export 
interest for developing countries, underpinned by an open, fair, equitable, 
rules-based multilateral trading system that takes into account the interests 
and concerns of the weaker nations. The EU will address the issues of special 
and differential treatment and preference erosion with a view to promoting 
trade between developed countries and developing countries, as well as among 
developing countries. The EU will continue to promote the adoption by all 
developed countries of quota-free and tariff-free access for LDCs before the end 
of the Doha Round, or more generally.605
In this extract, the EU defines the overall trade and PCD setting in which it 
operates and exerts its normative influence. In this context, the EU positions 
itself as the generator of trading capacity, and the intercessor and promoter of 
603 Interview Council[28]2008.
604 See Sub-chapter 3.4.
605 The European Consensus, para. 37. Cf. Göteborg Presidency Conclusions 15 and 16 June 2001.
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pro-poor international trade between developing and developed countries, on 
the one hand, and between different developing country groups, on the other.606 
Even more notably, the EU expresses its strong support and commitment to 
work for properly sequenced market opening, upheld by the multilateral trading 
system, which is already portrayed in a highly idealistic way in terms describing 
it as “open, fair and equitable”, and thus appropriate to safeguard the various 
developmental interests of its poorer members. 
Whereas the MDG8 on Global Partnership for Development starts from the 
premise that the current trading system requires reform, and calls for further 
development of an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading 
and financial system, the European Consensus does not provide a vision of what 
setting up such a system would require. The European Consensus thus misses 
the chance to define what it regards as the features of pro-poor trade and how 
one gets to the stage of an “open, fair and equitable” rule-based trading system. 
In this regard, the EU position is more conservative than reformist. Equally 
noteworthy is that, apart from mentioning developing countries’ debt problem, 
the European Consensus does not discuss the financial system at all. On the 
other hand, the Union expresses its full commitment to the EPA negotiations, 
which shifts the focus, at least symbolically in this case, from the multilateral 
to the bilateral level, also given the fact that the EU and ACP countries together 
form a substantial group of 104 countries out of the 151 WTO members in 2005. 
Again, the focus is on the developing countries’ own performance as the text 
explicitly states that “developing countries should decide and reform trade 
policy”. There are no such imperatives regarding the EU as a trading partner 
or the multilateral system as such. Importantly, however, the development 
policy expresses the willingness to provide additional (ODA) support to build 
the trading capacity of poor countries. This promise materialised in the Aid for 
Trade pledges in 2007 and as an incentive to proceed with the EPA negotiations. 
The process of trade liberalisation that the EU promotes at the WTO and in 
the EPA negotiations is defined with attributes such as rapid, ambitious and 
pro-poor. In this regard, the text does not include a single critical reference or 
concern that could be related to the trade and development interface, which 
differs from the more cautious approach in the other text chapters on policy 
coherence for development. Additionally, trade is considered most important 
in terms of focus and space.607 In the European Consensus Statement, the EU 
vision of achieving policy coherence for development is largely based on the 
606 The European Consensus, para. 36, lines 8-10. 
607 The European Consensus, para. 36. On alternative views on the WTO system and trade rules, see 
e.g. Stiglitz & Charlton 2005. On NGO insights into EPA and development goals, see. e.g. Oxfam 
2006. 
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assumptions and premises that can be derived directly from the EC’s trade 
policy of the time.608 
In this respect, it is safe to assume that the Council Conclusions of May 2001 
defining the EU position on the Doha Development Round have had a visible 
impact as the wording here is almost identical.609 Although it is logical and 
rational to refer to a text that has already been adopted at the highest level of 
the Union, it nevertheless poses a problem for the Consensus on development 
in two respects. First, taking the Common Union stand as the starting point, 
without defining it further from the development policy perspective, misses 
an important opportunity to set a development policy-led agenda for these 
processes. Second, the almost unconditional support is risky, as the end 
results were not foreseen at that point and there was no certainty of a positive 
development outcome of any kind.  
Regarding policy coherence for development, a crucial question is how 
the trade negotiations and the trade policy goals relate to the development 
policy goals of poverty reduction. The EU’s position presumes an automatic 
and positive link between these goals. There is no elaboration between the 
multidimensional aspects of poverty and the PCD chapter on trade that would 
invite discussion on the kind of trade policy that would be needed to answer the 
“development challenge”. Also in this respect, the development policy statement 
accepts the institutional structures as well as the trade rules as the normative 
point of reference to which the developing countries need to adapt. This is 
envisioned to take place with the help of the Union, both through development 
aid (particularly Aid for Trade; not named but referred to in the text) and trade 
policy. The EU reinforces this claim by promising additional assistance to build 
trading capacity, and uses the personal pronoun We to highlight the unified 
stance behind this promise. 
To persuade developing countries to embark on the trade policy reform, 
the EU confirms that it will maintain its work for properly sequenced market 
opening, especially where products of export interest for developing countries 
are concerned.610 This formulation gives an impression that the market opening 
is not entirely in the hands of the EU itself, and the text does not specify what 
is actually meant by “properly sequenced opening”, and in relation to what it 
should be defined. 
608 The assumptions include the positive impacts of liberalised trade and integration into the world 
economy for the developing countries, i.e. growth and an increase in welfare through trade, 
the role of foreign direct investment, a focus on external trade, a strong private sector and 
modern market system supported by an effective but narrow state. On the free trade paradigm 
in particular, see Sen 2005. 
609 Council Conclusions May 2001.
610 Ibid. para. 36, lines 5-8. 
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To set the paragraph in the context of the EPA process to which it explicitly 
refers, we must bear in mind the history and changes regarding the trade 
provisions of the preferential agreements basically since the association 
agreement of the Treaty of Rome and the first GATT agreement. This is because 
the question concerning the future of the non-reciprocal trade preferences 
was once again at the heart of the EPA negotiations, as will be discussed in 
Chapter 6. Significantly, the issue of reciprocity is not brought up at all in 
the European Consensus context even though the EU promises to address 
special and differential treatment in the text. In addition, the text does not 
include references to possible developmental concerns beyond the issues of 
market access for the poorer countries and with specific regard to the EPAs, 
asymmetry and flexibility in the implementations of the envisioned reciprocal 
FTA agreements. By the same token, crucial issues such as rules of origin 
(RoOs), Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) or SPS standards are not referred 
to (cf. Sub-chapter 4.3). In addition, the questions of special and differential 
treatment and preference erosion are mentioned as issues to be addressed in 
the North-South and South-South trade relations with a view to promoting 
such trade, but the question of how special and differential treatment will be 
provided to benefit the poorer countries is left unspecified. Interestingly, by 
speaking about preference erosion, the EU draws a parallel between erosion 
as it occurs in nature and the conscious policies of trade liberalisation, which 
have diminished the importance of trade preferences as the tariff levels go down 
multilaterally. 
Regarding market access, the text points to the duty-free, quota-free access 
which the EU adopted in the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative launched in 
2001. However, related to the EBAs, we can see a clear norm that the EU seeks 
to consolidate in the WTO context, as the EU suggests that a similar policy 
should be adopted by all developed countries vis-à-vis the least-developed 
countries at the WTO Doha Round and beyond. Continuing along the normative 
lines, another important feature is the issue of flexibility and asymmetry which, 
according to the text, should be in line with the development needs in the 
implementation of the EPAs. But the EU development policy does not set any 
parameters or make any suggestions on what this should imply in practice for 
the first round of EPA negotiations (at that time) or for locking-in the trade 
provisions to the EPA agreements prior to the implementation phase. 
What is also worth noting is that this commitment is not actually under the 
control of development policy actors as the EPAs fall under the trade competency 
as the implementation schedules are included in the FTA agreements. The legal 
aspects, for instance in the case of noncompliance, are by the same token in the 
hands of DG trade and the respective EU Council. Ultimately, disagreements 
concerning the implementation can be referred to the WTO dispute settlement 
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system. In this sense again, the question arises on whether the development 
policy statement as endorsed by the Commission president commits both 
development and trade policy actors alike. I will return to this issue below in 
the discussion on the development dimension of the EPAs. 
Agricultural Protectionism/Liberalisation and 
Policy Coherence for Development
Within the framework of the reformed Common AgriculturePolicy (CAP), the 
EU will substantially reduce the level of trade distortion related to its support 
measures to the agricultural sector, and facilitate developing countries’ 
agricultural development. In line with development needs, the EU supports the 
objectives of asymmetry and flexibility for the implementation of the EPAs. The 
EU will continue to pay particular attention to the development objectives of the 
countries with which the Community has or will agree fisheries agreements.611
In this context of the development and trade nexus, the issue of Common 
Agricultural Policy reform and its implications for PCD merit a closer look. 
From the developing countries’ point of view, this policy, with its strong 
protectionist elements, has been detrimental on the whole as it has included 
import quotas and high tariffs, which have limited market access for developing 
country exports, as well as subsidies, giving rise to overproduction, which in 
turn has both depressed world prices for agricultural products and caused 
export surges to fragile local markets in developing countries.612 In light of 
this, liberalisation of the CAP could be seen as an element of increased policy 
coherence for development as well as something that could markedly improve 
the consistency of the EU’s external action in the WTO.613
As a result of international and domestic pressures on the CAP and its 
subsequent reforms, there has been a shift away from the mechanisms 
supporting the prices the producers get from their produce towards direct 
income support. The latter would also ensure compatibility with the World 
Trade Organization’s rules for Agricultural Trade under the Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA).614 Regarding the international pressures triggering the 
611 The European Consensus, para. 36.
612 Hix 2005: 283.
613 See Daugbjerk and Swinbank 2009.
614 However, the organisation of power and interest within the so-called “iron triangle” of EU 
agriculture, meaning the ministers, agriculture officials in the Commission and European-level 
farming interests, have largely been able to prolong the status quo of prevailing price support 
mechanisms, and hence to maintain the high level of  resource allocation for agricultural subsidies 
within the EU. Hix 2005: 283-285; O’Shaughnessy 2006: 149.
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CAP reform, the agricultural trading system regulated by the WTO demands 
reform of domestic support mechanisms insofar as they are considered to 
be as trade-distorting, which the EU development policy text also points to. 
The mechanisms that were considered to be trade-distorting are categorised 
as belonging to the so-called “Amber Box615”, along with measures that are 
presumed to have an effect on production and are taken to be trade-distorting, 
such as the CAP’s price support. 
However, the EU, together with many other OECD countries, has been 
able to maintain its level of high subsidies in the international setting as well, 
despite the fact that the EU urges strong support for liberalisation of the world 
market and protection of developing countries’ interests in the WTO and Doha 
Development Round.616 As Stiglitz and Charlton (2005) point out, for instance, 
despite the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, the subsidies given to developed 
countries’ agriculture have actually increased rather than decreased since the 
Uruguay Round and with the establishment of the WTO rules on agriculture.617 
This is due to the fact that the AoA has allowed room for the developed countries, 
and particularly the EU, to maintain high domestic support by shifting the 
means from price-based subsidies, which are considered “trade-distorting”, to 
direct payments to farmers, and other “indirect” subsidies that are exempted 
from the WTO reduction discipline. Thus, the EU has been able to maintain the 
substance of its CAP under the WTO as well, by shifting “Amber Box subsidies” 
to the “Blue” and “Green Boxes”, where these types of permissible subsidies 
are located.618 
When it comes to the question of the reduction of trade-distorting 
agricultural export subsidies, there is a similar, conservative pattern. Although 
615 Amber Box subsidies have to be reduced by 20% for developed countries and 13% for developing 
countries. Developing countries have committed to a programme and schedule of liberalising 
their agriculture sector, similar to developed countries, the only concession being slightly lower 
reduction rates and a slightly longer time schedule. 
616 According to Khor (2006), these kinds of measures leading to selected protectionism are made 
possible by the in-built flaws of the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). Namely, when 
the latter was established in 1995 together with the WTO itself, it was expected to be able to 
reduce Northern subsidies and, in so doing, to benefit developing countries and reduce poverty 
through agricultural production. However, from the point of view of developing countries, these 
expectations are yet to be fulfilled. The LDCs do not have to reduce their tariffs or subsidies, but 
cannot raise them.
617 Stiglitz & Charlton 2005: 112. 
618 In practice, however, the Blue and Green Box subsidies also have significant effects on the market 
and trade, in particular by creating surges of EU exports to many of the developing countries. 
Therefore, even if the nature of the subsidy has changed from price support to income support, 
the end result stays largely the same. Namely, the agricultural products originating from the EU 
can still be exported at low prices without any consequences for EU farm income. 
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WTO members agreed in the Hong Kong (2005) ministerial to eliminate all 
agricultural export subsidies by 2013 as part of the Doha Development Round, 
and that a “substantial” number of subsidies should be abolished by 2010, 
in practice, although this commitment has been made, it is still subject to 
parallel commitments for other types of export subsidies from other developed 
countries. In this respect, the EU’s role as a PCD norm-setter in the positive 
sense is rather dubious. 
To sum up, the CAP reform has been too modest and consequently has not 
succeeded in removing the incoherence between the EU’s agricultural policy 
and the development policy objective of poverty eradication. In this context, the 
moves the EU has made within the space permitted by the current WTO rules 
show that the EU intends to limit its CAP reform as well as its efforts at policy 
coherence for development to the minimum necessary to comply with the WTO 
rules. As we can see here, the motivations do not spring from the development 
policy objectives as such, but from the overall trade policy consistency and the 
multilateral liberalisation commitment. What needs to be noted, of course, is 
the WTO single undertaking principle, which makes it possible to continue with 
the old rules until new agreements on each negotiating sector are reached.619 On 
the other hand, this situation could also provide the EU with a possibility to set 
an example in terms of setting normative standards before the trade agreement 
is in place. By the same token, non-action, namely maintaining the protectionist 
measures, can be read as a normative practice.  
The last sentence of the PCD and trade section of the Consensus defines 
the Union stance towards development and fisheries: “The EU will continue 
to pay particular attention to the development objectives of the countries with 
which the Community has or will agree fisheries agreements”.620 Again, the 
statement is left vague as the intention is not concretely defined. From the 
sustainable development perspective, the issue is of the utmost importance in 
terms of livelihoods, food security, export opportunities as well as maritime 
biodiversity. In addition, together with agriculture, the fisheries policy is one 
of the areas that have been identified as requiring the most improvement in 
policy coherence for development terms. In addition, over-fishing jeopardises 
all these possibilities. Bretherton & Vogler (2009: 86) point to the fact that 
the Commission had acknowledged in 2001 that the Common Fisheries Policy 
is “partly responsible for over-exploitation of the fishing grounds of some 
third countries”. 621 From a general trade policy point of view again, Gibbon 
(2010) points to the serious market access obstacles due to the rules of origin 
619 Odell 2006.
620 The European Consensus, para. 37.
621 Bretherton & Vogler 2009: 86. 
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in this sector that limit developing countries’ possibilities to benefit from these 
resources. 
In this regard, the European Consensus offers an important reference for 
further discussions, but misses the opportunity to push forward a development 
policy vision in line with sustainable development. The following excerpts 
illustrate the disappointment with the final outcome as regards the development 
and trade interface.
This whole question of globalisation and trade (…) in 2005 you still had very 
optimistic thinking on the Doha Round and that trade per se is always positive 
(…) the trade chapter is very disappointing, very conventional (…) but the EU 
builds on a free market and trade, so it is very difficult to question it in any 
context.622   
The Consensus was out in 2005 while the DL for EPAs was still two years away. By 
that time, you could see that there were problems and that there were people that 
could see that we were heading for a clash, but you could not be absolutely sure 
what would happen. It was in mid-2007 that you could see that this was a disaster 
and the Africans states would try to block it. So I would think that it was really a 
question of timing. You will find critics that saw it coming much earlier (…) but 
there were also people who thought that we would sort it out somehow, we would 
find a compromise, and after all, people have different views on these things.623 
On the other hand, and somewhat paradoxically, it was not the issue of trade in 
itself that was considered so crucial, but rather the combination of the ongoing 
trade-related processes that gave trade this central position in the European 
Consensus statement. 
If the Consensus was formulated today, I do not think that trade would be that 
high; it could have been migration (…) or climate change.624
Policy Coherence for Development and Security 
The second main element of the PCD section of the statement deals with 
development and the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Insecurity 
and violent conflicts are seen as being amongst the biggest obstacles to 
achieving the MDGs. Security and development are defined as important 
622 Interview EP[3]2009.
623 Interview Academia[21]2008. 
624 Interview Council[28]2009.
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and complementary, vital for breaking the vicious cycle of poverty, war, 
environmental degradation and failing economic, political and social 
structures.625 Compared to the trade policy and PCD text, in this context the 
EU defines its own responsibility more clearly, particularly with respect to the 
control of arms exports. On the other hand, the formulation of the text reflects 
the sensitivity of the subject, which is still largely a competence of individual 
member states.  
37. Insecurity and violent conflict are amongst the biggest obstacles to achieving 
the MDGs. Security and development are important and complementary 
aspects of EU relations with third countries. Within their respective actions, 
they contribute to creating a secure environment and breaking the vicious cycle 
of poverty, war, environmental degradation and failing economic, social and 
political structures. The EU, within the respective competences of the Community 
and the Member States, will strengthen the control of its arms exports, with 
the aim of avoiding that EU-manufactured weaponry be used against civilian 
populations or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in developing countries, 
and take concrete steps to limit the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and 
light weapons, in line with the European strategy against the illicit traffic of small 
arms and light weapons and their ammunitions. The EU also strongly supports 
the responsibility to protect. We cannot stand by, as genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing or other gross violations of international humanitarian law and human 
rights are committed. The EU will support a strengthened role for the regional 
and sub-regional organisations in the process of enhancing international peace 
and security, including their capacity to coordinate donor support in the area of 
conflict prevention.626
Following the joint EU commitment to strengthen the control of arms exports 
and the illicit trafficking of small arms, the EU expresses its support for the 
UN-led consensus (2005) on the responsibility to protect principle.627 
The text continues by connecting this principle with humanitarian law and 
human rights, and states that the EU, referred to by the personal pronoun 
We, cannot stand by as gross violations against humanitarian law and human 
rights are committed. In addition to this strong moral plea, the EU pledges 
625 The European Consensus, para. 37, lines 1-5. Cf. European Security Strategy 2003.
626 Ibid. para. 37. 
627 See the official formulation of: Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity: 138. http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement
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to support regional and sub-regional organisations to enhance international 
peace and security, in which context capacity-building to coordinate donors 
is mentioned. Worded in this way, the moral plea for EU involvement leads to 
the question of whether supporting regional organisations is the alternative to 
“standing by” as violations are committed. As the text states that the regional 
organisations are also expected to raise their capacity to coordinate donors, 
including the EU itself, this coordination task conflicts with their primary 
function of enhancing peace and security. On the other hand, the text leaves 
room for a positive interpretation according to which the EU recognises that 
the regional organisations are the best experts in their own security. This 
alternative, however, leaves the EU’s own position open and limited to the 
EU commitment to control arms exports. The EU position does not exclude 
the possibility of action in cases of violations of humanitarian law and human 
rights, although the EU does not commit itself to act. 
Finally, the last paragraph on PCD names other key sectors that are of 
particular relevance for sustainable development and poverty reduction. These 
comprise the social dimension of globalisation, migration and environmental 
issues, which could have been discussed in a similar manner to trade policy 
or security issues. Packaging them in a single paragraph automatically 
gives an impression of lesser political importance.628 For instance, the 
social dimension of globalisation is mentioned in just one sentence without 
any reference to international trading and economic systems. Regarding 
migration, the EU reassures readers by using the personal pronoun We that 
it “will strive to make migration a positive force for development through 
promoting concrete measures including facilitating remittances and limiting 
brain drain”. Compared to the potential power of EU countries’ migration 
policies, facilitating remittances is a rather modest, albeit important, measure. 
Limiting brain drain is mentioned without referring to its positive antonym 
of brain gain.629
With respect to environmental concerns, three themes are mentioned: 
unsustainable consumption and production, multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs) and climate change. Here, too, the EU position is distant 
from the root causes of these concerns. In the text, the EU states that it will lead 
global efforts to curb unsustainable consumption and production patterns, and 
as a group referred to by the personal pronoun We, the EU will assist developing 
countries in implementing MEAs, and promote pro-poor environmental-related 
initiatives. Although there has been a heated debate on the MEAs in relation to 
WTO rules, no references are made to the potential multilateral dimension of 
628 Ibid. para. 38.
629 Ibid. para. 38, lines 3-5.
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PCD. And lastly, the EU reaffirms its commitment to combat climate change, 
as if climate change was an external threat and not a result of human action, 
also and particularly in the European Union.630  
From “Harnessing Globalisation” to “Addressing Global Challenges”
“The EU vision of development” concludes with Chapter 7, entitled “Development, 
a contribution to addressing global challenges”. It presents a description of the 
role of development policy in this context. As discussed in Chapter 4, the idea 
of addressing EU development policy as a tool to harness globalisation was 
first coined by then Trade Commissioner Lamy and put forward by the DG 
Development in the Commission proposal. In the European Consensus, the first 
paragraph speaks about the EU’s pro-development activities which, in the EU’s 
view, are important in counterbalancing globalisation. 
39. EU action for development, centred on the eradication of poverty in the context 
of sustainable development, makes an important contribution to optimising the 
benefits and sharing the costs of the globalisation process more equitably for 
developing countries, which is in the interests of wider peace and stability, and 
the reduction of the inequalities that underlie many of the principal challenges 
facing our world. A major challenge the international community must face today 
is to ensure that globalisation is a positive force for all of mankind.631
The concluding paragraph of the European vision of development outlines the 
role of development and development policy in the context of global challenges. 
This paragraph is particularly interesting because it sets out a dual task for 
development policy which is based on a strong assumption about the power 
vested in this policy area. First, it assumes that the Union’s development 
policy is in a position to make an important contribution to addressing global 
challenges. Thus development policy is presented as a powerful instrument for 
global governance in terms of optimising the benefits and sharing the costs of 
the globalisation process. In order to be in this position, it is assumed that the 
actual impact of the policy is commensurate with the task. 
In other words, the Union counts strongly on the capacity of the development 
policy to deliver on its own objectives centred on the eradication of poverty in 
the context of sustainable development. This would imply that development 
aid and policy coherence for development truly work not only to attain the 
primary objective of poverty eradication, but also to perform a redistributive 
630 Ibid. para. 38.
631 Ibid. para. 39.
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role in globalisation. Furthermore, the rationale for this additional assignment 
envisioned by the text is based on the interests of peace and stability, not on 
equality in terms of social justice or poverty reduction for the sake of improving 
the lives of the world’s poor. 
However, as I have argued previously, from the point of view of sustainable 
development and poverty reduction, the EU’s activities are not as unambiguous 
as the text suggests. In the text, the EU argues that inequalities underlie many 
of the principle challenges of the world, and hints that the globalisation process 
in its present form has actually served to increase these inequalities. However, 
describing globalisation as an impersonal process and force, without referring 
to social actors and institutions, gives the EU a passive role which masks its 
actual power and responsibility in global governance. Consequently, the EU 
states that “the international community has to face the challenge of ensuring 
that globalisation works for all of mankind” without casting itself as an actor in 
this community. Instead, the EU envisages governing the effects of globalisation 
through development policy and not globalisation per se. However, the wording 
“ensuring that globalisation works for all of mankind” suggests that this 
process is governable after all. What is interesting here is why the EU proposes 
development policy for this task when there are other, better-placed policies 
that could set the rules for global economy and trade, for instance. 
In a somewhat controversial manner, the section on development and 
globalisation concludes with arguments on development which simultaneously 
highlight the importance of poverty reduction and sustainable development 
in their own right, but then link the importance of development objectives 
to other development-related global concerns of security, migration and the 
environment. First, the text points to the vicious cycle of poverty and insecurity 
by stating that: 
Achieving the MDGs is also in the interest of collective and individual long-
term peace and security. Without peace and security, development and poverty 
eradication are not possible, and without development and poverty eradication, 
no sustainable peace will occur.632 
This paragraph can be read as a response to the European security strategy 
of 2003, emphasising again the importance of development aspects in this 
equation, which the security policy actors within the Union were trying to 
appropriate.633 Second, the text continues by reaffirming that the EU sees that 
development is also the most effective long-term response to forced and illegal 
632 Ibid. para. 40, lines 1-4. 
633 Interviews EC[30]2009 and EC[34]2009.
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migration and trafficking of human beings. Third, development plays a key role 
in encouraging sustainable production and consumption patterns that limit the 
harmful consequences of growth for the environment.634 
As discussed in the theoretical chapter, “Development” as such does not 
provide a shortcut to sustainable production and consumption patterns 
although there is a connection regarding poverty and the environment, but it 
needs to be specified. Even more importantly, the EU does not hark back to 
its own role in this context in terms of its own production and consumption 
patterns, which are on a totally different scale compared to those of its poorer 
partners. Furthermore, it can be argued that developing countries have a right 
to growth, but it is the responsibility of developed countries to compensate for 
the harmful consequences of growth in developing countries by changing their 
own patterns of production and consumption.635 The EU statement does not 
connect its arguments to a larger sustainable development context, nor does it 
present criteria for sustainability. In this sense, the Union puts a lot of faith in 
technological progress in developing countries, while disconnecting it from the 
economic structures that underpin globalisation. 
5.5 EUROPEAN COMMUNITy DEVELOPMENT 
POLICy: PCD AND TRADE ASPECTS 
Part II of the European Consensus on Development presents the revised 
European Community Development Policy with a view to defining the EC’s 
role in the implementation of the joint vision as presented above. Whereas 
in the first part of the Consensus the emphasis was more on the overall 
normative framework for the whole Union, this section is designed to explore 
the operational aspects regarding the EC’s task in development policy and 
its interaction with developing countries. This includes priority-setting for 
development programmes at the country and regional levels, and guiding the 
planning and implementation of development assistance and cooperation 
strategies. In this respect, I look briefly at the particular sections on policy 
coherence for development in this context, as well as trade as an area of 
Community action. As regards the former, PCD is brought up again in the 
preamble to EC Development and in three different paragraphs of the text. In 
particular, the PCD component is presented as a part of paragraph 1, “Particular 
Role and Comparative Advantage of the Community”, as well as in the specific 
section 3.5 on implementing PCD commitments.  
634 Ibid. para. 40, lines 4-6.
635 World Commission on Environment and Development 1987: 31-32, 5-54; Baker 2006: 1-5.
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A couple of intriguing comparisons can be made at the outset between 
this final European Consensus text and the Commission proposal that was 
issued prior to the UK Presidency (see Sub-chapter 4.2). The first has to do 
with the role of the Commission in development policy in general, while the 
second relates to the Commission’s role in safeguarding policy coherence for 
development in particular. Regarding the former, the Commission proposal 
designates Part II of the envisioned European development policy as Guidelines 
for Implementing Development Policy by the Community, whereas the text 
keeps the EC Development Policy separate in the context of the European 
Consensus. This highlights the shared competence and distinct roles of the 
Community and the member states. The opening paragraph clearly states whose 
policies should lead the way and who should complement who.
41. Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation shall be 
complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States.636 
Furthermore, in the European Consensus text on the Community policy, the 
Commission promises to aim to provide added value through a number of roles. 
In the Commission proposal, the EC had taken a special role sui generis in 
international development based on its global presence and relationship with 
developing partners. It also claimed leadership in the development debate 
and harmonisation of the European development agenda.637 At the outset 
of its presidency, the UK made it clear that the Commission could play its 
role, but under the thumb of the member states’ supervision. Consequently, 
in the final text, the Commission bases its role on comparative advantage, 
namely, to enable the complementarity with bilateral policies. These roles 
are related to a number of tasks including global presence, ensuring PCD in 
Community actions, the promotion of best practices, facilitating coordination 
and harmonisation, delivery agent, promotion of democracy, human rights, 
good governance and respect for international law, with special attention paid 
to transparency and anti-corruption, promoter of civil society participation 
and, lastly, promotion of understanding of interdependency and North-South 
solidarity. By way of a critical note, however, each dimension reflects more of 
an ideal type of normative image that the Commission sought to have, rather 
than the prevailing reality. 
With particular regard to policy coherence for development, it is worth 
noting that in the Commission proposal, the EC did not see itself as the leading 
promoter of policy coherence as the final text portrays. Thus the Commission’s 
636 Ibid. para. 41.
637 COM(2005) 311 final: 14.
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role was significantly increased in this regard by the Council and the European 
Parliament. In this respect, one may ask whether the PCD watchdog role was 
given to the Commission because of its assumed capability to act as one, or 
just because the Council and the European Parliament considered the task too 
difficult and politically demanding for them. 
To make it more concrete, on behalf of the Community, the Commission is 
designed to provide added value by promoting the roles listed above. The text 
on PCD reads as follows:
49. Second, with the support of Member States, ensuring policy coherence for 
development in Community actions638, in particular where Community policies 
have significant impacts on developing countries, such as trade, agriculture, 
fisheries and migration policies, and promoting this principle more widely. 
Drawing on its own experiences, and exclusive competence in trade, the 
Community has a comparative advantage in providing support to partner 
countries to integrate trade into national development strategies and to support 
regional cooperation whenever possible.  [emphasis added]
According to this paragraph, the Commission has a special mandate to promote 
policy coherence for development with the support of member states. It is 
also recognised that the impact of Community policies is significant for the 
developing partners in the areas of trade, agriculture, fisheries and migration. 
The text also pledges that the Community will promote the principle beyond 
these designated contexts with a view to ensuring that the PCD principle 
is upheld. Notably, the text does not elaborate on what ensuring the PCD 
principle in these policy areas would entail. Instead, the PCD task is defined 
through one allegedly positive example from the area of trade policy regarding 
the EU’s own experience and integration (see below). Thus, the special role 
as a PCD promoter in this context stems from the EU’s own experience and 
exclusive competence in trade, which suggests that this knowledge can be 
transferred for the benefit of developing countries. According to the extract, 
this is to be achieved by integrating trade into national development strategies 
and supporting regional integration. Without explicitly questioning the 
usefulness of the EU’s own experience gained from the creation of the Single 
European Market and regional integration, this type of PCD framing shifts 
the focus away from the core question on the development and trade interface 
(as discussed in Sub-chapter 2.4). Namely, it deflects attention away from the 
policy coherence between the EU’s development and trade policies towards 
638 In all 12 areas set out in the May 2005 Council Conclusions and attached Communication on 
PCD. 
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recipients’ policies. Of course, the issue area is as broad as it is complex, but 
in this form it does not offer adequate reference to actual PCD promotion, as 
the focus is on the European model rather than on the measures directed to 
alleviate poverty. 
Further, the total absence of considerations about possible synergies, let 
alone problems related to trade or to any other nominated sectors, defines the 
Commission’srole as a PCD promoter in a very vague way. Also absent were 
considerations about any of the core questions on the development and trade 
agenda of the WTO Doha Round and bilateral trade agreements, for instance 
in terms of what the EU trade policy and trade agreement can do to promote 
development. How could the trade provisions be designed to benefit poorer 
countries, and can the EU assist multilateral trade cooperation in the WTO? In 
other words, how does the Commission integrate development objectives into 
its own trade strategies (and not only vice versa) so as to ensure greater policy 
coherence for development? 
Leaving aside the question of how transferable the EU’s experience is from 
the point of view of the poorer countries or the actual availability of knowledge 
or so-called “European experience” when national development strategies 
are drafted, perhaps more importantly here, there is a notable discrepancy in 
terms of the role of trade and the trade-related PCD in the first part of the 
European Consensus statement. First, the Consensus statement started with 
a definition of the Union as a “positive force for change” based precisely on 
its role in international development and trade. Further, the PCD chapter in 
the first part as adopted by the member states would have offered a basis for 
reflecting on the commitments made by the Commission as the promoter of 
PCD in these particular areas. At the very least, this could have reaffirmed the 
commitments in the Doha Development Round as well as in the Economic 
Partnership Agreements more specifically. Given that the second part of 
the European Consensus was designed to concretise the commitments for 
the EC, the opportunity to elaborate on them in sufficient detail was simply 
missed. Instead, again the main focus is on inter-institutional coordination 
and instruments without a clear indication of what political question will be 
addressed and what should be addressed from the point of view of European 
development policy and the attainment of the MDGs.
3.5 Policy coherence for development (PCD)
109. The Commission and Member States will prepare a rolling Work Programme 
on the implementation of the May 2005 Council Conclusions on PCD. This Work 
Programme will propose priorities for action; define the roles and responsibilities 
of the Council, Member States and Commission and set out sequencing and 
timetables, with the aim of ensuring that non-aid policies can assist developing 
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countries in achieving the MDGs. The Commission will reinforce its existing 
instruments, notably its impact assessment tool and consultations with developing 
countries during policy formulation and implementation, and considering new 
ones where necessary in support of a strengthened PCD.
Policy coherence for development in the context of trade as an area of Community 
action is further defined in a specific section on Trade and Regional Integration. 
These paragraphs elaborate on the intentions that shape the Union’s normative 
approach, which is then more concretely manifested in the process towards 
the “new trade provisions” under the Cotonou Agreement (EPAs) as well as in 
the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative. The main aspects include: assisting 
trade and regional integration, equitable and sustainable growth, integration 
into the world economy, linking trade and poverty reduction with a special 
focus on differentiation and the LDCs, as well as approximation to the EU single 
market standards. Interestingly, the Consensus provisions stress the differences 
and characteristics of the partner countries that the Union intends to take into 
account.639 Moving on from this puzzle as highlighted in the previous sections, I will 
now analyse more closely the picture of development and trade-related coherence 
that emerges from the process surrounding the Economic Partnership Agreements.
CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS
The main purpose of this chapter was to explore the elements of the European 
Consensus to better understand the normative model that the EU wishes to 
promote for global governance and its partners. In particular, I looked at the 
interrelationship with development and trade in the context of policy coherence, 
both at the Union (Part I) and at the EC (Part II) levels. 
I started with the discursive elements that emerge from the text. I then 
proceeded to deliberate on the use of discursive power as a source of the EU’s 
normative influence. Regarding the former, the European Consensus Statement 
constituted an instrument for conveying a preferred reading of the Union as 
a powerful agent in international development politics. It portrays a positive 
image of a unified EU which is both willing and able to act with a joint vision. It 
defines the roles and responsibilities of donor and recipient, as well as the policy 
objectives and the global context in which they are to be achieved. Importantly, 
the Union distances itself from poverty and defines it as a challenge to which 
it is capable of responding. The common values and principles both justify 
and direct this action. There are two kinds of means that the Union intends to 
639 Ibid. para. 72-74.
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deploy: more efficient and better development assistance and policy coherence 
for development. 
The role of aid is central. It constitutes something of a comfort zone where 
the EU does not hesitate to present its plan for “more and better aid”. The 
responsibilities are inclined towards the recipient end, while the donor role is 
marked with future intentions based on past progress rather than lessons learnt 
from its history as a donor or a partner. The idea of shared responsibility is key, 
and differs from Brundtland’s notion of shared but differentiated responsibility. 
The EU position draws heavily on past international achievements (i.e. Financing 
for development 2002, Paris Declaration of aid effectiveness 2005) to which the 
EU has certainly contributed, but again the idea of progress is not based on the 
evaluation of the EU’s action per se. In fact, a significant part of the European 
Consensus is written in response to these processes and their outcomes. On the 
other hand, it also expresses a key commitment to the governance for international 
development in these settings. Furthermore, the strong external dimension also 
supports the role of development policy within the EU system. However, the EU 
finds itself in the position of a “norm-taker” rather than a “norm-maker”. 
However, in the European Consensus, the EU did bring new elements to the 
international agenda, such as its approach to so-called “donor-orphans” and 
support for middle income countries, as well as its common conceptualisation 
of policy coherence for development. As regards “donor-orphans”, the EU 
commits itself to continuing cooperation and maintaining linkages regardless 
of the difficulties in the field. With the middle income countries, the issue is 
trickier. While a number of people living in poverty inhabit these countries, the 
jury is still out and divided on the question of whether aid should be directed 
there or focused on the LDCs. There is also an interesting discrepancy compared 
to the EU trade policy, which clearly differentiates between the treatment of 
LDCs and middle income countries.
The normative order that the EU suggests can be described as pro status quo. 
Rather than changing the international system, the emphasis of the EU action 
is on improving but maintaining the existing aid practices, without suggesting 
changes to the international system more widely. This also implies capacitating 
the recipients to participate in the present structures of development and trade 
politics, rather than changing the structures. Thus the EU discourse supports 
and naturalises the prevailing order. This approach is most evident in the 
Commission’s discourse, as the Commission speaks about “harnessing or 
addressing” the effects of globalisation through development policy.
 Firstly, and most crucially, the policy coherence question is framed as an 
administrative issue and not as a political one. Regarding development and 
trade, this was based on the shared Consensus on the benefits of market access 
and trade liberalisation in the EU, as well as on the positive assumed outcome 
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of the WTO Doha Development Round in this respect. On the other hand, there 
was no common, clear take on trade liberalisation in developing countries. 
Consequently, the European Consensus suggests that the possible incoherencies 
can be tackled administratively by improving mechanisms and procedures, 
rather than by opening PCD to the debate on what actually constitutes poverty-
reducing EU action in line with the development policy objectives of poverty 
eradication in different policy sectors and at different levels. 
The discursive framing is important because it then justifies the absence 
of long-debated political questions such as the role of fisheries, agriculture or 
reciprocity in trade liberalisation. More controversial items were simply left 
out or framed differently. Thus it erased the political dimension and diluted 
what was already presented in the specific EU communications on Millennium 
Development Goals preceding the Consensus in the spring of 2005. Importantly, 
the right to define what is likely to have an effect on the developing countries 
rests within the Union. 
In this respect, the policy coherence provisions were based on the ongoing 
process of trade liberalisation without, nota bene, the certainty of a positive 
development outcome. In addition, the PCD provisions on trade were not clear 
and strong enough to provide guidance on defining what at the minimum should 
be the result sought by the EU both multilaterally and bilaterally so as to make 
this comment a more concrete one. In part, this can be explained by the lack 
of obligation and will to challenge the Commission competence in trade. For 
DG Development, it was important to demonstrate Commission unity, while the 
member states had already adopted a very optimistic stance towards the WTO 
Round in the Presidency Conclusions in June 2001. Therefore, the member states 
had already internalised the language describing the WTO Doha Round and its 
importance to development, which was then moved to the Consensus document 
without reflecting the positions and questions in the ongoing negotiations. This 
text was taken as the basis for the PCD and trade paragraph as it was also in line 
with the interests of the UK. This was a practical, yet risky solution given that 
there were no guarantees that the bilateral and multilateral negotiations would 
be concluded successfully and result in an outcome – let alone in an outcome that 
could be considered beneficial for poorer countries. On the negative side, this was 
a missed opportunity to present a development-oriented trade policy that could 
have simultaneously guided the three institutions. It also gave these processes a 
priori legitimacy that was not necessarily commensurate with what was taking 
place in the actual negotiations. This also made it more difficult to present any 
critical alternatives as the trade negotiations started to unfold. Interestingly, the 
European Consensus defines PCD as one of the key areas of the EC comparative 
advantage. This is an issue that I will return to in the following chapter. 
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6 THE LIMITS Of POLICy COHERENCE  
IN TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
In this chapter, I shift the primary focus from development policy to trade 
policy. In so doing, I move on to analyse what happened on the trade side of 
the fence during the development momentum, and even more importantly, how 
policy coherence for development came to be understood there. More precisely, 
I focus on those elements in the EU trade framework that the European 
Commission and the Council have defined as conducive to poverty reduction 
and sustainable development. These include the WTO Doha Development 
Round (2001-), the EU Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the 78 
ACP countries (2002-) and the EU trade policy “Global Europe”(2006). All 
of these illustrate the workings of both discursive and institutional power in 
the trade and development nexus as outlined by Barnett and Duvall’s (2005) 
theoretical framework. 
My main purpose is to show how the limits of policy coherence were drawn 
in this context and to analyse how the trade actors conceptualised policy 
coherence for development. Making these limits more visible and explicit 
helps us to understand the interrelationship between development and trade 
policy in practice. Ultimately, it also shows who has the power to define policy 
coherence for development and how the sustainable development value is 
instrumentalised in the development and trade interface.
I start with the development hype at the WTO level and the Doha Development 
Round that led to the international consensus on sustainable development. I also 
analyse this consensus against the heritage of the WTO system and the question 
of power in the international trade negotiations. In particular, I look at the EU’s 
stance in this context, which became decisive in the conceptualisation of the 
Economic Partnership Agreements (Sub-chapter 6.1). From the multilateral 
level, I move on to the emerging web of the EU’s bilateral free trade agreements 
and the overall trade policy coherence (Sub-chapter 6.2). In Sub-chapter 6.3, I 
continue to explore how development policy coherence was taken into account 
in the EU’s main trade policy framework of “Global Europe” (2006) and how 
the EPAs were conceptualised within this setting. To take a step back from this 
chosen free trade agreement model for the EPAs, in Sub-chapter 6.4 I show 
how the format for the EPAs was one political choice out of many options. In 
this regard, I also discuss the views of DG DEV (while still in charge of EU-ACP 
trade) as well as those of DG Trade, the Council and the EP. Finally, I present 
the main features that constitute the EPA and subsequently the EU’s model to 
deliver on both development and trade commitments. 
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Taken together, the limits of multilateral and bilateral processes and the 
EU’s trade policy in general define the boundaries of the EU’s approach to policy 
coherence for development. Hence they also inform social practices in the sense 
that Fairclough uses that term to describe the process of naturalisation of a 
particular rationale while rejecting others. These also include the respective 
norms that the EU puts forward by consolidating and promoting its view on 
trade and development in global governance.
6.1 THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT ROUND: 
EXPECTATIONS AND REALITy 
In order to understand the EU’s conceptualisation of policy coherence for 
development in trade and development, it is necessary reflect it against the larger 
background of international trade. Therefore, the purpose of this sub-chapter is 
to analyse the premises and the principal ideas of the Doha Development Round 
for trade governance, particularly in relation to sustainable development and 
poverty eradication objectives. In this sense, it explains the international trade 
context in which the European Consensus and the ACP-EU Economic Partnership 
were created. Importantly, it analyses the institutional power dimension that 
shapes the governance of international trade in terms of prevailing norms and 
their makers in the preceding Uruguay Round (1986-1994). It also explores the 
EU’s role during the early years of the Doha Round (2001-2005). 
The WTO Doha Development Round and the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA) formed an essential link in the continuum of global events of the early 
2000s. Additionally, from the perspective of international trade, the Millennium 
Summit (New York 2000) advanced the idea of global partnership for 
development (MDG8) and improving the global trading system for developing 
countries more generally (Millennium Declaration). By the same token, the 
Financing for Development Conference and its outcome (Monterrey 2002) also 
highlighted the importance of resources in increasing developing countries’ 
trading capacity, and the key outcome of the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) in 2002 – the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation 
(JPOI) – was rather loyal in its adoption of the WTO language on trade and 
sustainable development.640 
The spirit of the momentum was crystallised in Article 2 of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration, which affirmed the grand aspirations expressed at the 
Millennium Summit. 
640 For a lengthier comparison of the intersecting Doha and WSSD agendas, see Sampson 2005: 
38-51.
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International trade can play a major role in the promotion of economic 
development and the alleviation of poverty. We recognize the need for all our 
peoples to benefit from the increased opportunities and welfare gains that 
the multilateral trading system generates. The majority of WTO members are 
developing countries. We seek to place their needs and interests at the heart of 
the Work Programme adopted in this Declaration.641 [emphasis added]
We strongly reaffirm our commitment to the objective of sustainable development, 
as stated in the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement [establishing the WTO]. 
We are convinced that the aims of upholding and safeguarding an open and 
non-discriminatory multilateral trading system, and acting for the protection of 
the environment and the promotion of sustainable development can and must 
be mutually supportive.642 [emphasis added]
This endeavour to promote trade liberalisation and sustainable development 
needed an institutional network connecting the governance systems for 
economics, environment and social issues.643 At the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg 2002, this idea was also strongly 
endorsed by Pascal Lamy, the then EU Trade Commissioner. In his speech on 
global governance, he explained these linkages.
… I would see the World Trade Organization as the commercial pillar of global 
governance, with finance as another and the set of rules and co-operation schemes, 
which deal with social development and environmental protection as a third 
one. And global governance is about coherence between the three pillars: Doha 
– Monterrey – Johannesburg! Trade liberalization without financial assistance 
and without multilateral, social and environmental norms would neither achieve 
North-South convergence, nor sustainable management of natural resources. 
Trade is not, nota bene, an end in itself, but as a means to an end it can be a 
very powerful tool for development if we get the conditions right … 644 [emphasis 
added]
In fact, the World Summit on Sustainable Development (2002) also resulted in 
an outcome in which participants agreed on promoting “mutual supportiveness” 
between sustainable development and trade liberalisation.645 In turn, this made 
641 Article 2. Doha Declaration.
642 Article 6. Doha Declaration.
643 Ivanova 2005: 46-47.
644 Lamy 12.4. 2002, addressing the World Summit on Sustainable Development Johannesburg. 
645 Ayre & Callway, 2005: 15-16.
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it possible for the World Trade Organization to take an even stronger role as one 
of the key promoters of “sustainable development”, while advancing its main 
agenda of trade liberalisation.646 This intertwining of sustainable development 
and trade liberalisation was in line with the Marrakesh Agreement that defined 
the normative foundation of the World Trade Organization. The opening 
paragraph of the Marrakesh Agreement embraced the idea that the founding 
Parties to the WTO organization should act in accordance with sustainable 
development. 
The Parties to this Agreement, 
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should 
be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment 
and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, 
and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing 
for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of 
sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment 
and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective 
needs and concerns at different levels of economic development …647
Yet, the interpretation of sustainable development in the Marrakesh Agreement 
was stretched to accommodate, for instance, expanding the production of goods 
and services without any reference to planetary limitations. At the same time, 
it was acknowledged that trade liberalisation has not automatically promoted 
sustainable development and that the potentiality depended on a host of factors. 
Again, in Lamy’s words:
Nonetheless, trade opening is neither natural nor automatically beneficial, in 
and of itself. It needs a system based on rules coupled with adequate domestic 
policies. Since the creation of the GATT, some important steps have been taken 
towards construction of this system and we can be proud of them. But there 
remains a lot to do; hence the launching of the new multilateral trade Round in 
Doha in 2001. 
… We learn more from our failures than from our successes, as ever. To surmount 
the difficulties confronting the WTO, it must adapt. To achieve this, the WTO 
must better integrate its work in the landscape of actors, states and international 
governance organizations …648
646 On the WTO as a promoter of sustainable development, see Sampson 2005.
647 The opening paragraph of the WTO Marrakesh Agreement.
648 Lamy 2005 foreword to Sampson 2005. 
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In response to the Doha Development Agenda, the key document of the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), the Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation (JPOI), departs from the Doha discourse on “opportunities 
and challenges of globalization” and stresses the importance of acting so as to 
make globalisation “fully inclusive and equitable”. In this respect, needs and 
interests and market access become the key to sustainable development.
47. …. This will require urgent action at all levels to:
(a) Continue to promote open, equitable, rules-based, predictable and non-
discriminatory multilateral trading and financial systems that benefit all countries 
in the pursuit of sustainable development. Support the successful completion 
of the work programme contained in the Doha Ministerial Declaration and the 
implementation of the Monterrey Consensus. Welcome the decision contained in 
the Doha Ministerial Declaration to place the needs and interests of developing 
countries at the heart of the work programme of the Declaration, including 
through enhanced market access for products of interest to developing 
countries;…649 [emphasis added]
… Review all special and differential treatment provisions with a view to 
strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational, 
in accordance with paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.650 
Hence, at the core of the Doha Development discourse, especially in more liberal 
industrialised countries, there was an emerging consensus on moving towards 
fairer global trade whereby the gains from global trade liberalisation and 
international trade could be more equally balanced (cf. European Consensus 
para. 36). This front was supported by the developing countries, which saw 
that improved market access would benefit their economies immediately. On 
the other hand, the Least Developed Countries were “protected” by Special and 
Differential Treatment that would absolve them of reciprocity. Regarding this, 
paragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration called for a review of all SDT provisions 
“with a view to strengthening them and making them more precise, effective 
and operational”.651 Indeed, the “Development” epithet was put forward by 
the European Union in recognition of the importance of the Least Developed 
Countries in these talks.652 
649 Johannesburg Plan of Implementation 2002, para. 47.
650 Johannesburg Plan of Implementation 2002, para. 92a.
651 Keck and Low 2006: 152.
652 Balaam 2004: 172.
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This line of thinking was grounded in a body of research from the top of 
the institutional hierarchy, especially by the World Bank and the OECD, which 
demonstrated how international trade could benefit all if trade barriers were 
removed.653 In this debate, Sampson (2005) and Ismail (2006) refer to Word 
Bank estimations whereby liberalisation of merchandise trade with supportive 
domestic policies would result in gains of around 5 per cent of income in 
developing countries, and lift 300 million people out of poverty by 2015. It was 
argued further that no other international economic cooperation – debt relief 
or aid – held this type of promise.654 With the liberalisation of services, the 
impact was argued to be even stronger. Nonetheless, these benefits required 
proper national policies, institutions, income distribution and social policies. 
655  This type of framing soon became very influential in the debates on trade 
liberalisation and development objectives in the development momentum, 
as noted in the European Consensus as well. However, what was intended as 
“potentiality” became an almost indisputable fact in the political discourses 
on trade and development. The international consensus also masked the 
problematic heritage of the Uruguay Round in some way. In fact, the difficulties 
in launching the next round of trade talks before Doha manifested the gap 
between the optimistic discourse and the work that remained to be done. 
At the heart of the matter was the question of developing countries’ treatment 
in international trade that related to the institutional rules and practices. By the 
end of the Uruguay Round (1986-1994), the name of the international trading 
game had shifted remarkably as developing countries had assumed a much 
higher level of liberalisation commitments as members of the trading system. In 
return for 40 years’ overdue inclusion of sensitive areas of agriculture, as well as 
textiles and clothing, in the GATT, there was increasing pressure for developing 
countries to take on new commitments in investment, trade in services, and 
intellectual property rights. This was enforced by the single undertaking 
principle656 according to which all members had to accept all the agreements, 
and so developing countries also became parties to the TRIPS and GATS 
agreements. These resulting agreements were very different and comprehensive 
compared to the market access-centred GATT. The TRIPS agreement included 
legal standards on the protection of intellectual property (patents, trademarks 
and copyrights) to be applied by the WTO members, regardless of their 
653 See Ismail 2006 and Balaam 2004.
654 World Bank 2004 Global Economic Prospects. See also Stern 2002.
655 Sampson 2005: 54-56.
656 The single undertaking principle implies that virtually every item in the negotiation is part 
of a whole and indivisible package and cannot be agreed separately. “Nothing is agreed until 
everything is agreed”. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/work_organi_e.htm. See 
also Sub-chapter 2.4.
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economic development. Moreover, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism 
was established to mitigate intended or unintended violations of international 
trade law.  As a result, the two principles – single undertaking and special and 
differential treatment – contradicted one another. 
The single undertaking principle increased the complexity of the negotiations, 
especially during the closing stages of the Uruguay Round. Disagreements on 
the negotiation practices started to emerge as developing countries largely felt 
that they were not being given an adequate say in the content of the agreements, 
but were basically bystanders to a fait accompli by the leading “Quad” of the 
US, the EU, Japan and Canada, which exercised institutional power in the 
negotiations. Moon (2004) argues that from the agenda-setting to the final 
outcome, the space had been dominated by concentric circles of power. These 
circles were centred on the USA and the EU, followed by Japan and Canada and 
developing countries in support of the trade liberalisers of the South (South 
Africa, Chile, Singapore) and the large and emerging powers of India, China, 
and Brazil, followed by the rest.657 As a result, many developing countries felt 
that the agreements of the Uruguay Round package were unsatisfactory in 
terms of their respective development priorities and economic needs. Many 
developing countries increased their tariff bindings considerably, especially 
in agriculture.658 Furthermore, the implementation of the new legislative and 
administrative obligations posed an additional challenge for them.
In fact, Ismail (2006: 215-126) points to the double standards which 
characterised the Uruguay Round agreements. A notable case in point was the 
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), which called for developing countries to open 
their markets, without any significant reduction in the huge subsidies and high 
tariffs that depress global prices and undermine the development potential of the 
developing countries. There was a similar disadvantage in industrial products, 
as developed countries have retained above average tariffs, tariff escalation, 
and tariff peaks in the areas of developing countries’ comparative advantage. 
Stiglitz and Charlton (2005: 1-2) claim that developing countries had gained 
less than they had hoped from the Uruguay Round, especially in textiles and 
agriculture whereas “the developed countries walked away from Uruguay with 
a large share of the gains, and many developing countries were predicted to 
be worse off as a result of the Round”. Consequently, as Moon reports (2004: 
25), profound critique of the fairness of the WTO process and the validity of its 
underlying economic and philosophical assumptions came from poor countries, 
which also complained that the protectionism of developed countries, especially 
with respect to textiles and agriculture, made a mockery of their liberalisation 
657 Moon 2004: 31. 
658 Keck and Low 2006: 151.
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rhetoric. This group was notably led by India, which wanted to revisit and open 
up discussion on the Uruguay Round agreements. In sum, the gap between the 
bright development prospects and the prevailing order was quite remarkable. 
While the interests of the various developing countries differ, it appeared that 
the Uruguay Round outcome had failed to advance any of them. 
Consequently, the heritage of the Uruguay Round did not exactly arouse 
avid enthusiasm towards the launch of the new round of trade talks. The leaders 
of the WTO front also faced concerns regarding the process. Whereas the US 
was aiming to launch the new round with a very narrow agenda centred on 
its own immediate economic interests, the EU was aiming at a much broader 
regulatory trade agenda, which included investment and the competition 
policy that it had tabled at the Singapore Ministerial in 1996. In this respect, 
the EU aimed to promote its own vision of the WTO as a global regulatory 
agency.659 By contrast, the key issues for the US included tariff reductions in 
a few sectors, duty-free e-commerce, transparency in public procurement, 
extending intellectual property rights, and changes in the dispute settlement 
system. However, neither one was able to play the hegemon in the face of the 
new round. The US played a dominant role in other Bretton Woods institutions, 
but lacked the will and vision to incorporate the interests and perspectives of the 
other countries, or further develop the WTO system itself as a genuine leader. 
As for the EU, the Common Agricultural Policy was effectively undermining its 
credibility as the leader of trade liberalisation. However, this is not to say that 
the EU was disinterested in such a position – quite the contrary. For the US, it 
was the domestic change from the Clinton administration to that of Bush which 
had decreased the interest in multilateralism. In the EU, this was seen as both 
an opportunity and a threat. 660
Against this background of multilateral trade talks, Seattle (1999) was a 
watershed in many respects. For the first time in the history of trade negotiations, 
it was not only the developed countries that were running the show. In fact, the 
show was taken over by stronger voices from developing countries, echoed by 
even angrier cries from the growing “anti-globalisation” crowd of demonstrators 
in the streets.661 The collapse of the launch and “the fall of the WTO” were 
soon loudly celebrated by protestors the world over.662 “The battle of Seattle” 
659 Sally 2004: 114.
660 Moon 2004: 24.
661 Moon 2004: 24-25; Ismail 2005: 215. On the preceding demonstrations of the World Economic 
Forums of Melbourne, IMF/WB/ Prague, IMF/ WB Washington and the Genoa G8 meeting, see 
Stiglitz and Charlton 2005.
662 The author was also present at a European Civil Society gathering of the Finnish EU Presidency 
in December 1999 where news of the collapsed talks divided the audience and sparked a fierce 
debate. 
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was over with a devastating lack of progress. No new negotiations had been 
scheduled, no agenda agreed upon, and no consensus reached on the future of 
either the WTO or the international trade system it nominally supervised.663 
International Trade Talks: Changing to Stay the Same
Without exaggeration, nothing less than faith in multilateral trade governance 
was at stake in Doha (2001). In the absence of tangible progress to build on, 
rhetorical presentation became increasingly important. As Moon (2004) 
bluntly puts it, the Seattle objective of the “Millennium Round” had become 
the “Development Round” of Doha, and agriculture was placed at the very heart 
as the development issue. However, the actual negotiating positions of both the 
EU and the US very much resembled those of Seattle, and worse. Because of 
the change of government in the US, the farm bill had in fact increased farm 
subsidies in 2002. At the same time, the EU was embroiled in a difficult CAP 
reform that did not augur well for the trade talks. The decoupling of subsidies 
from production (Blue Box) subsidies to more acceptable forms of farm support 
was also criticised as being cosmetic.664 These domestic changes were reflected 
in a joint EU-US paper on agriculture presented six months behind schedule. 
Not surprisingly, the content fell short at the Doha Development Agenda level 
on market access, domestic support and export subsides.665  
By the run-up to the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún (September 
2003), the Doha Development Round was already beset by difficulties. Two 
cases aptly illustrate the tensions underlying the pro-development discourse: 
that of cotton, and life-saving drugs. First, in June 2003, the West African 
authorities rallied against US (and to a lesser extent also EU) cotton subsidies, 
which they saw as detrimental to the 10 million people that depend on cotton 
production, and detrimental to export revenues in general. Therefore, they 
demanded that the US government reduce subsidies and pay compensation 
to African farmers. However, the initiative was effectively blocked by the US 
government. At the same time, a growing number of WTO members opposed 
the US-proposed restrictions on the TRIPS agreement on trade-related 
intellectual property rights. In brief, developing countries were of the opinion 
that the proposed TRIPS agreement was hindering technology transfer and 
widening the gap between the poorer and more advanced economies. This 
issue was particularly sensitive regarding trade in life-saving drugs. In the face 
of the African AIDS/HIV pandemic, any restrictions that would have limited 
663 Moon 2004: 24. 
664 Stiglitz & Charlton 2005: 59.
665 Stiglitz & Charlton 2005: 58.
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access to the purchase of such drugs at a reasonable price were condemned as 
devastating. Under strong public pressure, the issue was settled a couple of 
months before the next ministerial talks as the US changed its position and 
allowed the least developed countries to import generic drugs from low-cost, 
non-patent-holding producers in developing countries.666 Needless to say, these 
confrontations were not conducive to Development Round talks. 
To have an influence on the trade agenda, developing countries had pooled 
together their influence under different country groups with similar interests. 
Regarding specifically agriculture, the G20, the so-called Cairns Group formed 
an effective negotiating block led by South Africa, Brazil, India and China to 
press the EU and the US for greater market access and reduction of agricultural 
subsidies.667 
In addition, G90 countries consisting of least developed countries as well 
as other ACP countries had made it clear that it did not welcome the inclusion 
of the Singapore Issues into the Cancún negotiations agenda.668 The G90 
position was grounded on the assumption that the competition, investment, 
public procurement and to a lesser extent trade facilitation would restrict policy 
space and impose too large implementation costs.669 Furthermore, these issues 
were seen as incursions into their national sovereignty that would restrict the 
space for national development priorities.670 By contrast, for the European 
Union, the very essence of the development agenda lay in the inclusion of the 
Singapore Issues on the agenda, with market access in agriculture and non-
agricultural market access (NAMA). In turn, the EU position was justified by the 
argument that the regulatory issues actually constituted an essential part of the 
development dimension of the Doha agenda, crucial for good trade governance 
and export-led growth.671 The Cancún Ministerial meeting had ended in failure.
At this point, it was becoming evident that a new spur was badly needed to 
move the Development Round forward. Under the leadership of Commissioner 
Pascal Lamy and US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, the member 
countries agreed upon new modalities to proceed in the summer of 2004. 
This package became known as “the July package”, which extended the Doha 
Development Agenda to the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of Hong Kong in 2005.672 
Lamy and Zoellick presented a proposal for a simplified agenda and promised 
to compromise on some key issues. This simplified agenda excluded all the 
666 Stiglitz and Charlton 2005: 61-62.
667 Stiglitz and Charlton 2005: 62-63. 
668 Stiglitz and Charlton 2005: 63. 
669 Ibid.
670 Stiglitz & Charlton 2005: 60. 
671 Interviews EC[1]2008, EC[4]2009, EC[15]2009, Academia[7]2009 and CSO[20] 2009.
672 Ismail 2004: 226; Stiglitz & Charlton 2005. 
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Singapore Issues, apart from trade facilitation.673 In addition, the July package 
was built on core market access issues in agriculture, services, and industrial 
goods. Moreover, Lamy hoped to extend the EBA to the WTO so that the 
LDCs could have the “Round for Free” in line with Special and Differential 
Treatment.674 In other words, these countries “should not have to open their 
markets beyond their existing commitments, and should be able to benefit from 
increased market access offered by both developed and advanced developing 
countries”. However, Lamy had to withdraw his offer. It was returned to the 
table in a modified form under the banner of “Round at a Modest Price”. This 
modification was no longer based on non-reciprocity, but implied that the 
beneficiary countries would bind some of their tariffs and participate in the 
talks on trade facilitation. 
To bolster developing countries’ interest in the international trade 
negotiations, two features started to gain increasing importance. These 
were capacity-building to improve developing countries’ negotiation and 
implementation skills, and development financing to address “supply-side 
concerns”. The rationale for this was rather simple. Improved market access 
alone would not contribute to export-driven growth and economic development 
if the country lacked the appropriate infrastructure and the necessary human, 
material, financial or institutional resources. On top of these obstacles, there 
is also a series of adjustment costs as well as the fiscal impact associated with 
trade liberalisation, which explains the reluctance of governments to reduce the 
tariffs. In addition to all of these factors, some countries are concerned about 
multilateral liberalisation and the general decrease in tariff rates as they erode 
their preferential positions and put them up against even stiffer competition. 675 
Originally put forward in the discussions within the WTO Geneva 
headquarters, Gordon Brown, the then British Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
picked up on the idea to reinforce developing countries’ capacity for trade. 
To this end, he called for the creation of an international finance facility that 
would support both the Millennium Development Goals in terms of increased 
development funding and support developing countries in trade negotiations 
as well as in the implementation of the existing agreements.  Following the 
commitments made in the Doha Declaration on technical co-operation and 
capacity-building as “the core elements of the development dimension of 
673 According to Ismail (2004), trade facilitation is an exceptional negotiation area because some 
long-awaited progress was actually made in terms of increased transparency and more inclusive 
participation.
674 Stiglitz & Charlton 2005: 92, referring to the letter of 9 May by Pascal Lamy and EU Agriculture 
Commissioner Franz Fischler.
675 Ismail 2004: 219
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the multilateral trading system”, the July 2004 package called for assistance 
specifically for this purpose. In addition, it includes a clause according to 
which WTO members should ensure that “special attention shall be given to 
the specific trade and development- related needs and concerns of developing 
countries, including capacity and supply-side constraints”.676 
Against this background, it is clear that the pressure was mounting. In fact, 
the sixth Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong (December 2005) was loaded 
with unfulfilled expectations. At this time, the Ministerial agenda was built on 
four main elements: market access, domestic support, and export subsidies 
related to agriculture and services. Thanks to the July package, trade facilitation 
was the only issue on the original Singapore list that survived. From the EU 
perspective on development, the most challenging area was related to domestic 
support and export subsidies. Building on the 2003 reform, however, the EU 
was able to table an offer which showed changes in its own domestic support. 
Even more ambitiously, the EU was ready to set an example by being the first 
to cut its export subsidies (provided that others would follow this example). 
Contrary to the US, the EU also wanted to raise its profile regarding the TRIPS 
by accepting compromises on the compulsory licensing of generic medicines so 
as to improve developing countries’ access to life-saving drugs in line with the 
Millennium Development Goals. In addition to the Everything But Arms (EBA) 
initiative, Aid for Trade financing sealed the EU’s deal with a developmental 
touch. The US responded with the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 
and promised to grant duty- and quota-free market access to all of the Least 
Developed Countries.677 More controversially from the developing countries’ 
perspective, the EU was also willing to reassess labour and environmental 
standards in the WTO. 
In this context, defending the preferential treatment of the heterogeneous 
ACP group started to become ever more costly and problematic.678 On the 
one hand, the EU, under the leadership of Pascal Lamy, was still in favour of 
multilateralism and special and differential treatment of the least developed 
676 Ismail 2006: 219-220. The real novelty of this package was an assurance in the annex on modalities 
for trade facilitation implying that implementation costs will be addressed by developed country 
members, and that in the absence of adequate support, implementation obligations will be waived 
for developing countries. 
677 Lesage & Kerremans 2007: 92-93 point out that similarly to the EBA, the AGOA also had a 
loophole comprising a 3 per cent margin to cover sensitive products (from the US and EU 
perspective). Interestingly, the US strongly endorsed political and economic conditions as a part 
of the AGOA-related legislation, while the EU showed little interest in this kind of approach at this 
point.  On the other hand, according to Stiglitz and Charlton 2005, the AGOA was more generous 
in textiles and apparel than the EU EBA.
678 Orbie 2007: 27. 
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countries until the end of its term (2004). On the other hand, the EU saw the 
broad, regulatory trade agenda as its preferred form for the WTO system. The 
ACPs were problematic for the EU from both points of view. Being a group of 
both LDCs and more developed countries, it was not as a whole eligible for the 
EBA. In addition, it had opposed the EU initiative to include the broad trade-
related agenda and the Singapore Issues in the Doha Development talks. 
As one of my interviewees described the situation from the Commission 
point of view:
I think we are one of the WTO members most concerned with these [development] 
aspects but we have been criticised as not being sufficiently flexible. Maybe at 
times. But we were also there to say that one-size-fits-all solutions to TRIPS and 
access to medicine does not fit and we acknowledged differentiated treatment for 
developing countries. We were on the move first before the others joined. Pascal 
Lamy certainly spent as much time on access to medicine and the Cotonou waiver 
as he did on the rest of the trade issues on the agenda.679 
Whereas the multilateral Consensus on trade and development was structured 
around market access, LDCs, financial support (aid) to trade and trade 
facilitation, the flipside of the liberalisation paradigm, namely the aspect of 
reciprocity, remained ambiguous. On the one hand, all developing countries 
(regardless of their level of development) were called to engage in the trade 
talks and to become parties to the WTO agreements. Yet at the same time, the 
SDT principle was considered so essential for development that the developing 
countries themselves were able to decide on the level and scope of the 
engagement. Both options highlighted the importance of trade liberalisation, 
but in fundamentally different normative terms. This division was to sharpen 
with the rise of bilateral agreements between the North and the South under 
Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson (November 2004 - October 2008). 
To conclude, as the early years of the Doha Development Round show, the 
nexus of development and trade remained highly contentious and controversial. 
This also increased the sense of confusion around trade, sustainable development 
and policy coherence. On the one hand, the EU acknowledged that the least 
developed countries needed differential treatment, yet a broad regulatory trade 
agenda was seen as conducive both to the development of more advanced 
economies as well as to the EU’s interests in the WTO. Although the EU’s proactive 
stance in the EBA and TRIPs was a contribution in line with development policy 
objectives, the grand principles of Special and Differential Treatment remained 
ambiguous. Similarly to the US, the EU’s institutional power in the WTO had 
679 Interview EC[15]2009.
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decreased with the rise of the emerging economies, resulting in an impasse 
in Cancún as early as 2003. Furthermore, both parties suffered from internal 
opposition to agricultural liberalisation, which complicated their position at the 
multilateral level. Therefore, the litmus test for trade and policy coherence for 
development shifted to the context of bilateral negotiations.
6.2 THE EPAS AND THE EMERgINg bILATERAL TRADE AgENDA
Trade negotiations can hold steady only as long as they keep moving forwards. 
Moon (2005) aptly describes this phenomenon as “bicycle theory”.680 After the 
Hong Kong Ministerial in December 2005, progress on the multilateral front 
started to stall. 681  As it was crucial for the EU to keep the wheels in motion, 
it increased the focus on bilateral and bilateral regional free trade (RTAs) 
negotiations. In practice, this meant maintaining the multilateral track as the 
key priority officially, while advancing bilaterally what had been multilaterally 
blocked and left incomplete.682 However, this choice again posed a new set of 
questions. In particular, it raised concerns over whether bilateralism actually 
formed a compatible “fast track” arena for global trade governance. In other 
words, would bilateral agreements become “stepping stones” for multilateral 
liberalisation in line with the WTO regulations, or would these arrangements 
actually constitute “stumbling blocks” to multilateral solutions? The latter 
point was related to the fear that WTO members’ engagement in bilateral 
free trade would result in an unmanageable web of overlapping, complex and 
discriminatory agreements, instead of a consistent process towards global trade 
liberalisation. This phenomenon is often referred to as the “spaghetti bowl” 
effect, as coined by Bhagwati.683 The purpose of this sub-chapter is to look at 
the EU’s bilateral efforts to see how they shaped the understanding of policy 
coherence for development. In this regard, the Economic Partnerships under 
the EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement (2000-2020)684 are a case in point that were 
designed to deliver on both development and trade. 
680 Moon 2004: 33.
681 The suspension in July 2006 and the total standstill in July 2008 confirmed this trend.
682 Interview EC[4]2009, Academia[7]2009, Interview CSO[31]2008, Interview CSO[20]2009 and 
Interview Council[5]2008.
683 Sally 2004: 110-113. See also Malhotra et. al 2003. On UNCTAD’s critical take on free trade 
agreements for developing countries, see the full version of UNCTAD’s Trade and Development 
Report 2007.
684 At the time of the study, the ACP comprised 78 member states, 47 of which were from Sub-
Saharan Africa, 16 Caribbean and 15 Pacific states. 33 out of the 50 Least Developed Countries 
are African states.
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Indeed, the EU has been an enthusiastic chef, filling the bowl with a number 
of bilateral arrangements. Since the late 1990s, EU-South Africa as well as 
EU-Latin America relations have provided a modern kitchen laboratory for 
bilateral free trade prior to the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements. An 
important model was provided by the South African Trade and Development 
Agreement of 2000. Similarly, the EU has gained experience from the model 
that was set out in the negotiations with Mexico (2000) and Chile (2003), 
whereas the results have been meagre from the Union’s point of view with 
Peru and Columbia (2011), as well as the Central American Common Market. 
In addition, the EU has been actively negotiating free trade arrangements with 
its neighbouring countries in the South and in the East.685 The former group 
consists of Euro-Mediterranean Countries that were concluding country-
based bilateral FTAs with the Union in 1998-2006. The latter group consists 
in a similar manner of the former stabilisation and association countries 
of Macedonia (2005), Albania (2009) and Croatia (2004), with entry still 
pending for Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro. Moreover, the EU 
was engaged in a number of other trade talks: the ASEAN (failed regionally, 
individual negotiations ongoing); Indian (pending); Singapore (pending); 
Indonesia (pending); and South Korean (2010) talks, which were coinciding 
with the reform of EU trade relations with the ACPs. The words of one 
Commission official describe it well.
It is quite important to understand that trade and development policies in the EU 
took place first in regions other than in the ACPs (…) It was more the ACP group 
coming towards the mainstream than the other way round.686 
In this respect, the two Trade Commissioners, Pascal Lamy (1999-2004) 
and his successor Peter Mandelson (2004-2008), differed from one another. 
Whereas Lamy had prioritised the multilateral level and acknowledged the 
need for special and differential treatment of the least developed countries, 
for Mandelson the bilateral, free trade context was key.687 What is important to 
note is that the original idea was to pursue EU-South negotiations with a view to 
completing regional agreements bilaterally, and not with individual countries. 
The rationale for this approach rests on the importance of regional cooperation, 
and dismantling obstacles to trade between neighbouring countries to increase 
the scale of developing countries’ economies and thereby competitiveness in 
685 For a comprehensive view of this set of free trade arrangements, see http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2012/june/tradoc_149622.jpg.
686 Interview EC[15]2009. 
687 Interviews EC[27]2009, EC[15]2009, CSO[11]2009 and Academia[7]2009.
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the world economy.688 In this context, the differences between countries, for 
instance between the LDCs and middle income countries, would be balanced. 
As discussed previously in the context of the Doha Round, the constellation of 
the ACP group was problematic because it consisted of both LDCs and countries 
whose level of economic and social development superseded them. Therefore, 
the EU could not unambiguously apply the GATT Enabling Clause, under 
which the industrial countries are permitted to give unilateral non-reciprocal 
treatment to just two categories of countries: either all LDCs or all developing 
countries. Furthermore, the EU had already experienced five separate rulings 
in the GATT/WTO dispute settlement because of the waivers requested by the 
Union since 1993.689
To ensure WTO compliance, GATT Article XXIV stipulates that the RFTAs 
are to be regional free trade agreements that set out the reciprocal liberalisation 
of “substantially all trade within a reasonable length of time” between the 
parties. Interestingly, “substantially all trade” has not been defined anywhere 
in the WTO, and consequently there is no clear understanding of what passes 
for “substantially all trade”. The only source of interpretation is the Appellate 
Body report in Turkey-Textiles (DS34). Paragraph 48 of the report states 
that:690
Neither GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES nor the WTO Members have ever 
reached an agreement on the interpretation of the term “substantially” in this 
provision. It is clear, though, that “substantially all trade” is not the same as all 
trade, and also that “substantially all trade” is something considerably more than 
merely some of the trade.
Depending on the interpretation of “substantially all trade”, the reciprocity also 
concerned the least developed countries if they were to become members of a 
regional agreement.691 The lack of clear criteria opened up a huge debate on the 
appropriate terms to define both the standard for reciprocal trade liberalisation 
in the North-South context and the norms for trading with the poorest countries 
on a bilateral basis. More importantly, it raised the question of which party 
would have the power to define that, and on what grounds. 
In this respect, it is important to note that all three institutional parties to the 
European Consensus (para. 36) – the EC, the Council and the EP – had already 
688 Interviews EC[14]2008, EC[18]2009, EC[4]2009 and Academia[7]2009.
689 On the banana disputes between the EU and US/Latin American producers as well as their 
linkages to the EU-ACP waiver, see McCall Smith 2006.
690 Alavi 2010: 189.
691 Lesage & Kerremans 2007: 92-93.
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expressed support “to the rapid, ambitious and pro-poor completion of the 
Doha Development Round and the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements 
EPAs”. But whereas the European Consensus process was finished in time with 
results that largely satisfied all parties involved, the trade dimension of the 
European Consensus continued to live a life of its own. Due to the EC sole 
competence in trade, as well as institutional re-shuffling within the Commission 
services, the life of the EPAs was in the hands of DG Trade for the critical years 
ahead. This was again a different international sphere and institutional context 
from that of development, where the Millennium Development Goals were not 
per se amongst the main concerns, but compliance with international trade 
law was.692  In this respect, the form of the free trade agreements became the 
top priority. 
The predominant explanation by those in favour of the proposed FTA EPAs 
– and the EU Commission in particular – stressed that the EU-ACP economic 
relations needed to be changed for two main reasons. Firstly, according to the 
Commission, there is a mutual recognition by the main parties that “existing 
trade preferences have not promoted sustainable development or integration 
into the world economy” (COM 2005d: 3). This quotation refers in particular to 
the non-reciprocal market access arrangements which have proved inadequate 
in reversing the declining share of ACP countries’ exports in the European 
market. Secondly, and perhaps more acutely for the EU, the current trade 
preferences were inconsistent with the prevailing international trade rules as 
defined by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and therefore needed to be 
changed. As one of my interviewees explained:
The idea was that preferences would increase their [ACP countries’) market share 
in the European market and, in this way, develop through trade and not through 
aid, or not only through aid. This has not happened the way we wanted. In fact, 
the opposite happened; their market share has gone down. So something was 
wrong. In fact, there may have been two things wrong. Firstly, the preferences 
were initially not deep enough, and they were limited. We gave very generous 
preferences to industrial products which they did not produce, and where they 
did have a chance to export, it was much more limited. The approach has been 
now corrected by really offering 100% DFQF [duty-free, quota-free access] (…) 
The Americans don’t do it. The Japanese really don’t do it. China is far from doing 
it. This is a big improvement and we hope that it will lead to results. Secondly, 
our preferences were discriminatory.693 
692 Cf. Global Europe Trade Strategy in Sub-chapter 6.3.
693 Interview EC[18]2009.
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The following excerpts describe the situation for the EU. Despite the subjectivity 
of the interview data, these samples aptly summarise the main EU positions 
regarding the “substantially all trade” clause more generally.
 
We have to have legal protection in the WTO. We need to be able to satisfy the legal 
requirement of Article XXIV of the GATT in that an FTA must cover substantially 
all trade. Now the longstanding EC interpretation of that requirement is 90 per 
cent liberalisation. The very explicit expectation for a timetable is no more than 
10 years. So essentially, before negotiating the EPAs, we have unilaterally decided 
to soften both requirements: not 90 in 10, but 80 per cent over 15 years.694
The ACP countries have to fit into the Trade Policy approach and the EPAs have to 
look as much as possible like the other FTAs and find their place on the bookshelf 
together with the others. The EC does not want to fall below the standards that 
it has been preaching all over the world.695  
80/20 is absolutely sufficient. We are making EPAs after having lost more than 10 
appellate body panels. (…) and we had to pay in real terms (…) so the preferential 
relations with the ACP have been under attack (…) We go as far as we believe it is 
economically, legally and politically sensible. Regarding Africa in particular, we 
should also see this evolution and harmonising of trade policies as mainstreaming 
our relationship with Africa. It is policy coherence for development, but it is also 
development policy for coherence of the EU’s external action, or of EU action 
altogether.696 
Interestingly, all three examples revolve around the issue of coherence, but with 
different criteria. While the first refers to coherence with international trade law, 
the second emphasises the EU’s concern for the overall coherence of its trade 
policy. The third is a combination of both, with a reference to development. 
Taken together, the nexus seen from the trade policy side was already beset 
with pressing issues that were primarily to do with trade, and much less to 
do with the development objectives. To summarise, there were already three 
trade-related constraints on the table which were to influence the future EPAs. 
These included the failed EU regulatory efforts at the multilateral level and the 
shift towards bilateral trade agreements, as well as the overall question of WTO 
compatibility and the substantially all trade clause. 
694 Interview EC[1]2008.
695 Interview CSO[20]2009.
696 Interview EC[15]2009. 
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6.3 TAKINg OVER POLICy COHERENCE fOR DEVELOPMENT:  
THE “gLObAL EUROPE” TRADE POLICy
One year after the European Consensus, the Commission launched a new trade 
policy. Masterminded in DG Trade under Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson, 
it was entitled “Global Europe Competing in the World: A Contribution to 
the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy”. As the second part of the title suggests, 
Global Europe presented a response from external trade to the renewed Lisbon 
Strategy (2005) and explained how the EU’s competiveness in world trade can 
stimulate growth and jobs in Europe. From this standpoint, it would appear at 
first that this task is rather impossible to reconcile with the EU’s development 
agenda. This dichotomy is highlighted by the fact that the former is centred on 
competiveness and growth for Europe, and the latter on poverty eradication in 
distant developing countries and regions. 
Despite this grand division in policy objectives, there were common 
discursive elements and core ideas that brought these agendas closer together. 
Not surprisingly, trade liberalisation and regulatory norms at the international 
and domestic levels constituted the backbone on which trade and development-
related reasoning was built. In addition, there were a number of remarkable 
similarities between the Global Europe and European Consensus documents. 
First, both had a strategic approach for Europe to act and influence the changing 
world to the benefit of both Europe and others. 697 Second, both documents 
referred to sustainable development. In the case of EU trade, the linkage was 
drawn directly to the EU’s renewed Sustainable Development Strategy of June 
2006. Third, both statements were addressed to wider audiences than those 
immediately concerned with trade or development. This was the case especially 
with “Global Europe”, in which DG Trade explains that the policy was directed 
at EU citizens, providing them with the possibility to judge whether “Europe 
is delivering results in their daily lives”.698 Fourth, they both referred to one 
another in a mutually reinforcing way. This was particularly important from 
the point of view of coherence in the Union’s external policies. 
Through our trade policies, we also seek to contribute to a range of the Union’s 
external goals, in particular development and neighbourhood objectives. These 
will remain core functions of EU trade policy. Coherence of the Union’s external 
policies is vital to strengthening the EU’s global role.699 
697 Interview EC2008. David O’Sullivan 2008: Speech at Global Europe Strategy European 
Parliament December 2008.
698 EC (2006) Global Europe: 2. 
699 EC (2006) Global Europe 2006: 2. 
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Unlike the European Consensus, however, the political consensus around 
Global Europe was remarkably fragile. It was in fact adopted by the European 
Parliament with a very small margin after a long and heated debate. Particularly 
sensitive were the areas concerning the implications of such a policy for “social 
justice” and “adaptation to market impacts” in Europe and abroad. Although 
development aspects were also present in the debate, the resistance was 
triggered around the primacy of the market and the possible negative impacts 
on European citizens.700 While the EU development policy targets were set 
outside Europe, the trade policy objective was first and foremost to build a 
Global Europe by reinforcing the EU’s own competitiveness, growth and 
creation of jobs in the global economic system. According to DG Trade, this 
global system was an essential condition for economic prosperity, social justice 
and sustainable development within Europe.701 According to Global Europe, the 
advancement of the EU’s trade agenda was to be promoted by: 
… opening markets where European companies can compete abroad while 
rejecting protectionism at home and promoting fair conditions to trade abroad.
In this context, fair trade can be equated with the absence of protectionism, and 
fair conditions from the point of view of the Union’s competiveness.702
However, the EC defined progressive trade opening almost as a panacea for 
the EU’s competiveness. Even more importantly here, it was seen as an essential 
factor in reducing poverty and promoting development, as well as in addressing 
global challenges from security to migration to climate change.703 Therefore, the 
text states that the EU’s trade policy also seeks to contribute to development goals 
and maintains that coherence in this respect is vital to strengthening the EU’s 
global role.704 Again, just how this coherence designed to strengthen the EU’s 
role also contributes to development objectives is left unspecified. However, the 
reasoning can be inferred from the (surprisingly few) sections of the document 
where developing countries and sustainable development are mentioned. 
To summarise, what Global Europe clearly advocated was that the EU’s 
trade policy model was not only suitable for serving the EU’s interests, but 
also those of developing countries regardless of the size and levels of their 
economies. To this end, DG Trade further states that progressive trade opening 
700 MEP Caroline Lucas sharing her insights in the EP-CSO-EC debate on “Global Europe” Dec. 
2008. 
701 Global Europe, 2006: 2.
702 This argument is based on an analysis of the appearance of the word “fair” in the document.
703 Global Europe, 2006: 6.
704 Ibid.: 2.
238  |  THE lIMITS OF POlICY COHERENCE IN TRADE AND DEvElOPMENT 
is an important source of productivity gains, growth and job creation, which are 
seen as essential factors in reducing poverty and promoting development.705 
The underlying assumption is that trade opening needed to go far beyond the 
traditional tariffs and trade in goods approach. In fact, Global Europe explicitly 
listed new trade issues: tackling non-tariff barriers, securing the EU’s access 
to resources and energy, and promoting new areas of market opening related 
notably to intellectual property, services, investment, public procurement and 
competition in the partner countries. Related to this list of so-called Singapore 
Issues, the Global Europe policy explicitly stressed these areas as the EU’s 
strategic potential.706  
What is noteworthy here is that the EU emphasised the importance of the 
rules-based multilateral system and the Doha Development Agenda, which DG 
Trade saw as the most effective channel to exercise its influence.707 Interestingly 
at this point, Global Europe does not make any reference to the concrete 
commitments of the Doha Development Agenda, let alone to the European 
Consensus. For instance, the document does not contain a single reference to 
Special and Differential Treatment, LDC countries or Gender and trade – or to 
the needs of the poorest countries in general. The EU, however, refers back to 
its own EBA initiative and appeals to its FTA partners:
In line with our position in the WTO, we will encourage our FTA partners to 
facilitate access by least-developed countries to their market, if possible by 
granting duty- and quota-free access.708
In this respect, only the EBA is highlighted on both agendas as a model that the 
EU has set for others to follow regardless of its limitations. 
As regards development and poverty eradication, progressive liberalisation 
is defined as the way to remedy poverty. In this respect, China, India and Brazil 
are used as examples of countries that have been able to lift millions out of 
poverty with such a policy.709 Leaving aside the fact that economic development 
and growth has taken place in these countries, this kind of justification poses a 
provocative question as to whether the development models of these countries 
can be seen as being in line with the European Consensus and sustainable 
development. Global Europe does not provide the answer to this question. 
705 Ibid.: 6.
706 Global Europe 2006: 7-8.
707 This also had to do with the timing, as Global Europe came out in October 2006 after the 
suspension of the Doha Round in July 2006.
708 Global Europe 2006: 12.
709 Global Europe 2006: 6.
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Regarding trade in agriculture, there is an interesting discrepancy between 
the development and trade agendas. While the European Consensus promised 
that “the EU will substantially reduce the level of trade distortion related 
to its support to the agricultural sector, and facilitate developing countries’ 
agricultural development”, less than a year later Global Europe reported that: 
The EU has made significant offers of liberalisation, not least in agriculture, and 
made clear its willingness to go further within the limits of its current mandate, 
as part of a global agreement.710
If we look back at DG Development’s paper on the Millennium Goals and 
Policy Coherence for Development, PCD was defined in terms of “what 
trade policy will do for development”, and the EC agenda also included the 
elimination of tariffs, tariff peaks and dumping.711 This time, they are once 
again omitted. Instead, Global Europe focuses on the cornerstones of the EU 
approach to trade in the face of globalisation by advancing technologies and 
foreign capital, global supply chains and the labour market. In this context, 
the EU’s trading power appears to lie in knowledge, innovation, intellectual 
property, the service sector and the efficient use of resources.712 These factors 
were also at the heart of its strategy regarding the challenge posed by the 
emerging powers of China and India for the most part, but also Brazil, Russia 
and others. In order to be successful, DG Trade claims that the EU has to adopt 
the right internal policies and maintain openness to trade and investment. 
More generally, this approach implies transparent and effective rules at 
domestic, bilateral and multilateral levels.713 Relatedly, protectionism was 
defined as the greatest vice impeding the advancement of development within 
and outside of Europe.714 
Regarding the EU’s own bilateral free trade endeavours, there is an 
intriguing embedded tension. First, FTAs are to be crafted with a view to taking 
EU interests to those places where multilateral agreements did not result in 
success. To quote:
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), if approached with care, can build on WTO and 
other international rules by going further and faster in promoting openness and 
integration by tackling issues which are not ready for multilateral discussions and 
710 Global Europe 2006: 10.
711 COM 2005a: 5-8.
712 Global Europe 2006: 2-3.
713 Global Europe 2006: 4.
714 Global Europe 2006: 5.
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by preparing the ground for the next level of multilateral liberalization. Many key 
issues, including investment, public procurement, competition, other regulatory 
issues and IPR enforcement, which remain outside the WTO at this time, can be 
addressed through FTAs.715
Second, at the same time the EU was perfectly aware that stirring the FTA 
spaghetti bowl could jeopardise the multilateral system. In fact, Global Europe 
pinpoints specific concerns including complications in trade, erosion of the 
principle of non-discrimination, and exclusion of the weakest economies. Third, 
and at odds with the previous point, the EU seeks to advance its bilateral FTA 
agenda to avoid this:
To have a positive impact, FTAs must be comprehensive in scope, provide for 
liberalization of substantially all trade and go beyond WTO disciplines.716  
To guarantee development, and sustainable development in particular, and to 
validate the chosen approach, DG Trade underlines the incorporation of labour 
standards and environmental protection, on the one hand, and the importance 
of impact assessments for each new FTA, on the other. 
In considering new FTAs, we will need to work to strengthen sustainable 
development through our bilateral trade relations. This could include incorporating 
new co-operative provisions in areas relating to labour standards and environmental 
protection.717 
We will also take into account the development needs of our partners and the 
potential impact of any agreement on other developing countries, in particular 
the potential effects on poor countries’ preferential access to EU markets. The 
possible impact on development should be included as part of the overall impact 
assessment that will be conducted before deciding to launch FTA negotiations.718
These assumed positive elements of the broad FTA agenda are also what DG 
Trade regards as the very essence of the EU’s bilateral free trade agreements with 
developing countries. This also included the Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) with Sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific states.719 In 
715 Global Europe 2006: 10.
716 Global Europe 2006: 10.
717 Global Europe 2006: 12.
718 Global Europe 2006: 12.
719 Here the EPA negotiations are presented in the context of the other planned bilateral free trade 
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general, DG Trade’s position on Free Trade and Association Agreements with 
particular regard to developing countries can be summarised in the following 
sentence: 
… while these arrangements have reinforced economic and regulatory ties with 
the EU as well as supported development objectives, the EU’s own trade interests 
have been less well served.720 
This type of statement increases the existing levels of ambiguity. Firstly, the 
formulation suggests that the primary function of free trade agreements is 
to reinforce economic ties with the EU, and that supporting development 
objectives comes second. Secondly, the current free trade arrangements have 
contributed to these objectives, but they have fallen short as far as promoting 
the EU’s own trade interests is concerned. However, based on  DG Trade’s vision 
of mutual benefits through increased competition and trade liberalisation, 
there is no conflict between trade and development goals. Therefore, the EU’s 
representation reinforces the conception that coherence prevails between the 
suggested trade and EU development policies. 
A couple of observations can be made at this point. Although Global Europe 
was a strategy document to direct external trade, there is not a single reference to 
the European Consensus statement or its various trade and PCD commitments. 
In this sense, there is a notable discrepancy between these two policies. From 
the policy coherence for development perspective, this absence of dialogue 
is problematic. If we compare the role given to trade policy in the European 
Consensus statement, it is interesting to note how loyally development policy 
actors are counting on trade policy to support its own objectives. However, as 
the reading of Global Europe shows, the trade agenda only refers to coherence 
at the level of external relations, and does so on its own terms. What follows 
is that the norms that the EU suggested for trade and development are also 
biased towards the trade dimension. This begs the question of whether the 
PCD commitment is genuinely shared on both sides. Even more intriguingly, 
both documents have gone through inter-service consultations within the 
Commission and are EC documents. Furthermore, they have both been adopted 
as EU policies. Given that Global Europe, just like the European Consensus, 
constituted the first main authoritative guideline for the policy-makers, the 
absence of these references is disturbing.
and association agreements between the EU and Central America and the Andean Community.
720 Ibid.: 10-11.
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6.4 CHANgINg DEVELOPMENT AND 
TRADE NORMS IN THE EPAS
Having outlined the overall trade policy context in which the ACP-EU Economic 
Partnership Agreements were conceived, the main purpose of this sub-chapter 
is to show how the EC-preferred free trade format advocated in “Global Europe” 
was not a “natural choice”, although DG Trade tried to advocate it as such, 
but the result of a long political process. Essentially, the way in which the 
Commission constructed the EPAs was closely linked to the inter-institutional 
relations and hierarchy of policy priorities. To illustrate this, I backtrack to the 
ACP-EU Lomé IV mid-term review of 1995 and trace the main changes until 
the expiration of the WTO waiver granting the ACP trade preferences in 2007. 
In this regard, four junctures are of particular importance: the Lomé IV mid-
term review of 1995 by DG DEV and the member states, the Commission (DG 
DEV) Green Paper of 1996, the ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement provisions, the 
DG Trade negotiations mandate of 2002 and, finally, the eventual crisis in the 
EPA negotiations in 2007. 
The Lomé IV Convention mid-term review of 1995 was the first official 
occasion that anticipated changes to the ACP-EU trade relationship. 
Interestingly, these changes coincided with the end of the Uruguay Round and 
the establishment of the World Trade Organization. As Vernier (1995) notes in 
his summary of the Lomé review, the negotiations on the commercial section 
were marked by a radically new approach. For the first time since Lomé I, the 
main focus of the debate was not preferential access (previously seen as the 
main way of ensuring trade flows from ACP states) but, increasingly, trade 
development. Articles 135 and 136 of the review specified that the objective 
of trade development is to ensure that the ACP states derive the maximum 
benefit from the trade development provisions of the Convention, and may 
participate under the most favourable conditions in the Community, domestic, 
sub-regional, regional and international markets. The aim here was to diversify 
the range and increase both the value and volume of the ACP states’ trade in 
goods and services. In addition, the Lomé IV mid-term review highlighted 
the importance of the ACP states’ self-reliance, intra-ACP and international 
trade, and improved regional cooperation in these fields.  Special attention 
was to be paid to capacity-building, infrastructure, human resources, and 
organisational and private sector development, which the revised Lomé 
Convention was designed to support. At this point, the sovereignty of the ACP 
states was emphasised regarding the selection of macro-economic policies, 
trade strategies, as well as the legal and regulatory framework. In this respect, 
the Lomé IV mid-term review stated that specific operations in this regard 
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should be undertaken at the request of the ACP states and regions. In this 
regard, the change is significant compared to the EC stance seven years later in 
the Commission mandate and the actual EPA negotiations.
Another important benchmark was the European Commission/DG DEV 
Green Paper (1996) on the Relations between the European Union and the 
ACP countries. The very purpose of this paper was to discuss the challenges 
and options for the new partnership in the future Cotonou Agreement.721 With 
regard to trade and investment (Chapter V:C), DG Development outlined various 
options for the future trade arrangements. Interestingly, the section starts with 
rather critical remarks. On the one hand, the text sees a suitable integration of 
the ACP group into the global economy and the definition of its proper place in 
the evolving economic relations with the EU as crucial. On the other hand, the 
Green Paper warns upfront about the risks and failures that might ensue if an 
appropriate framework is not found. Indeed, “These may result in the breaking 
up of the ACP group, the drifting away of some ACP regions and countries from 
the present link with the EU, and further marginalization of the poorest ACP 
countries”. 
To avoid this, DG DEV sketched different alternatives with a view to allowing 
the ACP countries to accommodate their preferred integration strategies. These 
trade alternatives included (i) Single trade arrangements versus multiple 
arrangements, (ii) Differentiated versus generalised, (iii) Reciprocal versus non-
reciprocal, and (iv) Contractual versus unilateral. In more specific terms, the 
Green Paper presents a menu of several  options: “Status quo”; “Integration into 
the GSP”; “Uniform reciprocity”; “Differentiated reciprocity”; “Differentiation 
under a single framework including Region-to-Region FTAs”; “Bilateral FTAs”; 
“Non-reciprocal preferences”; “Graduation into GSP”; and finally as the sixth 
option, “Differentiation leading to a variety of arrangements”. 722 The Green 
Paper text also included a discussion on the assumed pros and cons of each 
of the presented options. Negative and positive implications were examined, 
particularly from the perspective of WTO compatibility, developmental 
differences within the ACP groups, capacity concerns, regional markets and 
integration, as well as overall feasibility.723 
When it came to the ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement, the point of departure was 
clear. In essence: “economic partnerships” should facilitate the achievement 
of the overarching goal of the EU’s development policy and the Cotonou 
Agreement – the reduction, and eventually the eradication, of poverty – in a 
way which is both consistent with sustainable development and the gradual 
721 Interviews EC[30]2009, EC[34]2009, CSO [31]2008 and CSO[11]2009. 
722 For more content details, see Green Paper 1996: 38-39. 
723 Green Paper 1996: 40-41.
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integration of the ACP countries into the world economy.724  According to Article 
1 of the Cotonou Agreement, the pursuit of these objectives should be conducted 
through an integrated approach which simultaneously takes into account the 
political, economic, social, cultural and environmental aspects of development. 
This integrated approach is further guided by fundamental principles of 
equality and ownership between the ACP and EU partners, participation that 
includes both state and non-state actors, dialogue between the partners as well 
as differentiation according to the needs of each ACP state, and regionalisation 
to promote cooperation between the ACP countries.725 Moreover, all the parties 
“shall refrain from any measures liable to jeopardise these objectives”. These 
terms were also to apply to the New Trade Arrangements section of the 
Cotonou Agreement, which provides the basis for the EPA negotiations between 
the European Commission (EC) and six ACP regional groups.726 
In this section, modalities and procedures (including the timeline for the 
negotiations) were outlined under the title of Economic and Trade Cooperation. 
Most importantly here, in the modalities section, the “Parties agree to conclude 
new World Trade Organisation (WTO) compatible trading arrangements, 
removing progressively barriers to trade between them and enhancing 
cooperation in all areas relevant to trade” (Article 36:1). With regard to the 
issue of WTO compatibility, in the Agreement’s Objectives section, it is also 
underlined that “Economic and trade cooperation shall be implemented in full 
conformity with the provisions of the WTO, including special and differential 
treatment, taking account of the Parties’ mutual interests and their respective 
levels of development” (Article 34: 4). 
Translating the objectives and principles of any given policy into practice 
is a complicated process. It is especially difficult when the objectives and 
principles are merely listed, or defined so broadly that they are left open to 
various interpretations. This is very clearly the case with the key objectives 
of the Cotonou Agreement – “poverty reduction”, “sustainable development”, 
and “the world economy”, into which the ACP countries are meant to be 
integrated. Despite these difficulties, the way in which the objectives of the 
Cotonou Agreement are declared in the text suggests that there is a shared 
prior understanding between the parties on what the objectives of poverty 
reduction and sustainable development imply, and how the integrated approach 
in pursuit of these goals should be governed, as it is not explicitly stated in the 
724 See the Cotonou Agreement, Article 1, Objectives of the partnership and European Consensus on 
Development: paragraph 5. 
725 See the Cotonou Agreement: Article 2, Fundamental Principles. 
726 Four out of the six EPA configurations are Sub-Saharan African, plus the Caribbean and the 
Pacific. 
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text. This joint understanding of the objectives is supposed to come from the 
references made to certain international agreements in the preamble to the 
Cotonou Agreement. These include the pledges of the major UN Conventions, 
with the Rio Declarations on sustainable development being the first to be listed 
in the preamble.727 On the other hand, the Cotonou Agreement also refers to the 
commitments made within the legally binding framework of the World Trade 
Organization. 
Leaving aside for a moment the issue of compatibility regarding the agendas 
of these two international organizations (see Chapter 2), we may refer back 
to the international consensus that was reached at the Rio+10 follow-up in 
Johannesburg in 2002, and that of the WTO Doha Development Round a 
year earlier. This consensus was based on the recognition of the importance 
of dismantling protectionism in, and increasing market access to, the 
developed economies, such as the EU and the US, especially in those areas 
where developing countries had the strongest export interests. This demand 
can also be traced back to the original Our Common Future (1987) (see Sub-
chapter 2.4). In other words, market access for developing countries was 
the key issue that both agendas had in common. Both the trade liberalisers 
in the North as well as the developing countries that wanted to benefit from 
external trade supported this. More specifically, this was a key issue for the 
ACPs, which regarded it as important to maintain and improve their access to 
the EU market and benefit from different forms of assistance to increase their 
capacity to trade. By contrast, the issue of reciprocity in trade liberalisation was 
much more controversial. By the same token, the trade-related aspects that 
the EU wanted to push forward without a consensus at the WTO level formed 
another bone of contention. In the EPA case, WTO compatibility came to be 
understood as compatibility with GATT Article XXIV on the format of a free 
trade agreement. As the Doha Development Agenda (2001) did not materialise 
in the actual WTO Doha Round negotiations, a significant vacuum was left for 
actors such as the EU to use the space for their own benefit at the bilateral level, 
while the multilateral governance reform was put on hold.  To conclude, at the 
goal-setting level, the goal of trade liberalisation started to live a life of its own, 
detached from the larger sustainable development agenda, or the European 
Consensus on development. 
In the absence of a shared understanding, the power to define and decide 
comes into play. Due to the community competence in trade, DG Trade was 
granted the pole position to frame how these provisions would be taken 
727 These include the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the UN Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD), and the Statement on the Forest Principles.
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forward. In practice, this was guaranteed with the possibility to design the EPA 
negotiations mandate, which was then submitted to the Council for approval 
in September 2002.728  Even at this point, DG Trade put forward the idea that 
an all-encompassing trade and economic reform was needed in order to attain 
the objectives of the Cotonou Agreement. DG Trade outlined the formula in the 
following way:
… by establishing a stable, predictable and transparent framework for economic 
and trade relations between the ACP countries and the EU, EPAs are intended to 
mobilize economic operators at local, national, regional and international levels 
and to promote local economic activity and attract regional and international 
investments. By removing border measures to trade between the parties as well 
as other factors causing market segmentation, they will enlarge the markets of 
ACP countries, which will allow for economies of scale, will improve the level of 
specialization, will increase competiveness of the ACP states and will help attract 
investment. This, in turn, will lead to an increase in trade flows in the region, with 
the Community and with the rest of the world, thereby promoting the sustainable 
economic and social development of the ACP countries. 
At the same time, the Commission recognised that such a plan would require 
difficult economic and social adjustments.729 However, these difficulties would 
be addressed through development aid from the European Development Fund, 
rather than adjusting trade policy in itself.
In order to maximize the benefits of EPAs, it is therefore essential that EPA 
negotiations and implementation be accompanied by appropriate flanking 
policies of the ACP and the appropriate EU support measures are included in 
regular EDF financing. EPAs will set a trade policy framework which will need to 
be complemented by development policies in areas such as regional integration, 
macroeconomic and social policies, environmental policies, good governance, 
supply-side measures, sectoral programmes, fiscal reforms and assistance in 
trade-related areas such as customs administration, investment, competition 
and standards.730 
Without dwelling here on the issue of the adequateness of the proposed model, 
a number of observations can be made. First, whereas the Cotonou Agreement 
provided the general framework for the new trade arrangements, the Commission 
728 Interviews Council[5]2008, EC[4]2009 and CSO[20]2009. 
729 Commission mandate SEC (2002) 351: 3-4.  
730 Ibid.  
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negotiating mandate set out a comprehensive framework listing a wide range of 
issues to be incorporated into the EPAs. This also included a proposal to extend 
the scope of the EPAs to trade in services in accordance with the WTO GATS 
provisions. Second, it positioned the EU development policy at the service of this 
proposed model in terms of difficult economic and social adjustments. Third, it 
also positioned ACP developmental strategies to complement and support the 
anticipated challenges.731 Whereas the Green Paper explicitly stated that these 
issues should be addressed only at the request of the ACP states, here the EC 
defines them as the key to trade relations reform. With regard to the objective 
of removing border measures, the issue of reciprocity in tariff liberalisation was 
seen as crucial. However, in terms of the EPA format, the mandate still stressed 
that the EPAs need to serve the developmental objectives first, and that WTO 
compatibility of ACP-EU trade relations does not override this primacy.732 Yet, 
the content of the future EPA was already pre-selected and defined as a free 
trade agreement.
The primary building block for EPAs is the establishment of free trade areas, 
progressively eliminating tariffs and non-tariff barriers, such as quotas and 
measures having an equivalent effect, on substantially all trade between the 
parties.733
The Commission-mandated text proposes two normative guidelines that 
subsequently went on to become key issues in the actual negotiations. The first 
concerns the flexibility and asymmetry of the reciprocal trade liberalisation 
vis-à-vis the Community, while the second regards the differentiation of the 
ACP LDC states. Regarding the former, the mandate states that the Union will 
apply the maximum degree of flexibility available. “Therefore, while a period 
of 10 years for tariff dismantling would be the normal rule (in other FTAs), the 
Community should be prepared to accept that this period will be exceeded, where 
this is required by economic and social constraints of the countries concerned”. 
Flexibility should also be applied to product coverage as well as product 
exclusions and the pace of liberalisation commitments by the EPA partners. 
Deviating from the GATT principle of special and differential treatment, the 
mandate emphasised that under the EPAs, the least developed countries were 
also required to reciprocate. In other words, the EC held that special treatment 
was needed only if a country’s “adaption capacity” was at stake. However, this 
did not imply exemption from reciprocity, but more flexibility in terms of timing 
731 Commission Mandate SEC (2002) 351: 5.
732 Commission Mandate SEC (2002) 351: 4. 
733 Commission Mandate SEC (2002) 351: 4.
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and slower implementation schedules. On the contrary, reciprocity as such 
was seen as essential for the developmental contribution of the EPAs. In other 
words, the needs and developmental differences would be addressed in the same 
framework for all the ACPs with the assumption that free trade benefits the 
parties regardless of the level of economic and social development. Moreover, 
the framework of harmonised rules and disciplines in all areas relevant to trade 
would be designed to cover all ACP regions and sub-regions.734
What is important to note is that the Commission mandate included a 
commitment to initiate sustainability impact assessment (SIA) prior to the 
start of the negotiations. The purpose of this study was to “bring a better 
understanding of trade, development and environment linkages and identifying 
the best policy mix”.735 This was seen as crucial in terms of linking the trade 
measures to the wider development objectives of the Cotonou Agreement.736 
The five-year SIA research project resulted in two SIA reports in 2005 and 2006 
as well as a summary report in 2007. The summary report was finalised in April 
2007 and accepted by the Commission in May 2007737, just six months before 
the anticipated conclusion of the EPA negotiations. Due to their late timing, 
these studies did not provide much of a guideline for the actual negotiations. 
They were also commissioned, and consequently conducted, based on one 
pre-selected FTA format under GATT Article XXIV.  This choice left aside the 
concerns expressed in the DG DEV drafted Commission Green Paper (1996) 
and its different alternatives, which were not evaluated.738 
George (2010: 126) points to the fact that the first two SIA reports presented 
a total of 207 detailed recommendations, many of which called for significant 
changes to the proposed EU EPA model. However, the EC did not officially 
respond to them. Instead, the Commission issued a position paper on sugar eight 
months later in which it stated that the twelve summary report recommendations 
had already been taken into account. Among these 12 recommendations were 
identified concerns related, for example, to the fragmentation of the regional 
groupings, “sensitive” product protection and rules of origin.739 
In May 2002 the General Affairs and External Relations Council approved 
the Commission proposal. This implied that the Commission’s DG Trade now 
had a mandate to negotiate on behalf of the EU, along the lines that it had 
drafted. On the ACP side, guidelines for negotiations were agreed by ACP Trade 
734 Commission mandate SEC (2002): 5, 7. 
735 Commission mandate SEC (2002): 8. 
736 Ibid.
737 PricewaterhouseCoopers 2007: 4. 
738 Interviews CSO[31]2008 and EC[1]2008.
739 See PricewaterhouseCoopers 2007: 10-18.
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and Finance Ministers.740 The text defining the Commission mandate re-asserted 
the overall development objectives of the Cotonou Agreement as the framework 
for the talks. It was also confirmed that the EPAs must serve these objectives.741 
In specific terms, it “shall aim at fostering the smooth and gradual integration of 
ACP States into the world economy, with due regard to their political choices and 
development priorities, thereby promoting their sustainable development and 
contributing to poverty eradication in the ACP countries (Article 34 (1))”. The 
Council conclusions (13 May 2002) re-affirmed the centrality of these objectives. 
They also stressed the importance of market access, WTO compatibility and 
flexibility. This importance was further highlighted with a rather ambiguous 
phrase stating that “the Economic Partnership Agreements should be regarded 
as a tool for development and, by the same token, be WTO compatible”.742
However, as discussed above, the Commission negotiating mandate expanded 
the provisional text in the Cotonou Agreement and set out a comprehensive 
framework listing a wide range of trade-related issues to be incorporated into 
the EPAs. This also included a proposal to extend the scope of the EPAs to trade 
in services in accordance with the WTO GATS provisions and other issues that 
were rejected during the WTO negotiations. In the course of the negotiations, the 
regulatory elements were further expanded to investment regimes, protection 
of intellectual property rights, labour and environmental norms.743 However, as 
important as labour and environmental norms are for sustainable development, 
emphasising those elements overshadowed the core question related to the 
functionality of the free trade agreement format in this context. Furthermore, 
this approach shifted the focus and responsibility away from the EU’s role in 
policy coherence towards the ACP partners.
According to the original plan, the Commission, representing the Union, 
was to first reach a framework agreement with all the ACP regions by 2004. 
After that, the negotiations were to proceed with the EU and each of the six ACP 
regions separately, with a view to concluding the EPAs by the end of 2007.744 
740 The so-called Joint Roadmap documents between the EC and each regional grouping define 
the organisation of the parties to the negotiations. The EC organisation is based on the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community. The European Commission negotiates on behalf of the 
EU, represented by the Commissioner of Trade at the ministerial level, and a senior official of 
DG Trade at the ambassadorial level. Preparations at the technical level will be coordinated by 
the geographical responsible unit in DG Trade. 
741 SEC (2002) 351 Final: 2. 
742 Council Conclusions 13 May 2002: 10.
743 Lesage & Kerremans 2007: 93.
744 The EPA groups consist of six ACP regions: CEMAC plus Sao Tome and Principe (Central Africa), 
ECOWAS plus Mauritania (West Africa), COMESA minus Egypt and South Africa (East and 
Southern Africa), SADC plus Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania (Southern Africa), CARIFORUM 
(Caribbean) and Pacific ACP States.
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However, the negotiations proved to be much more complicated than those 
first envisioned in Brussels. Symptomatically, the first all-ACP stage of the 
negotiations was never completed. This was due to a number of reasons. First, 
there was a remarkable degree of confusion caused by the decision to transfer 
ACP trade-related issues from DG DEV to DG Trade (see Sub-chapter 3.2) in 
the EC. The ACP countries were confronted with an altogether different logic of 
discussing their relations with the Community. In particular, they were confused 
by the approach to separate trade from the traditional approach of development 
cooperation and the overall ACP-EU framework. Whereas the ACPs anticipated 
discussions along the traditional lines of diplomacy, DG Trade framed the 
process as free trade negotiations in line with the EC mandate. Furthermore, 
the ACP countries had very limited interest in engaging with the EC, as they 
were quite satisfied with the preferential treatment and non-reciprocity.745 This 
position did not augur well for the actual negotiations. 
Ideally, in bilateral negotiations both parties engage in the process 
voluntarily and expect to gain from the exchange. They test the ground and 
place their offers. Through bargaining, they aim to maximise their gains while 
seeking an agreement on the actual content and scope of the outcome. These 
preconditions were not in place in the EPAs. As a matter of fact, the logic of the 
trade negotiations left very limited room for mutual analysis or planning on how 
to formulate the strategies prioritising the development interests. The ACPs 
also found it strange that DG Trade was leading the negotiations without the 
competence to discuss development cooperation and aid. At this point, DG DEV 
was still trying to put its own house in order after the Commission reforms, and 
did not demand a bigger role than the one officially allocated to it. Many of the 
interviews point to this delay and the absence of more proactive involvement 
before 2005.746 
… certainly, there was a transition period of one year or a bit more [2004-2005] 
where  DG DEV was slow to realise the implications of launching the EPA. This 
was also the case with the member states. The EPAs were truly launched in the 
course of 2004, which was the end of the previous Commission. Then there was 
the new Commission, the new Director-General, so from the organisational point 
of view, things were not in place.747  
So in practice, both the negotiations of the EPAs with the ACPs as well as 
the inter-service consultations within the Commission were in the hands of 
745 Elgstöm 2010: 21.
746 Interviews EC[15]2009, EC[14], CSO[31] 2008, CSO[11] and Academia[7]2009.
747 Interview EC[15]2009. 
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DG Trade. Respectively, DG DEV was confined to the provision of technical 
and financial assistance.748 This power position depended on the Community 
competence and the EU’s institutional organisation. Similarly, every item in 
the negotiations was presented under the lead of the respective sectoral DG. 
For instance, DG Agriculture was in charge of agriculture, DG TAXUD took 
the lead when it came to certain details on Rules of Origin, and DG SANCO 
provided input on sanitary and phytosanitary standards.749 On the Commission 
side, this standard FTA negotiation procedure also turned the EPAs into “a 
joint true EC undertaking”.750 As such, it became increasingly important for the 
Commission to reach and maintain internal consensus in order to speak with 
one voice externally.751 The “fact” that the Commission is one, and operates as 
one, was a feature that frequently came up in the interviews, irrespective of the 
DG. There were also dissident voices, but they constituted a silent minority 
within the Commission.752 From the point of view of the ACP countries, this 
setting marked a complete change of culture. At the negotiations, they were 
faced with highly skilled, result-oriented and strategically motivated (often also 
pressured) EC staff, whose primary mandate was influenced by the sector in 
question as well as the overall EC position. The Cotonou Agreement as such 
did not constitute an important reference. Or rather, the Council had already 
approved the Commission mandate, which decreased the need for closer 
scrutiny.753  In addition, the gap between the EC and the ACP negotiating power 
and capacity posed yet another question.
Once the negotiations had got underway, alternative or critical views 
were seen as counterproductive. Therefore, DG Trade trod carefully when 
it came to planning how the whole issue area was to be communicated and 
discussed. This included common guidelines to debate free trade, FTAs, the 
Doha “Development” Round as well as the EPAs.754 The controlled exchange of 
information was further enforced by the Commission hymn sheets that were 
regularly sent to the member states. In this configuration, the Council and the 
member states took a rather passive stand. This can be explained again by the 
fact that DG Trade used its community competence fully – and skillfully – in the 
actual negotiations where the member states did not have a role to play. Inside 
the Council, the Article 133 Committee constituted the key forum, whereas the 
748 Hudson 2006. 
749 Interviews EC[15]2009 and EC[4]2009. 
750 Interviews EC[4], EC[14], and EC[15]2009.
751 Interviews EC[17], EC[32], EC[10]2009, EC[34]2009, EC[12]2009, EC[27], EC[26]. 
752 EC[34]2009.
753 Interviews CSO[31]2008, Council[5]2008 and Academia[7]2009.
754 CSO[20]2009, Council[5]2008 and informal discussions.
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role of the ACP Working Group remained rather modest and disintegrated.755 
However, the positions on the Article 133 Committee were largely influenced 
by the fact that the member states were represented by national trade policy 
functionaries who were, in turn, directed to promote their own national trade 
policy interests. In this context, development concerns were mainly on the table 
to accompany the liberal trade policy stand on market access, but not as an 
independent issue area.756 Furthermore, the nature of the Article 133 Committee 
as an arena for all trade policy issues and ongoing negotiations was not 
conducive to critical remarks or new openings that would have challenged the 
Commission’s view. As neither the ACPs nor the EPAs were hardly of primary 
interest to any of the member states, they also avoided challenging the EC in this 
area. In addition, the member states themselves had given the Commission a 
very broad mandate that largely legitimised the EC choices. Moreover, after the 
approval of the Commission mandate, the role of the Commission was mainly 
to inform the Committees about the proceedings on the EPA front.
In this rather dormant setting, the UK government was the first to 
react, and react it did. In March 2005, the UK published a highly critical 
position paper by the Department for International Development and the 
Department of Trade and Industry. Essentially, the paper outlined how the 
EPAs could be designed to deliver for development and what changes that 
would imply in the Commission stance. First and foremost, it accused the 
EC of a mercantilist approach and the pursuit of offensive interests. Second, 
it stated that developing countries can benefit from liberalisation in the 
long run provided that they have the economic capacity and infrastructure 
they need to trade competitively. It also warned that if these conditions 
were not in place, trade liberalisation could be harmful. Therefore, the UK 
letter stated that trade liberalisation should not be imposed on developing 
countries, neither through trade negotiations nor aid conditionality.757  To 
this end, the UK set out a list of measures for implementing this in practice. 
These included flexibility over market opening (20 years), duty-free, quota-
free market access and coordinated Aid for Trade financing, the removal of 
the Singapore Issues from the negotiations, unless specifically requested by 
the ACP Party, and the establishment of a review mechanism for EPAs, with 
full ACP regional group ownership and participation. Even more radically, 
the UK stated that the Commission should also be prepared to provide an 
alternative to an EPA without entailing inferior market access to the Cotonou 
755 Interview Council[5]2008.
756 Interview Council[5]2008.
757 Economic Partnership Agreements: Making EPAs work for development. DTI and DFID paper, 
March 2005. 
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preferences, should that be requested by any ACP country. And lastly, the UK 
advised the Commission to propose, in conjunction with the WTO, that Article 
XXIV defining frontier traffic, customs unions and free trade areas would be 
reviewed, as suggested by the Commission for Africa. In sharp contrast to the 
Commission stance, the idea here was to circumvent the requirements for 
reciprocity and increase the focus on development priorities. 
The letter was received with dismay at the Commission end. In his response 
on behalf of DG Trade and Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson, Peter Carl 
described the British approach as a “major and unwelcome shift” influenced 
by “celebrities and NGOs who are now pressing for action which would have 
no impact on the Commission’s negotiation position”. However, the UK 
government re-affirmed its stance as a matter of principle to make the EPAs 
as development-friendly as possible. 758  A more constructive framework was 
found with the establishment of an informal EPA Expert Group during the 
UK Council Presidency. This group, often referred to as “The Friends of the 
EPAs”, shared the concern about the inadequate development focus in the 
EPA process. In addition to the UK, DG Trade (chair) and DG DEV staff, the 
group included both trade and development people from Germany, Sweden, 
the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Finland, Belgium, Austria, France and 
Poland.759 Unsurprisingly, the UK was also vocal in this context as it had taken 
a very positive stand towards trade liberalisation as a whole, and placed Africa/
poverty eradication at the heart of its presidency agenda (cf. Sub-chapter 4.3). 
Furthermore, it did not agree with the reciprocity in the FTA format that the 
Commission sought to put forward in the negotiations. Despite improved 
information sharing and more focused discussions on development funding, 
this group did not provide a sufficient counter-force to the Commission stand. 
One reason for this was the frequently changing staff and lack of capacity in 
many of the member states to address the EPA question from the development 
point of view.760 
The ACP countries, together with the European Parliament Committees 
on Development and International Trade as well as various NGO platforms, 
largely perceived reciprocal liberalisation measures as inadequate in 
advancing development in ACP countries. Furthermore, they stressed the 
so-called supply-side constraints761 within the ACP states, which make it 
758 “EU move to block trade aid for poor”, the Guardian 19 May 2005.
759 Interviews Council[5]2008 and CSO[20]2009.
760 Interviews Academia [7]2009, EC[1]2008, Council[5]2008 , CSO[20]2009 and CSO[31]2008.
761 Supply-side constraints generally refer to factors such as poor economic infrastructure, 
unfavourable investment climate, weak institutions, and lack of a trained workforce, which 
prevent developing countries from taking advantage of trade liberalisation. See also Bilal & 
Rampa 2006. 
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unlikely that the majority of the ACP countries’ producers can benefit from 
the EC approach. What is more, the least developed countries (LDCs) had 
already been offered duty- and quota-free access to the EU market under 
the Everything But Arms initiative, which diminished their incentives. 
Furthermore, reciprocal liberalisation in itself was not in line with the WTO/
GATT principle of special and differential treatment.762 These critics feared, 
inter alia, that the current international setting allowing the EU increased 
access to the ACP markets by liberating “substantially all trade” would have a 
negative impact on the development of local producers and industries, as well 
as on the public revenues of the ACP states, and would narrow down the policy 
sphere for alternative development paths. The EU approach was consequently 
more likely to lead to growing inequality than to the achievement of joint 
development goals.763
Regarding the WTO rules, the EP did nothing less than urge the EC to take 
the initiative to revise and clarify GATT Article XXIV concerning free trade 
agreements and the “substantially all trade” clause.  At the same time, the 
Committee advised taking into account the reality of the ACP countries in terms 
of dependency on primary commodities and their price fluctuation and tariff 
escalation. To remedy this, the EP stressed that diversification was needed 
which, in turn, requires development of the processing industries and SMEs 
in those countries. Additionally, the EP called upon the EC to offer valid EPA 
alternatives such as the Everything But Arms initiative (EBA) to all non-LDC 
countries, or by improving the EU’s GSP+ proposal for those ACPs that may not 
wish to enter into an EPA. The EPA checklist concluded by stressing that the 
capacity invested in building local markets and trade was at least as important 
as market access.764 
However, the EC maintained that reciprocity in trade liberalisation was not 
only a WTO requirement concerning free trade agreements, but an essential 
element of any development-oriented trade agreement.765 In response to this 
criticism, the Commission worked hard to communicate more effectively why 
762 On Special and Differential Treatment, see Sub-chapter 2.4.
763 This position is largely shared by the African ACP states, the European Parliament, as well as 
various NGOs both in Europe and in the ACP countries. Compare, for instance, the ACP-EU 
Joint Parliamentary Assembly 2006, EP Report A6-0075/2005 Committee on Development, 
Rapporteur: Glenys Kinnock: 12-13. EP Reports 2007, Oxfam 2006 and the Stop EPA campaign 
by 171 NGOs.
764 This EP Report A6-0075/2005 also included calls for the Council to take measures to implement 
the WTO Decision of 30 August 2003 on the implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, and calls on the Commission to urge 
the member states to implement the new regulation fully. 
765 Interviews EC[1]2008, EC[10]2009, EC[18] and EC[4]2009.
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the EPAs are an essential tool for development. Most importantly, this effort 
was facilitated by Development Commissioner Louis Michel, who adopted a very 
supportive and proactive stance towards the EPAs. This has resulted in a number 
of joint documents on trade and development aspects since November 2005.766 
The cooperation between the two Commissioners, Michel and Mandelson, 
peaked in a jointly signed booklet entitled “Economic  Partnership Agreements: 
Drivers of Development” (2008). The main purpose of this joint endeavour was 
to clarify the misunderstandings that surrounded the EPA question and to show 
that the Commission stood and spoke as one in the negotiations and beyond.767 
As plausible as this position was for Commission unity, it effectively blocked 
a more open debate on policy coherence for development. Almost ironically, 
the European Consensus Statement had given the Commission the very role of 
safeguarding policy coherence for development in trade and development (see 
Sub-chapter 5.5).  
Towards the end of 2007, it became obvious that none of the African regions 
would be either willing or able to conclude an EPA as envisioned and urged by 
the Commission. Only one regional EPA – the EU-CARIFORUM EPA – was 
adopted as planned.768 In this situation, the EU tabled a two-stage proposal, 
which consisted of concluding the WTO- compatible interim and partial 
agreements with predisposed regional groupings and individual countries. 
Development assistance, which had been omitted from the trade negotiations 
until 2007, was brought back to facilitate the conclusion. However, the main 
bones of contention that have appeared during the process still remain, and 
keep increasing. Most importantly, it is evident that the lingering doubts 
over the appropriateness of the EPAs as instruments for economic and social 
development can be attributed to the degree of reciprocal liberalisation, 
timetabling, capacity and revenue loss as import tariffs go down, increased 
foreign influence in internal affairs, regional disintegration, and lack of public 
support. 769 In the meantime, falling back on either unilateral preferences, such 
as the EBA or GSP, or the expiration of interim agreements since 2007, all 
parties have committed themselves to pursuing comprehensive and regional 
negotiations. However, a notable disinterest prevails on the ACP side when it 
comes to pushing the EPAs forward. DG Trade was also aware of the risks of 
766 SEC (2005) 1459 The trade and development aspects of EPA negotiations. 
767 Interviews EC[27] and EC[14 ]2009. See also the foreword to the booklet by Commissioner Louis 
Michel.
768 Five of the 11 Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) states (excluding the East African Community 
– EAC) initialled an interim EPA in 2007 and a sixth, Zambia, did so in 2008. In addition, Ivory 
Coast initialled an interim EPA in 2008, and 2 countries initialled an interim EPA in the Pacific 
(Bilal and Stevens 2009).
769 See the list by the ACP negotiators on the Contentious Issues 2009. 
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reciprocal liberalisation if the ACPs chose not to act accordingly and started 
implementing reforms necessary for facing future competition.770 However, 
should that happen, the EC still has the option to pressure a non-complying 
country with the threat of the WTO appellate body.771 
To summarise, due to the institutional power of DG Trade and its sole 
competence, it was rather immune to pressure from other involved actors, 
most importantly from the ACPs. This position provided DG Trade with an 
opportunity to expand the consensus on market access and trade capacity-
building in a direction that was in line with its overall trade policy and vested 
interest. In this situation, the support from DG DEV, particularly from 
Commissioner Louis Michel, was crucial. This liaison between DG DEV and 
DG Trade was founded both on the shared idea of trade liberalisation at the 
Commissioner’s level and the need to work in unison. Officially, the EC was 
aiming to kill two birds with one stone by fulfilling the EU’s interpretation of 
WTO compatibility and the development policy objectives. In this regard, the 
EU also highlighted the possibility of using economic coercion. Consequently, 
the limits of policy coherence for development were set out within these 
boundaries. However, the problem of the gap between the actual interest-driven 
negotiations and the normative value-based commitments made in the ACP-EU 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement and European Consensus still needed to be 
covered. That is why the use of discursive power became key in presenting the 
EPAs in the chosen free trade format as the necessary and only option for the 
development of the ACPs. This setting manifests the normative dualism in the 
EU’s development and trade approach.
6.5 THE EPAS AS A MODEL fOR TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 
The main purpose of this last sub-chapter is to conduct a closer analysis of the 
format that the European Commission was proposing for EU-ACP trade. More 
precisely here, I focus on the proposals that concern the (four) Sub-Saharan 
negotiation groups and their main normative features. None of these groups 
was willing to conclude a comprehensive EPA before the 31 December 2007 
negotiation deadline. Importantly from the PCD perspective, the Sub-Saharan 
groups include the vast majority of the world’s least developed countries, where 
the need for sustainable development and poverty reduction is particularly 
pressing. Therefore, rather than analysing the specific provisions of each 
of the proposed EPAs, my interest lies in the elements that define the EU’s 
770 Interviews EC[18]2009 and EC[27]2009.
771 Interview EC[27]2009.
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understanding of policy coherence for development.772 The main features can 
be inferred from its trade and development policy statements, as well as EPA 
negotiation documents. I also rely on the semi-structured interviews that 
I conducted with the key trade and development officials in the respective 
Commission services.773 In the following, I will briefly summarise the main 
characteristics of the EU approach and discuss them from the point of view of 
policy coherence for development. In particular I look at:
a) the Commission’s negotiation stance in terms of the EU’s dominant 
normative approach to trade and development in the EPAs,
b) the Commission’s primary goals in the negotiations, namely what it wants 
to gain from the negotiations, after which it may make concessions on other 
topics in return for accepted trade and development gains,
c) the Commission’s minimum acceptable compromise, namely its “bottom 
line” and the ultimate limit on its willingness to negotiate.774
With regard to the EU’s dominant approach, the main features relate to the 
mutually reinforcing interrelationship between development objectives and 
the multi- and bilateral trading systems.775 The Sub-Saharan countries are also 
expected to benefit from closer involvement with these arrangements, thanks to 
regional integration, on the one hand, and through closer and more harmonised 
economic relations with the EU, on the other.776 The way in which the multilateral 
trading system operates or the EU organises North-South free trade agreements 
with poorer countries does not necessarily require reforming.777 Instead, the 
EU-African ACP trade arrangements need to be aligned more closely with the 
existing EU-South trade framework and, in particular, the FTA models and 
overall WTO compatibility. This implies major changes both at the country 
and regional levels. As a result, the EU embarked on the negotiations with a 
broad trade agenda including liberalisation of both trade in goods and trade in 
services. In addition, the EC was/is endeavouring to include a number of so-
772 For further details on the EPA provisions, tariffs and schedules, see Bilal and Stevens 2009.
773 In addition to research interviews, the exchanges included informal meetings and discussions 
with persons involved. I was also present in a number hearings, consultations and conferences 
where the issues were presented and debated by some of the interviewees in 2006-2009. 
774 See and compare with Grainger 2004: 283-292, on positions in respect of climate change 
negotiations. 
775 Cf. Global Europe.
776 Interviews EC[1]2008, EC[4]2009,EC[10]2009, EC[14]2008 and EC[15]2009. 
777 None of the 17 EC interviewees brought up this issue or expressed any interest in discussing it.
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called “New Trade” issues like competition, investment and public procurement 
in the EPA agreements, which it sees as reinforcing elements in the EPA 
packages.778 Compared to the Cotonou Agreement, the status of these elements 
in the negotiations proposal was shifted from “areas of cooperation” to legally 
binding contractual arrangements so as to lock-in the necessary EU-compatible 
reforms. 
In keeping with the EU’s dominant approach, the EU expresses strong 
support for trade liberalisation and the consequent increase in competition, 
which it regards as beneficial both for its own trade interests and duly for 
those of its ACP partners. Reciprocity per se is not considered problematic; 
on the contrary, it is seen as beneficial, if market liberalisation is sufficiently 
asymmetric and takes place gradually.779 In this respect, the EU proposal puts 
forth a strong norm of what this should imply in practice. This norm is based 
on the EU interpretation of the “substantially all trade” definition of the North-
South FTAs, including the EU and the LDC as well as the non-LDC ACP partners 
under GATT Article XXIV. 
In this case, the Union is willing to exercise flexibility and asymmetry in 
terms of liberalising 100 per cent for ACP trade and expecting the EPA partners 
to reciprocally dismantle 80 per cent of their tariffs on EU exports per tariff line 
and volume. This would allow the 20 per cent margin to be used by the Sub-
Saharan ACPs to protect sensitive products against EU competition. In this case, 
the EPA would result in an average of 90 per cent liberalisation.780According to 
the SIA by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2007), this would cover several sensitive 
products. 
However, “several” does not mean “all of them”. In addition, this margin 
distinguishes the EPAs from the “normal FTAs” as the room for manoeuvre is 
10 per cent larger than is usually the case.781 Given that the “substantially all 
trade” clause has not been defined in the WTO782, the EU is not willing to test 
the ground with lower liberalisation offers which would risk being challenged by 
other WTO members. This choice is grounded in legal, economic and political 
arguments.783 Most importantly here, from the EU development perspective, the 
more you liberalise, the better for your economic development. This approach 
is applied to non-LDCs and LDCs alike. Although the LDCs could stay outside 
the EPAs and continue to export to the EU under the EBA initiative with the 
778 Interviews EC[1]2008, EC[4]2009, EC[10]2009, EC[14]2008 and EC[15]2009.
779 Interviews EC[1]2008, EC[4]2009, EC[10]2009, EC[14]2008, EC[16]2009 and EC[15]2009.
780 Interviews EC[1]2008, EC[4]2009, EC[10]2009, EC[14]2008 and EC[15]2009.
781 On the problem of protecting sensitive products and the trade-offs between agricultural and 
industrial products, see Hepburn 2007.
782 Cf. the Turkey case discussed above.
783 Interviews EC[4]2009 and EC[14]2008.
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same duty-free, quota-free market access, the reciprocity in terms of EU exports 
would also affect them if they are members of the EPA regional configuration 
with a common external tariff. However, flexibility regarding the pace of the 
transition period for the liberalisation commitments is set at an average of 15 
years by the EPA, instead of the 10 years applied by other FTAs. During this 
time, the Sub-Saharan countries should adequately prepare for the market 
opening and aim at increasing the competiveness of their products. Reciprocity 
is most challenging for countries where EU imports compete with domestic 
production and where import tariffs constitute a substantial part of government 
revenue. However, this is not seen as problematic as the 20 per cent margin 
is more than sufficient to protect the sensitive core industrial and agricultural 
sectors. Crucially, liberalisation should be directed in a way that lowers the 
price for imports that are not at present in direct competition, and can facilitate 
development by providing “inputs” to different manufacturing and processing 
sectors, thereby adding value and diversifying production. 
The rationale for reciprocity rests on the principle that the liberalisation of 
ACP markets towards the EU is expected to increase competition within ACP 
economies, reduce prices for consumers, and stimulate investment as well as the 
transfer of technology and knowledge.784 The increase in competition will lead to 
more efficiency as the uncompetitive industries and sectors will be outcompeted 
and eventually vanish. In this respect, the question of Sub-Saharan agricultural 
production is a crucial one in terms of poverty eradication. However, in the 
actual EPA negotiation model, there is very little that directly touches upon 
the developmental needs of agriculture, apart from the 20 per cent exclusion 
margin. In addition, poor urban consumers are likely to benefit in the event that 
competition is also increased concerning sensitive agricultural products if they 
can purchase the subsidised EU products at a lower price than the domestic 
ones. This is where the government policy, as well as regional strategies, should 
intervene to direct national development, which would then be supported by 
the EU development policy, including Aid for Trade schemes.785 By the same 
token, the issue of revenue loss will be partially addressed by development 
policy and will be compensated by increased effectiveness in customs control 
and alternative methods of tax collection.786 
However, the phase during which gradual progress should take place is 
directed by the WTO rules and not by the development needs of a specific ACP 
country or region. Discussion and assessment of development benchmarks in 
terms of the advancement of the poverty reduction goal does not lie within 
784 See more in Bilal & Rampa 2006: 41.
785 Interviews EC[1]2008, EC[4]2009, EC[10]2009, EC[14]2008 and EC[15]2009. 
786 Interviews EC[4]2009 and EC[18]2009.
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Commission trade competence and is therefore to be excluded from the actual 
negotiations. However, according to some key Commission officials, the EU 
itself does not have any offensive interests vested in EPAs that would conflict 
with the poverty reduction goal.787 This is simply because free trade as such 
is seen as development-friendly despite the lack of theoretical and empirical 
evidence pertaining to this type of particularly vulnerable context. Even the 
suggested inclusion of the New Trade issues is considered compatible with the 
EC’s Global Europe Trade Agenda and necessary for the EU’s development 
through trade approach.788 However, the EPAs also include issues that go beyond 
the development dimension, such as the MFN treatment that the EC, with the 
support of some of the member states, seeks to incorporate.789 In addition, 
the absence of interests can be questioned with the very logic of similar FTAs, 
which are negotiated with a view to gaining mutual benefits through reciprocal 
liberalisation. This was particularly the case with the service sector. 
In the reform of the EU-ACP economic relations, the EU promises to assist 
ACP countries in respect of adjustment costs and capacity-building. Further, 
regional task forces (where active and established) are expected to act as 
interlocutors between trade and development agendas in the implementation 
of the EPAs.790 But negotiating on aid and cooperation are legally matters of 
shared competence between DG Development and the member states, which 
follow their own budget cycle and allocations independently of the EPAs. Even 
more importantly where PCD is concerned, DG DEV, member states or civil 
society actors do not have a direct say in the negotiation process. Consequently, 
the development issues form a parallel agenda but they are not directly 
integrated into the free trade discussions. In order for EPAs to deliver their 
expected development benefits, they should be part of the larger economic and 
development policy reform of each ACP state. In sum, EPAs are seen as the 
main instrument of economic and trade cooperation, closely linked to but not 
integrated into the political and development finance aspects of the Cotonou 
Agreement.791 
The European Commission’s primary goal with respect to the EPAs is to 
conclude free trade agreements and certain WTO compatibility in line with its 
overall trade policy objectives. In particular, coherence with the other North-
South FTAs is seen as crucial. From the broader normative perspective, the issue 
of harmonisation and integration between the EU and the ACPs is also regarded 
787 Public speeches by Wunenburger, 2.10.2006; Manservisi, 4.12.2006; and Dihm, 2007.
788 Cf. Sub-chapter 6.3.
789 Article 133 Committee internal document. 
790 Interviews Academia[7]2009, CSO[20]2009 and EC[14]2008. 
791 COM 2005d: 3; COM 2003.
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as fundamental. Thus the primary objective is ultimately to conclude broad 
and comprehensive regional EPAs. The EC can, however, make concessions 
regarding trade in services and the New Trade issues with the African EPA 
groups. In addition, what the EC promises to ACP countries as part of the free 
trade agreement includes improved full market access, gradual and asymmetric 
trade liberalisation to protect fragile sectors, the removal of non-tariff 
barriers, support to trade facilitation, and deeper regional integration. It also 
considers reforming measures regarding export and price support subsidies, 
as required under the WTO rules. However, what is seen as crucial for the 
development dimension is adopting the whole EPA agenda and adhering to its 
implementation schedules. Due to the difficulties during the actual negotiation 
process in 2007, the EU adopted a last-minute plan for two-stage EPAs to 
avoid trade disruption and to meet the WTO waiver deadline. In practice, this 
meant conducting the negotiations with individual countries or regional sub-
groups on trade in goods only. However, this was seen as “a first step towards 
more comprehensive regional EPAs”. In addition, following the impasse in the 
EPA negotiations towards the end of 2007, the prevailing Commission stance 
towards decoupling development assistance from the negotiations changed. 
Although development assistance was not on the negotiation agenda, the 
linkages between the envisioned EPA implementation and support in the form of 
development assistance become more important. This tendency has intensified 
since the onset of the global financial crisis. Nevertheless, the crisis itself served 
to increase the importance of having the EPAs negotiated as planned without 
the need to revise any of the provisions. 
The EC’s bottom line can be described in two words: WTO compliance. 
This implies a reciprocal free trade agreement to open the ACP markets to the 
EU-defined minimum level necessary to secure WTO-compatible economic 
relations.792 However, the EC’s interpretation of the WTO rules is very strict and 
it has not shown any willingness to explore either the limits or the alternatives 
to reciprocal free trade agreements in line with its other free trade agreements. 
In order to draw the limits which define the EC’s understanding of the 
development dimension, three factors can be examined. Firstly, the EC 
assumes that the development impact will follow the adoption of the trade 
liberalisation paradigm in the ACP countries, including Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Secondly, this impact will be supported by development measures that will 
be negotiated outside the free trade agenda by DG Development. These will 
consist of traditional elements of the EU-ACP economic partnership, namely 
through national and regional development cooperation programmes and aid to 
increase ACP countries’ trading capacity, as well as to reduce the costs involved 
792 Interviews EC[1]2008, EC[4]2009,EC[10]2009, EC[14]2008 and  EC[15]2009.
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in the adjustment periods. However, aid and development cooperation at the 
Community and country levels should be formulated in line with the EPAs 
and not vice versa. Finally, and most importantly for this chapter, what the EC 
position lacks are considerations that would imply changes to the prevailing EU 
trade liberalisation paradigm beyond the limited asymmetry and flexibility. It 
appears as if development – the goal – is meant to adapt to the EPA instrument 
and not vice versa.  
CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
The evolution of both multilateral trade negotiations and EPAs provides a range 
of lessons in terms of the EU’s normativity and policy coherence. At the level of 
official discourse, the Doha Development Round was to deliver on the unfulfilled 
expectations of the international trade talks to date. Those who were leading 
the preparations wrapped these aspirations around the concept of sustainable 
development. The EU was at the forefront in advocating the launch of the new 
Round. However, there was a tangible gap between the sustainable development 
rhetoric and the actual negotiation positions, which were very traditional and 
self-interest-centred. First and foremost, the EU wanted to see regulatory 
elements on the agenda, similarly to its position at the WTO 1996 Singapore 
Ministerial, while struggling internally with the Common Agricultural Policy. 
This time around, the broad liberalisation agenda was promoted under the 
banner of development issues but, despite this framing, developing countries 
rejected them. Instead, the majority of developing countries wanted to focus on 
the pending trade in goods issues, including agriculture. Due to the difficulties 
at the multilateral level, the Union shifted the focus to its own bilateral trade 
agreements, while still stressing the importance of the WTO talks. The “Global 
Europe” Trade policy of 2006 was designed to encompass both levels. This 
framework constituted the context and domain within which the Economic 
Partnership Agreements were to fit, detached from the Cotonou Agreement 
and the European Consensus on Development. 
As the case of the Economic Partnership Agreements clearly shows, the 
question of norm promotion is a complex process with many intervening 
variables, such as different ideas, means and interests that relate to the norm 
as well as to the institutional context in which the norm is promoted. This risks 
resulting in a gap between the “original” value and the preferred meaning of 
the norm that is promoted in practice. Regarding sustainable development as 
a norm, the EU starts from the assumption that a broad free trade and strong 
regulatory framework is the key to promoting sustainable development. In 
order to achieve this, the focus was narrowed down to a very specific and even 
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controversial interpretation of sustainable development that was subordinate 
to the overall trade agenda. Thus the problem here lies both in the details as 
well as in the whole policy framework. 
To start with the latter, the EPAs pay the price for the past failures to agree 
on clear and fair trade rules at the multilateral WTO level. This, on the one 
hand, points to the current state of affairs and the institutional power vested in 
the WTO and the EU, which has made it possible to simultaneously continue 
with active trade liberalisation in developing countries while maintaining 
protectionist measures at home. However, there was an emerging international 
consensus led by the more liberal EU member states to contest these standards. 
Yet the consent over trade liberalisation related to the developing countries’ 
market access and dismantling protectionism, rather than to the wide-ranging 
reciprocal FTAs and adjustments in the partner countries. 
When the multilateral trade framework failed to materialise as intended, 
the EPAs were left with the bilateral domain and its logic of broad reciprocal 
trade liberalisation and its regulatory ethos. Consequently, the sustainable 
development agenda was rapidly narrowed down to the debate over the 
appropriate interpretation of GATT Article XXIV on free trade agreements. In 
this respect, the most crucial issue for the EU was to avoid further disputes in 
the WTO as well as to harmonise EU-ACP trade in line with its overall trade 
strategy. Due to its institutional power – and sole competence in trade inside 
the EU framework – DG Trade was able to control the agenda as well as the 
actual negotiations. In this respect, development actors were more reactive than 
active with a very narrow and technical role. In addition, they had participated 
(albeit not unanimously) in legitimising the joint EC position by approving the 
Commission mandate. This in turn led to the acceptance of the reciprocal free 
trade agreement format that became the model for the EPAs. At the same time, 
it constituted the EU interpretation of the GATT XXIV clause on North-South 
free trade agreements in global trade governance. In practice, this was adopted 
in the EU-Caribbean (CARIFORUM) EPA, while it was rejected at the regional 
level in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Pacific. 
In terms of conceptualising this interrelationship between the EPAs and the 
development policy objectives, we may apply the previous definitions of policy 
coherence for development. What we have at hand is a phenomenon that falls, 
on the one hand, under narrow (in)coherence, namely (in)coherence between 
the two branches of the EU’s external relations, and horizontal (in)coherence 
within the European Commission more generally, on the other (cf. Hoebink 
in Sub-chapter 2.3). The EPAs are also related to the question of multilateral 
governance of sustainable development (cf. Carbone in Sub-chapter 2.3). 
As I concluded above, the EU position is predominantly driven by the trade 
agenda, whereas development policy again has a supporting role to play. This 
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constellation reflects a similar discrepancy at the level of global governance of 
trade and development.
However, as the EPA case shows, the question of (in)coherence is not 
that straightforward. The Commission, especially the highest echelons of the 
Commission services, stresses positive coherence (cf. Ashoff 2005 in Sub-
chapter 2.3). In fact, the EPAs are seen as a manifestation of PCD in practice, 
whilst on the other side of the negotiation table the opposite view prevails. 
In addition, the civil society groups that were engaged in the STOP EPA 
Campaigning and the EP INTA Committee hold a much more concerned view 
of the EPAs as rather incoherent vis-à-vis the development objectives. This 
setting relates to the pressing questions that I address in the final conclusions: 
What do we use as a yardstick, and who has the power to define what constitutes 
a policy-coherent policy?
Another way to address this issue is to look at the way in which trade policy 
was adjusted to serve the developmental impact of the EPAs. In other words, 
what would trade policy do for the sake of policy coherence for development that 
it would not do otherwise? Here we can perhaps list issues such as improved 
market access, the limited flexibility in the liberalisation product coverage in 
the transition periods, as well as better rules of origin. In addition, trade-related 
cooperation and trade facilitation should also be mentioned. On the other 
hand, due to the EPA implementation, the development policy needs to change 
substantially in terms of future development aid allocations to the adjustment 
needs and supply-side constraints under Aid for Trade. Hence, the limits of the 
EU PCD approach can be drawn within the boundaries of the external trade 
policy and its broader trade policy objectives. 
According to the OECD definition (see Sub-chapter 2.3), policy coherence 
implied that the objectives, strategies, mechanisms, intentions, motives and 
outcome are consistent with each other and are at the minimum not conflicting 
with the objectives, strategies, mechanisms, intentions, motives and outcome 
of the other policy fields in the same policy system. Against this definition, 
what is particularly interesting in the EPA debate is that the overall objectives, 
strategies, mechanisms, intentions, motives, as well as the anticipated outcome, 
are all presented as mutually reinforcing and consistent. In this way, they are 
assumed to enhance positive policy coherence (cf. Ashoff 2005) between the 
development and trade policies. On the negative side, this observation supports 
Elgstöm and Pilegaard’s (2010) notion of imposed coherence, whereby the 
goals of development policy are not taken as the guiding principle in building 
policy coherence but the objectives of the dominant policy sector, in this 
case also of the EU trade policy. In this sense, the responsibility allotted to 
one institutional actor and its policy domain tends to increase the coherence 
and consistency of the trade and development policy agendas, but not policy 
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coherence for development. This solution helps to overcome the difficulties in 
achieving horizontal coherence and, importantly for the Union, broad system-
wide coherence, but does not necessarily advance the development policy 
objectives. Drawing on what has been discussed above, I conclude that the EPAs 
are promoting policy coherence for development in so far as the Commission-
proposed free trade model between the EU and poorer countries and regional 
groupings is considered conducive to poverty eradication. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS: THE EU AS A 
NORMATIVE POwER IN INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT
7.1 EU NORMATIVITy, COHERENCE AND POwER
In this dissertation, I embarked on a journey inside the European Consensus 
on development and trade before the Lisbon Treaty (2009). My purpose was to 
better understand the enigmatic role of development policy as well as to analyse 
the EU’s capacity to act coherently towards poverty eradication in the context 
of sustainable development. I wanted to probe beneath the surface and explore 
the foundations of the Union’s normative positions and the pre-conditions for 
policy coherence from a development perspective. Therefore I chose to look 
at the policy-making processes between different institutional players and the 
resulting formulations defining their positions. 
In particular, I was interested in how the interrelationship between the 
development and trade policies has shaped the EU’s understanding of policy 
coherence for development. More precisely, I was looking at how PCD was 
both formed and informed within the development and trade domains. I also 
pondered the normative aspects related to these framings. These included the 
way in which the EU used values, such as sustainable development, in this 
puzzle and selected what passed for policy coherence in the development and 
trade nexus. My enquiry was directed by general questions such as: What was 
the normative approach that the Union proposed in order to tackle world 
poverty? How did this approach emerge within the EU institutions and how did 
it  crystallise into the official Union policies? And ultimately, what does this kind 
of analysis tell us about the Union as a power in international development?
I unpacked the European Consensus on development and trade in the 
context of its larger historical, international and institutional settings. My 
empirical Chapters 3 to 6 first discussed the context, followed by the process 
of development policy and discourse formulation, and the development policy 
content as a sample of the EU’s official discourse. Finally, I shifted the focus 
to trade policy and development, including the multilateral and bilateral trade 
negotiations and the EPAs. 
In this endeavour to crack open the Consensus, I peered through the lenses 
of power to see how the elements of the Consensus and policy coherence for 
development were selected and framed, who the main actors were and how 
their interrelationships played out. In order to avoid losing my way, I was 
equipped with a comprehensive conceptual guide on governance, normativity 
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and coherence, as well as studies on sustainable development, development 
cooperation and the trade equation. I took snapshots of the different stages of 
the policy process (cf. Hill) and traced how the EU discourse – or the EU way 
of approaching and conceptualising its own role in international development, 
means and purpose – was produced (cf. Fairclough on discourse production, 
and Barnett & Duvall on discursive power). I also looked at the normative 
practices that emerged from these  framings (cf. Fairclough on social practices), 
and what the EU sought to establish, promote and, eventually, to naturalise in 
this nexus of international development. In the case of the European Consensus 
Statement, I also conducted a critical discourse analysis and looked at the 
text itself as a systemic sample of the EU discourse, whereas in other sources 
(documents, interview data) I explored the content at a more general level. 
I draw my final conclusions starting with the general set of questions 
portraying the EU’s normative profile in international development, before 
proceeding to the more specific research questions regarding the process 
(Chapter 4), the content (Chapter 5) and the development and trade 
interrelationship (Chapter 6). I structure my general conclusions around the 
three key concepts of the EU’s normativity, coherence and power. 
The EU’s Normativity in Global Governance 
My first general conclusion relates to the EU’s normativity in global governance 
for international development, which I can draw from Chapters 3 to 6. A distinct 
feature of the EU’s normativity lies in the tension between the overall European 
project and European development policy since the Treaty of Rome. Although 
not explicit in the current discourse, development cooperation emerged almost 
as a by-product of the colonial past and has evolved following the changes 
in Europe, its position in the world and its thinking on development, rather 
than changes in the developing world. Ideally, development policy and policy 
coherence should emerge from the dialogue and contact with the partners. In 
reality, however, there are other intervening variables such as economic and 
political interests that define the policy domain more than its own objectives. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the complexity of the development policy objectives 
themselves poses yet another challenge. This has further implications for the 
EU’s normative power, as the example of policy coherence for development 
clearly reveals.  
Therefore, I argue that for development policy, the question of normativity 
and normative power appears more complicated than what has been discussed 
previously (cf. Manners). In fact, my second general conclusion points to the 
different functions of normativity in this context. Furthermore, I suggest that 
the EU’s normative role cannot be understood independently of the different 
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forms of power that the EU may deploy in line with its material and immaterial 
interests (cf. Barnett & Duvall). What makes the EU’s use of normative power 
interesting is the way in which the Union combines different sources of power 
to justify its actions based on common or international adopted values, while 
advancing its own standards, ideas and interests as international norms and 
practices.
Although value-based conventions, agreements and joint institutions 
have constituted the foundation of the European developmental action, the 
organisation of the development relationship between the EEC/EC/EU and the 
South has also provided a pragmatic way to manage post-colonial ties. Given 
the inherently unequal position between the parties in this relationship, the 
organisation of the EEC/EC/EU-South relationship along these lines has in 
itself constituted a framework for a dualistic use of normative power. As the 
evolution of the EU-South relationship has been closely intertwined with the 
construction of the EU itself, the changes – be they related to the international 
context, member states or common policies – have had an impact on the EEC/
EC/EU’s policies with the developing world. These changes are manifested in 
the variations in the development and trade policy content and scope from the 
Treaty of Rome to the Cotonou Agreement, from Lomé I to the Washington 
Consensus – and finally to the European one. However, the EU has effectively 
distanced itself from the past and wants to be portrayed as a modern actor and 
a model donor in international development. In more philosophical terms, the 
EU wants to be seen as a force for good and a promoter of common – allegedly 
universal – values such as sustainable development. 
Relatedly, my third main finding relates to the tension between the promotion 
of values, and the pursuit of interests. To strengthen the value promotion, the 
EU has been actively engaged in international processes and has launched a 
number of initiatives within the Union. On the other hand, however, the Union 
cannot escape the fact that its multilevel political system encompasses policy 
sectors that are more central to the European project and to EU interests than 
development policy. The external trade policy is a case in point with its own 
normative, treaty-based agenda. This affects the normative model that the EU 
regards as politically acceptable and desirable in development policy. 
The dualistic use of normativity manifests itself in the EU’s efforts to justify 
and naturalise its policy choices by referring to internationally endorsed values. 
On the other hand, however, the Union also seeks to establish and promote 
internationally common standards and norms to regulate development 
and trade that match its own interests. This dualism also affects the EU’s 
contribution to global governance as there is no pressing need to alter existing 
governing systems in line with development goals. Rather, the EU is opting for 
gradual improvements within the existing tools of governance. In this respect, 
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development aid and aid effectiveness can be used as an example. However, 
as the EU’s activity in the WTO Doha Round shows, it is very willing to push 
its own vision through internationally, provided that it benefits the Union’s 
material and immaterial interests. At the same time, it is important to note that 
in the case of norms that may serve both trade and development and that are 
in line with both policy frameworks, the EU is also willing and able to act. This 
kind of normative approach takes us back to the questions of policy coherence 
and power.
The EU Approach to Policy Coherence for Development
The fact that policy coherence has been an issue on the European development 
agenda for four decades is another manifestation of the above-described 
tension. This study suggests that the EU’s capacity or incapacity to act 
coherently is determined by the characteristics of the policy-making process 
and the difficulties in handling the issue of policy coherence for development. 
This results in inherently incoherent policies in development and trade. 
Rather than mitigating the tension between the development and trade-
related aspects, the policy-making process risks reproducing and increasing 
it.  What passes for policy coherence, then, is the sum of several factors. 
My analysis indicates at least three different, yet interlinked factors that 
result from the policy formulation processes and the interaction between 
different Commission services and between the Commission, the Council 
and the European Parliament. These include institutional competencies and 
frameworks, policy goals and interests, as well as ideational aspects related to 
the development and trade nexus. 
To start with the institutional factors, the most fundamental is the distinction 
between the community competence in trade and the shared Commission 
and member-state competence in development policy. These competences 
seem to have significant implications for the policies and, consequently, for 
policy coherence for development. Interestingly, the research shows how the 
trade competence remains largely unchallenged in the development and trade 
nexus, while the nature of shared competence appears to be the arena for a 
constant struggle between the EC and the Council. This in turn weakens the 
development dimension in the PCD debate in two important respects. First, 
at the EC end, DG DEV chose to seek a closer relationship with the other 
branches of external relations, especially with DG Trade. The reason for this 
was the expectation of mutual gains. First and foremost, it was important 
to then Development Commissioner Michel to strengthen the institutional 
position of development policy within the EU system by seeking common 
ground with DG Trade and the Commission as a whole. The downside of this 
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choice was the fact that it limited the space for development policy to have 
an independent agenda on trade matters beyond development aid. On the 
other hand, the time spent on the internal coordination between the EC and 
the Council was inevitably also time spent away from strategic development 
policy planning and extending the development policy agenda. At the same 
time, however, the Commission competence in trade was acknowledged and 
respected by the Council. This gave DG Trade the leading role and established 
the logic of organising trade and development issues in the setting of bilateral 
trade negotiations. The leading role was also supported by the control of 
information and procedures for instructing the member states on the joint 
EU stances on the EPA negotiations and their rationale. Furthermore, in the 
European Consensus (Part II), the member states themselves had given the EC 
the task of acting as the guardian of policy coherence for development without 
paying sufficient attention to the subordinate position of development policy 
inside the Commission.
In this regard, the EPAs illustrate a textbook case in institutionalist literature, 
where it is claimed that institutions have an independent effect on policy decisions 
since they constrain certain actions and facilitate others. What I am not claiming, 
however, is that institutions would pre-determine the fate of policy choices. Yet, 
in the absence of “critical mass” or powerful individuals that could have claimed 
the power and presented strong alternatives, the institutional competence vested 
in the Commission remained decisive. In this context, the “critical mass” could 
have included member states grouped around the UK, which did not materialise, 
however. By the same token, the Development Commissioner could have taken 
a different stand but in this case, his personal support for trade liberalisation 
and for Commission unity were stronger.  
The institutional context was also influential in terms of policy goals and 
frameworks in the development and trade nexus. Compared to the clear and 
concrete trade policy goals and agenda, the development policy focus was still 
largely concentrated on its primary – yet highly contentious – issue area of 
development aid and aid allocations. Despite the re-affirmed commitment 
to policy coherence for development, this commitment did not result in an 
autonomous PCD agenda for trade. Furthermore, the development policy focus 
was divided between the poverty and globalisation approaches, whereas the trade 
competence was guided much less ambiguously by a strategic advancement of 
trade liberalisation. This approach was in turn defined to highlight the benefits 
of export opportunities and modernisation of the trading sector. Crucially, the 
EC saw the trade policy reform in the ACPs as a way to foster their integration 
into the world economy, thereby promoting sustainable development. In fact, 
there was very little disagreement on this point. However, the frame of that 
reform – reciprocal bilateral free trade – became the bone of contention.  By 
CONClUSIONS: THE EU AS A NORMATIvE POwER IN INTERNATIONAl DEvElOPMENT  |  271
adopting this kind of approach, EU trade policy concerns and a vision of PCD 
compatible to that context were prioritised. 
In the absence of clear-cut answers to the development and trade conundrum, 
the role of ideas and interests became central. This was very clear in the policy 
formulation in both the development and trade domains, as the focus was firmly 
on the level of intentions, anticipated outcomes and positive causation rather 
than experience. In this respect, the EU trade policy could provide an imposing 
blueprint for a model to serve both trade and development, but in terms that 
were set by the trade policy. On the other hand, the international consensus 
on the allegedly pro-poor free trade approach to the Doha Development 
Agenda (2001) and at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (2002) 
did not encourage seeking global alternatives either. Besides, the EU had 
made progress with the EBA initiative, which it also used to promote its own 
pro-development image. When the multilateral trade framework failed to 
materialise as intended, the EPAs were left with the bilateral domain and its 
logic of broad reciprocal trade liberalisation and its regulatory ethos. Then, at 
the level of bilateral free trade agreements, the EC also had much freer rein 
to conduct the actual negotiations and their modalities. Most importantly in 
practice, DG Trade had the final say in what policy coherence for development 
implied in that context.
As defined in the Chapter 6 conclusions, the EU approach to policy 
coherence can be conceptualised in terms of narrow, EU external relations-
related, horizontal (in)coherence that reflects (in)coherence at the multilateral 
level. The interrelationship can be perceived as a manifestation of either 
positive coherence or negative coherence. I conclude that the EPAs promote 
policy coherence for development in so far as the Commission-proposed free 
trade model between the EU and poorer countries and regional groupings is 
considered conducive to poverty eradication and sustainable development. 
According to the official EC position, this is the case, whereas the member 
states, grouped as “the Friends of the EPAs”, and the European Parliament 
tend to have a more reserved view, not to mention those NGOs working on 
trade and development. Most importantly, the (African) ACP parties have not 
embraced the idea of the EPAs as their own preferred way forward. In other 
words, ownership of the EU’s trade policy and policy coherence model appears 
to be lacking at the other end. Therefore, if policy coherence is addressed as 
a political question, then policy coherence for development is in the eye of 
beholder. This again leads us back to the question of power. 
Thus, another important finding is that the definitions of policy coherence 
(for development) look very different if one addresses them through the lenses 
of power. Let us use the OECD definition (1996) as an example. According to 
that definition, the principle of policy coherence in its narrowest sense implies 
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that the objectives, strategies, mechanisms, intentions, motives and outcome 
pursued within a given policy framework are consistent with each other and are at 
the minimum and – most importantly here – not conflicting with the objectives, 
strategies, mechanisms, intentions, motives and outcome of other policy 
frameworks in the system. What follows is that if policy coherence is to prevail 
between development and trade, the objectives of development (sustainable 
development and poverty eradication) and those of trade (the EU’s growth and 
competitiveness, expansion and diversification of access to external markets 
and natural resources) should be mutually supporting – or at the minimum 
not conflicting. As discussed in the theoretical and conceptual chapter, there 
appears to be a tension between such goals, which calls for governance. By 
the same token, the analysis of EU trade strategies at multilateral, bilateral 
and unilateral levels points in that direction. The same applies to motives 
and intentions. Moreover, the mechanism of trade negotiations differs from 
the ideal format of exchanging views in respectful dialogue. However, these 
dimensions are masked in the development and trade nexus. Instead, the 
overall objectives, strategies, mechanisms, intentions, motives as well as the 
anticipated outcome are all presented as mutually reinforcing and consistent. 
In this way, they are assumed to enhance positive policy coherence (cf. Ashoff 
2005) between development and trade policies. 
In the light of this research, the main reason for this lies in the quest 
for greater EC consistency and a unified institutional image. The terms of 
consistency are adopted largely from the dominant sector of the trade and 
development nexus. This is also manifested in the gradual narrowing of the 
PCD agenda within the inter-service consultation, and consequent exclusion 
of incoherencies and emphasis on EU market access questions. Further, 
approaching policy coherence for development as an administrative task 
deflects attention away from its underlying political nature. As a result, the 
EU’s model for policy coherence is inclined towards trade policy coherence and 
in favour of the overall consistency of the Union, rather than policy coherence 
for development. Therefore, the EU’s normative model risks being inadequate 
for safeguarding and advancing development policy goals. 
The Different Dimensions of  
Normative Power in Global Governance
In this dissertation I founded my approach to power on two theoretical 
pillars, namely power in global governance for international development 
(Barnett & Duvall 2005) and normative power Europe (Manners 2002, 2006). 
Regarding the former, the study benefited from the taxonomy of power(s) 
in global governance, which sheds light on the Union’s global role. In this 
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framework, I focused mainly on discursive (i.e. productive), and institutional 
powers (cf. Barnett & Duvall 2005). In essence, discursive power related to 
the capacity to define problems and solutions to fit both interest and value 
promotion. Through discursive means, the EU also reproduced and legitimised 
its own choices and agency in this field, as it did in the European Consensus 
process and in the EPAs. Most notably in the development and trade nexus, 
the EC used discursive power to support its institutional power position to 
frame and to justify the chosen modalities for EU-ACP trade. Institutional 
power in this context referred both to the EU’s own institutional architecture 
(formal and informal organisation, rules and procedures) that shaped the 
Union’s contributions, as well as to the EU’s position in relevant international 
organisations (WTO, UN, OECD/DAC) where it aims to exercise its influence. 
Regarding the former, the above-discussed DG trade position manifests the 
intra-institutional power in the formulation of the Commission stance towards 
development and trade. Finally, Barnett and Duvall also discussed compulsory 
power related to a direct relationship. In this case, the potential use of coercion 
exists in the EU donor-partner relationship in which the EU is positioned to 
enforce certain policies and practices in line with its global stance and alleged 
normative values. 
The taxonomy of power provided a new and useful perspective on the EU 
and normative power, especially in the case of the Economic Partnership 
Agreements and the EU’s role in international development more generally. 
However, many of its dimensions could be applied to study the actual use of 
normative power in negotiation practices regarding different types of aid and 
trade-related agreements. In this respect, the actual negotiation processes of 
any regional or national EPA could provide an interesting case for this kind of 
research. In addition to the development and trade nexus, future studies could 
also examine the political games behind policy coherence for development in 
different fields of EU politics. In my view, the policy fields most in need of 
attention would include fisheries, agriculture, immigration, security policies 
as well as a review of financial flows, taxation, debt, intellectual property rights 
and corporate governance. All these areas are increasingly important ones for 
global governance and sustainable development. In these cases, I would also 
focus on the structural power element and use the hierarchy of power as the 
starting point more explicitly.  
Table 2 illustrates the different types of EU normative power that were 
identified in this study, and which have the potential for further inquiry and 
comparison.
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Table 2. Types of EU Normative Power in global governance
Based on: Barnett & Duvall “Types of power in global governance” 2005: 12.
In the light of this dissertation, two types of diffuse influence – institutional 
and discursive power – appear to be the most important ones for the EU. These 
forms of power can also be deployed together to advance norms and interests. 
For instance in the institutional context of the World Trade Organization, the 
EU tried to combine developing countries’ market access and its own vested 
interests in new trade issues and promote them jointly as a development agenda 
in the multilateral arena. In the case of the Economic Partnership Agreements, 
the EU relied more on institutional power to advance its interests and standards, 
whereas discursive power was used to emphasise value promotion as well as to 
mask the gap between these two. The potentiality to exercise compulsory powers 
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features in the background in the EU’s direct relationship between its developing 
country partners. When it comes to less controversial examples of the EU’s use 
of normative power in international development, we can refer back to the 
financing for development outcome in Monterrey in 2002 or to the Everything 
But Arms initiative (2001) on the trade policy side. Conversely, the EU’s efforts 
to advance its regulatory trade agenda in the WTO setting demonstrate the limits 
of its institutional influence at the multilateral level. The EU also faced similar 
difficulties at the bilateral level in the Economic Partnership Agreements with 
the crucial difference that in this context the EU was able to exert direct influence 
on the EPA parties and control the agenda. But despite the power play position 
in the bilateral ring, the EU cannot score to win with its normative means. In 
case of disobedience, the EU also has coercive measures at its disposal, such 
as tariff increases, the use of the WTO dispute settlement or the suspension 
of development aid.  Most importantly, however, I argue that the EU’s power 
lies in the way it is able to put together and deliver its position in relation to 
trade-related policy coherence. Despite contrasting views and voices, the official 
understanding of this form of PCD started to dominate the discourse in the EU 
and formed an obstacle to more viable alternatives and policy reforms. 
In addition, there are a number of more specific points that I want to bring 
to the attention of the reader once again. These also reflect the specific research 
questions as outlined in the Introduction and in Sub-chapter 1.2.
In Chapter 4, my main task was to trace the process that led to the joint 
adoption of the first European development policy statement between the 
Commission, the Council Presidency and the Parliament. These negotiations 
over different framings, conceptualisations, elements, presentations and 
priorities can also be read as the production of a joint European discourse. In 
this endeavour, I focused on the inter-institutional cooperation and competition 
as well as on the role of the European development policy in general. As the 
European Consensus process clearly shows, the limits of the shared competence 
were vague. The ambiguity surrounding the question of “Who is the EU in 
international development?” is not only perceived externally, but also remains to 
be settled internally. Unclear as it is, “the EU” remains to be defined depending 
on the context and the leadership in any given case. The fact that the Council, 
and the UK in particular, were against labelling the European Consensus as EU 
development policy suggests that there is something particularly intriguing in 
the field of international development that goes against the logic of European 
integration. In fact, this point calls for further research. On the other hand, 
the international processes and commitments constitute the main point of 
reference for governance both at the EU and member-state levels, providing 
incentives for joint action. By the same token, experiences in the field should 
serve to inform the content of the policy choices to a greater extent. 
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Taken together, the unclear mandate between the Community and the 
Council, as well as the pressure for Commission consistency, also affect the 
role of development policy vis-à-vis the other branches of the EU external 
relations. Hence, I argue that the EU’s contribution to global governance is 
affected by the intra- and inter-institutional tensions as well as the ambiguity 
surrounding the role and purpose of development policy in the Union. In 
particular, the proactive role of the Commission in the policy initiation was 
triggered primarily by the changes in the security and trade branches of the 
external relations, rather than by learning from the past development policies 
and its own goal attainment. These linkages can be seen as a strategic choice 
to improve the institutional position of EC development policy both within the 
Commission as well as between the Commission and the Council, yet it was 
problematic from the perspective of the development policy role and policy 
coherence for development. Whereas the joint EU agenda and the role of 
development policy were focused on aid and aid-related commitments, the 
nexus between development policy and trade lacked a clear and compelling 
vision. In the policy formulation process, the relationship between development 
and trade was defined within the trade liberalisation proclamations based on 
the consensus on market access and capacity-building. Regarding the former, 
the scope of the trade issues ranged from the more critical proposal from the 
European Parliament and the DG DEV initiatives in the issues paper and 
MDG-related documents to the Commission’s proposal, where the list of items 
was already more limited and based on positive coherence. In addition, the 
European Consensus did not result in a joint position on the controversial 
issue of reciprocity in EU-ACP free trade agreements as the modalities were 
considered to belong to the trade policy side of the institutional fence and to 
the Commission. 
Having discussed the details of the European Consensus in Chapter 5, I 
only discuss here the European Consensus as a distinct European alternative 
for global governance. As concluded in Chapter 5, the European Consensus 
Statement has constituted an instrument for conveying a preferred reading of 
the Union as a powerful agent in international development politics. It portrays 
a positive image of a unified EU which is both willing and able to act with a joint 
vision. It defines the roles and responsibilities of donor and recipient, as well 
as the policy objectives and the global context in which they are to be achieved. 
Importantly, the Union distances itself from poverty and defines it as a challenge 
to which it is capable of responding. The faith in Europe as a development actor 
is in itself a key element in this discursive puzzle. Whereas the Washington 
Consensus was a very pragmatic model for others, the European Consensus is 
first and foremost an EU-centric compilation of different development-related 
commitments and intentions. With the European Consensus, the EU was able 
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to re-affirm and sharpen its position towards the key process of international 
development (i.e. Financing for development (Monterrey 2002), Sustainable 
Development (Johannesburg 2002), the Paris Declaration (2005) and the WTO 
Doha Round (2001) – and policy coherence for development. 
What constitutes the European alternative in international development 
then? The normative order that the EU suggests can be described as pro status 
quo with enhanced liberal values. Rather than changing the international 
system, the emphasis of the EU action is on improving but maintaining the 
existing aid practices without suggesting changes to the international system 
more widely. This also implies capacitating the recipients to participate in the 
present structures of development and trade politics, rather than changing 
the structures. Thus the EU discourse supports and naturalises the prevailing 
order. In this regard, it resembles the Washington Consensus. However, what 
distinguishes the EU’s action is the claim that it is underpinned by the common 
values and principles that both justify and direct the EU action towards positive 
coherence between trade and development. By the same token, the European 
Consensus frames the policy coherence question as an administrative issue and 
not as a political one. Regarding development and trade, this was based on the 
shared Consensus on the benefits of market access and trade liberalisation in the 
EU, as well as on the positive assumed outcome of the WTO Doha Development 
Round in this respect. On the other hand, there was no common, clear take on 
trade liberalisation in developing countries. 
As a result, policy coherence for development was confined mainly to the 
market access-related proposals made by trade actors. This aspect of trade 
liberalisation was at the heart of both the international and EU consensus in 
this sector. However, as the analysis of the Economic Partnership Agreement 
negotiations showed, the issue of policy coherence in the context of trade 
liberalisation was much more complicated and contested than anticipated 
by the development actors both in DG Development and in the EU member 
states. This resulted in a reciprocal free trade-focused understanding of policy 
coherence for development and a very specific DG Trade interpretation of 
international trade law (i.e. GATT Article XXIV). Yet, in the promotion of 
the EU’s development and trade agency, the Union continued to refer to the 
joint values of the European Consensus and the Cotonou Agreement in the 
promotion of such a model as a standard for North-South regional free trade 
agreements for global governance. This risks resulting in a gap between the 
“original” value and the preferred meaning of the norm that is promoted in 
practice. Regarding sustainable development as a norm, the EU starts from the 
assumption that a broad free trade and strong regulatory framework is also key 
when it comes to promoting sustainable development. In order to achieve this, 
the focus was narrowed down to a very specific and controversial interpretation 
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of sustainable development in the context of the overall trade agenda. Therefore 
the key question for the future Consensus is whether such a view will withstand 
the increasing pressure for change. 
From a researcher’s point of view, the decision to pursue this kind of research 
agenda is often informed by personal interests and normative aspirations. In 
my case, the study emerged from the apparent dichotomy that existed between 
the EU’s bold, official self-representation and more critical concerns expressed 
inside and outside of the Union. Furthermore, my own positionality was shaped 
by my personal working experience as well as my interest in theoretical debate, 
which seemed to suggest that in the development and trade-related field the EU 
is doing something very controversial, yet it is able to claim just the opposite. 
My motivation was to gain a better understanding of what was going on, 
and why. Ideally, like every researcher, I hope that this study for its part will 
increase understanding of the workings of the EU in the wider context of global 
governance and encourage further studies and more informed policy decisions. 
7.2 fINAL REfLECTIONS IN THE POST-LISbON CONTEXT
In many respects, this work has been a historical mapping of the evolution 
of the development and trade policy relationship during the first decade of 
the millennium. However, as the first years after the Lisbon Treaty show, the 
puzzle of the EU’s development policy and policy coherence remains relevant 
both for the Union and for global governance at large. For many, the Lisbon 
Treaty marked the launch of a more effective and responsible European Union 
in the world. Once again, the Treaty prompted the EU’s development policy 
to foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of 
developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty in the world. 
The novelty of the Lisbon Treaty lies in the enhanced trinity of the EU’s external 
relations – the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Trade Policy and the 
Development Policy – which were designed to form a coherent and consistent 
external front with a common set of objectives (Art. 21). 
The fact that the Lisbon Treaty anchored the EU development policy at the 
forefront of the Union’s external relations provides a stronger normative base 
for development policy that should be handled strategically. For the second time, 
the momentum exists to improve its own role and functions in relation to its 
own targets, as well as in relation to the other external policies. As this research 
clearly shows, the Treaty position is only a starting point. Furthermore, the 
Lisbon Treaty stipulates that the Union development policy shall be conducted 
within the framework of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external 
action. This framing assumes that all the principles and objectives are of equal 
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value, which in the light of this study is not the case. Whether development 
policy will form a domain in its own right remains the key challenge. In this 
respect, the reinforced PCD commitment that “the Union shall take account of 
the development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely 
to affect developing countries” (Art. 208) should be utilised to the benefit of 
development objectives in a proactive and compelling manner. 
Regarding the Europeanisation of development policy, the Lisbon Treaty 
states that the EU development cooperation policy and member states’ 
development policies should “complement and reinforce each other”.793 In this 
respect, the Lisbon Treaty did not change this basic division of competences, 
but it does provide a welcome incentive to continue along the lines of the 
joint European Consensus. Curiously, the Lisbon Treaty refers to the former 
European Community development policy as the EU development policy. 
However, the term adds to the confusion as it masks the parallel existence of 
the two tracks of the EU and national policies, which de facto has not changed. 
After seven years in force, the European Consensus on Development still 
forms the overarching reference for both the EC and the member states. 
Furthermore, the Commission’s vision of a common operational framework 
did materialise in the form of the Code of Conduct and Division of Labour 
in development policy between the EC and the member states in 2007. The 
European Consensus also set an example for the European Consensus on 
Humanitarian Aid that was adopted a year later. While the European Consensus 
on Development is still regarded as the main reference for development policy 
in Europe, an updated development strategy, the “Agenda for Change” (2012), 
was renegotiated in parallel with the Post-Lisbon institutional reform. 
The new institutional set-up for the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), namely the European External Action Service (EEAS), has raised 
questions on whether this setting could also improve the EU’s development 
policy influence as well as enhance coherence and consistency between the EU’s 
external arms. The EEAS should not be seen solely as a product of EU foreign 
policy reform, but as a reform of external relations by and large. Ideally, it 
should be a natural candidate for a renewed and enlarged European Consensus. 
By virtue of its leadership, the EEAS is situated at the core of the institutional 
patchwork. Starting from the highest sphere – the High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with her institutional functions as the Vice 
President of the Commission and Chair of the Foreign Affairs Council – high 
hopes have been pinned on the ability of these functions to advance the EU’s 
external role. However, the EEAS is, in essence, an administrative structure 
at the service of policy-makers. In addition, where the European development 
793 The Lisbon Treaty, Article 208.
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policy is concerned, policy-making seems to be particularly complex as the 
struggle over development policy leadership and shared competence has not 
yet been permanently resolved among the EU institutions and between the EU 
and national levels. 
Since January 2011, the new DG Development and Cooperation – Europe 
Aid (DEVCO) – continues to work on Sub-Saharan Africa and Horizontal 
ACP matters, Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia, Central Asia and the 
Pacific, while the other external relations units of DG RELEX now form the 
core of the EEAS. The division of labour between these two institutional entities 
calls for further analysis in the future. So far, the new institutional setting has 
aroused interest in synergic linkages between development, security and good 
governance – inspired by the Arab Spring. The prerequisite is, however, that 
the development actors and their counterparts are ready to cooperate across 
the sectors and have sufficient resources to make an informed analysis, and 
the will to support these views from the development partnership perspective. 
At the same time, the challenge also resides within the Commission, as in this 
new setting the need to safeguard the internal cohesion of the Commission 
may be even greater than before. This is important because the Commission 
unity de facto requires compromises that may not be the first choices for the 
development policy. 
In this post-Lisbon political landscape, the new development policy “Agenda 
for Change” builds on two main priorities: “good governance” (including human 
rights, democracy, the rule of law and other aspects) as well as “inclusive 
growth for human development”.794 Regarding the latter, the EU starts from 
the fact that the world economy, into which the developing countries should 
be integrated, has changed dramatically with the financial crisis, competitive 
emerging economies and the further marginalisation of the Least Developed 
Countries on the African continent. However, there is an alarming discrepancy 
between the importance given to local businesses, regional integration and 
world markets and the scant attention paid to trade-related coherence. In fact, 
policy coherence is only connected and discussed in relation to security and 
migration, but not to trade. Instead, the role of development policy is reduced 
to financial support to tackle “competiveness gaps” in developing countries.795
In the meantime, the EPA negotiations with Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Pacific states are still in progress and pressures are mounting in the countries 
that have already embarked on the EPA round. Yet a notable disinterest prevails 
on the ACP side to adopt and push the EPAs forward. In the face of this passivity 
to either ratify or implement the interim EPAs, the Union issued a statement on 
794 COM (2011) 637 final. 
795 COM (2011) 637 final: 8.
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30 September 2011 announcing the termination of Market Access Regulation 
1528/2007. This regulation granted improved market access to ACPs that had 
initialled or signed an interim EPA while intending to conclude the regional 
comprehensive one. Market access, the key element of the development and 
trade-related consensus, risks being significantly restricted if the countries 
refuse to make progress with the EPAs by January 2014. Although the European 
Parliament, now a core legislator in trade policy, has extended the deadline until 
2016, the announcement casts another shadow over the EU-Africa partnership. 
In more conceptual terms, it can be interpreted as a sign of failed norm 
diffusion. This is in sharp contrast to the spirit of the Cotonou Agreement and 
its new trade partnership, which was expected to combine both development 
and trade-related aspirations in line with sustainable development and the 
Millennium Development Goals. Despite this confrontation, the Commission 
has not changed its position on policy coherence for development in this 
regard. On the contrary, the latest Commission proposal, “Trade, Growth and 
Development: Tailoring Trade and Investment Policy for those Countries Most 
in Need” underlines that the sooner EPAs are completed, the earlier they will 
start delivering development benefits in line with the EU principle of Policy 
Coherence for Development.796  However, neither the EU nor the partners can 
afford to get it wrong. While for the African countries sustainable development 
is a matter of survival, for the EU its legitimacy and, in the long run, also 
its stability are at stake. The year 2015 marks an important goalpost in this 
respect. By that time, a new global development agenda encompassing both 
sustainable development and the Millennium Development Goals should be in 
place. The EU is expected to show leadership and to join the dots between the 
economic, social, environmental and political agendas. To deliver successfully, 
the development policy vision needs to stretch beyond the question of aid and 
provoke debate at the EU system level on policy coherence. The prerequisite 
is that the Union can extricate itself from the straitjacket of policy silos and 
re-open the Consensus on development and trade to an open review. 
796 COM(2012) 22 final: 13; 3.
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ANNEX 1) 
INTERVIEw fORM A  
fOR THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS
Theme 1) Background 
• Personal and professional background
• The mission of the organisation/unit
• Key achievements so far and challenges ahead
Theme 2) The European Consensus on 
Development policy formulation process
• What were the key factors that triggered the process for a new development 
policy in the Union?
–  inside the Commission
–  inside the European Union
–  in the partner countries 
–  in the world
• How was the Commission Communication drafted in terms of key input, 
ideas and themes? 
• How was the Commission Communication received (i.e. by the member 
states, in particular by the Council presidency, the European Parliament, 
civil society and other relevant actors you wish to mention)?
• What kinds of similarities/differences were there in terms of the scope, 
purpose and objectives of European development policy? 
• How did the policy proposal evolve from a Brussels Consensus into a 
tripartite statement?
• How is the European Consensus related to the Washington Consensus? 
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Theme 3) The division of labour between the parties
• How would you describe the interplay between the Commission, member 
states and the European Parliament before and during the UK presidency?
• How was the Consensus reached and what were the turning points in the 
process? 
• In your view, what were the key factors influencing this division of labour?
Theme 4) The content of the European Consensus
• What were the cornerstones of the European Consensus and how did they 
evolve into the final text?
• In which issue area was the Consensus the strongest/weakest and why?
• Could you elaborate on the contribution made by the parties to the process?
• How did the different EU policies impact the European Consensus?
• If you could have held the pen, what would you have changed?
• In your view, what is the meaning of the European Consensus?
Theme 5) European Consensus and Policy 
Coherence for Development
• What is the role of policy coherence for development in the European Union 
and for development policy more specifically?
• Which issues work in its favour and/or against it?
• How did policy coherence for development evolve into the European 
Consensus and result in the final text? Relatedly, were there any differences 
in views? If so, please specify. 
• How was the trade-related policy coherence negotiated for the whole EU in 
Part I, and for the Commission in Part II?
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ANNEX 2) 
INTERVIEw fORM b fOR TRADE  
AND DEVELOPMENT
Theme 1) Background 
• Personal and professional background
• The mission of the organisation/unit
• Key achievements so far and challenges ahead
Theme 2) The EU and the multilateral level
• How would you describe the EU’s role and agenda in the WTO?
• What are the main issues that the EU has or has not advanced as a 
development partner in trade and development?
• What is the interrelationship between the EU’s regional free trade agreements 
and the WTO Doha Round?
• How do the EU trade goals relate to the EU’s development goals and trade 
goals at the multilateral level?
Theme 3) EU Trade Policy and the Economic Partnership Agreements
• What is the background to the Economic Partnership Agreements?
• What is the main purpose of the EPAs?
• What constitute the key elements of the EPAs and who has designed them?
• How are these elements connected to the EU development policy in the ACP 
partner countries?
• Consequently, how flexible are these elements?
• How do the EPAs relate back to the EU’s general trade agenda and to rules 
at the WTO level?
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Theme 4) The EPAs, the Cotonou Agreement 
and the European Consensus Policy
• How do the EPAs implement the Cotonou Agreement?
• What kind of role do the EPAs play in relation to the European Consensus 
Development Policy?
• What is the role of traditional development cooperation in the EPAs?
• How do you see the EPA process so far in terms of:
– The progress made and the main obstacles that remain to be addressed
– The original Commission negotiation mandate and the negotiations 
outcome 
– Policy coherence between development and trade
Theme 5) Actors and institutions 
• Who are the key actors in the EPA process (i.e. institutions/persons)? 
• How would you describe their respective roles and the interplay between 
them (i.e. different DGs, the member states, the European Parliament and 
ACP negotiators and representatives, and civil society)?
• How would you improve this interaction?
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Aspelund, Marja PCD Desk, Department for Development Policy, Unit for 
General Development Policy and Planning, the Finnish Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs. 25 September 2009. 
Bilal, Sanoussi (Dr) Head of Programme, Economic and Trade Cooperation, 
European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). 12 October 
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Carbone, Maurizio (Dr) Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of Glasgow. 26 
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